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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis sheds light on the ways in which Germany's 'double' National Socialist and 
communist past has been represented and contested since 1998, taking the Buchenwald 
and Sachsenhausen memorials as case studies. It pays particular attention to the 
intersection between discourses on the ‘double past’ and the institutionalization of 
remembrance in reunified Germany, signalled by the passing into law of a Federal 
Memorials Concept (Gedenkstättenkonzeption) in 1999 that sought to align the 
memorials with a present-day 'anti-totalitarian consensus'. Whilst Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen, having served as concentration camps during the Third Reich and then 
as Soviet internment camps from 1945-1950, have in a normative sense been co-opted 
into the ‘anti-totalitarian’ narrative, this thesis argues that it is necessary to at least 
partially uncouple the situation on the ground from the official position.     
 
On the evidence of various cultural representations of the two memorials, it 
demonstrates that there is no single, uniform ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ governing 
discourse on the double past. Instead, the thesis proposes a situational and relational 
model of discourse that attends to both the contexts and power relations within which 
the double past is negotiated. The four thematic chapters of the thesis address the 
situational question by each focusing on the embedment of the memorials in a specific 
cultural space. In the majority of these spaces, a Holocaust-centred culture of 
remembrance has obtained, despite federal rhetoric appearing to have moved closer to 
equation of National Socialism and communism throughout the 2000s, therefore 
pointing to factors besides policy directives emanating in Berlin shaping discourse on 
the memorials. Furthermore, by utilizing a Foucauldian model of discourse and 
concepts from Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems, the thesis offers a more 
nuanced view of the relationship between institutionalization and responses to the 
memorials.   
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Ch. 1: Constructing and deconstructing 
the ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This thesis, which explores patterns of representing Germany’s ‘double’ National 
Socialist and communist pasts1 at the Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen memorials, 
beings to an extent in media res. It sets out to nuance our understanding of discourse on 
the ‘short twentieth century’ in the Berlin Republic by examining debates on the ground 
at the memorials, but these debates in fact pre-date the move of the German capital from 
Bonn to Berlin. As early at 1994, the Buchenwald survivor Jorge Semprún was 
enjoining reunified Germany to lead the way in establishing a unified European 
memory of the double past.2 At the memorials too, plans were already in place for 
documenting and commemorating their use as, variously, concentration camps during 
the Third Reich, Soviet internment camps (‘special camps’ or Speziallager) whilst 
Germany was under Allied occupation, and highly tendentious memorials to the 
‘antifascist’ struggle against Nazism in East Germany. Why then begin an account of 
cultural discourse on the two memorials in 1998?3 
There are, I argue, two good reasons for doing so. Firstly, 1998 marked a crucial 
juncture in the meaning assigned both to the memorials and to the double past more 
generally for German political culture. It was in 1998, after all, that the Bundestag 
formally laid out a vision for remembering National Socialism and the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) as well as a model of how this would relate to concepts of 
                                                
1 Though the term ‘double past’ will appear in the remainder of the text without single quotation marks, 
these should be inferred. ‘Double past’ can be rendered in German as either ‘zweifache Vergangenheit’ or 
‘doppelte Vergangenheit’. It should be noted however that ‘doppelte Vergangenheit’ more readily 
implies equivalence between the two pasts in question and is therefore more problematic.     
2 He stated this most clearly in his 1994 acceptance speech upon being awarded the Peace Prize of the 
German Book Trade. See Jorge Semprún, ‘Dank’, in Friedenspreis des deutschen Buchhandels 1994, pp. 
7-14 (p. 13), http://www.friedenspreis-des-deutschen-
buchhandels.de/sixcms/media.php/1290/1994_sempr%FAn.pdf [accessed 03 Sept 2013]. 
3 Though the formal move of the capital from Bonn to Berlin occurred in 1999, and was first approved by 
a narrow majority in the German parliament in 1991, this study takes 1998 as its starting point in 
recognition of the significance of the change in government that took place that year.   
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German identity in the present. This came in the form of recommendations issued by a 
federal commission of inquiry into East Germany, which had as part of its remit 
considered nationally viable forms of remembrance. Proclaiming an ‘anti-totalitarian 
consensus’ based on repudiation of Nazism and ‘real existing socialism’, it attached a 
normative discourse to sites such as Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen that presented the 
memorials as a kind of civilizing technology. One year later, a Federal Memorials 
Strategy (Gedenkstättenkonzeption) extended central funding to the sites on an 
indefinite basis, signaling the transition they had made in the course of the 1990s from 
the periphery to the centre of society. The point of departure for my study therefore 
dovetails with the institutionalization of memory on the double past, and the clear 
identification of the two memorials with a national culture of remembrance. 
Secondly, the sites themselves had professionalized in the eight years between 
unification and the coming to power of a ‘Red-Green’ Social Democrat-Green coalition 
under Gerhard Schröder. New museological concepts that established a framework for 
handling the multiple pasts had explicitly called for a reorientation of the memorials 
around scientific standards and the practices of museums of contemporary history, 
though without losing sight of their unique commemorative and humanitarian functions. 
Likewise, new lobby groups had emerged in response to the discovery of mass graves at 
both sites containing prisoners of the Speziallager, and advocated the extension of 
commemoration to include these victims (the existence of the Speziallager had been 
suppressed in the GDR). Other survivors’ organisations, particularly communist-
dominated groups that were sympathetic to the now discredited GDR model of 
remembrance, mobilized in support of pre-existing traditions. Not infrequently these 
groups would refuse outright to acknowledge prisoners of the Speziallager as victims, 
believing that to do so would risk relativizing National Socialist crimes that some 
inmates at the post-war camps, albeit a tiny minority, had indeed been involved in. 
Repertoires of commemorative practice and interpretations of the double past had thus 
begun to crystallize by the turn of the millennium. 
There is of course a politics to these discrepancies in interpretation, as control of 
history was clearly viewed as a means of legitimization in the present. Caroline Pearce 
neatly sums up the implicit political (and ethical) equations behind debates on the 
double past since 1990 as follows: 
 
‘The postunification period has seen recurring and unresolved debates on how to 
remember the Nazi and GDR pasts in the attempt to shape a unified narrative on 
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German history. The challenge is firstly which elements of both pasts to 
preserve in official memory, and secondly how to represent them without 
conflation, relativi-zation, or hierarchization.’4  
 
By definition, then, the debates revolved around control of official memory. This is an 
elucidating insight into how the narration of the past depends to a great extent on latter-
day power relations. To my mind however, the opposition between past and present 
does not get to the heart of how a given narrative on the double past is arrived at, or 
indeed how and why it either obtains or shifts over time. Consequently, the principle 
aim of this thesis is to look behind the rhetoric of the ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ and 
pay greater attention to the situational and relational dimensions of discourse on 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen.  
Concentrating on situational factors allows us to question the role played by the 
sites and spaces in which discourse is produced and communicates with other 
discourses. This is crucial, first of all, since the protagonists involved in debates over 
the memorials differ from space to space. I place debates on Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen in four discrete contexts: the memorial sites (as a type of public space), 
the locales of Weimar and Oranienburg, the regional states of Brandenburg and 
Thuringia, and the trans-national sphere. In addition, the drivers behind remembrance 
are not necessarily the same at federal level as they are at local or national level. We 
should be wary of overstretching the anti-totalitarian consensus as an underlying 
structure that determines the shape of remembrance away from Berlin. 
Nonetheless, we cannot entirely disconnect discourse on the memorials since 
1998 from the normative framework of institutionalized remembrance. I suggest 
thinking in terms of plural relations however, and therefore ask which relations are most 
influential in shaping discourses. As I have intimated above, attending to situational 
factors is one way of determining this. A second way is to assess how the ‘anti-
totalitarian consensus’ has shaped engagement with the memorials. Rather than solely 
mapping this engagement against the ‘anti-totalitarian’ model on a spectrum between 
differentiation and equation though, we also need to establish whether it situates itself 
within or outside of this consensus – that is, does it identify and align itself with an 
overarching ‘federal’ model of civic governance? I work with a Foucauldian concept of 
                                                
4 Caroline Pearce, ‘An Unequal Balance? Memorializing Germany’s “Double Past” since 1990’, in The 
GDR Remembered: Representations of the East German State since 1989, ed. by Nick Hodgin and 
Caroline Pearce (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2011), pp. 172-198 (p. 173). 
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the dispositif, which has been helpfully modified and applied to the place of museums 
in broader patterns of cultural production through Tony Bennett’s model of the 
‘exhibitionary complex’ (see below for a fuller elaboration of the concept). Though I 
point to certain ways in which the institutionalization of remembrance has re-networked 
discourse and practice at the memorials, on the whole they do not act as straightforward 
‘Fixpunkte des antitotalitären Konsenses’. 
Thirdly, and as a complement to the Foucauldian approach, I apply the concept 
of autopoiesis taken from Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems to developments 
at the memorials. This way, I can avoid unduly prioritizing the postulate of a hegemonic 
‘collective’ or ‘cultural’ memory (and by extension a legitimate version of history) as 
the organizing force behind debates on the past. Luhmann suggests departing from 
regulatory ideas or structures in an analysis of society5 and focuses instead on 
communication between systems. Systems are not essentialized entities but are formed 
via the ‘order from noise’ principal. That is, systems are created out of the disjuncture 
between their external environment and the (less complex) way in which they render 
this. In the act of reducing complexity, systems establish a self-referential ‘code’ or 
logic that underlies subsequent systemic operations. Applied to the situation at 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, the concept of autopoietic reproduction allows us to 
probe the ‘codes’ behind different discourses on the double past – theorized as systems 
in their own right – and their role in shaping these discourses over time. Thus, we can 
look beyond shifts in the ‘institutionalized’ position as the primary driver behind 
continuity and change since 1998. 
 Furthermore, given the number of structural similarities between Buchenwald 
and Sachsenhausen, they are ideally suited to a comparative analysis that teases out 
general and context-specific trends. Not only did the same tripartite division into 
concentration camp, Speziallager and GDR-era memorial apply to the two sites; both 
were subject to re-conceptualisation after unification, and this was overseen in both 
cases by academic, Western-dominated Historians’ Commissions 
(Historikerkommissionen). The resultant museological concepts are similar (though 
certainly not identical) and the debates surrounding the re-conceptualisation processes 
have hinged on the same questions. On the other hand, different stakeholder groups are 
engaged with each memorial, and they exist in different local and regional cultural 
constellations.   
Writing in 2002, Bill Niven speculated that it would require a full ten years 
                                                
5 Niklas Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, vol. 1 (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1997), p. 35. 
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before one could judge with any certainty whether or not the concepts implemented at 
the memorials to the double past had been successful in negotiating the potential pitfalls 
of relativisation and hierarchization6 mentioned by Pearce. Thus, 2013 represents a 
useful juncture at which to take stock on developments in the intervening decade. 
Though a case can certainly be made for looking beyond these two case studies7 in 
order to produce a more complete picture of remembrance – they are by no means the 
only memorials with a ‘double’ past – I would nonetheless argue it is more useful to 
return to these prominent sites and hone in on their position relative to the 
institutionalized discourse. Given that both Sachsenhausen and Buchenwald serve a 
range of publics, from the more parochial to the positively global, they act as 
seismographs of the ‘official’ federal position and of the challenges mounted against it 
too. 
The conclusion that this thesis reaches is that there has indeed been considerable 
deviation from the normative federal position at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. 
Though totalitarianist rhetoric has crept into the official federal line from the latter half 
of the 2000s onwards, and is enacted at or using the memorials by conservative 
politicians in particular, this contrasts with the continuity of a Holocaust-centred 
commemorative paradigm in discourses on-site, in the locales, and in Thuringia. Only in 
Brandenburg has there been a comparable trend towards supporting a totalitarian 
position on of the double past, but as we will see in chapter four, this was not simply an 
example of following federal precedent. By employing a multi-pillared theoretical 
model, I am able to shed light on what has driven each of these trends and connect this 
to specific contexts. In short, this thesis offers a differentiated analysis of the double 
past and can with some justification question whether the ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ 
will ever become in reality what it is normatively supposed to be: a cornerstone of 
German identity, civic governance, and cultural policy.
                                                
6 Bill Niven, Facing the Nazi Past: United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich (London/New 
York: Routledge, 2002), p. 45. 
7 See for instance Andrew H. Beattie, ‘Between histories and memories: Torgau’s Memorial Museum for 
Germany’s short twentieth century’, Museum and Society, 8, 1 (2010), 37-55. 
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History of Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen 
 
 
Today the National Socialist concentration camps are widely regarded as a 
‘Chiffre für die verabscheuungswürdigen Verbrechen des Nationalsozialismus 
insgesamt’.8 Wolfgang Sofsky, in his pioneering sociological analysis, describes 
them as a microcosm of the National Socialist state’s absolute power over its 
perceived enemies.9 Evocative though this image is, it rather masks the more 
complex reality of the camp system’s organizational structure, the conditions 
faced by prisoners there and the function they fulfilled.10 The opening of 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, for instance, marked a second phase in the 
camps’ development. Many of the camps that had been set up in the aftermath of 
the Nazis’ seizure of power in 1933 were so-called ‘wilde Konzentrationslager’ 
and came under the jurisdiction of, variously, the local police, the SA, and the 
SS. Yet the camps established from mid-1936 onwards, by which time Himmler 
was Chief of German Police, belonged to a formalized camp system 
administered by the Inspektion der Konzentrationslager (IKL). 
Sachsenhausen, which Himmler himself proclaimed to be the model of a 
new, modern concentration camp, epitomized the formalization that was taking 
place. Opening in summer 1936, it was Oranienburg’s second concentration 
camp, following KZ Oranienburg, located in a local brewery and in existence 
between March 1933 and April 1934. Comparisons between the two camps are 
instructive. At KZ-Oranienburg, 34.6% of the prisoners were interned for 
between one and four weeks, and were subject to work as a corrective measure. 
KZ Sachsenhausen, by contrast, was enlarged several times and became a 
                                                
8 Ulrich Herbert, Karin Orth, Christoph Dieckmann, ‘Einleitung’ in Die nationalsozialistischen 
Konzentrationslager: Einleitung und Struktur, ed. By idem., vol. 1 (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 2002), pp. 17-40 (p. 18). 
9 Wolfgang Sofsky, Die Ordnung des Terrors: Das Konzentrationslager, 6th edn. (Frankfurt a. 
M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2008). 
10 For overviews of the concentration camps, see, for Buchenwald, Harry Stein, ‘Buchenwald – 
Stammlager’, in Der Ort des Terrors: Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen 
Konzentrationslagers,  ed. By Wolfgang Benz and Barbara Distel, vol. 3: Sachsenhausen, 
Buchenwald (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2006), pp. 301-356; for Sachsenhausen, Hermann Kaienburg, 
‘Sachsenhausen – Stammlager’, in ibid., pp. 17-72.  
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permanent feature of the National Socialist state.11 From 1938, the IKL had its 
seat in a building belonging to the camp complex, making Sachsenhausen the 
administrative centre of the camp system. KZ Buchenwald, opened in mid-July 
1937, typified the new model of a self-contained camp complex, constructed 
around two separate areas for the prisoner camp and the SS and combining 
military institutions with sites of slave labour, detention and murder in an 
architectural ensemble.12 
Neither camp was hidden from its surrounding locale. The municipality 
of Weimar in fact objected to the name KZ-Ettersberg initially given to 
Buchenwald, fearing that it may tarnish the Ettersberg’s existing association with 
the town’s classical heritage. As a consequence the camp’s definite name was 
altered to KZ-Buchenwald/Post Weimar several weeks later. In 1935, the year 
after KZ Oranienburg was closed, three hundred-strong SS Death’s Head 
Formation units were stationed in the town, using the baroque palace as a 
‘Militärquartier’.13 Later, it was possible to see into the main camp at 
Sachsenhausen from houses in the neighbouring Jägerstraße (now Straße der 
Nationen).14 Though prisoners recall isolated gestures of solidarity from locals, 
others remember receiving a far more hostile reception. Leon Szalet, for 
instance, describes how he and other Polish prisoners were pelted with stones 
and heckled upon arriving at Oranienburg.15 Whatever their attitudes towards the 
camp and its occupants, locals – contrary to protestations after the end of the war 
– certainly knew about the camps and were aware of what went on there. Indeed, 
before crematoria were installed at Buchenwald in mid-1940, bodies of prisoners 
were brought to the town to be cremated in Weimar’s municipal crematorium.16 
Everyday life in the camps, though from the very beginning characterized 
by arbitrary and excessive use of violence as far as the prisoners were concerned, 
changed over time. Initially, the camps were used as an instrument of political 
                                                
11 Günter Morsch, ‘Oranienburg – Sachsenhausen, Sachsenhausen – Oranienburg’, in Die 
nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager, ed. by Herbert et al, vol. 1, pp. 111-134 (pp. 117-
118). 
12 Stein, ‘Buchenwald – Stammlager’, p. 303. 
13 Johannes Tuchel, ‘Die Systematisierung der Gewalt: Vom KZ Oranienburg zum KZ 
Sachsenhausen’, in Konzentrationslager Oranienburg, ed. by Günter Morsch (Berlin: Edition 
Hentrich, 1994), pp. 117-128 (p. 119). 
14 See Andrea Riedle, ‘Die Stadt und das Lager: Oranienburg und das KZ Sachsenhausen’, 
GedenkstättenRundbrief, 114, 8 (2003), 23-30. 
15 Leon Szalet, Baracke 38: 237 Tage in den “Judenblocks” des KZ Sachsenhausen (Berlin: 
Metropol, 2006), p. 31. 
16 Stein, ‘Buchenwald – Stammlager’, in Der Ort des Terrors, ed. by Herbert et al, p. 348. 
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repression and intimidation directed against internal ‘enemies’ of the Reich. 
Prisoner numbers at both Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen swelled in 1938 as 
concerted efforts were made to imprison those deemed to be ‘work-shy’ 
(‘arbeitsscheu’),17 and increased again by several thousand in the wake of the 
Kristallnacht pogroms on 9 Nov 1938 (though many of those imprisoned at this 
point were released before the end of the year). With the onset of war however, 
any further releases were ruled out altogether, and the prisoner population 
increasingly consisted of non-Germans deported from occupied territories. As of 
November 1944, German nationals numbered 5,425 of a total of 59,267 prisoners 
at Buchenwald.18 Prisoners were increasingly put to work as slave labourers in 
service of the state’s war economy, and indeed the camps came under the 
jurisdiction of the Business Administration Main Office 
(Wirtschaftsverwaltungshauptamt; WVHA) in early 1942. By the end of the war, 
prisoners were being forced to work in a dense, expansive network of satellite 
camps (Außenlager). The death rates at certain sites, such as in the Klinkerwerk 
brick factory in Oranienburg or the Mittelbau-Dora camp (which later became a 
standalone camp), were shockingly high. 
Overall, the number of prisoners murdered or who died of exhaustion or 
illness at Buchenwald is thought to be in the region of 56,000. The figure 
estimated for Sachsenhausen is between 35-40,000.19 Particularly as the war 
dragged on and the camps became increasingly overcrowded with frequent 
prisoner transports arriving from camps further east, the already deplorable 
hygienic conditions there worsened significantly, meaning that fatal diseases 
were rife amongst the prisoners. In the ‘small camp’ (‘kleines Lager’) at 
Buchenwald, where Jewish inmates were concentrated in an attempt to limit the 
spread of infection, up to 1980 prisoners occupied a single barrack. In addition, 
the SS frequently carried out targeted executions and mass murders; a 
particularly perfidious method, used to liquidate thousands of Soviet POWs at 
Sachsenhausen and Buchenwald in the course of 1941-1942, involved leading 
                                                
17 The term could refer to Jews, Sinti and Roma, prostitutes, alcoholics, the destitute and so on. 
Those sent to the concentration camps as a result of the ‘arbeitsscheu’ roundups were forced to 
wear a black triangle on their uniform to denote imprisonment as ‘asocials’ (‘Asoziale’). 
18 Karin Hartewig, ‘Wolf unter Wölfen? Die prekäre Macht der kommunistischen Kapos im 
Konzentrationslager Buchenwald’, in Die nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager, ed. by 
Herbert et al, vol. 2 pp. 939-958 (p. 949). 
19 Kaienburg, ‘Sachsenhausen – Stammlager’, in Der Ort des Terrors, ed. by Benz and Distel, p. 
65. 
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prisoners into a room on the pretext of measuring their height and shooting them 
at point blank range from behind a small, neck-high slit in the wall.20       
The SS delegated much of the everyday running of the camps to 
prisoners. Unsurprisingly, many of the positions within the camp ‘self-
administration’ such as camp elder or kapo were allocated to ‘Aryan’, usually 
German, prisoners. By contrast, the lot of those deemed ‘inferior’ in the racist 
hierarchy of the Third Reich was considerably worse, leaving them at the mercy 
of the SS and of the prisoner functionaries. Some of the kapos abused their 
power for personal advancement and more or less willingly collaborated with the 
SS in torturing and even killing prisoners; others built up clientist systems in 
which certain cliques within the camp benefited at the expense of others. It 
should be said, though, that a considerable number of prisoner functionaries, 
above all communists, did attempt to use what little latitude was available to 
them to ameliorate conditions for their fellow inmates and foment clandestine 
resistance within the camps. All in all, the line between resistance and 
collaboration was a fine one for the kapos, and placed them in a moral ‘grey 
zone’, to use Primo Levi’s term21 – in the end a manifestation of the SS’s power, 
since it was they who forced prisoners into such collusion in the first place. As 
we will see, the legacy of resistance in the camps would later become an intrinsic 
part of the GDR’s official narrative of the Nazi past (I deal with this below, and 
in chapter two in the context of post-unification memorialization).  
Such was the dominance of communist prisoners within the camp 
administration at Buchenwald that the underground resistance remained in 
existence until liberation on 11 April 1945; resistence members even had a hand 
in seizing control of the guard posts after the SS had fled the camp. In marked 
contrast to the approximately 21,000 prisoners the liberating US army division 
found at Buchenwald, only around 3000 inmates remained in the camp at 
Sachsenhausen when it was liberated by Polish and Soviet units of the Red Army 
on 22 April 1945. Around 33,000 others had been sent towards Schwerin on 
‘death marches’, and thousands more had been transported to camps for 
                                                
20 On the execution and mass murder of inmates at Sachsenhausen, see Günter Morsch, Mord und 
Massenmord im Konzentrationslager Sachsenhausen 1936 – 1945 (Berlin: Metropol, 2005). 
21 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. by Raymond Rosenthal (London: Abacus, 
1989), pp. 22-51.  
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liquidation in the months preceding this – 16,000 in February 1945 alone.22 
Already by this time, the Soviet advance westwards had brought with it the need 
to establish internment camps under the jurisdiction of the People’s 
Commissariat for Internal Affairs (the NKWD; later the Ministry for Internal 
Affairs or MWD) for German POWs, Nazi functionaries and other ‘hostile 
elements’.23 Though most of these camps were located in Poland and what was 
then East Prussia at the time of Germany’s surrender on 8 May 1945, there was a 
gradual westward shift in the establishment of special camps (Speziallager) in 
subsequent months.    
In the SBZ, ten such Speziallager were established, including at 
Buchenwald (Speziallager Nr. 2) and Sachsenhausen (Speziallager Nr. 7/Nr. 1). 
The Speziallager, although notionally existing as a legitimate part of the Allies’ 
denazification strategy, also functioned as Stalinist internment camps in which 
legitimate or assumed political and ideological enemies of the Soviet state were 
arbitrarily held prisoner. A comparison with the internment camps set up by the 
western Allies illustrates this. Whilst the two largest groups imprisoned in camps 
in the US zone were Nazi functionaries and members of the SS, the Speziallager 
held almost no high-ranking officials or members of either the SA or SS.24 
Certainly there were de facto perpetrators amongst the prisoners. Held at the 
Speziallager at Buchenwald, for instance, was the mayor of Weimar Otto Koch, 
who had assisted in the ghettoization of the town’s Jews in 1941.25 On the other 
hand, a number of internees were simply suspected of posing a political threat to 
the Soviet Occupation – threats that were often entirely groundless and were in 
any case never established, as not a single prisoner received due process.    
                                                
22 Monika Knop and Monika Schmidt, ‘Das KZ Sachsenhausen in den letzten Monaten vor der 
Befreiung’ in Befreiung Sachsenhausen 1945, ed. by Günter Morsch and Alfred Reckendrees 
(Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1996), pp. 22-34 (p. 23); Susanne zur Nieden, ‘Kriegsende und 
Brefreiung in Sachsenhausen’, in Von der Erinnerung zum Monument: Die 
Entstehungsgeschichte der Nationalen Mahn- und Gedenkstätte Sachsenhausen, ed. by Günter 
Morsch (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1996), pp. 59-67. On the death marches, see Antje Zeiger, ‘Die 
Todesmärsche’, in Befreiung Sachsenhausen, ed. by Morsch and Reckendrees, pp. 64-72. 
23 The text of the decree ordering these arrests is contained in Bodo Ritscher, ‘Zur Herausbildung 
und Organisation des Systems von Speziallagern des NKVD der UdSSR in der sowjetischen 
Besatzungszone Deutschlands im Jahre 1945’, Deutschland Archiv, 26, 1 (1993), 723-735 (pp. 
726-727). 
24 See Lutz Niethammer, ‘Allierte Internierungslager in Deutschland nach 1945: Ein Vergleich 
und offene Fragen’, in Speziallager in der SBZ: Gedenkstätten mit “doppelter Vergangenheit”, 
ed. by Reif-Spirek, Peter and Bodo Ritscher (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 1999), pp. 100-123 (p. 
107). 
25 See Das sowjetische Speziallager Nr. 2 1945 – 1950: Katalog zur ständigen historischen 
Ausstellung, ed. by Bodo Ritscher (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1999), pp. 248-251. 
20 
 
 
Conditions in the camps were also dire, and inmates had to contend with 
pitiful rations, widespread disease and enforced inertia, meaning that they spent 
long periods of time consigned to their blocks without any opportunity to see the 
outside world. In Sachsenhausen alone, 12000 of a total of 60000 prisoners held 
at the Speziallager between summer 1945 and March 1950 died as a result of 
starvation or illness.26 Of approximately 28,500 inmates at Speziallager Nr. 2 at 
Buchenwald, around 7000 died. Research into Soviet documents made publicly 
accessible after 1990 has found no evidence that prisoners were deliberately 
liquidated, though some survivors of the Speziallager vigorously dispute this 
claim; I look in more detail at some of the contests over interpreting the cause of 
death at the Speziallager in subsequent chapters. Prior to 1990 this was a moot 
point, at least in the GDR, which suppressed the existence of the camps and 
particularly of mass graves in which the thousands of prisoners who had died 
there were buried. Besides two waves of highly propagandistic releases in 1948 
and from the camps that remained open after that in 1950, the Speziallager were 
simply not discussed publicly. Around 3400 prisoners were given further lengthy 
prison sentences in a series of show trials at Waldheim in 1950. 
Waldheim and the subsequent disavowal of any knowledge of the special 
camps points to the highly selective, instrumentalized character remembrance of 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen took on in the GDR. The political mobilization 
of memory went hand in hand with the repression of less expedient aspects of the 
camps’ past (and present). A number of survivors of the concentration camps had 
argued for preservation of the camp structures in the years following liberation, 
but their pleas largely fell on deaf ears as state interest in the sites increased in 
the course of the 1950s. Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen, and the former womens’ 
concentration camp Ravensbrück were all recognized as potential propaganda 
tools with which the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei 
Deutschlands; SED) could stake its claim to represent the ‘better’ Germany 
borne out of antifascist resistance to Nazism. Somewhat ironically, the attempt to 
bring the planned memorials at the concentration camps under the purview of the 
state ended up marginalizing the very communists who had previously been 
                                                
26 Lutz Prieß, ‘Das Speziallager des NKVD Nr. 7 (Nr. 1) Sachsenhausen 1945-1950’, in 
Sowjetische Speziallager in Deutschland 1945 bis 1950: Studien und Berichte, ed. by Sergej 
Mironenko, Lutz Niethammer and Alexander von Plato, in association with Volkhard Knigge and 
Günter Morsch, vol. 1 (Berlin: Akademie, 1998), pp. 380-410 (p. 404). 
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imprisoned there, as the wrangling over commemoration played out along 
factional divides within the party. This power struggle pitted those communists 
who had spent the war in exile (including SED General Secretary Walter 
Ulbricht) against the former camp prisoners, resulting in a number of influential 
Buchenwalder and Sachsenhausener who had held important positions in the 
East German state falling from grace. By the mid-1950s, a Curatorium for the 
Construction of National Memorial Sites had been constituted under the 
chairmanship of GDR Minister-President Otto Grotewohl, ensuring centralized 
control over the projects.27  
Three Nationale Mahn- und Gedenkstätten (National Sites of Memory 
and Warning; henceforth NMG) were inaugurated in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, beginning in 1958 with the opening of the Buchenwald memorial on the 
slope of the Ettersberg and followed by subsequent inaugurations in 1959 at 
Ravensbrück and in 1961 at Sachsenhausen. Mythologizing the heroic struggle 
of communist resistance in the concentration camp and its legacy for the GDR 
took clear priority over any regard for authentic relics or the suffering of non-
communist prisoners. Indeed, the fate of Sinti and Roma and homosexual 
prisoners in the camps was overlooked altogether. Though Jewish suffering was 
somewhat obliquely acknowledged – and in fact a separate Museum of the 
Resistance Struggle and the Suffering of Jewish People was opened at 
Sachsenhausen in 1961 in response to criticism from Israeli victims’ associations 
– the issue was only ever addressed through an overarching antifascist 
commemorative framework.  
By contrast, the memorial site planners made significant alterations to the 
camp topography in order to convey a sense of the resistance struggle’s 
profundity to visitors. At Sachsenhausen, a 40m obelisk was erected within the 
main camp triangle and a semi-circular wall built around the perimeter of the 
barrack rings in an intentional negation of the gatehouse they faced.28 
Buchenwald, elevated to the central GDR memorial on account of the supposed 
                                                
27 On these internal party disputes see Manfred Overesch, Buchenwald und die DDR oder die 
Suche nach Selbstlegitimation (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995). 
28 Günter Morsch, ‘Von Denkmälern und Denkmalen. Von Gedenkstätten und zeithistorischen 
Museen’ in Die geteilte Vergangenheit: Zum Umgang mit Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand in 
beiden deutschen Staaten, ed. by Jürgen Danyel (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), pp. 181-186 
(p. 183); on the GDR memorial at Sachsenhausen more generally see Morsch, ‘Von der 
Erinnerung zum Monument – eine Einführung’ in Von der Erinnerung zum Monument, ed. by 
Morsch, pp. 12-25.  
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‘Selbstbefreiung’ and the underground resistance organization active there, was 
memorialized in an imposing complex built into the Ettersberg. Here the 
architectural ensemble dramatized antifascist resistance and martyrdom: visitors 
first walked along the ‘Straße der Nationen’ depicting the international camp 
resistance movement in a series of reliefs before reaching a path leading up the 
face of the Ettersberg. Located at its summit was Fritz Cremer’s sculpture of 
Buchenwald prisoners in heroic, defiant poise. The concept was orientated 
around a teleological narrative summed up by the notion ‘durch Sterben und 
Kämpfen zum Sieg’.29     
 
The NMG underwent very little change during the 1960s and 1970s, both 
in terms of concept and ideological message. At Buchenwald, an early exhibition 
in the gatehouse between 1951-52 and created in large part by communist camp 
survivors had been replaced by subsequent exhibitions in the prisoner canteen 
and later the disinfection building.30 Despite some concessions to non-
communist victimization in revisions made to the latter exhibition in the mid-
1980s, no mention was ever made of the Speziallager, whilst research by a 
member of the site staff into the camp’s Jewish inmates could only be published 
belatedly after reunification.31 Of the three museums at Sachsenhausen – the 
camp museum, the aforementioned Museum of the Resistance Struggle and the 
Suffering of Jewish People, and the international resistance museum – none 
deviated from the standard interpretation of National Socialism as a capitalist-
fascist system. Only in 1990 when mass graves containing prisoners of the 
Speziallager at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen were discovered could the GDR 
paradigm be challenged in earnest. Upon unification later that year the 
memorials came under the jurisdiction of the respective federal states (Länder), 
signaling a formal end to around three decades of centralized control. I address 
post-1990 developments at the memorials in a subsequent section of this 
                                                
29 For an overview see Volkhard Knigge, ‘Opfer, Tat, Aufstieg. Vom Konzentrationslager 
Buchenwald zur Nationalen Mahn- und Gedenkstätte der DDR’, in Versteinertes Gedenken: Das 
Buchenwalder Mahnmal von 1958, ed. by Knigge, Jürgen M. Pietsch and Thomas A. Seidel, vol. 
1 (Leipzig: Spröda, 1997), pp. 5-94.   
30 Volkhard Knigge, ‘Statt eines Vorwortes: Vorgeschichten einer Ausstellung’ in 
Konzentrationslager Buchenwald 1937 – 1945: Begleitband zur ständigen historischen 
Ausstellung, ed. by Gedenkstätte Buchenwald (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1999), pp. 9-14 (p. 9). 
31 Harry Stein, Juden in Buchenwald, 1937 – 1942 (Weimar: Weimardruck, 1992). 
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introduction, but first provide an overview of Vergängenheitsbewältigung in 
divided and reunified Germany. 
 
 
From divided to unified memory 
 
As has already been intimated in the discussion of the memorials’ post-war 
history, processes of representing the past followed very different patterns and 
trajectories in the eastern and western half of Germany. The establishment of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic out of the 
Allied Occupation Zones in 1949 formalized these differences. Thereafter, 
internal developments within each state as well as the exigencies of the Cold War 
shaped the handling of the National Socialist past. By way of a brief overview I 
will chart these developments, beginning with the GDR. In order to grasp the 
fundamental difference between an instrumentalized and centrally controlled 
discourse on the past in the East and a grassroots confrontation with the 
Holocaust after a period of aversion and silence in the West, I also consider 
emerging patterns during the ‘Nuremberg interregnum’32 between Germany’s 
defeat in 1945 and the crystallization of the Cold War. 
 
In the Soviet Occupation Zone, the immediate post-war period was 
marked by the SED’s monopolization of discourse on the Nazi past and a 
narrowing of focus on communist suffering and resistance. Initially communist 
victims of National Socialism were represented alongside various other groups in 
broad-based victims’ associations, firstly in the less politicised local Opfer des 
Faschismus (Victims of Fascism; OdF) committees and as of 1947 the catch-all 
Verein des Verfolgtens des Naziregimes (Association of Those Persecuted by the 
Nazi Regime; VVN). Although non-communist victims of National Socialism 
were admittedly capable of holding OdF-status, communist prisoners raised the 
possibility of a distinction between active resistance fighters and passive victims 
                                                
32 See Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: the Nazi Past in the two Germanys (Cambridge Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 69. 
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within this categorization as early as June 1945.33 Redefining the classification of 
‘OdF’ had at first served to align resistance efforts with East German 
communists and therefore the SED, but it was soon used as a tool for party 
restructuring too. It became a pretext for the exclusion of political undesirables, 
whose credentials as resistance fighters had not been able to survive the scrutiny 
that followed in the wake of refining the ‘OdF’ label.34 Before long, even the 
VVN had been dissolved and the victims’ associations, as of 1953 represented by 
the umbrella Kommittee der Antifaschistischen Widerstandskämpfer (‘Committee 
of Antifascist Resistance Fighters’; KdAW), subjected to the practice of 
centralization governing other GDR mass organizations.35 
From this point on, the instrumentalization of remembrance for the 
purposes of legitimizing the East German state and casting blame for National 
Socialism onto the FRG continued in more or less unaltered form. In addition to 
the opening of the NMG, the SED sought to impose official doctrine by 
renaming streets and schools after prominent resistance fighters, and assiduously 
built up a remembrance cult around certain individuals such as Ernst Thälmann, 
who had been murdered in Buchenwald in 1944. Yet much like the memorial 
sites themselves, the GDR’s antifascist ideology had essentially become petrified 
by the time the Wall fell in 1989. Though memorialization for instance did begin 
to diversify slightly in the 1980s and honour Jewish victims, all too frequently 
the racial dimension of Nazi persecution was elided altogether. Even a memorial 
stone erected at Lieberose in the 1970s to commemorate Jewish prisoners from 
Sachsenhausen who had been murdered there referred to the victims as ‘fighters 
                                                
33 See Susanne zur Nieden, ‘“Für das Ansehen der ‘Opfer des Faschismus’ nicht tragbar”: 
Auseinandersetzungen um den Verfolgtenstatus von Minna R., Blockälteste im KZ 
Ravensbrück’, in Die Sprache des Gedenkens: Zur Geschichte der Gedenkstätte Ravensbrück 
1945-1995, ed. by Insa Eschebach, Sigrid Jacobeit and Susanne Lanwerd (Berlin: Edition 
Hentrich, 1999), pp. 184-195 (p. 185).  
34 For just two such examples of political marginalisation, the first relating to a communist 
former prisoner and the second to a criminal prisoner, see Susanne zur Nieden, ‘“Für das 
Ansehen der ‘Opfer des Faschismus’ nicht tragbar”’; also zur Nieden, ‘“L. ist ein vollkommen 
asoziales Element…” Säuberungen in den Reihen der “Opfer des Faschismus” in Berlin’, in 
Vielstimmiges Schweigen: Neue Studien zum DDR-Antifaschismus, ed. by Annette Leo and Peter 
Reif-Spirek (Berlin: Metropol, 2001), pp. 85-108.    
35 On the central steering of the camp committees, the Lagerarbeitsgemeinschaften (LAG), see 
Manfred Wilke, ‘Die Anleitung der Lagerarbeitsgemeinschaften durch die SED’, in Materialien 
der Enquete-Kommission “Überwindung der Folgen der SED-Diktatur im Prozeß der deutschen 
Einheit (13. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages), ed. by Deutscher Bundestag, vol. VI 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), pp. 623-764. 
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against fascism and war’.36 Likewise, younger generations of GDR citizens 
increasingly failed to identify with Thälmann in spite the state’s best efforts.37        
 
West German approaches to the Nazi past between 1945-1989, by 
contrast, can be quite aptly described as a sequence of ‘memory regimes’38 rather 
than a static, politicized narrative imposed from above. Nor were developments 
over time reducible to a belated overcoming of latent trauma, not least as this 
problematically applies an individualized, psychosomatic concept to a collective 
body. Certainly however it took over a decade before any kind of widespread 
engagement with National Socialism set in, and longer still before West Germans 
were referring to ‘the Holocaust’ to denote the industrializes mass murder of 
Jews and other racial enemies of the Third Reich. Indeed, in the late 1940s most 
of the early memorials erected at former concentration camps in the territory of 
the FRG were devoid of Jewish symbolism, instead listing victims by nationality 
and addressing injunctions to remember to global audiences.39 
In the 1950s too, collective energies were typically devoted to reintegrating 
former Nazis into West German society and driving on economic recovery. It 
was not until the 1960s that a ‘Holocaust-centred’ memory regime would 
supplant this ‘German-centred’ paradigm.40 
This can be attributed to a number of factors, not least generational 
change and several high-profile trials involving prominent Nazi perpetrators. 
Firstly the trials of the Ulmer Einsatzgruppen were held in 1958, followed by the 
1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann, who had overseen the ghettoization and 
deportation of Europe’s Jews during the Third Reich, and the Auschwitz trials in 
1964. Meanwhile, a generation of Germans born after the war – the so-called 
‘1968ers’ – began to address the paternal generation’s complicity in National 
Socialist crimes, demanding broader societal confrontation with this hitherto 
                                                
36 Bill Niven, ‘Remembering Nazi Anti-Semitism in the GDR’, in Memorialization in Germany 
since 1945, ed. by Niven and Chloe Paver (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 205-213 
(p. 210). 
37 Annette Leo, ‘“Deutschlands unsterblicher Sohn…”: Der Held des Widerstands Ernst 
Thälmann’ in Sozialistische Helden: Eine Kulturgeschichte von Propagandafiguren in 
Osteuropa und der DDR, ed. by Silke Satjukow and Rainer Gries (Berlin: Christoph Links 
Verlag, 2002), pp. 101-114 (p. 114). 
38 Eric Langenbacher, ‘Changing Memory Regimes in Contemporary Germany?’, German 
Politics & Society, 21, 2 (2003), 46-68.   
39 See Harold Marcuse, ‘Memorializing Persecuted Jews in Dachau and Other West German 
Concentration Camp Memorial Sites’, in Memorialization in Germany since 1945, pp. 192-204 
(pp. 193-195). 
40 Langenbacher, ‘Changing Memory Regimes’, pp. 52-53. 
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marginalized past. It was not until the broadcast of the US television miniseries 
Holocaust in 1979 however that the now ubiquitous term entered common usage. 
Nonetheless, efforts were made to commemorate victims of the Third Reich, not 
least at the former concentration camps; the opening of the Dachau memorial site 
in 1965 represented the first of its kind in the Federal Republic. Though the West 
in this sense lagged behind the GDR, which had already in 1961 opened all three 
NMG, the memorials here were not subject to centralized control of the kind the 
SED exerted over Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen and Ravensbrück. Indeed, 
memorial sites in the FRG largely owed to the engagement of civic initiatives 
and received little in the way of state funding – I return to the legacy of this 
grassroots memorialization later in the introduction. 
The mid-1980s and the return of the CDU to government marked a 
resurfacing of the German-centred memory regime. Two episodes in particular 
illustrate how it now vied for interpretative hegemony with the Holocaust-
centred position. The first was the controversial commemorative visit by 
chancellor Helmut Kohl and US President Ronald Reagan to a military cemetery 
in Bitburg containing several SS graves in 1985. Then, in 1986, a second 
controversy followed, revolving around the question of ‘historicizing’ the 
Holocaust. Known as the Historians’ Dispute (Historikerstreit), it was principally 
fought out between conservative historians such as Ernst Nolte and Andreas 
Hillgruber and left-liberal intellectuals such as Jürgen Habermas. What was at 
stake was the singularity of the Holocaust in history, which Nolte sought to 
challenge and Habermas upheld.41 Both positions would prove to be absolutely 
fundamental to post-unification debates on Germany’s coming to terms with the 
past, and were frequently referenced by various parties engaged in debates at 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, as we shall see. 
With the fall of the Wall and the events of 1989-1990, the debate took on 
an entirely new dimension. Unsurprisingly, the caesura was pivotal to the future 
of the concentration camp memorials, and perhaps above all the former NMG. 
With unification, the Federal Republic had not just incorporated the territory now 
referred to as the ‘new’ federal states, but had taken on responsibility for the 
legacy of division too. This held consequences, firstly, for Germany’s handling 
of the Nazi past. Whereas, prior to 1989, blame for the National Socialist 
                                                
41 On these episodes see Charles Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust and German 
National Identity (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988). 
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dictatorship had typically been projected westwards onto the Third Reich’s 
‘capitalist-fascist’ successor-state or eastwards onto the ‘totalitarian’ GDR, self-
exculpation was no longer a viable option now that the bipolar world order had 
come to an end. Secondly, the collapse of the East German state and the vote to 
relocate the German capital and seat of government to Berlin in June 1991 
consigned both the GDR and the Bonn Republic to history. Confrontation with 
the past in the new ‘Berlin Republic’ would necessarily entail addressing the 
entire period 1933-1989 – and as the mass graves discovered at Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen indicated, addressing injustices committed under two different 
regimes as well. 
 
Memory of the ‘double past’ in the Berlin Republic: the 
shifting coordinates of ‘normalization’ 
 
Unification and the accession of the GDR into the Federal Republic via article 23 
was regarded with a degree of unease by a number of prominent intellectuals and 
public figures in Germany. Günter Grass, seen by many to be the nation’s moral 
conscience, was for instance opposed to reunification on the grounds that 
Germany had been divided in the first place as a consequence of the war of 
annihilation and genocide it had unleashed in Europe. An end to division, Grass 
maintained, signaled an end to contrition for crimes committed during the Third 
Reich. Grass was certainly not alone in voicing his opposition to unification, and 
in fact Joschka Fischer, later the German Foreign Minister, also rejected the 
proposition of a unified Germany in an article published in the taz.42 For these 
critics, the concept of a resurgent German nationalism was in itself problematic, 
and many on the political left did indeed feel more comfortable expressing their 
‘constitutional patriotism’ (Verfassungspatriotismus) or talking of German ‘post-
nationalism’ (Postnationalismus), two ideas championed by the philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas. Both implied allegiance to and identification with Germany as 
a set of values – in this case the values enshrined in the West German 
‘Grundgesetz’ – more than as an ethnically or politically defined nation. The 
                                                
42 Joschka Fischer, ‘Jenseits von Mauer und Wiedervereinigung’, taz, 19 Nov 1989; see also 
Hans Kundnani, Utopia or Auschwitz: Germany’s 1968 Generation and the Holocaust (London: 
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logical extension of this argument was that the country’s recent past precluded a 
form of national identity comparable to that adopted elsewhere in Europe. Unlike 
Nolte, Hillgruber and others during the Historikerstreit, influential voices on the 
left rejected the historicization of the Holocaust and countered that the 
uniqueness of these crimes justified the ‘abnormal’ division of Germany.   
This was not quite the line Helmut Kohl took during his second and third 
terms in office, however. Admittedly, he was well aware of the need to reassure 
Germany’s partners in Europe that unification would not presage a return to 
bellicose nationalism, and accordingly stewarded the country through the 
transition out of Zweistaatlichkeit whilst simultaneously anchoring it in Europe. 
Monetary Union, a project ushered in with the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1991 and spearheaded by Kohl and the French Prime Minister Francois 
Mitterand, epitomized this dual vision. Yet at the same time, Kohl had 
proclaimed a ‘geistig-moralische Wende’ in 1983 aimed at fostering a renewed 
sense of national pride, and made a concerted effort to include German victims in 
commemorations of wartime suffering, as he demonstrated at Bitburg. It was 
very much with this in mind that he vigorously campaigned for the inauguration 
of a new central memorial in 1993, dedicated to ‘all victims of war and tyranny’ 
(“Den Opfern von Krieg und Gewaltherrschaft”). Situated on Unter den Linden 
in east Berlin, the Neue Wache made almost no distinction between those 
persecuted by the Nazis and the German soldiers and civilians who had been 
killed during the war, suggesting empathy with rather than condemnation of 
Germans’ experiences under the Third Reich. Kohl’s memory politics therefore 
insisted upon a measure of ‘normal’ – that is to say, ‘conventional’ European – 
nationalism where certain figures on the left had viewed the very proposition 
with scepticism. 
That said, Kohl had not been able to garner support for the Neue Wache without 
first lending his own endorsement to another, quite different memorial project, 
this time dedicated to Jewish victims of Nazi persecution. The monument had 
first been proposed in the late 1980s by a citizens’ initiative whose members 
included the historian (and later chair of the Thuringian Historians’ Commission 
at Buchenwald) Eberhard Jäckel, and TV-personality Lea Rosh. When, in 1994, 
the first of two architectural competitions designed to elect a design for the 
Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe was held, this set in train a more than 
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decade-long debate that closely mirrored shifts taking place in the discourse on 
the Nazi past in the first decade and a half after unification. In the meantime 
though, the country was faced with the looming 50th anniversary of the end of 
World War II in 1945. As Klaus Naumann has aptly noted, 1995 was deemed 
important not just on account of being the first major round anniversary. It was 
additionally loaded with significance as ‘eine Schwellensituation’ that 
highlighted the transition from a lived, communicative memory of National 
Socialist crimes to a ritualized and symbolically supported cultural memory.43  
Contrary to fears raised in certain quarters prior to 1995 – though perhaps 
unsurprisingly – this caesura was not marked by attempts to draw a line under 
the past. Indeed, a resolution was brought before the Bundestag that same year to 
establish, as of 1996, an annual day of commemoration for the victims of 
National Socialism, coinciding with the anniversary of the liberation of 
Auschwitz on 27 January 1945. Liberation anniversaries were commemorated in 
large-scale ceremonies at other concentration camps on German soil too, 
including Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. Though the message presented by the 
federal government at the camp liberation ceremonies was not altogether 
uncontroversial (see chapter two), there can be no doubt that genuine attempts 
were made to embed ongoing remembrance within the country’s political culture. 
Moreover, other events taking place at the same time began to educate and 
sensitivise a broader public to the history of National Socialist crimes. The 
hugely popular – and equally controversial – travelling exhibition 
Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944, designed by the 
Hamburg Institute for Social Research and shown in its original incarnation 
between 1995-1999, drew crowds of up to 100,000 in several of the German 
cities it toured to. It would later be suspended and overhauled after it was 
discovered the curators had misattributed several photos in the exhibition 
depicting wartime atrocities to German Wehrmacht soldiers. In terms of initiating 
a broader debate on the issue of ‘ordinary’ Germans’ culpability for Nazi crimes, 
however, the exhibition could be counted an undeniable success.44    
                                                
43 Klaus Naumann, Der Krieg als Text: Das Jahr 1945 im kulturellen Gedächtnis der Presse 
(Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1998), pp. 10-11. 
44 See Niven, Facing the Nazi Past, ch. 5. 
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If 1995 was therefore not necessarily a turning point in the 
‘normalization’ discourse, 1998, by contrast, almost certainly was.45 Firstly, it 
brought a change of government, with an SPD-Green coalition replacing Kohl’s 
CDU/CSU-FDP administration. Whereas Kohl had belonged to the so-called 
Flakhelfergeneration and had experienced the Third Reich as a youth rather than 
as an active wartime combatant – what he referred to during a visit to the Israeli 
Knesset as ‘the grace of late birth’ – the incoming chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
had been born in 1944. He therefore had no personal connection to Nazism at all, 
belonging instead to the German generation of ‘1968’. The 1998 election was for 
Schröder’s SPD very much fought on a ‘68er agenda, championing social 
liberalism and engagement with the Nazi past in place of the older generation’s 
innate conservatism and focus on the post-war Wirtschaftswunder. 
Secondly, Schröder’s assumption of the chancellorship signaled a 
revitalized sense of German national pride. It was in some ways a continuation of 
Kohl’s ‘geistig-moralische Wende’, though now more assertive of the nation’s 
own interests where Kohl had been content to frame these in a broader European 
project. Indeed, in contrast to Kohl’s aspiration that Germany “not stick out”, the 
Schröder government was, on the whole, more comfortable pursuing an agenda 
that occasionally put it at odds with the country’s European and Atlantic 
partners.46 Undoubtedly the policy of multilateralism continued, as the ‘Salami-
Taktiken’ of habituating the German public to overseas military involvement 
through supporting international peacekeeping missions in the 1990s indicated. 
In 1999, however, German troops were deployed as part of NATO air operations 
in Kosovo in 1999 – a bold step for a country whose last aggressive military 
sortie had been during World War II. Military involvement in Afghanistan 
followed in 2001 but, far from electing not to “stick out” once more, Schröder 
actually opposed the subsequent US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. In further 
historic steps, the chancellor personally attended the 60th anniversary of the 
Allied D-Day landings in June 2004, and a year later the Russian state’s day of 
commemoration for the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War, 
                                                
45 In recognition of the concept’s contested status, ‘normalization’ appears here in single 
quotation marks. In all subsequent uses of the term and all cognate words quotation marks 
should be understood. 
46 See Stephan Brockmann, ‘“Normalization”: Has Helmut Kohl’s Vision Been Realized?’, in 
German Culture, Politics and Literature into the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Normalization, 
ed. by Stuart Taberner and Paul Cooke (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2006), pp. 17-29. 
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reflecting just how ‘normal’ Germany’s relations with its former enemies had 
become. 
 
 
None of this could have been achieved without having simultaneously 
demonstrated a willingness to learn from Germany’s ‘abnormal’ past. Schröder’s 
itinerary around the 9 May 2005 anniversary illustrated this. A day after 
travelling to Moscow, he returned to Berlin to take part in the inauguration of the 
Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe. The sequence quite clearly suggested 
that renewed national pride would not come at the expense of accountability for 
the Holocaust. When making the case for Germany’s involvement in Kosovo in 
1999, Schröder’s Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer also fused Holocaust memory 
and normalization in the present: deployment was justifiable not in spite of the 
country’s Nazi past but because of it. As Fischer himself pointed out in 1997, 
growing up he had learnt to understand the true meaning of “Nie wieder Krieg”, 
but as a German he also believed profoundly in “Nie wieder Auschwitz”.47 
Between unification and the end of Schroeder’s second term in office, therefore, 
both the concept of normalization and the relationship between the Holocaust 
and national identity had undergone fundamental revision. By a process of 
inversion, normality – a term hitherto associated exclusively with the political 
right and a disavowal of Holocaust singularity – was adopted by the political left, 
and now signified critical engagement with this past. Equally, those on the left 
who had once seen in the Holocaust an irredeemable rupturing of the German 
nation now used this very memory to derive a sense of identity and purpose. The 
Social Democrat Richard Schröder perhaps best encapsulated this somewhat 
paradoxical notion of normality in exceptionality, remarking that being German 
meant ‘nichts Besonderes, aber etwas Bestimmtes.’48  
But was the vision of German identity Richard Schröder put forward, as 
something fundamentally normal (‘nichts Besonderes’) though borne out of the 
unique history of National Socialism (‘etwas Bestimmtes’), widely shared? This 
is one of the questions that will be addressed here through detailed examination 
                                                
47 Kundnani, Utopia or Auschwitz, p. 248. 
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Contemporary German History’, in Recasting German Identity: Culture, Politics and Literature 
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of the debates around Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. Though, as I will go on 
to show, both sites provide ample evidence of divergent positions vis-à-vis 
normalization, it is also important to note that the discursive shifts I have 
described above were not without challenges from elsewhere in Germany’s 
political and intellectual establishment. In fact, in 1998, the very year that the 
Red-Green coalition came to power, the prominent author Martin Walser sparked 
a heated debate that revolved around precisely the question of a Holocaust-
centred political culture. In an acceptance speech at the Frankfurt Paulskirche, 
having been awarded the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade, Walser railed 
again a perceived ‘Dauerpraesentation unserer Schande’, referring to the 
prominent place of Holocaust remembrance in German public life. This and 
other provocative claims, including the suggestion that Auschwitz was being 
used as a ‘moral cudgel’ (‘Moralkeule’), were branded ‘intellectual arson’ by the 
then President of the Federal Council of Jews in Germany, Ignatz Bubis.49 
Central to the debate was the question of whether remembrance should be a 
private, internalized ritual – as was seemingly favoured by Walser – or (also) a 
symbolic, public act of contrition. As we will see, various positions along this 
axis between internalization and external performance of Holocaust memory 
crystallized at the concentration camp memorials, though this was by no means 
the only differential underlying interpretation of the sites. 
Since the current chancellor Angela Merkel assumed office in September 
2005, the debate has largely resolved itself in favour of a continuing central role 
for the Holocaust in official expressions of Germans’ self-understanding. Clearly 
the inauguration of the Holocaust memorial at the site of the former Reich 
Chancellery (and virtually a stone’s throw away from the Bundestag) in May 
2005 lends most weight to such a view. Beyond this, however, the Merkel 
administration has by and large continued the policy of unequivocally restating 
German responsibility for National Socialist crimes.50 Indeed, Merkel was the 
first chancellor and head of government to be invited to speak at the Israeli 
Knesset in 2008. Not that her frank handling of the Nazi past in public 
appearances has been restricted to addressing Jewish persecution. Under Merkel 
                                                
49 On the debate, see Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte: eine Dokumentation, ed. by Frank Schirrmacher 
(Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1999). 
50 See Ruth Wittlinger, ‘The Merkel Government’s Politics of the Past’, German Politics and 
Society, 26, 4 (2008), 9-27 (p. 14f). 
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there has been a pronounced thaw in German-Polish relations, no doubt helped 
along by her decision to clearly lay blame for the start of World War II with 
Germany. Speaking at a ceremony in Gdansk marking the 70th anniversary of the 
outbreak of war on 1 September 2009, for instance, Merkel repeatedly made 
reference to ‘[den] von Deutschland entfesselte[n] Krieg’.51 
On the other hand, however, the trend – already perceptible in the early 
2000s – of commemorating German wartime suffering has gained momentum 
since 2005. As such, one can justifiably view Merkel’s contrite rhetoric in joint 
German-Polish commemoration of the war as underwriting simultaneous moves 
to honour ethnic German expellees from territories belonging to the ‘old Reich’ 
(and now part of Poland, the Czech Republic, and so on) after 1945. Somewhat 
controversially, she wrote a pledge to erect a ‘visible sign’ (‘sichtbares Zeichen’) 
to victims of flight and expulsion in Berlin into the 2005 coalition contract 
between the CDU and SPD. Schröder had, by contrast, opposed the project when 
it was first put forward. The controversial debates surrounding German 
victimhood as well as the question of how and in what relationship to memory of 
German crimes it should be acknowledged even reached Buchenwald in August 
2006, during the annual Kunstfest held in Weimar. At the opening ceremony, 
entitled ‘Gedächtnis Buchenwald’, the deputy Minster for Culture Hermann 
Schäfer, who had been invited to give an address, spoke exclusively on the topic 
of flight and expulsion before being forced to cut his speech short as he was 
booed by sections of the audience. Besides the overt link to Buchenwald (and 
therefore National Socialist crimes) suggested by the ceremony’s title and 
location, several survivors of the concentration camp were amongst the audience 
in Weimar, rendering Schäfer’s choice of topic all the more problematic. Though 
some commentators believe the speech ‘illustrates that Holocaust centred 
memory culture is being challenged’,52 my analysis in chapters three and four 
points to a more complicated picture, indicating just how useful a closer look at 
these particular memorials is for reassessing the normalization discourse.     
The second development that has accompanied Merkel’s entry into office 
is the increasing attention paid to the fate of German victims of communism. To 
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an extent this was to be expected given the 20th anniversary of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 2009 and the resurgence of interest in the GDR this has prompted. 
Yet it is nonetheless a vital context for understanding how memory contests have 
played out at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen since 2005 in particular. Before I 
deal with developments under the respective CDU-SPD and, latterly, CDU-FDP 
governments, it is worth retracing the steps that have led to the emergence of a 
joint culture of remembrance in Germany, structured around the legacy of both 
National Socialism and communism.  
It is instructive to follow Bernd Faulenbach’s loose periodisations for the 
first decade after unification in order to take us up to the point of departure for 
this thesis. Faulenbach posits that the working through of the GDR past 
underwent three phases after the collapse of the SED-system, beginning with a 
period of sensational revelations as high-profile cases of collaboration with the 
East German Staatssicherheitsdienst (the Stasi) were reported and details about 
the Speziallager belatedly came to light. This was followed by a second phase of 
intensive and far-reaching confrontation with the GDR, signaled not least by the 
establishment of a federal commission of enquiry into the East German state in 
1992 (on which more in the following section). Finally, a third phase of receding 
interest set in, accompanied by the beginnings of historicisation.53 Of note is that 
a comprehensive catalogue of measures had been introduced by the end of the 
decade with the aim of documenting life and mechanisms of rule in the GDR, 
bringing perpetrators in government and state institutions to justice, purging 
former collaborators from the public sector, and memorializing the victims of 
injustice.54 Though these are discussed in greater detail below, it is vital to 
acknowledge that, at the point at which my narrative begins, remembrance of 
both National Socialism and East German communism (including the period of 
Soviet occupation directly preceding it) had been institutionalized to a greater or 
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lesser extent. Disagreements as to the relative weighting of these two phases in 
the double past, however, by no means abated.  
Once more, Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen acted as something of a 
lightning rod for controversies of this kind, particularly during Merkel’s time in 
office. Perhaps the most pertinent example was the CDU Interior Minister for 
Brandenburg Jörg Schönbohm’s commemoration of victims of the Speziallager 
as well as of the concentration camp in a commemorative speech at the official 
ceremony marking the anniversary of Sachsenhausen’s liberation in April 1945. 
Schönbohm’s comments strongly suggested an equationist reading of the two 
separate forms of injustice and victimization. This was a ceremony relating to the 
concentration camp, after all, and he had delivered his speech from the central 
commemorative site for victims of the National Socialist camp, Station Z. 
Coming as it did just a matter of months before Hermann Schäfer’s ‘Gedächtnis 
Buchenwald’ speech, the episode at Sachsenhausen can likewise be seen in the 
broader context of an apparent slippage in the centrality of Holocaust memory; it 
raises questions about which past and which memories make up the cornerstones 
of post-unification normalization. I trace the implications of Schönbohm’s 
remarks for the coordinates of German memory culture in chapters two, three, 
and four, where I argue that these coordinates were shaped by other factors 
besides the issue of Holocaust singularity versus Holocaust comparability.   
In a speech at Buchenwald in June 2009, Merkel herself hinted that these 
coordinates might indeed have shifted, if not necessarily towards equation, then 
certainly towards inclusivity. She had spoken at the memorial on occasion of a 
visit by the US president Barack Obama, who had included Buchenwald as a 
stop on his official trip to Germany. Reiterating the nation’s ‘special 
responsibility’ (‘besondere Verantwortung’) towards its past, Merkel echoed 
Schröder in declaring remembrance of the Shoah to be part of Germany’s 
‘Staatsräson’.55 Where her rhetoric differed somewhat was in her description of 
German multilateralism and liberation, not from National Socialism – which she 
also mentioned – but from division (and by implication from communist rule in 
the eastern half of the country) in 1989. The preconditions for German normality 
and a return to Europe were therefore a repudiation of both National Socialism 
                                                
55 ‘Ansprache von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel’ (online) 
http://www.buchenwald.de/315/date/2009/06/08/ansprache-von-bundeskanzlerin-angela-merkel. 
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and communism, a fact that Merkel only further underlined by explicitly 
remembering the victims of the Speziallager at Buchenwald in her speech.56 If 
Richard Schröder had been referring to the singular legacy of the Holocaust 
when he described Germanness as ‘etwas Bestimmtes’, it appeared that for 
Angela Merkel, that same ‘etwas Bestimmtes’ was the German experience of the 
double past. 
Several of the chancellor’s public speaking engagements later in 2009 
continued this politics of the past. We have already discussed how Merkel used 
her attendance at the ceremony on the Westerplatte to categorically restate 
German accountability for the outbreak of war. Several months later, in a speech 
at the ‘Fest der Freiheit’ marking the 20-year anniversary of the fall of the wall 
on 9 November, she again reflected on both positive and negative aspects of 
Germany’s history, as she had done at Buchenwald. Thus, she juxtaposed the 
memory of ‘Kristallnacht’ on 9 November 1938 with the events of 9 November 
1989, which she dwelt upon at far greater length.57 Implicitly the latter-day, 
normal nation now stood in contrast to the entire period of 1933-1989 rather than 
the legacy of the Holocaust. Just as the legacy of the concentration camps was 
now recalled unproblematically alongside post-war injustices, so too was the 
history of division placed in relation to the dictatorship that preceded and caused 
it.     
 
 
Institutionalizing remembrance and the development of 
the memorial landscape 
 
 
Unification ensured not only a belated national moral responsibility for sites with 
a double past; financial responsibility for their preservation was now a matter for 
reunified Germany too. Whereas the model of Kulturföderalismus established in 
the old FRG had placed allocation of funding for culture squarely in the hands of 
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the Länder, the absorption of the GDR into the West now brought sites such as 
the NMG under the purview of the Bund. It was in fact the last East German 
government under Lothar de Maizière that proposed including federal financing 
of the former NMG in the unification treaty, much to its credit. Accordingly, the 
handling of the memorials in the Berlin Republic followed an administrative 
structure inherited from the East. Legislation passed by the Bundestag in 1993 
therefore extended central funding to Buchenwald, Ravensbrück and 
Sachsenhausen, as ‘sites of national importance’, for an initial period of ten 
years. 
Before I address this, it is necessary to return to 1990, when two other 
overwhelmingly Western-dominated institutions responsible for 
‘reconceptualising’ the memorials were called into being. These were the two 
Historians’ Commissions (referred to variously as the Historikerkommissionen or 
Expertenkommissionen), convened to issue a series of recommendations for the 
redesign of Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. Now that the antifascist concept 
employed at the NMG was widely recognized as being outdated and 
monodimensional, the task the commissions were faced with was to replace this 
and at the same time establish parameters for commemorating both camp phases 
on site. The seven-member Brandenburgian Expertenkommission was convened 
in June 1991 under the chairmanship of historian Bernd Faulenbach, and set 
about drawing up recommendations for the reconceptualisation of National 
Socialist memorial sites in Brandenburg. In the very first paragraph of its 
concluding report, the commission referred to the KZ-Gedenkstätten in the state, 
Sachsenhausen and Ravensbrück, as ‘überaus wichtig Orte historischer 
Erinnerung der Deutschen und der europäischen Völker an die Verbrechen des 
Nationalsozialismus’.58 It also recommended that the memorials depart from the 
discourses of dismay (‘Betroffenheitsdiskurse’) perpetuated by the NMG. They 
were instead advised to document their history in a way that was ‘möglichst 
umfassend und differenziert.’59 Indeed, the Expertenkommission explicitly 
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advocated addressing both historical phases at the redesigned memorial site, 
saying: ‘Anspruch darauf, nicht vergessen zu werden, haben alle Opfer.’60 
The Thuringian commission, headed up by the historian Eberhard Jäckel, 
issued its final report in the spring of 1992, making broadly similar 
recommendations. Thus, the Speziallager was also to be addressed at 
Buchenwald; commemoration of the concentration camp was to be diversified; 
and the objective, meticulously researched documentation and communication of 
historical events was to replace antifascist propagandizing in the camp 
exhibitions.61 Beyond these more general recommendations, both commissions 
issued specific suggestions as to the spatial and conceptual treatment of the sites’ 
multiple historical phases. As these are fundamental to the subsequent memory 
debates discussed here, I recap them below: 
 
Both commissions advised explicit prioritization of the period 1933-1945 in the 
new memorial concepts. The Speziallager were to be documented, and the 
victims commemorated, but this task was to be ‘subordinated’ (‘nachgeordnet’) 
to handling of the sites’ National Socialist past.62 As intimated in the quotation 
taken from the Brandenburgian commission’s report above however, this was not 
to impinge upon the duty to acknowledge all victims. During the course of this 
commission’s work, Bernd Faulenbach coined a shorthand for referring to these 
guiding principles of comprehensiveness and differentiation: the fate of the 
concentration camp victims should not be ‘relativised’ (‘relativisiert’), nor 
should the suffering of the Speziallager victims be ‘trivialized’ 
(‘bagatellisiert’).63 This quickly developed into a maxim for the handling of the 
double past more broadly, and would later be cited in federal documents too.    
Additionally, there was to be strict spatial separation of the respective 
camp phases in commemorative spaces at the memorials – a stipulation denoted 
by the term ‘räumliche Trennung’.64 Furthermore, the Thuringian commission 
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advised that a new building should be constructed to house a dedicated 
exhibition on the Speziallager at Buchenwald. It recommended that the building 
be used expressly for documentation; a space for commemoration, meanwhile, 
was available around the mass graves, at which relatives of many victims had 
already placed crosses and other markers in 1990.65 The Brandenburg 
commission referred to ‘documenting’ rather than ‘commemorating’ victims of 
the Speziallager.66    
Further underlining the importance they attributed to comprehensiveness, 
both commissions recommended also dealing with the GDR pre-history of the 
sites. As a result, new standalone exhibitions on the NMG and the handling of 
the Nazi past in East Germany were opened in 1999 at Buchenwald and in 2001 
in Sachsenhausen. They each belonged, moreover, to drastically changed 
memorial museums. At Buchenwald, the single ‘Lagermuseum’ at the NMG 
opened in the mid-1980s had been replaced with a total of four permanent 
exhibitions belonging to the Gedenkstätte Buchenwald: exhibitions on the 
concentration camp, the special camp, and the NMG respectively; and an 
exhibition of art created in the concentration camps and after liberation by 
survivors. At Sachsenhausen, the GDR exhibition forms part of a ‘decentralized’ 
museum landscape of thirteen thematic exhibitions, each tied to the historical 
camp topography.67     
Meanwhile, the various transitional justice measures utilized for coming 
to terms with the GDR past detailed earlier on in the chapter were in the early 
stages of implementation. In a strange and somewhat ironic coincidence, it was 
one of these instruments that would ultimately come to shape official cultural 
memory of the Nazi past in the Berlin Republic. This was the second of two 
federal commissions of enquiry investigating the history and legacy of the East 
German state, entitled Overcoming the Effects of SED-Dictatorship in the 
Process of German Unity (Überwindung von Folgen der SED-Diktatur im 
Prozess der deutschen Einheit). As part of its remit, the commission discussed 
viable strategies for national (‘gesamtstaatliche’) forms of remembering both the 
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National Socialist and East German communist regimes. Included in the 
commission’s concluding report was, first of all, recommendations for a formal 
federal funding strategy covering German memorial sites – this would form the 
basis for the Gedenkstättenkonzeption that was subsequently drawn up in July 
1999. More to the point, though, at the hearings of the commission at which the 
subject of the memorials was discussed, a remarkable consensus emerged around 
both what was to be memorialized and how this would be achieved.   
Already in a hearing of the first commission, held at Sachsenhausen in 
March 1994 on the ‘Beteiligung des Bundes an den Mahn- und Gedenkstätten’, a 
basic agreement as to the function and profile of the memorial sites appeared to 
have been reached. Besides commission members, a number of expert delegates 
– a mix of academics and museum professionals – had been invited to give 
statements. In addition, a ‘Fragenkatalog’ soliciting responses to questions on the 
role of memorials, memory culture in pre-1989 East and West Germany, and 
federal financial contribution to the sites had been circulated to specialists, 
victims’ associations and civic initiatives in advance of the hearing. Notably, the 
invited experts spoke unanimously in favour of polyfunctional memorials; they 
should ideally have a dual commemorative and documentary remit. This meant, 
in practice, undertaking research and implementing a museological and 
pedagogical concept alongside commemorating victims, as the director of the 
Topography of Terror site in Berlin, Reinhard Rürup, outlined at the hearing.68 
Rürup also established a set of criteria for determining which memorials were 
entitled to federal funding, in which factors such as authenticity, international 
standing, and the site’s unique indexical link to National Socialist, Stalinist, or 
SED injustices – in other words a unique ‘profile’ – were central. These same 
criteria were later adopted by the Federal Memorials Strategy.     
Moreover, the principle of historical differentiation was clearly 
articulated at this stage too. Indeed, the question in the ‘Fragenkatalog’ relating 
to memory cultures in divided Germany had met with criticism from several 
memorial professionals – amongst them Günter Morsch – on account of its over-
                                                
68 Materialien der Enquete Kommission “Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-
Diktatur in Deutschland”, 12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages, ed. by Deutscher 
Bundestag, vol. 9 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), p. 228; see also the same basic argument in 
written responses to the ‘Fragenkatalog’ submitted by the then director of the Buchenwald 
memorial Thomas Hoffmann (p. 331) and the director of the Dachau memorial at the time, 
Barbara Distel (p. 327).  
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simplification of the issues at stake. It had asked for comment on the East 
German policy of antifascist mythologisation and West German policy of 
restitution, prompting Morsch and also Annette Leo, a member of the 
Brandenburg Historians’ Commission and the Brandenburg Memorials 
Foundation’s academic advisory council, to argue for a less dichotomous view of 
the pre-1989 situation.69 In the Buchenwald Memorial’s response to the 
‘Fragenkatalog’, the phrasing was not criticized, but it was nonetheless revealing 
that the work and recommendations of the Thuringian Historians’ Commission 
were cited.70 It was a striking indication of the extent to which these milestones 
in the early 1990s increasingly functioned as a legitimizing resource when it 
came to making a case for a differentiated approach to the memorials.    
Undoubtedly however, the second Enquete commission played a more 
significant role in post-unification commemorative politics, insofar as it put 
forward an actual funding concept. This made it perhaps the most decisive step 
in the process of institutionalizing memory in the Berlin Republic. In its closing 
report, the commission followed Reinhard Rürup’s earlier recommendations, 
proposing that federal funding be extended to ‘authentic’ sites that possessed a 
unique historical profile and a professionalized museological and pedagogical 
infrastructure in addition to a firm anchoring in civil society. Likewise, it 
recommended equal financial contributions from Bund and Land.71 Here then 
was the first iteration of a policy that would fuse the memorials to governance 
and identity in the Berlin Republic. Furthermore, the commission’s report made 
quite clear that both National Socialism and East German communism figured in 
this nationally defined culture of remembrance: ‘Die notwendigkeit von 
Aufarbeitung und Erinnerung an die beiden Diktaturen ist heute Teil des 
demokratischen Selbstverständnisses im vereinten Deutschland.’72  
When, on 27 July 1999, the federal government announced a ‘Konzeption 
der künftigen Gedenkstättenförderung des Bundes’, the claim was repeated, this 
time in a more precise definition: 
 
                                                
69 Ibid., p. 349 (Morsch); for Annette Leo’s position, see p. 341. 
70 Ibid., pp. 403-409. 
71 Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Schlußbericht der Enquete-Kommission “Überwindung der Folgen der 
SED-Diktatur im Prozeß der deutschen Einheit”’, Drucksache 13/1100, 13. Wahlperiode, 10 Jun 
1998, p. 250. 
72 Ibid., p. 227. 
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‘Die Erinnerung an die NS-Terrorherrschaft, an Stalinismus und die 
SED-Diktatur sowie das Gedenken an ihre Opfer ebenso wie an 
Opposition und Widerstand gegen die Diktaturen festigen das 
Bewusstsein für Freiheit, Recht und Demokratie und den antitotalitären 
Konsens in Deutschland.’73  
 
It is worth reflecting for a moment on the weighting given to these 
respective pasts in the parliamentary debates of 1998-1999. Certainly it would be 
hard to deny the central role of the Holocaust in the Berlin Republic, not least at 
this juncture. One such reminder of this was the parliamentary vote on the 
Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, which took place around a month 
prior to the Gedenkstättenkonzeption passing into law. Even so, the tone and 
language of the Enquete Commission’s report hinted at an increasing equation of 
the National Socialist past with East German communism. These were referred 
to throughout as ‘die beiden deutschen Diktaturen’,74 and somewhat reductive 
commonalities between the systems such as their shared disregard for and abuse 
of liberty, parliamentary democracy, and the rule of law were stressed.75 On the 
whole though, a distinction was drawn between the two, and the report even cited 
the ‘Faulenbach-Formel’.76 At this point at least, institutionalized memory 
discourse followed a principle of differentiation. 
With shifts in the normalization discourse after 2000 came attendant 
attempts to revise and realign the ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’. In opposition 
since 1998, the CDU in particular sought to replace the existing Memorial 
Strategy with a concept of its own, tabled by the delegate Günter Nooke in 
autumn 2003 (and again in early 2004).77 This ‘Gedenkstättenkonzept für ein 
würdiges Gedenken aller Opfer der beiden deutschen Diktaturen’ made an 
extensive list of recommendations for the memorialization of German wartime 
suffering and communist injustices, at the expense of maintaining an appropriate 
distinction between crimes committed against Germans and those committed in 
                                                
73 Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Konzeption der künftigen Gedenkstättenförderung des Bundes und 
Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Beteiligung des Bundes an Gedenkstätten in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, Drucksache 14/1569, 14. Wahlperiode, 27 July 1999, p. 3. 
74 ‘Schlußbericht der Enquete-Kommission’, p. 227. 
75 Ibid., p. 227; p. 241. 
76 Ibid., p. 240. 
77 Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Förderung von Gedenkstätten zur Diktaturgeschichte in Deutschland – 
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Germany’s name. At best the CDU concept paid lip service to Holocaust 
singularity, and in any case proposed the energetic memorialization of German 
victimhood. Measures it put forward included a national memorial to the victims 
of Allied aerial bombing and a ‘centre against expulsion’ (‘Zentrum gegen 
Vertreibung’) in Berlin, suggesting rather an attempt to offset focus on the 
Holocaust and ‘re-nationalize’ memory culture.78 At around the same time a 
similar controversy had erupted in Saxony over the Saxony Memorial Site 
Foundation to Remember the Victims of Political Tyranny. Though the 
Foundation appeared to conflate the Nazi, Stalinist and SED regimes in its 
statute, it was nonetheless granted legal status in 2003, a step that culminated in 
representatives of the victims of National Socialism publicly distancing 
themselves from it. Together the scandals over the CDU memorial concept and 
the Foundation in Saxony threatened to dislodge the consensus articulated in 
1999. 
In the event, the CDU proposal was roundly rejected in the Bundestag. 
This was of no little significance. As Andrew Beattie observes, Nooke had 
disputed that the concept aimed at altering the coordinates of commemoration in 
the first place. That it had made at least passing reference to the singularity of the 
Holocaust, and was defeated nonetheless, amounted to a uniform rejection of 
exclusivist commemoration of one or another victim group. From this point on, 
German wartime and/or post-war suffering could realistically only occur 
alongside ongoing Holocaust-centred remembrance. 79 Indeed, the amendment of 
the Gedenkstättenkonzeption in 2008 would appear to bear out this hybridized 
reading of memory discourse. Though it continued to refer to the GDR as a 
‘kommunistische Diktatur’,80 there were various genuine efforts to distinguish 
between the Nazi and GDR pasts, for instance through emphasizing that the latter 
                                                
78 See Rudnick, Die andere Hälfte der Erinnerung, pp. 93-96. The working group of 
concentration camp memorial sites in particular objected to the concept’s attempted ‘re-
nationalization’ of memory. See Arbeitsgemeinschaft der KZ-Gedenkstätten in der 
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79 Andrew H. Beattie, ‘The Victims of Totalitarianism and the Centrality of Nazi Genocide: 
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was a ‘Konsequenz’ of the former and the war of annihilation it unleashed on 
Europe.81 The revised strategy also mentioned the ‘Unvergleichlichkeit’ of the 
Holocaust and quoted the ‘Faulenbach-Formel’.82  
 
Whilst the revised Gedenkstättenkonzeption represents the current federal 
position on memorialization and the ‘double’ past, developments in Europe since 
2008 have over-layered this narrative. Attempts by several pan-European 
organizations to institutionalize transnational memory of communism as part of 
broader efforts at constructing an ‘anti-totalitarian’ European identity, for 
instance, implicitly seek to re-frame German memorials to the double past. 
Emblematic of this trend is the movement to establish a day of remembrance for 
victims of totalitarian regimes on August 23, the anniversary of the Hitler-Stalin 
Pact of 1939. First proposed by a number of prominent politicians and 
intellectuals from Central and Eastern Europe in the so-called Prague Declaration 
of 2008, this initiative has since received the endorsement of the EU parliament 
and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).83 
Responses by the concentration camp survivors’ associations and prominent 
figures within the German memorial site milieu – not least Günter Morsch – have 
by contrast been critical. In chapter four, I consider the dynamic created by the 
emergent European anti-totalitarian narrative on the one hand and the cultural 
agency of memorials to both Nazism and communism such as Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen on the other. It is this dynamic, I suggest, that points to the new 
ways the federal ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ will be inflected in coming years.    
The unfolding federal German narrative has also been accompanied by a 
globalisation of Holocaust memory in more general terms. Daniel Levy and 
Natan Sznaider have spoken in this regard of a ‘cosmopolitan’ Holocaust 
memory, in which memory of the historical event itself has on the one hand 
become a universally valid morality tale – a ‘symbol of transnational solidarity’, 
in their words – but interacts on the other hand with local contexts at its point of 
                                                
81 Ibid., p. 1. 
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83 See Stefan Troebst, ‘Der 23. August als euroatlantischer Gedenktag? Eine analytische 
Dokumentation’, in Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt 1939 in den Erinnerungskulturen der Europäer, ed. 
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reception.84 Here again the turn of the millennium is a key juncture. In fact, the 
Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, itself an expression of the 
historical event’s fundamental significance for humanity in general, took place in 
2000. At a European level, protagonists such as the EU parliament have also 
attempted to establish a trans-national foundation for Holocaust memory through 
the introduction in 2005 of an official day of remembrance on 27 January. The 
globalization of memory is thus a characteristic phenomenon of the fifteen-year 
period under discussion here, a context I acknowledge and relate to 
developments around Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen above all in chapter four 
(and also in the thesis conclusion).  
So far I have covered the ‘institutionalized’ narrative of remembrance 
emanating from Berlin during Kohl, Schröder and Merkel’s terms in office. But 
did the ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ proclaimed at federal level match the reality 
on the ground at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, where a number of different 
stakeholders had emerged since 1990? It is easy enough to point out that the 
reality of implementing the desired consensus lagged some way behind the 
rhetoric of the Federal Memorials Strategy. In both the weighting they accorded 
to the respective ‘totalitarian’ pasts and the function they attributed to 
remembrance, advisory and advocative groups active at the memorials departed 
from the federal narrative. Achieving consensus and balance was more difficult 
than the somewhat platitudinal references in the official documents to the 
‘Faulenbach-Formel’ would suggest.85 With this in mind, I look in more detail at 
how the central actors at the two sites have interpreted the double past, before 
proposing a conceptual model for mapping out the (dynamic) landscape of 
cultural memory in the following section.  
I concentrate on the memorial specialists and the various concentration 
camp and special camp victims’ lobby groups, as they actively participate in 
debates across all four cultural spaces examined in the thesis. Other groups 
whose engagement is limited to particular debates or spaces are introduced in the 
discrete chapters. As I have already outlined in the introduction, my conceptual 
                                                
84 Danel Levy and Natan Sznaider, ‘Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of 
Cosmopolitan Memory’, European Journal of Social Theory, 5, 1 (2002), 87-106 (p. 93). See 
also Levy and Sznaider, Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter: Der Holocaust (Frankfurt a. M.: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001). 
85 See further Pearce, ‘An Unequal Balance?’, in The GDR Remembered, ed. by Hodgin and 
Pearce, p. 177. 
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model rests on two basic assumptions. Firstly, if we are to relate debates over the 
double past to struggles to control the ‘order of discourse’ in the present, then we 
must acknowledge that institutionalization in the late 1990s has invested this 
discourse with a force of its own (rather than it simply being the passive object of 
contestation). Secondly, we must ask how far it is helpful to centre these 
processes of institutionalization in an analysis of cultural discourse that begins in 
1998.    
On the face of it, the involvement of the memorial specialists in post-
unification memorialisation at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen would appear to 
have little, if anything, to do with memory. Both Historians’ Commissions were 
convened as advisory bodies rather than in service of one or another victim 
groups’ particular claim to commemoration. As Hasko Zimmer observes, the 
commissions were required to fulfill a ‘Doppelrolle’, operating as specialist 
advisors and as a ‘quasi-politische Clearing-Stelle’86 for resolving disputes 
between these victim groups. Equally, the permanent staff members at the 
memorials are responsible for research, education, documentation, curatorial 
work and logistical support of commemorative ceremonies and on-site 
memorialization. They are not personally responsible for on-site 
commemoration. On the other hand, memorial museums as institutions are the 
product of, in Paul Williams’ words, a ‘desire to add both a moral framework to 
the narration of terrible historical events and more in-depth contextual 
explanations to commemorative acts.’87 Moreover, the on-site exhibitions 
possess an implicitly commemorative function, even if they strictly separate 
documentation from commemoration. As such, the work of the memorial 
specialists is informed by a combination of the desire to objectively document 
the entire history of the sites and the moral commitment to honour the victims. 
Recognizing this is essential if we are to fully understand what drives and 
shapes cultural representation of the double past in the Berlin Republic. For 
though the memorial specialists support the principle of differentiation contained 
in the Federal Memorials Strategy, this should not be confused with 
straightforward compatibility between professional and ‘official’ discourses. 
Whether a particular group takes a view of the Holocaust as singular or 
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87 Paul Williams, Memorial Museums: The Global Rush to Commemorate Atrocities (New York: 
Berg, 2007), p. 8. 
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comparable is a question of more than political bias or its position vis-à-vis a 
federal norm. Instead we can trace the genealogy of the memorial specialists’ 
approach to Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen by turning to the German 
Gedenkstättenbewegung. This movement coincided with a broader heritage and 
history boom in the West during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and manifested 
itself in the Federal Republic through increasing interest in local ‘traces’ 
(‘Spuren’) of the National Socialist past. Following the history boom’s mantra of 
“digging where you stand”, numerous local history workshops and dedicated 
university courses sprung up to meet this demand. At former concentration camp 
sites such as Dachau, the movement spurred on civic confrontation with the 
events that had taken place there during the Third Reich.88  
To be sure, the specifically West German generational confrontation 
between post-war generations (namely the ‘1968’ and ‘1979’ generations) and 
their parents over the suppression of the Nazi past also played a part in the 
movement’s origins. Such a fixation on the legacy of National Socialism 
certainly goes some way towards explaining why protagonists within the 
Gedenkstättenbewegung advocated a delimitation of the ‘Gedenkstätte’ label 
after 1990. Their plea responded to an increasing extension of the term to cover 
historically significant sites of German division as well as communist injustices, 
countering that these were qualitatively different from sites of Nazi crimes.89 
Consequently, some have interpreted differentiation in this context as a 
fundamental inability to acknowledge the extent of persecution under the GDR 
or empathize with victims of communism to the same extent as with the victims 
of National Socialism.90 Karen Till has argued that, for professional protagonists 
at the KZ-Gedenkstätten, locating and documenting historical ‘Spuren’ was 
entwined with recovering a putatively ‘authentic’ history hitherto suppressed by 
                                                
88 On Dachau, see Harold Marcuse, Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a 
Concentration Camp 1933-2001 (Cambridge: CUP, 2001).  
89 See Jörg Skriebeleit, ‘Neue Unübersichtlichkeit? Gedenkstätten und historische Orte im 
aktuellen erinnerungspolitischen Diskurs’, GedenkstättenRundbrief, 103, 10 (2001), 3-10. 
90 See Heidi Behrens and Petra Haustein, ‘Abschied von der Unübersichtlichkeit! Vom Verlust 
vermeintlicher Eindeutigkeiten im aktuellen erinnerungspolitischen Diskurs. Eine Replik auf Jörg 
Skriebeleit’, GedenkstättenRundbrief, 106 (2002), 3-11; Christian Schneider, ‘Deckerinnerungen: 
ein Lager, zwei Bilder: Generationengeschichtliche Anmerkungen zur psychologischen 
Binnenkonstruktion deutscher Erinnerungspolitik’, in Instrumentalisierung, Verdrängung, 
Aufarbeitung: Die sowjetischen Speziallager in der gesellschaftlichen Wahrnehmung 1945 bis 
heute, ed. by Petra Haustein, Anne Kaminsky, Volkhard Knigge and Bodo Ritscher (eds.),  
(Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006), 79-99; Haustein, Geschichte im Dissens, p.287. 
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their parents’ generation and marginalized by the state.91 Yet it seems to me 
more accurate to understand differentiation as a result of the site- and trace-based 
practice this cohort adopted rather than of the accent they placed on 
commemorating pre-1945 events. If the sites’ testimonial connection to historical 
crimes and victimhood was their defining feature, and scientific approaches 
could reveal these historical layers of testimony, then the reflex of differentiation 
was not political but pragmatic. 
Since 1990, approaches to Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen based around 
differentiation and the concept of a ‘search for traces’ (‘Spurensuche’) have been 
enshrined in the recommendations of the Historians’ Commissions. They were 
also upheld by the Enquête Commissions, which reflected broad-based support 
for the memorials’ reconceptualisation along dual commemorative and 
documentary lines. The memorial professionals have thus established a corpus of 
conventions and principles of their own, quite distinct from the Memorials 
Strategy, for legitimizing their interpretation of the double past.  
In addition to this, they could draw on an existing pedagogical precedent 
in support of differentiation, namely the 1976 Beutelsbacher Konsens – a set of 
principles established as guidelines for political education in the Federal 
Republic.  
The three principles outlined were, broadly speaking: expressly 
forbidding indoctrination of any kind (‘Überwältigungsverbot’); respecting 
‘controversial’ positions in science and politics in the classroom setting; and 
empowering students to voice and reflect upon their own opinion.92 One can 
fairly easily recognize the ‘Überwältigungsverbot’ in the deliberate moves to 
distance the post-unification memorials from their heavily politicized GDR-era 
predecessors during the redesign processes. Likewise, neither memorial shied 
away from controversial matters such as the post-war camps and, at Buchenwald, 
the role of the organized resistance and particularly of communist prisoner 
functionaries. In fact, the ‘Faulenbach-Formel’ was a clear attempt to a mediate 
between the competing claims of the pre- and post-1945 victims’ claims to the 
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Press, 2005), p. 208. 
92 See Bernhard Sutor, ‘Politische Bildung im Streit um die “intellektuelle Gründung” der 
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bundesrepublik-deutschland?p=all#fr-footnodeid26. Last accessed 20 May 2013. 
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sites.93 Finally, critical reflection on the past was at the centre of the pedagogical 
concepts developed at both Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. As will become 
clear in the sections analyzing the educational programmes developed there (see 
chapters one and three in particular), the notion of ‘Urteilskraft’ – that is, a sense 
of critical empowerment – underlay virtually the entire enterprise. In sum, it is 
not particularly helpful to place the memorial specialists’ reading of the double 
past on a ‘flattened’94 political terrain. After all, it owes to both west German, 
milieu-specific and post-unification, institutional precepts for dealing with 
historical traces.  
Survivors of the concentration camps at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, 
unsurprisingly, insist upon strict differentiation between the camp phases too. To 
a greater degree than the Federal Memorials Strategy though, they regard the 
sites as universal symbols of National Socialist terror (and resistance against 
this), making no explicit connections to a more narrowly defined ‘German’ self-
understanding. Thus, the international camp committees’ initial calls for 
participation in the ‘Erhaltung und Verwaltung der “Konzentrationslager”’95 
shortly before unification were addressed not to the federal government, but to 
various national and European authorities as well as UNESCO. When, in 1993, 
the EU Parliament passed a resolution on the concentration camp memorials that 
explicitly rejected ‘willkürliche[…] Verquickung’ of their histories under 
National Socialism with their subsequent post-war usage, it set a European 
precedent that justified prioritization the period 1933-1945.96 It became an 
ultimate authority for the concentration camp survivors’ organizations, invoked 
to counter attempted equation of National Socialism and communism. 
Responding to the CDU/CSU faction’s 2003 Memorial Strategy, for instance, 
Buchenwald survivors and their representatives declared the EU ruling to be 
‘nach wie vor gültig’.97 Generally speaking, these organizations reacted with 
considerable unease at any signs of a nationalization of discourse on the 
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memorials – a position I highlight in my discussion of Hermann Schäfer’s 
controversial 2006 speech in Weimar (see chapters four and five).   
As far as the committees were concerned, classifying the camps as part of 
a universal cultural patrimony reflected the internationalism of the prisoner 
contingent too. It was not just the legacy of suffering but the fact that a range of 
prisoners from across Nazi-occupied Europe had resisted persecution in the 
camps that provided a universally applicable moral lesson.98 This humanistic 
narrative found its ultimate expression, of course, in the 1945 Buchenwald Oath 
– a manifesto of sorts which organizations such as the Internationales Komitee 
Buchenwald-Dora und Kommandos e. V (hereafter IKBD), the 
Lagerarbeitsgemeinschaft Buchenwald-Dora e. V (henceforth LAG), and the 
Internationales Sachsenhausen-Komitee (ISK) have continued to reference 
frequently since 1990. Commemoration was therefore explicitly joined to a 
political campaign to uphold the values of pacifism, tolerance, democracy and 
anti-extremism first expressed in the ‘Schwur’.  
Since the impetus for this campaign was, for the survivors’ organizations, 
the desire to avoid a repeat of the events of 1933-1945, they by definition 
regarded Nazi barbarity as a historically singular phenomenon. When confronted 
with the public outcry over the mass graves for prisoners of the Speziallager at 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen in 1990, their response was consequently to 
insist upon exclusive treatment of the site’s National Socialist pasts at the 
memorials. Early concerns that ‘die Henker’ – a rather indiscriminate label for 
perpetrators and accomplices of the Nazi regime – would be rehabilitated if post-
war injustices were also addressed99 continued throughout the 1990s. In 1996, for 
instance, the IKBD delegation staged a walkout of a hearing of the second 
Enquete Commission held at Buchenwald on the grounds that the organization 
was not prepared to cooperate with the Speziallager victims’ group, referred to as 
‘die Vertreter[…] unserer Henker[…]’.100 Though staunch refusal to cooperate 
with the post-1945 victims and their representatives has on the whole given way 
to the more defensible demands for a ‘strikte[…] Trennung der Darstellung der 
Geschichte des Konzentrationslagers und der Geschehnisse nach dem Sieg über 
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den Faschismus 1945’101 in the 2000s, the concentration camp survivors’ 
associations’ position is distinct from that of the memorial professionals, who 
also support differentiation. As Petra Haustein has shown, the survivor groups 
tend to lionize ‘antifascist’ commemorative traditions, and in doing so overlook 
negative aspects of centralized antifascism in the GDR such as the persecution of 
camp survivors who deviated from the official line.102 This has also manifested 
itself in occasional complaints that the administrative structure of the memorial 
foundations has excluded antifascist groups and former concentration camp 
prisoners from the site directorates.103    
 
The victims of communism were represented both by lobby groups 
founded in the early 1990s and by organizations with their roots in the old 
Federal Republic. I focus in particular on the working groups set up after the 
collapse of the GDR at each camp, the Initiativgruppe Buchenwald 1945 – 1950 
e. V, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Lager Sachsenhausen 1945 – 1950 e. V (ALS), the 
Gemeinschaft ehemaliger politischer Häftlinge – Victims of Stalinism e. V. 
(VOS), founded in 1951, and the umbrella organization established in 1992 to 
represent victims of communism, the Union der Opfer kommunistischer 
Gewaltherrschaft e. V (UOKG). Though the stances of these respective groups 
differ quite considerably in certain respects, as I point out in later chapters, there 
are nonetheless two shared threads that underpin their readings of Buchenwald 
and Sachsenhausen. The first is a staunch (and in some cases virulent) anti-
communism, and the second is a fairly unreflected insistence on applying a 
blanket victim label to prisoners of the Speziallager.  
Prototypically anti-totalitarian statements and positions were common to 
virtually all of the different lobbies. They to varying degrees equated National 
Socialism and East German communism, as the rhetoric of early commemorative 
ceremonies and responses to the Neugestaltungen demonstrate. Articles in 
Freiheitsglocke, the newsletter of the VOS, frequently stressed common 
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komitee.eu/download/erstes_vermaechnis_deutsch.pdf. Last accessed 16 Apr 2013 (p. 3). 
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denominators such as ‘Wahnideen und Herrschaftsgelüste’,104 and used the term 
‘Sowjet-KZ’ to refer to a Speziallager.105 Members of the UOKG spoke of the 
dual imperatives of ‘Antinazismus’ and ‘Antikommunismus’ in commemorative 
speeches held at Buchenwald.106 Only the Initiativgruppe appeared to accept the 
proposals for separate on-site commemoration of pre- and post-1945 victims.107 
Otherwise, anti-communist interpretations of the sites endured, and would later 
by employed by victims’ associations (and the conservative right) in the debates 
on the double past staged during hearings of the two Enquete commissions.108 
The second motif was total victimization, a claim which contributors to 
Freiheitsglocke constructed around three rhetorical devices. Firstly, the number 
of juvenile prisoners held in the Speziallager was inflated, thereby eliding the 
issue of moral and criminal complicity in National Socialism and foregrounding 
the arbitrariness of imprisonment by the Soviets.109 Secondly, much was made of 
the death rate, with certain articles speculating that it had been as high as 32,000 
in the Speziallager at Sachsenhausen,110 and others pointing to the proportion of 
prisoners that lost their lives at the concentration camp and special camp at 
Buchenwald – 24% at the former as opposed to 41% at the latter.111 Thirdly, the 
total isolation from the outside world that prisoners of the Speziallager had been 
made to suffer was seized upon as a symbol of the camps’ particular 
perfidiousness. A common recollection was of the strict ban on receiving or 
sending post of any kind that had existed until 1949, which powerfully conveyed 
the plight of the prisoners, hermetically sealed off from the outside world.112 
Collectively, these impressions of life in the special camps left little doubt about 
the victim status of prisoners there, but equally elided the issue of initial 
culpability for the Third Reich. 
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105 E. Reese, ‘Sachsenhausen: Zwei Gedenkstätten’, FG, 498 (1993), 6. 
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As the two motifs suggest, the victims’ associations typically support a 
reading of the ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ in which both pasts are equally 
repudiated. Where state policy is predicated on differentiated and separate 
commemoration however, the Speziallager lobby regards talk of a consensus 
with scepticism. As just one example, Gerhard Finn, a survivor of the special 
camp at Buchenwald, advocated an internalized, conciliatory form of 
commemoration, expressed in the form of a Christian ‘Bekennen der eigenen 
Schuld’.113 Commenting upon the controversial memorial to all victims of war at 
the Neue Wache and subsequent attempts to list and distinguish between these 
victim groups on an accompanying plaque, Finn dismissively referred to the 
memorial’s ‘usage instructions’ (‘Gebrauchsanweisungen’).114 Clearly this was 
intended as a criticism of a national culture of remembrance established by 
decree, not to mention of enforced distinction between National Socialism and 
communism. In chapter two, I show that both the Initiativgruppe and the ALS 
have adopted elements of this conciliatory narrative in the commemorative 
ceremonies they hold at the memorials, thereby deflecting attention away from 
questions of difference and upholding the narrative of total victimization. 
 
 
Theoretical underpinnings 
 
 
So far in this introduction we have charted developments in efforts at coming to 
terms with the Nazi past following Germany’s total military defeat in World War 
II, and with the ‘double’ past since the collapse of ‘real existing socialism’ in the 
GDR. I wish to turn now to how ways of relating to the past at a collective, 
cultural level are best theorized. That this process of reckoning with difficult 
legacies can and perhaps even should be undertaken by groups as well as 
individuals in society is implicit in the German terms ‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’ 
and ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’. Translated as ‘confronting’ or ‘working 
through the past’ and ‘mastering the past’ respectively, they denote a broader 
public responsibility for dealing with historical injustices in the transition to 
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stable democracy.115 Such neologisms notwithstanding, this process is by no 
means a specifically German phenomenon. Indeed, it has been a feature of the 
transition to democracy in southern European states during the 1980s, of the 
aftermath of military dictatorships in the Southern Cone, and particularly of post-
communist Eastern and Central Europe.  
 
 
Typically, successor states in these instances have (with varying degrees 
of energy) put perpetrators and apparatchiks on trial, undertaken purges of 
former collaborators from the public sector (otherwise known as lustration), 
launched official truth commissions, ordered the opening of secret police files 
and sought to compensate victims of state persecution. The result has been the 
emergence of a consolidated field of transitional justice – a field in which 
Germany stands out as the only country to have negotiated two such transitions. 
My interest is of course primarily in memorialization – a practice that is seen as 
usually belonging to the broader transitional justice apparatus if not necessarily 
as a core constituent element of it116 – and its relationship to Germany’s post-
unification transition. Even if the existence of terms such as 
‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’ and ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’ does not 
automatically imply German exceptionality in its approach to democratic 
transition, it may well indicate that handling difficult pasts is something of a 
‘German speciality’, to use Timothy Garton Ash’s expression.117 I have already 
elaborated on the uniquely wide range of measures implemented by the Federal 
Republic after the Wende and how this related to shifts in a specifically German 
normalization discourse above.  
Before making a case for situating the debates around Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen in this broader ‘transitional’ context, however, I outline a 
                                                
115 Though the terms imply quite different processes, it should be noted that ‘Geschichte’ and 
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theoretical model for conceptualizing them that utilizes an approach grounded in 
memory studies. At the core of this relatively new discipline is a theory of 
‘collective memory’, first developed by the French sociologist Maurice 
Halbwachs, who was in fact imprisoned at Buchenwald and died at the ‘Kleines 
Lager’ there in 1945. According to Halbwachs, individual acts of remembrance 
cannot exist independently of social frameworks such as the family, religious 
community and professional milieu, all of which condition how one recalls the 
past.118 In essence, ‘[o]ne cannot…think about the event’s of one’s own past 
without discoursing upon them’, as Halbwachs explains.119 This notion of society 
not as an aggregate of various fixed individual memories but as a shaper of these 
presupposes that what we remember of the past depends on circumstances in the 
present rather than the actual events in question. It has become a central point of 
departure for subsequent research into memory, and is indeed highly relevant to 
the German context under discussion here.    
Building on Halbwachs’ model, the Egyptologist Jan Assmann has 
developed the concepts of ‘communicative memory’ and ‘cultural memory’ to 
explain how memory is transmitted over time.120 In Assmann’s typology, 
communicative memory refers to collectively held memories that can be passed 
from one generation to another through conversation in de-hierarchized spaces 
such as the family. Usually they will convey lived experience, and therefore 
cannot travel beyond the upper limit of inter-generational age differences (which 
Assmann sets at approximately 80-100 years).121 Cultural memory, on the other 
hand, refers to external repositories of memory that endure beyond generational 
boundaries; these tend to be carefully constructed and reified, and therefore 
hyper-mediated. Elaborating upon the mechanics of cultural remembrance, 
Aleida Assmann uses the terms ‘Speichergedächtnis’ and ‘Funktionsgedächtnis’. 
These refer to a reserve of unmediated memory not (yet) ordered into a narrative 
in the case of the former, and select ‘bewohnte Erinnerung[en]’ that underpin 
identity in the case of the latter.122 The connection between cultural memory and 
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identity construction posited here, and in particular Aleida Assmann’s suggestion 
that memory is made ‘functional’ by animating particular strands of a 
background store of ‘saved’ memory, will inform the theoretical model I develop 
here.      
With this in mind, I would like to reflect briefly on the emergence of 
memory as both a complement and challenge to history as a mode of 
reconstructing the past. Scholars such as Andreas Huyssen have noted that we 
are living in ‘memory’s privileged time’.123 For Huyssen, this fixation upon 
remembrance reflects an anxiety surrounding unmediated access to the past in an 
age of modernization and generational change. Pierre Nora makes a similar 
point, arguing that a vital connection to the past found in milieux de mémoire is 
giving way to archived, historicized lieux de mémoire.124 To be sure, memory’s 
current ubiquity both as a social phenomenon and a method of historical inquiry 
has led some to believe that a critical, objective historical profession is in danger 
of being supplanted by partisan and proprietorial claims over the past.125 
Conversely, it is also true that memory can illustrate ethical investments in the 
past amongst those involved in writing it.126 Yet even if this is true, and we 
accept that the paradigm of cultural memory reveals much about the 
constructedness and contingency of the past, it is nonetheless necessary to ask 
“why memory?” if we are to avoid naturalizing the concept as a means of 
analysis in this case study.     
Two issues in particular bear further consideration. Firstly, both history 
and memory are at stake in debates over Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, where 
the communication of the past ‘as it really was’ in the Rankian sense is as much 
an objective as the legitimization of particular memory (and identity) discourses. 
It is essential to consider the different subject positions stakeholders at the 
memorials may adopt as a result, ranging from memory activists, to custodians of 
the historical record, to a combination of the two. Secondly, it is important not to 
overextend and over-apply memory as a heuristic tool. Accordingly, whilst I still 
see much value in an approach grounded in memory studies, I suggest that we 
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must attend more closely to how processes of reckoning with the past are 
constructed and/or contested synchronically (in specific contexts), and 
diachronically (in relation to structures of power and hegemony over time) – two 
questions that Halbwachs and the Assmanns’ models of cultural memory do not 
satisfactorily answer. Complementing memory studies with the tools of museum 
studies research, transitional justice methodologies, critical discourse analysis, 
and systems theory, I argue for a considered and conditional application of the 
lens of memory to cultural representations of the double past. 
Let us firstly address the synchronic question of context before turning to 
regimes of discourse from a diachronic perspective. As has been pointed out 
recently, what had begun as an interest in ‘memory in culture’ within memory 
studies research has increasingly come to resemble the study of ‘memories of 
cultures’.127  That is to say, the definition of ‘culture’ at the heart of cultural 
memory is all too easily bound up with the frame of the nation state. Rather than 
think solely in terms of static national cultures of remembrance, however, it is 
helpful to pay attention to the ‘dimensions of movement’128 that characterize 
cultural memory. Cultural memory narratives, as well as the symbols and icons 
comprising them, and the media through which they are transmitted, are not 
necessarily specific to a particular ‘national’ collective; they move across 
different cultures, spaces, and times. This movement can be in two directions of 
course – either towards globalized cultural formations, such as a ‘cosmopolitan’ 
form of Holocaust memory, or alternatively towards localized permutations. 
Understanding transcultural memory as movement along both local and 
global planes allows me to question and look behind normative pronouncements 
of an institutionalized ‘national’ culture of remembrance in the Berlin Republic. 
For the same reason, I structure the thematic chapters of this thesis around 
several discrete cultural constellations: the institutional context (in other words, 
the memorial museums as spaces), the municipality, the federal state or region, 
and the nation (for a more detailed discussion see the explanation of the thesis 
structure below). In addition, by drawing on a wide range of source groups, 
including the sites’ museological and pedagogical concepts, press reportage, 
parliamentary documentation, curricula, marketing material and specialist 
publications by memorial professionals, survivors’ organizations and civic 
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groups, I shed light on the fluid composition of cultural memory across these 
different spaces. Do the same types of cultural representation of and debate over 
the past characterize all four spaces, or does the cross-section of particular 
representational forms and debates differ between them? What does this say 
about the dominance of certain actors or positions vis-à-vis the double past, the 
role of certain memory media in shaping discourse, and the reasons for which 
these discourses are deployed? 
Importantly, paying attention to context in this way lends greater nuance 
to the following discussion of how memory of the double past is contested at 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. The discussion itself draws upon existing 
theories that posit a ‘history politics’ (Geschichtspolitik)129 behind constructions 
of identity and history on a collective level, according to which reference to 
history is used to buttress political legitimacy and power in the present.130 
Likewise, it follows recent scholarship on memorials and memorialization, which 
has shown how memorials serve the deliberation and contestation of a group or 
nation’s historical consciousness.131 Certainly they are ‘objects for critical 
enquiry into the mechanisms by which…memories are constructed’,132 as Peter 
Carrier has argued, but as I explain above, an analysis of construction and 
contestation requires acknowledging the multiple planes on which these take 
place besides that of the nation.  
The second theoretical intervention made by this thesis concerns patterns 
of constructing and contesting discourses on the double past from a diachronic 
perspective. Of interest here are questions of continuity and change in how the 
various stakeholders at the two memorials have interpreted their multifaceted 
histories since 1998, and how this relates to the (shifting) normalization 
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discourse outlined above. Having already refuted the notion that there exists a 
singular, monolithic culture of remembrance, I suggest, furthermore, that it is 
necessary to rethink the dynamic that has driven processes of representing the 
past. My argument here rests on two propositions. Firstly, I contend that the 
imminent generational transition facing the period under discussion – the passing 
away of the eye-witnesses who lived through National Socialist terror in the 
concentration camps – is crucial to understanding the dynamic of the past fifteen 
or so years. Secondly, and in keeping with the argument that representations of 
the double past ‘on the ground’ challenge as much as reflect the institutionalized 
narrative, I point to ways of relating the situations at Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen to a federal ‘centre’ without reducing them to mere by-products 
of it.      
With regards to the generational transition, I follow Harald Wydra’s 
thinking. Wydra argues that new paradigms of representing the past in Europe 
since 1945 have emerged out of a dialectic confrontation with existing values, 
traditions, and structures in society. Emerging generational ‘elites’ do not so 
much dispassionately analyze these as confront them from their own subjective 
standpoint. They are themselves socially conditioned by rituals, formative 
experiences and a store of latent societal memory (Aleida Assmann’s 
‘Speichergedächtnis’) common to their age cohort, all of which impact upon 
their negotiation with the current value system.133 I believe this processual model 
of reckoning with the past neatly captures the shift that took place in the 
normalization discourse upon the ‘68er government around Schröder and Fischer 
coming to power. As we have seen, the ‘nationalisation’ of memory – even 
negative memory – was almost unthinkable to many of the key figures in the 
generation of ‘1968’, not least Fischer himself, who as we have seen was initially 
deeply uneasy about the idea of unification. Hence why the shift is best 
understood as the result of a search for new meaning rather than the simple 
projection of the ideals of 1968 onto post-unification German political culture. 
Equally, the process of institutionalizing remembrance of the double past was not 
an imposition of one or another generational agenda but a discursive 
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achievement that cannot be understood in isolation from the debates and 
decision-making processes of the 1990s.  
By contrast, the period beginning in 1998 has not (yet) been marked by 
rupture and the resulting need for reorientation. In terms of generational change, 
the ‘Ende der Zeitzeugenschaft’ is still anticipated rather than necessarily 
deemed a reality. We have also seen a raft of measures implemented that now 
govern the handling the double past, such as the Gedenkstättenkonzeption and 
new museological concepts at the sites. As such, the emphasis when it comes to 
grasping the dynamic behind patterns of cultural representation now falls on an 
emergent ‘order of discourse’, to use Michel Foucault’s term.134 By this I mean 
the functioning of received notions of the double past as a mechanism for the 
exercise of power. This is an important complement to the model of synchronic 
contestation proposed above, and its value to an investigation of Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen requires some further explanation. 
There is a distinct advantage to treating institutionalized narratives of an 
anti-totalitarian consensus as an ‘order of discourse’. Taking this view, the 
memorials to the double past form part of a broader apparatus for the structuring 
of knowledge in society; they become tools of governmentality. Museums 
studies research has fruitfully applied foucauldian theory to the work performed 
by museums, and the approach lends itself particularly well to my study of 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. Tony Bennett uses the term ‘exhibitionary 
complex’ to denote the collective work performed by museums and related 
heritage institutions in inculcating particular civic values and forms of 
government.135 Though Bennett first developed the concept in relation to 
emerging forms of liberal governmentality and the ordering of evolutionary time 
around assumptions of Western progress and modernity in late-nineteenth 
century museums in Europe and North America, it can be meaningfully applied 
in this context too, albeit in modified form. For I too am interested in how 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen are used to structure (but also to critique) 
prevailing federal narratives of an ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ and constructions 
of citizenship rooted in repudiation of National Socialism and communism. 
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In today’s post-colonial order, Bennett argues, museums function as 
‘differencing machines’, engaged in ‘shaping and transforming people through 
their own self-activity’136 and thereby embodying the political project of multi-
cultural pluralism. If we add to the description of this project a civic will to 
engage with the legacy of Germany’s ‘short twentieth century’, then we come 
close to capturing a sense of the normative expectations attached to memorial 
museums such as Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. The value of Bennett’s 
theoretical model thus lies in its ability to render transparent the role of the 
memorials as civic technologies responsible for the political projects of 
inculcating an ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’. By extension, it becomes clear that 
contesting the historical narrative they present involves putting forward counter-
versions of the federal anti-totalitarian project and so goes to the heart of post-
unification governmentality too. I therefore propose combining a memory studies 
methodology with a Foucauldian approach to the ‘disciplinary regime’137 of 
these memorial museums and the anxieties – or even outright challenges – that 
emerge in response to it. 
With this we return to the issue of the memorials’ relationship to a federal 
‘norm’ over the course of the period under discussion. Certainly the model of an 
‘exhibitionary complex’ or an ‘order of discourse’ provides one means of 
mapping their interconnectedness. As I alluded to above however, it is in my 
opinion a mistake to take one single discourse – in the German context the 
institutionalized discourse – as the sole point of reference when analyzing 
engagement with the memorials and the double past. What if engagement 
positions itself neither within nor outside of a prevailing ‘order of discourse’? 
And what if, besides implicitly contesting political legitimacy in the present, as a 
model of Geschichtspolitik would have it, engagement is in certain instances 
driven on by an underlying logic separate from that of governmentality? Indeed, 
Barbara Kirschenblatt-Gimblett’s reference to ‘exhibitionary complexes’ in the 
plural attests to the limitations of clustering divergent approaches to the past 
around a political centre-point.138  
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In order to resolve the dilemma posed by the simultaneous existence of 
the ‘anti-totalitarian conensus’ across multiple orders of discourse, I turn to the 
late sociologist Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems.139 Society, Luhmann 
argues, is not defined by external structures or universally valid ontological 
categories (what he refers to as a ‘Dingschema’),140 but is instead comprised of 
communication between systems. These systems organize themselves on the 
basis of how they perceive and reproduce communications. Crucially, this 
process involves a kind of second-order observation by which systems draw a 
distinction between the way they constitute elements from their environment 
(Umwelt) and the far more complex horizon of possible alternatives that this 
environment provides. Systems therefore reproduce themselves self-referentially 
through reducing the complexity of their environment – a process Luhmann 
terms ‘autopoiesis’. Thus, meaning (Sinn) is, according to this model, a 
‘laufendes Aktualisieren von Möglichkeiten’141 produced by the action of 
autopoiesis. Understanding meaning in terms of the functional differentiation 
that takes place within systems is, in my opinion, an instructive way of analyzing 
the positions taken up by various protagonists at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen 
since 1998.  
Though I do not suggest that the discourses surveyed here are identical 
with discrete systems such as science, art, politics and the economy, I do 
consider whether they evidence systemic behaviour. In particular, I draw on the 
model of recursivity belonging to systems theory – that is, autopoiesis – to 
demonstrate that discourses are social processes as much as they are forms of 
productive semiotic work. Certainly the idea of a system distilling meaning from 
its environment resembles Aleida Assmann’s notions of ‘Speichergedächtnis’ 
and ‘Funktionsgedächtnis’. Unlike Assmann’s rather static model, however, 
Luhmann’s concept of autopoiesis manages to reflect the processual nature of 
sense-making. When applied to the negotiation of the double past, then, it 
helpfully reveals interpretations to be continually constituted – a vital insight if 
we accept that the past is not only open to revision and contestation at moments 
                                                
139 Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Systeme: Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie (Frankfurt a. M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1984). 
140 Ibid., p. 98. 
141 Ibid., p. 100. 
63 
 
 
of generational transition, as Wydra claims, but rather on an ongoing basis.142 
Furthermore, utilizing a theory of self-referential systems allows us to more 
satisfactorily address specific parochial drivers behind reckoning with the double 
past rather than somewhat over-deterministically reading the situation at the 
memorials out of developments in the institutionalized narrative. Interestingly, 
this theoretical premise is hinted at in Halbwachs’ theory of collective memory. 
Discussing the family as a social realm of memory, Halbwachs states: 
 
‘[T]he family progressively tends to interpret in its own manner the 
conceptions it borrows from society. Each family ends up with its own 
logic and traditions, which resemble those of the general society in that 
they derive from it and continue to regulate the family’s relations with 
general society. But this logic and these traditions are nevertheless 
distinct because they are little by little pervaded by the family’s particular 
experiences and because their role is increasingly to insure the family’s 
cohesion and to guarantee its continuity.’143      
 
Though Halbwachs is referring here to the family unit, and specifically to 
memory, what he describes nonetheless resembles Luhmann’s description of the 
operations undertaken by social systems. Indeed, Halbwachs’ conceptualization 
of a ‘logic’ and ‘traditions’ that have a cohesive role to play in specific social 
frames of memory mirrors the ‘Konzept des selbstreferentiell-geschlossenen 
Systems’144 in Luhmann’s theory. In both cases, interaction with the external 
environment (for Luhmann) and society (for Halbwachs) occurs, but ultimately 
to perpetuate the internal dynamic of that system or frame of memory.  
How can this insight usefully inform an analysis of Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen? First of all, it provides an opportunity to nuance models of 
coming to terms with the double past that place conflicting positions on a 
political spectrum. Certainly I would not disagree that a left-wing view typically 
differentiates between National Socialism and East German communism, whilst 
                                                
142 On this point, see Astrid Erll, Kollektives Gedächtnis und Erinnerungskulturen: Eine 
Einführung (Stuttgart: Verlag J. B. Metzler, 2005), p. 34; also Jeffrey K. Olick and Daniel Levy, 
‘Collective Memory and Cultural Restraint: Holocaust Myth and Rationality in German Politics’, 
American Sociological Review, 62, 6 (Dec 1997), pp. 921-936. 
143 Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, p. 83. 
144 Luhmann, Soziale Systeme, p. 63. 
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a right-wing view usually stresses similarities between the two or even equates 
them. As the thematic chapters of this thesis will show, it is indisputably those on 
the political right and the victims of communism who most vocally advocate the 
latter position. Likewise, the political left and left-liberal historians and memorial 
specialists do consistently come down in favour of differentiation and the 
singularity of the Holocaust. What I suggest instead is that we also attend to the 
aforementioned ‘logic’ and ‘traditions’ of these discourses to look behind labels 
such as left- and right-wing, Holocaust-centred, and totalitarianist, which may in 
instances screen complexity. 
Needless to say, I do not aim to supplant an approach grounded in the 
tools and concepts of cultural memory with a focus on governmentality and 
functional differentiation. Together, the three complement one another, allowing 
representations of the double past to be approached from the bottom up, as 
constituent elements of a broader cultural formation, and from the top down, in 
connection with power relations and the structuring of knowledge in society. To 
reiterate what I have outlined in this section, my approach nuances the cultural 
memory paradigm so widespread in research into the place of the German past in 
the Berlin Republic on two counts. It proposes, firstly, a more fine-grained 
understanding of the situational factors underpinning how the double past is 
handled at and around the memorials. This chiefly entails breaking with a 
‘containered’ model of cultural memory that unproblematically takes the frame 
of the nation-state as its point of departure, and questioning the role that the 
media of memory plays in shaping discourse. Secondly, it draws on the 
Foucauldian concept of governmentality and Niklas Luhmann’s theory of 
autopoietic social systems to suggest two ways of looking at the relational aspect 
of memory discourse from 1998 onwards. Thinking of the institutionalized 
position on the double past as an ‘exhibitionary complex’ regulating both history 
and identity enables us to take it seriously as a central organizing force behind 
debates on the ground (and specifically at the memorials). On the other hand, the 
relations and interactions between discourses can be analyzed on the assumption 
that each operates according to its own internal logic or code too.      
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Methodology & sources  
 
 
Like the theoretical framework outlined above, there are several pillars to the 
methodology utilized in this thesis. Whilst the theoretical underpinnings need not 
be repeated here, they do help to clarify the criteria use for selecting sources and 
delimiting the frame of enquiry. Since I am concerned with contextual factors 
that shape patterns of representing the sites, for instance, it follows that I look 
closely at the genre of the texts, practices and objects I deal with. Likewise, I will 
take into account ‘discourse positions’, which is to say the ideological stances of 
discourses.145 In addition, unpacking the work of individual texts within an 
apparatus for legitimizing power and governance – what Foucault terms a 
dispositif – helps to shed light on the relationship between a normative ‘official’ 
discourse and grassroots constructions of the double past. Finally, critiquing this 
centre-periphery model and applying the concept of self-referentially closed 
systems emerging through communication shifts the focus from the inside of 
dispositifs to the interstices between them. Broadly speaking, then, I ask what the 
sources I analyze say about the mechanisms of power and legitimization at work, 
and how the exercise of power is distributed across the cultural formation.       
Following recent museum studies literature, I take a holistic view of 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen’s embededness ‘within broader relations of 
cultural production’.146 This requires a similarly broad analytical lens that covers 
both site-based discourses and their symbolic and rhetorical figuration across 
multiple public spheres consisting of local, national, and even trans-national 
actors. That said, it is not any and all cultural representations of the double past 
that are of interest here, but rather those which offer a window onto the 
‘disciplinary regime’ of these memorial museums or pluralize and critique the 
concept. I have, as a rule, concentrated on cultural discourses, practices, and 
objects that bear a direct relation to the ‘governmental’ aspect of remembrance, 
given that I am concerned first and foremost with problematizing the notion of an 
institutionalised narrative of the double past. Equally, I have selected sources that 
                                                
145 Siegfried Jäger, ‘Discourse and knowledge: Theoretical and methodological aspects of a 
critical discourse and dispositive analysis’ in Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, ed. by Ruth 
Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: SAGE, 2001), pp. 32-62 (pp. 49-50). 
146 C. A. Kratz and I. Karp, ‘Introduction: Museum Frictions: Public Cultures/Global 
Transformations’, in Museum Frictions,  ed. by Kratz et al, pp. 1-31 (p. 20).  
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treat remembrance as a ritual of citizenship. Hence I my source base includes 
European and German federal and regional policy documents, press reportage, 
memorial exhibitions, educational materials, specialist debates on ‘best practice’ 
at the memorials, advocacy work by survivor and civic lobby groups, and 
municipal discourse. 
Though there is a considerable amount of fictional literature and filmic 
material that deals with these two former camps and clearly constitutes part of a 
broader cultural memory, neither of these source groups directly addresses issues 
of post-1998 governmentality and of remembrance as a civic value. Indeed, I 
have on the whole excluded creative, non-documentary responses to the 
memorials from my analysis, as the range of subjective, artistic motivations 
behind their production makes them far harder to either place with any degree of 
certainty within the ‘exhibitionary complex(es)’ supporting the Schröder and 
Merkel governments’ politics of the past or clearly identify them as a critique of 
such complexes. The same applies to online discussion forums established by 
and for victims of pre- and/or post-1945 injustices, which in any case offer a 
sparse data set for the two memorials I address.  
This notwithstanding, scholarship on the working through of the double 
past stands to benefit from analysis of new media. Both Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen have official web sites, and the Buchenwald memorial now has 
an official presence on Facebook and YouTube.147 If one accepts the caveats 
relating to ‘online’ identities, there is much to be gained from interpreting online 
fora as constituent elements of a broader public sphere in which the past is 
debated and represented. Paul Cooke, for instance, has surveyed a wide range of 
websites related to various aspects of life in the GDR and their relationship to 
negotiations of East German identity and ‘inner unity’ since unification.148 Sara 
Jones, too, has convincingly illustrated how online repositories can impact upon 
modalities of remembrance in her analysis of the website www.stasiopfer.de, 
which contains a discussion forum for victims of the East German secret 
                                                
147 See http://www.buchenwald.de/69/. Last accessed 12 Aug 2013; http://www.stiftung-
bg.de/gums/de/index.htm. Last accessed 12 Aug 2013; 
https://www.facebook.com/buchenwaldmemorial. Last accessed 12 Aug 2013; 
http://www.youtube.com/user/BuchenwaldMemorial/about. Last accessed 12 Aug 2013. 
148 Cooke, Representing East Germany since Unification, ch. 6. 
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police.149 The fact is, however, that neither Buchenwald nor Sachsenhausen 
feature on this forum,150 nor are the Speziallager a topic of interest in the 
websites Cooke discusses, even those intended to underline the GDR’s 
criminality (they typically focus instead on the Stasi). Therefore I concentrate on 
print media such as the various Verbandszeitschriften in which survivors and 
their representatives voice their opinions. The far higher incidence of articles in 
print media compared to online sources relating directly to one or both of the 
memorials I discuss means that the former constitutes a more comprehensive and 
elucidating text corpus. 
 
The one source group that I have not systematically analyzed but that could 
reasonably be considered part of the ‘exhibitionary complex’ is German 
television programmes and news broadcasts dealing with either Buchenwald or 
Sachsenhausen. This omission is regrettable, not least as it would have provided 
an interesting visual comparison to my analysis of text-based newspaper 
reportage, but can be explained in part by the difficulties of locating and 
accessing particularly the (generally shorter) segments of news broadcasts. A 
filmography of longer documentary films – 20 minutes and over – on the 
Speziallager has for instance been complied by Günter Agde, but of the 28 films 
Agde lists, only nine date from the post-1998 period examined here. Of these, 
two deal with the Soviet special camp at Sachsenhausen and none with 
Speziallager Nr. 2 at Buchenwald.151. 
I use the methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to provide a 
close analysis of my chosen sources. CDA is useful precisely because it uncovers 
the semiotic work performed by elements of discourse – in other words, the way 
these elements communicate meaning. As a first step, I subject my research data 
to language-based and iconographic analysis, asking how the linguistic and non-
linguistic forms of communication employed by individual sources represent 
particular aspects of Buchenwald and/or Sachsenhausen’s history. This helps to 
establish common topoi, which may vary depending on the genre or provenance 
                                                
149 See Sara Jones, ‘Catching fleeting memories: Victim forums as mediated remembering 
communities’, Memory Studies, 6, 4 (2013), 390-403. 
150 A keyword search of the terms ‘Buchenwald’ and ‘Sachsenhausen’ on 12 Aug 2013 produced 
no results for either. 
151 Günter Agde, ‘Filmographie zur Geschichte der sowjetischen Speziallager in der SBZ/DDR’, 
in Instrumentalisierung, Verdrängung, Aufarbeitung: Die sowjetischen Speziallager in der 
gesellschaftlichen Wahrnehmung 1945 bis heute, ed. by Haustein et al, pp. 266-270. 
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of certain text clusters. Newspaper reportage, as one particular text type, may for 
instance foreground the sensational aspects of debates at the memorials, whilst 
memorial specialists interpret them in terms of their relation to historical events. 
At the same time, local newspaper reportage will take a greater interest in the 
implications these debates have at the municipal level than the national press. 
Having identified the relevant genre- and context-specific topoi, I then group the 
sources according to theme and relate this back to my theoretical construct, 
applying concepts drawn from memory studies, Foucault’s model of 
governmentality, and systems theory. Finally, I draw general conclusions about 
the ways in which these topoi are constituted and re-constituted over time (the 
diachronic dimension of my analysis).    
In deciding which debates to cover, I rely on the concept of ‘discourse 
strands’ – that is, ‘thematically uniform discourse processes’152 – that can be 
analyzed both synchronically and diachronically. Focusing on a smaller number 
of exemplary ‘discourse strands’ is most appropriate to the thick descriptive 
approach of this thesis and can do justice to its aim of problematizing a 
normative national discourse through looking more closely at specific sites and 
debates. As a discourse strand can consist of various genres of text, and operate 
across multiple discourse planes and contexts, it is possible to approach it from a 
number of vantage points. Accordingly, I revisit certain ‘strands’ such as the 
controversial speeches by Hermann Schäfer and Jörg Schönbohm in 2006 in 
several chapters, thereby comparing and contrasting their discursive construction 
in local, regional and national contexts. To allow for a diachronic analysis, a 
number of discourse strands are surveyed in each respective chapter, spread 
across different stages in the political life of the Berlin Republic. On the whole, 
the chapters begin with the years around 1998-1999, when the Schröder 
government came to power (1998), the seat of the capital moved to Berlin 
(1999), and the Federal Memorials Strategy passed into law (1999). Subsequent 
discursive strands relate to the years either side of 2005, when Angela Merkel 
took up office, and 2008-2009, which saw an amendment to the 
Gedenkstättenkonzeption (2008), the 20-year anniversary of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall (2009), and federal elections (2009). 
 
                                                
152 Jäger, ‘Discourse and Knowledge’, in Methods, ed. by Wodak and Meyer, p. 47. 
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Thesis structure 
 
 
The structure of this thesis reflects its aim of looking behind a normative reading 
of the ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ in Germany. Each of the four thematic 
chapters that follow therefore takes issue with an over-simplified ‘national’ 
model of cultural remembrance, demonstrating how approaches to the double 
past are patterned quite differently depending on the cultural space one looks at. 
The four ‘spaces’ I investigate are the memorial museums (as public spaces), the 
camp locales, the federal states of Brandenburg and Thuringia, and what Astrid 
Erll calls the ‘fuzzy edges’153 of national memory – that is, the fluid and multiple 
constructions of the nation as a cultural entity. As the inclusion of this final 
chapter indicates, I by no means reject the proposition of a national discourse out 
of hand. Rather, I approach it in a way that sheds light on the mutually 
constitutive relationship between the institutionalized discourse and 
representations of the double past on the ground. Indeed, as Etienne François and 
Hagen Schulze note in their study of Deutsche Erinnerungsorte, national identity 
is in any case only conceivable ‘in Beziehung und Wechselwirkung zu anderen 
Teilidentitaeten’.154 Thus, my objective is not to compartmentalize national 
discourse or suggest that it can be broken down into concentrically organized 
micro and macro spheres. Instead, I chart the key actors, debates, and junctures 
in the respective spaces under discussion, thereby attributing a dynamic to each 
space in its own right, without losing sight of continuities cutting across several 
spaces. 
Chapter two addresses debates conducted either on-site at Buchenwald 
and Sachsenhausen or in relation to the site materiality since 1998. In treating the 
Gedenkstätten as public spaces I follow Tony Bennett, who distinguishes 
museums and heritage institutions from self-contained ‘public spheres’ to 
highlight their intermediatory role in public culture.155 That is to say, I view the 
                                                
153 Erll, ‘Travelling Memory’, p. 8. 
154 Etienne François and Hagen Schulze, ‘Einleitung’, in Deutsche Erinnerungsorte, ed. by idem., 
vol. 1 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2001), pp. 9-24 (p. 22). 
155 Bennett, ‘Exhibition, Difference, and the Logic of Culture’, in Museum Frictions, ed. by kratz 
et al, pp. 46-6 
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memorials as both spaces for reproducing and inflecting the ‘anti-totalitarian 
consensus’, and as agencies shaping these discourses. The chapter traces a 
chronological narrative, but treats the phases of the memorials’ tripartite past (as 
concentration camp, Speziallager, and GDR memorial) in turn – each, we will 
recall, having received its own specific treatment in the Neugestaltungen. On the 
evidence presented here, it is the respective survivors’ associations and the 
memorial specialists who have featured most prominently in debates in the 
memorial spaces. Furthermore, I argue that there has been marked continuity in 
the situation here, insofar as interpretations of the double past on-site have not 
necessarily moved with concurrent shifts in the normalization paradigm, and 
remain diverse. To my mind, we can attribute this to successful implementation 
of de-centralized and plural museological concepts at both Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen. 
In chapter three, I turn to the relationship between the camps and their 
neighbouring towns. Material traces of the concentration camp complexes and 
the historical entwinement of town and camp make the Nazi past virtually 
unavoidable in Oranienburg and Weimar. Yet, as my analysis of post-1998 
marketing discourses, local press reportage, and municipal cooperation with 
victims’ lobbies, the memorials, and trans-national cultural institutions such as 
UNESCO proves, there is little doubt that the sites and their histories are now 
openly confronted at local level. This is no mere microcosm of the shift in the 
normalization paradigm introduced during Gerhard Schröder’s chancellorship 
however. If German normality can be described as a dialectic confrontation156 
with positive and negative aspects of the country’s past and present, then the 
dialectic is certainly most pronounced in Oranienburg and Weimar – a point 
confirmed by the continuous negotiation of these poles we see in municipal 
discourses. It is not only symbolic dates on the commemorative calendar that 
prompt mention of the double past (or at least certain aspects of it); public 
articulation of local identity more generally seems to implicitly contend with the 
Nazi past. Interestingly, I show that the Speziallager and NMG, as symbols of 
the East German past, play a more marginal role in identity discourses than one 
might expect given the decades-long imposition of antifascist identity after 1945. 
If anything, the unbroken focus on the years 1933-1945, which has obtained even 
                                                
156 See Caroline Peace, Contemporary Germany and the Nazi Legacy: Remembrance, Politics 
and the Dialectic of Normality (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
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as communist injustices have come into much sharper relief under Angela 
Merkel’s coalition government, may even screen the post-1945 period from 
representations of the double past.  
In chapter four, debates at the memorials are analyzed within the cultural 
framework of the federal states, Brandenburg and Thuringia. Though this chapter 
is no different from others in taking a holistic view of culture, it should be noted 
that political culture – chiefly the work of the regional parliaments, ministries, 
educators, and regionally active survivors’ organizations – plays a particularly 
pronounced role here. Partly this can be explained by Germany’s federal 
structure, and the emergence of Landeskunde as a means of promoting 
identification with these regional entities. Indeed, institutions such as the 
Regional Offices for Political Education (Landeszentralen für politische Bildung) 
designed to fulfill this remit play an active part in promoting awareness of 
regional memorial sites.157 As I point out in my analysis, the predominance of 
political actors in this space under whose jurisdiction the memorials fall could 
well explain why post-1998 representations of the double past are pointedly 
bound up with Germany’s post-unification transition here. Unification’s stated 
aim of breaking definitively from the GDR past has become, I argue, a powerful 
underlying narrative that has informed reckoning with Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen well into the 2000s. Thus, where Buchenwald largely appears to 
symbolize the successes of transition in Thuringia, in Brandenburg, certain 
discourses on Sachsenhausen’s double past connect it to perceived deficits in that 
state’s transitional process.  
Chapter five challenges the notion of a single, national discourse on the 
double past on one final count. If, as stated above, the objective here is to 
problematize a normative definition of the ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’, then it 
stands to reason that, as well as pointing out local or regional permutations of 
cultural discourse, it is necessary to convey the sheer variety of claims to 
represent official German national memory that crystallize at the memorials. I 
cover several examples, including debates on the relationship of the 
Gedenkstätten to the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin, and a 
                                                
157 See Dieter K. Buse, ‘The Mediators: Memorialization Endeavours of the Regional Offices for 
Political Education (Landeszentralen für politische Bildung)’, in Memorialization in Germany 
since 1945, ed. by Bill Niven and Chloe Paver  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 91-
102 (esp. pp. 92-93). 
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challenge issued to the Red-Green coalition government by the conservative 
author and critic Ulrich Schacht at Sachsenhausen in 2005. The second and third 
sections of the chapter deal with the implication of the memorials in European 
and global processes of coming to terms with difficult pasts. It points out that the 
memorials serve not only local and regional but also trans-national 
constituencies. At the same time, the chapter resists implying a sequential 
progression from national to global memory in the years since 1998. On the 
contrary, the evidence I present suggests that in fact both national and global 
frames exist simultaneously. Arguing in favour of an overlapping and contiguous 
relationship as opposed to a model that sees national frameworks giving way to 
global memory in the course of the decade or so after 1998 is an important 
contribution to historicizing the period. 
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Ch. 2: The ‘double past’ in the 
memorial museum 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In April 2012, the Minister for Culture Bernd Neumann (CDU) ceremonially 
opened the recently re-landscaped prisoner camp at Sachsenhausen as a 
memorial. As part of the Neugestaltung, elements of the GDR-era memorial 
architecture had been removed and the exact foundations of the concentration 
camp barracks marked out using gravel beds, thus revealing the hitherto 
obscured ‘Geometrie des totalen Terrors’.158 With the opening, the 
Neugestaltung was now all but complete. Meanwhile, the redesign of 
Buchenwald had been largely finished by 1999, when the third and final 
permanent exhibition on the GDR memorial had opened. These by no means 
represent the final changes to be made at the sites – further ‘decentralised’ 
exhibitions on the camp personnel at Sachsenhausen are scheduled to open next 
year, and the permanent exhibition on the concentration camp at Buchenwald is 
currently being overhauled with a view to reopening in 2015. Nonetheless, all the 
major recommendations contained in the reports by the Brandenburgian and 
Thuringian Historians’ Commissions have now been realized. Now is therefore 
an appropriate juncture at which to take stock of how these redesigns, at the heart 
of which lay the sites’ tripartite history under National Socialism, Stalinism and 
real existing socialism, relate to an ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ in Germany.   
Looking at how the physical memorials, relics, and on-site exhibitions 
have been culturally coded, I will probe an uncomplicated link between the sites 
and an ‘official’ discourse on the past. Incidentally, Neumann himself drew just 
such an uncomplicated link at the 2012 opening. Though he conceded that there 
                                                
158 See Günter Morsch, ‘Sachsenhausen – ein neuer Lagertypus? Das Konzentrationslager bei der 
Reichtshauptstadt in der Gründungsphase’, Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 56, 10 (2008), 
805-822. 
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was ‘keine allgemein verbindliche Anleitung für die Aufarbeitung der 
Verbrechen der Nationalsozialisten und für das Gedenken an die Opfer’, he 
nonetheless reminded the audience of the Gedenkstättenkonzeption – updated 
under his tenure as Minister for Culture in 2008 – and the importance it placed 
on preserving ‘authentische[…] Erinnerungsorte’.159  
Contradicting his earlier statement, Neumann did in fact offer ‘Anleitung’ 
of sorts for dealing with Sachsenhausen. In his view it was important ‘hier in 
Sachsenhausen aber auch, an das Sowjetische Speziallager Nummer 7, das auf 
dem Areal des ehemaligen KZs lag, angemessen zu erinnern.’160 The virtues of 
remembrance, the historical site, and the anti-totalitarian paradigm were brought 
together in programmatic fashion. In the remainder of this chapter, I look behind 
this normative position, showing that, whereas official discourse has gradually 
moved towards a totalitarianist stance on the double past, discourse in the 
museum spaces has upheld the principle of differentiation. As I will go on to 
argue, the trend can be attributed to the discursive context of the memorial 
museums as intermediatory ‘public spaces’ and the discursive dynamic at play. 
To begin with contextual factors, I suggest that the material sites play a 
crucial role in structuring the kind of discourse on the double past that is 
presented there, whether differentiated or equationist, and the shape of discourse, 
by which I mean its contours and constituent voices. Whilst I follow Flora 
Kaplan’s description of museums as ‘political arenas’161 of contestation, I am 
also interested in what makes these two particular ‘arenas’ distinct from both 
conventional history museums and other cultural or political units such as the 
‘region’ or the ‘nation’ (handled in chapters three and four respectively). 
Buchenwald’s and Sachsenhausen’s particular auratic and spatial qualities for 
instance help us to understand why it is above all survivors’ organizations, the 
memorial sites, and political representatives who stake out claims to interpret 
their multi-faceted history. Equally, they may hold a clue to understanding how 
these various groups attempt to do so (see above for an overview of the 
respective positions staked out in the immediate post-unification period).  
                                                
159 ‘Rede von Kulturstaatsminister Bernd Neumann anlässlich der Übergabe der neugestalteten 
Freiflächen der KZ-Gedenkstätte Sachsenhausen am 20. April 2012’ (online) 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Rede/2012/04/2012-04-20-neumann-
sachsenhausen.html. Last accessed 30 Aug 2013. 
160 Ibid. Last accessed 30 Aug 2013. 
161 Flora E. S. Kaplan, ‘Exhibitions as communicative media’, in Museum, Media, Message, ed. 
by Eileaen Hooper-Greenhill (London/New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 37-58 (p. 55). 
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At the same time, I treat museums as agencies in the production of 
heritage discourse.162 Here I am particularly interested in how the memorials as 
spaces as opposed to simply texts reinforce or challenge particular readings of 
the double past. After all, it is the memorials themselves rather than individual 
exhibits that are the genuine historical artifacts.163 Drawing on Greer Crawley’s 
definition of ‘theatricality’ in the museum, which need not imply lack of 
authenticity but instead a ‘spatial and spectatorial’ mode of experience164 
engendered through particular staging effects, I suggest that the memorial space 
can narrate the double past in a number of ways, both intended and unintended. 
The curatorial teams at both sites have for example ingeniously juxtaposed 
historical relics with conspicuously re-constructed elements in certain places, 
serving as a commentary on the relics’ ‘layeredness’. In this case, the sites lend 
themselves to a discourse that distinguishes between their multiple pasts. On the 
whole, the new museological concepts implemented at Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen, oriented as they are around the principles of plural and 
decentralized commemoration, have limited the extent to which the sites could 
be monopolized by any single narrative.    
These principles have their roots not in federal cultural policy but in the 
Gedenkstättenbewegung and the post-unification re-orientation of the old NMG. 
We are therefore dealing with longer-term chronologies and developments that 
have unfolded alongside and not as a result of institutionalizing the ‘anti-
totalitarian consensus’. In fact, conceiving of debates on site at the two 
memorials since 1998 as a form of history politics obscures more than it reveals 
about the stance of the memorial professionals on the double past. To my mind, 
their involvement in the (changing) memorial landscapes should be characterized 
not only as memory construction, but also as the integration of dialogic, 
reflective, critical standards from the historical profession into the memorial 
                                                
162 Here I borrow from Sharon Macdonald, who primarily addresses science museums and the 
authority they possess in presenting scientific knowledge. See Macdonald, ‘Exhibitions of power 
and powers of exhibitions: an introduction to the politics of display’, in The Politics of Display: 
Museums, Science, Culture, ed. by Sharon Macdonald (London/New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 
1-24 (esp. p. 19).  
163 Volkhard Knigge, ‘Gedenkstätten und Museen’, in Verbrechen Erinnern: Die 
Auseinandersetzung mit Holocaust und Völkermord, ed. by Knigge and Norbert Frei (Munich: C. 
H. Beck, 2002), pp. 378-389 (p. 385f). 
164 Greer Crawley, ‘Staging Exhibitions: Atmospheres of Imagination’, in Museum Making: 
Narratives, architecture, exhibitions, ed. by Suzanne MacLeod, Laura Hourston Hanks and 
Jonathan Hale (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 12-20 (p. 13). 
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museums.165 Broadening focus, we see that the same applies to other groups too; 
the stances they adopt on the memorials may derive from a kind of self-contained 
discursive logic as much as from totalitarianist or Holocaust-centred history 
politics. Survivors and their representatives, for instance, may see the sites as 
form of physical proof that can buttress claims for symbolic recognition of 
victimization (or for that matter of acts of solidarity and resistance), and this in 
turn feeds into how they interpret them. For politicians the sites may facilitate the 
exercise of power, given the legitimization that can follow from controlling 
which story gets told there.  
On this evidence, applying Luhmann’s concept of autopoietic 
differentiation between systems would go some way towards explaining these 
distinct positions. Indeed, in a recent article analyzing compensation legislation 
for victims of human rights abuses in the GDR, David Clarke makes a 
compelling case for such an approach. Drawing as I do upon the terminology and 
concepts of system theory, Clarke suggests that even ostensible coalescence 
around common goals – in this case the CDU’s support for former victims – can, 
on closer inspection, reveal a certain doubling of discourse. That is to say, 
political and advocative actors code their arguments around concepts of power 
and (symbolic) recognition respectively, and though in instances each appears to 
adopt the other’s position, what takes place is in fact a translation of that position 
‘into the languages of [the group’s] own interests’.166 Applying the model of 
autopoiesis to the memorials, and to the discourses of victims’ organisations, 
memorial specialists and politicians, I suggest that it captures what the concepts 
of history politics and an ‘exhibitionary complex’ cannot, namely the (at least 
partial) autonomy of discourse from the dominant federal precedent.   
The chapter is structured around the major challenges that faced the two 
memorials during the period of reconceptualisation and have since been over-
layered by normative expressions of an ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’. These two 
main challenges are addressed in individual sections of the chapter. Firstly, I 
address the task of diversifying and broadening commemoration of the 
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concentration camp victims as well as fleshing out the picture of camp life. 
Secondly, I reflect on the bitterly contested integration of the history of the 
Soviet camps into the memorial concepts. I quite deliberately leave aside 
processes of musealizing the legacy of GDR antifascism and the history of the 
GDR memorials, in part because this has already been explored in an excellent 
study focused on Buchenwald, and in part because the new museums dealing 
with the East German memorials more closely resemble traditional museums of 
contemporary history. They do not facilitate commemoration but treat it as an 
object for documentationand critique; as such, they are not as present in the 
various different forms of interaction with the sites and do not give a handle on 
how these are constituted. In any case, GDR traditions are addressed in some 
detail in the opening section of the chapter. 
I treat each of these in order rather than tracing a chronological course 
from the turn of the millennium onwards as I do in other chapters. Taking this 
delineated approach allows me to map out many of the arguments that I will 
return to throughout the thesis. It also allows me to assess when exactly during 
the lifespan of the Berlin Republic each of the constitutive elements of the 
reconceptualisation has been most vigorously debated on-site. Finally, my 
specific interest in developments at the memorials is reflected in the source base 
for this chapter: I draw for the most part on analysis of the memorial and 
exhibition spaces, published critiques of these, commemorative ceremonies and 
speeches held on site, exhibition catalogues, and interactive media produced by 
the memorial staff.  
  
 
 
“Rückkehr zum historischen Ort”: interpreting the 
concentration camps 
 
 
In the opening section of the chapter I explore patterns of commemorating the 
concentration camps at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen and the ways in which 
these patterns variously shape and are shaped by the site materiality. My 
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overarching concern with institutionalization and the postulate of an 
‘exhibitionary complex’ that deploys the memorials as mechanisms of 
governance guides the enquiry. I am most interested here in questions of 
continuity and change across the period of formal institutionalization towards the 
end of the 1990s. Picking up on the argument made in the introduction to this 
chapter, I dispute whether forms of interaction position themselves in relation to 
a central, federal narrative of an ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’. Arguably it is not 
one central reference point but in fact several, dispersed discourses that account 
for patterns of interpretation. In order to gain a sense of chronology, I begin by 
recapitulating the early post-unification debates on how to find adequate forms of 
memorialization and musealization at the two sites. Although these debates are 
familiar and have been recounted elsewhere,167 my interpretation is unique in 
linking them to a discussion, firstly, of the sites’ defining auratic and spatial 
qualities and, secondly, of how these qualities either normativized or unsettled 
patterns of interpretation emerging towards and into the 2000s. It is for this 
reason that I concentrate on a smaller number of high-profile exhibitions that 
were seismographs of the re-conceptualisation process. At Buchenwald, I 
consider the permanent exhibition on the concentration camp opened in 1995, 
and at Sachsenhausen I hone in on the exhibition produced for barrack 38, which 
was damaged in an arson attack in autumn 1992.    
The second half of the section concentrates on the post-2000 period, 
thereby bringing the discussion more or less up to date. It focuses on the ways in 
which groups have interacted with the memorial space and the authentic objects 
since the turn of the millennium. As the post-unification decisions on how best to 
re-present the history of the concentration camps set in train a diversification of 
the memorials, the decade or so since 2000 has represented, amongst other 
things, a continuaton of a process begun already in the 1990s.168 New memorials 
to hitherto marginalized victims groups continue to be added and a number of the 
decentralized exhibitions on the pre-1945 camp at Sachsenhausen have since 
opened. Notably, unlike the new approach taken to political resistance to national 
Socialism in the camps in the redesigned exhibitions, these developments have 
provoked little controversy. In light of the fairly minimal trace that can be found 
in, for instance, the publications of survivors’ associations in response to on site 
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memorialization, I rely amongst other things on commemorative ceremonies held 
at the sites by various groups, a number of which I attended. These have of 
course continued to take place on an annual basis and so provide a consistent 
barometer of attitudes. Aside from participant observation and the analysis of the 
ceremonies’ performative and discursive dimensions, I also analyze educational 
materials produced by the memorials and designed to either aid orientation on 
site or accompany new exhibitions there.   
In my analysis of the first exhibitions to emerge out of the 
Neugestaltungen, I critique Alexandra Klei’s argument that the contemporary 
memorials are best understood as a series of ‘gestalterische[…] Eingriffe[…]’169 
in the architectural ensembles. Certainly Klei is right to point out that re-
conceptualising the former concentration camps has required ‘Formen von 
Präsentation und Gestaltung’170 and is therefore inherently much more than a 
value-negative ‘overcoming’ (‘Überwindung’)171 of prior GDR practices of 
remembrance at sites such as Buchenwald. How this politics of representation 
has played out, and the extent to which the professional and advisory teams 
behind the redesigns at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen have reflected on this, 
are questions to which I will return throughout this chapter and the thesis as a 
whole. I do however depart from Klei’s reading in certain respects. Firstly, I seek 
to balance a view of the ‘Neugestaltungen’ as a new layer of interpretation with 
recognition that the historical site nonetheless lies at the heart of the new 
memorial concepts. Secondly, I propose that the key to understanding both the 
aims of the redesign and the highly disparate ways in which the sites continue to 
be read today is, in fact, the uniquely auratic, ‘authentic’ qualities they possess – 
qualities that set them apart from other museums of contemporary history. As I 
will show, whilst the reconceptualisation processes and the official ‘anti-
totalitarian consensus’ in Germany have both undeniably played a role in 
memory contests at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, many of the positions 
adopted in these contests have just as much to do with interpretations of the 
material sites themselves. 
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I begin with the permanent exhibition on the concentration camp that was 
inaugurated in 1995 – the first such exhibition to open at a concentration camp 
memorial on German soil in the post-unification period. Scholarship on the 
concentration camp exhibition has focused for the most part on its deconstruction 
of the mono-dimensional antifascist narrative presented at the GDR memorial, 
and in particular its treatment of resistance at Buchenwald.172 Certainly it did 
break from the previous memorial’s overwhelming fixation on (communist-led) 
opposition to National Socialism and focus the exhibition around prisoners’ 
shared experiences of arrest, cruelty and murder. Furthermore, the new 
exhibition, spread over two floors of the former camp depot building 
(Kammergebäude), ends not with the triumph over fascist-capitalism but with the 
literal ‘end’ of the camp. A dimly lit table display in the final section of the 
exhibition contains archaeological finds from the memorial grounds, mostly 
personal items belonging previously to prisoners, reminding visitors that 
thousands of lives had been unjustly cut short by the time Buchenwald was 
liberated. For the purposes of this thesis however, it is helpful to analyze the 
exhibition as an early example of the functional changes that the memorials were 
undergoing in the 1990s, and also as the nexus of the various discourses that 
were beginning to crystallize here at that time. 
In the exhibition’s concept paper drawn up by the Buchenwald site staff, 
the turn to embrace a multi-perspectival approach is evident. The history of the 
concentration camp, the concept paper stated, should not be presented ‘im 
überlieferten Fundus von Sinnkonstrutionen’173 – a position that resonated with 
the description of the memorials several pages later as ‘offene Lernorte’.174 
These tenets informed the inclusion of various victim perspectives in the 
exhibition, represented by their written and spoken testimony as well as objects 
(Relikte) that were of significance to them. However, the concept paper 
advocated a particular approach to the display and contextualisation of exhibition 
objects that was distinguishable from the way in which the concentration camp 
victims’ organisations interacted with them. As this difference cross-cuts 
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distinctions drawn by mapping discourses against the anti-totalitarian consensus, 
it is worth reflecting on. 
In the view of the concept paper, objects were merely the starting point of 
visitors’ interaction with the material site; they represented the ‘Niederschlag 
von in und hinter ihnen liegenden unterschiedlichen Praktiken, von Strategien, 
Bedürfnissen und Zwängen, die sie haben entstehen lassen.’175 On account of the 
by definition fragmentary meaning of objects that the museum setting is able to 
convey, the concept paper unequivocally rejected attempts to impose totalizing 
claims over them in the concentration camp exhibition by subordinating them to 
an overarching narrative, as had been the case at the NMG. For the 
Lagerarbeitsgemeinschaft Buchenwald-Dora e. V., by contrast, this position was 
unacceptable precisely because it denied visitors a sense of orientation. 
Reflecting on the exhibition in Neues Deutschland, the secretary of the LAG 
argued that its design had ‘left visitors alone’ (‘Besucher…allein gelassen’) with 
a flood of information.176 Though the LAG evidently supported the GDR 
narrative, choosing to interpret the exhibition as evidence of the ‘Verbindung 
zwischen KZ und Industrie’,177 it also responded differently to the aura of the 
exhibition objects. Whereas the Relikte held documentary value for the memorial 
staff, who proposed using them to trigger processes of autonomous learning and 
interpretation, for the LAG they took on a moral force as legitimation of an 
antifascist political programme. 
One of the first major projects undertaken at Sachsenhausen as part of the 
Neukonzeption was a design concept for the Jewish barracks, which had been 
badly damaged in an arson attack in the autumn of 1992. The incident prompted 
a global outpouring of disgust, with large numbers of visitors to the memorial 
gathering around the charred remains of the barracks in a spontaneous 
condemnation of anti-Semitic violence. The federal government’s response was 
rather more lukewarm, Helmut Kohl declining to visit and instead sending the 
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in a move that some commentators later pointed 
out to be typical of Kohl-era commemorative politics, averse as they were to any 
kind of sustained engagement with the Holocaust and German guilt. Indeed, 
Kinkel appeared at pains to discredit the attack as an isolated act of anti-
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Semitism, in response to which he could evoke a morally pristine culture of 
‘anti-anti-Semitism’ in Germany, to use Klaus Neumann’s term, and 
conveniently ignore the broader questions this raised about the rise of 
xenophobia and extremism in the Federal Republic.178 All the same, the council 
of the Brandenburg Memorials Foundation – on which representatives of the 
federal government sat, incidentally – agreed to prioritize the redesign of the 
Jewish barracks in the Neugestaltung at Sachsenhausen.179 Even at this early 
stage, it was inaccurate to suggest that discourses at the memorial mirrored the 
federal government’s line.  
What the redesign of the Jewish barracks did reflect was a critical 
juncture in an institutional discourse on memorial site practice. Memorial 
professionals such as Günter Morsch very clearly interpreted the impending 
redesign along these lines. Speaking at a preliminary meeting to discuss what 
was to be done with barracks 38 and 39, Morsch noted the lack of consensus 
within the memorial site milieu around approaches to historical relics. He 
personally regarded reconstruction with scepticism, believing that it would 
equate the concept of historical authenticity with ‘Typengleichheit’.180 Yet he 
conceded that ‘[o]hne die Darstellung ihrer äußeren Form...die Topographie fast 
unvorstellbar, jedenfalls den Besuchern kaum noch vermittelbar [scheint]’.181 At 
stake for Morsch was also the place of artistic, interpretative elements in an 
eventual solution. It was of course little surprise that this question arose, given 
that the architect Daniel Libeskind had submitted (and garnered not 
inconsiderable support for) a design concept that would, if selected, preserve the 
barrack ruins as a potent symbol of the constant threat posed by right-wing 
extremism and anti-Semitism. Morsch conceded the attraction of Libeskind’s 
proposal in a remark cut from the final draft of his speech, in which he noted of 
the design: 
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‘[seine] künstlerische Ausdruckskraft [war] so stark und 
beeindruckend…, daß sie die öffentliche Debatte ebenso wie die 
Entscheidungsfindung in den Gremien der Stiftung, im internationalen 
Beirat, in der Fachkommission und im Stiftungsrat, lange und anhaltend 
beschäftigte.‘182 
 
In the event, the chosen concept, submitted by the Frankfurt-based 
architects Braun & Voigt, eschewed an artistic memorial. This was an altogether 
more restrained design, and one that restored the ‘äußere[…] Form’ considered 
by Morsch to be so integral to communicating the topography of the 
concentration camp.As Morsch would later explain in a speech marking the 
inauguration of the museum in barrack 38 in late 1997, Libeskind’s approach 
was ultimately considered too problematic by the memorial professionals. To 
juxtapose the barrack with the acrylic and charred remains of the proposed 
memorial would, Morsch argued, have risked banalising Nazi crimes and the 
destruction of the European Jews at their core by appearing to put them on equal 
footing with right-wing extremist crimes of today.183 This was a significant 
departure from artistic memorial forms, and therefore also an important step in 
working out a position that would later be applied to Sachsenhausen’s post-war 
history, too.  
The Braun & Voigt design entailed reconstruction of barrack 38 with the 
addition of a ‘shell’ covering the badly damaged but still extant section so as to 
incorporate the fire damage into the exhibition. Another damaged section was 
preserved behind protective glass and a timeline of the barrack’s history, which 
ran from its construction as part of the ‘Kleines Lager’ in the concentration camp 
up until the arson attack in 1992. A ‘zeithistorisches Fenster’ was installed in the 
opposite wing of the barrack, illustrating the stages in this historical sequence 
through exposed layers of paintwork on a section of the structure dating from the 
time of the concentration camp, special camp and GDR memorial respectively. 
The reconstructed sleeping quarters – a feature of the NMG that had been built 
using material taken from other barracks – were also preserved behind glass, 
turning not the objects themselves but the entire restaging into a Perspex-framed 
museum exhibit for visitors to view from a distance. 
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Thus the redesign concept was, as Günter Morsch put it, unequivocally 
‘auf den Bau eines funktionalen Museums ausgerichtet’.184 Not only was the 
reconstructed barrack an exhibition object as much as it was an exhibition space; 
it also became the starting point for confrontation with the various phases of 
Sachsenhausen’s checkered history (though its significance for the concentration 
camp was clearly foregrounded). This approach obtained in the exhibition 
content, which led from the biographies of 74 Jewish prisoners at Sachsenhausen 
and was organized around the stages of progressively radical Nazi persecution of 
Jews in Germany and Europe. Biographical information and exhibits relating to 
these prisoners could be found in wall-mounted vitrines consisting of a display 
cabinet and a series of protractible drawers. As such, the highly tactile wall-
mounts literally interrupted the visitor’s route through the exhibition and gave 
him or her a moment’s pause to uncover aspects of the prisoners’ pre-1933 and 
(in the case of those who survived) post-1945 biographies. The exhibition 
therefore countered urges to regard the Holocaust as a shorthand for the myriad 
processes that defined the systematic murder of the Third Reich’s racial and 
political opponents – as a kind of ‘Metatheorie’, in Morsch’s words.185 Instead, it 
sought to present an artifact-based, factually grounded account of Jewish 
persecution between the years 1933-1945 related specifically to the site in 
question and the individuals who populated it. 
Taken together, the exhibition content and redesigned barracks generate a 
deliberate ‘archeaology’ of the past, if anything aimed at problematising and 
complicating straightforward commemoration of a sui generis ‘Holocaust’. 
Whether in the disembodied voices of victims that echo through hand-written 
letters on display in the vitrines, the ‘zeithistorisches Fenster’, the GDR-era 
recreation of sleeping arrangements in the barrack now frozen in time behind 
Perspex, or the smell of charred wood pumped around the exhibition space to 
evoke the moment of the arson attack, absent traces of the layers of history are 
everywhere to be found in barrack 38. The layers themselves can be likened to 
ruins, unsettling the unity of the body in space and time in the manner of what 
Dylan Trigg refers to as a ‘haunted undercurrent’.186 That is to say, they pose a 
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challenge to conceptualizations of time in which one simply projects one’s own 
temporality onto the world around oneself or derives temporality from sites. 
Instead, the voids left behind by the barrack’s partially erased pasts resurface in 
an unspecific, unplaceable way as ‘murmurs’ – an ‘architectural emergence 
without time and stability’ comparable to traumatic memory.187  
Yet this symptomatic appropriation of the barrack’s traumatic past is in 
turn offset by deliberate attempts to distance the visitor from the exhibits they are 
confronted with. The glass paneling in particular functions as a frame, mediating 
and managing the relationship between object and viewer as well as producing a 
historiographical cross-section of the past in which purportedly ‘authentic’ relics 
exist in an entirely constructed but perpetual stasis. Visitors who view the 
‘zeithistorisches Fenster’ or reconstructed barrack, for instance, see a component 
of the concentration camp architecture, but are simultaneously aware of how its 
original meaning has not endured over the decades. It is not an uncomplicated 
artefact of the ‘Holocaust’ as much as it is a composite of different temporal 
layers – the arson attack and the contemporary issue of anti-Semitism being just 
one of these. That said, there is a clear hierarchy established here, and the 
primacy of events between 1936-1945 is manifest in the museological 
arrangement. 
Ultimately, then, the redesigned Jewish barracks cannot be interpreted as 
a product of shifts occuring at the political centre of German discourse on the 
recent past. Nor for that matter was the museum a direct response to prevailing 
interpretations of National Socialism and the Holocaust. It might have proposed 
an alternative to a view of the Holocaust as ‘Metatheorie’, but was hardly a 
symptom of political contests over history fought out between the Kohl 
administration and the the members of the ‘68er and ‘79er generations 
professionally linked to the memorials. The new museum’s pared-down 
presentism and diacticism suggests that standards belonging to the historical and 
museological professions as well as the unique ‘auratic’ quality of the site 
informed the approach adopted at barrack 38. These provided a kind of internal 
logic through which the curatorial team at Sachsenhausen filtered their 
interpretation of the site materiality. Luhmann’s concept of autopoietic self-
reference therefore provides an instructive lens for theorizing the means by 
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which discourse on the memorials was constructed and contoured. As we will 
see, the logic of problematizing fixed meaning and taking ‘“what has been” [as] 
the starting-point of meaning’188 would indeed come to underpin the entire 
memorial site, in museums to both the concentration camp and special camp. 
It is possible to apply this theoretical concept to political interpretations 
of the Jewish barracks too. A speech held by the incumbent Foreign Minister 
Klaus Kinkel at Sachsenhausen to mark the 50th anniversary of the concentration 
camp’s liberation in 1995 provides an opportunity to do so. The manner in which 
Kinkel framed the history of the concentration camp (and the Third Reich more 
generally) in his speech was markedly different from the bottom up, site-specific, 
biographically and empirically grounded concept implemented at the memorial. 
Instead, a nebulous and largely symbolic understanding of the Holocaust 
permeated Kinkel’s reading of Sachsenhausen, and his speech concentrated 
overwhelmingly upon the legacies and lessons of Nazi terror in the present rather 
than upon the historical detail. 
Kinkel noted early on in his speech that Sachsenhausen had been a 
European site of National Socialist terror prior to 1945 on account of the wide 
range of nationalities amongst the prisoner contingent. From here, he jumped 
forward 50 years to reflect upon the very different set of relationships that the 
Federal Republic had cultivated with its European neighbours. Retaining his 
focus on the nations that became erstwhile victims of Nazi occupation and rule, 
Kinkel observed: 
 
‘Alle diese Länder sind heute unsere Partner, Verbündete, Freunde. 
Besonders zu Israel haben wir ein Verhältnis besonderer Freundschaft 
gefunden, wofür wir dankbar sind.’189       
 
Using ‘heute’ to demarcate reunified Germany from its wartime 
predecessor, Kinkel gestured towards Germany’s wholly different (and 
improved) standing in the eyes of Europe and the world. Similarly, his reference 
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to German-Israeli friendship suggested historical animosities had been overcome, 
a point that he spelled out unambiguously by asserting: ‘weil wir [the collective 
German nation, RB] mit der Vergangenheit gebrochen haben, wurden wir wieder 
in die Völkergemeinschaft aufgenommen’.190 Sachsenhausen was thus a 
convenient staging post for the Kohl government’s attempts to shore up a ‘post-
national’ German identity embedded in European and trans-national values. This 
was reflected not least in the rhetorical sequencing of Kinkel’s speech. In a series 
of four paragraphs making up the latter half of the speech, universal values of 
‘Würde’ and pacifism – symbolised by the ‘Aufbau des neuen Europa’191 – 
preceded any mention of Sachsenhausen, which featured in the fourth and final 
paragraph. Coming to the specific history of the site and the arson attack only at 
the end of his speech, Kinkel effectively inverted the fine-grained biographical 
approach taken in the on-site exhibition and proceeded from a European meta-
narrative. 
Thus, the ‘doubling of discourse’ that Luhmann’s theory identifies was 
apparent in the various interpretations of Sachsenhausen in the mid-1990s. 
Kinkel’s reading of Sachsenhausen and the museum in barrack 38 both 
acknowledged and commemorated the suffering of prisoners at the concentration 
camp, but this ostensible convergence masked differences in how the narrative 
was framed. Whereas the museum foregrounded the specific site and historical 
events, Kinkel’s speech connected Sachsenhausen to post-war European politics 
and concentrated on the site’s meaning in the present. The systemic coding of 
discourse taking place here can be aptly explained using Luhmann’s description 
of how systems interpret certain elements in their environments: 
 
‘Es bleibt zwar richtig, daß interpenetrierende Systeme in einzelnen 
Elementen konvergieren, nämlich dieselben Elemente benutzen, aber sie 
geben ihnen jeweils unterschiedliche Selektivität und unterschiedliche 
Anschlußfähigkeit, unterschiedliche Vergangenheiten und 
unterschiedliche Zukünfte’ (italics in original, RB).192     
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Luhmann’s model is accordingly better suited to coveying discourses on 
the memorials at this point than a Foucauldian analysis using the concept of an 
‘exhibitionary complex’. But has a synchronicity between federal policy 
directives and memory discourse on the ground at the memorials been 
established with the passing into law of the Gedenkstättenkonzeption? Certainly 
the decade or so since then has seen the strengthening of an ‘anti-totalitarian 
consensus’ at central level. Yet whilst few would deny that post-1945 injustices 
have received increasing attention during the 2000s, the primacy of the National 
Socialist past has by and large been upheld at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. 
In order to illustrate what has produced this relative degree of continuity, I now 
address the post-1998 years at the sites.  
I turn my attention firstly to some of the major annual commemorative 
ceremonies held at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. To a certain extent, these 
have grown out of the Neukonzeptionen, at least insofar as they have replaced the 
centralised mass rallies that were a hallmark of the NMG or have been modified 
in line with post-1990 efforts to ‘decentralise’ commemoration and tie it to 
historical sites, events, and groups. On the other hand, they stand in a longer-
term tradition of on-site commemoration, and so attest to the fact that the 
physical sites map out parameters of interpretation in much the same way 
interpretations can be mapped back onto the sites. This helps to explain why we 
see both continuity and change in the nature of the ceremonies across the rupture 
caused by the events of 1989/1990. In order to convey a sense of the pluralisation 
and de-centralisation mentioned above, I discuss ceremonies introduced since 
unification, above all those marking the day of remembrance for victims of 
National Socialism on 27 January. But I also analyse ceremonies that have their 
roots in the NMG, such as the liberation anniversaries and, at Sachsenhausen, the 
anniversary of the murder of 27 political prisoners in October 1944 following the 
investigation of a Gestapo Sonderkommission into underground resistance at the 
camp.  
The 27 January commemorations at Sachsenhausen are dedicated to a 
specific group of the camp’s victims each year. This can be a national group – 
there have been recent ceremonies dedicated to Spanish inmates (2009) and 
French prisoners (2013), for instance – or victims of particular events, such as 
the ‘Kriegswinter’ of 1939/1940 (commemorated in the 2010 ceremony), or the 
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250 Jewish camp inmates murdered in May 1942, the focus of the ceremony in 
2012. Most obviously this strategy allows for a degree of thematic variety in the 
ceremonies and largely prevents repetition or hollow commemorative platitudes 
creeping into the proceedings – a not insignificant consideration given that the 
date is often referred to (incorrectly) in Germany by the shorthand ‘Holocaust-
Gedenktag’. This notwithstanding, there are established traditions that now 
belong to the Sachsenhausen ceremonies. They are, for example, staged by the 
memorial site in cooperation with the regional government and parliament in 
Brandenburg, and begin with a series of commemorative addresses. This is 
followed by a wreath-laying ceremony at Station Z, the central commemorative 
site at Sachsenhausen. 
Looking specifically at the 2010 ceremony, which I attended, it could in 
some respects be considered a re-contextualisation of the material site. By 
holding the commemorative addresses in the ‘Veranstaltungsraum’ housed in the 
former prisoners’ laundry room (‘Wäscherei’), the organisers subvert the East 
German commemorative practice of staging highly politicised, open-air, mass 
gatherings at the memorial. Instead of speaking from a pulpit in front of René 
Graetz’s sculpture Befreiung and beneath the 40-metre obelisk with its 
overwhelming political symbolism, the speakers address an audience in the 
enclosed and therefore almost reverentially quiet space of the former barrack. 
Likewise, the careful sequencing of the ceremony, beginning with the addresses 
and concluding with wreath laying at Station Z, breaks with the antifascist 
narrative of rebirth through death as resisters and martyrs.193 Whereas the 
memorial complex at the NMG Buchenwald, for instance, lead visitors down a 
series of steps into the ‘Nacht des Faschismus’ before they ascended to the 
‘Turm der Freiheit’ (via a series of reliefs depicting the international communist 
resistance struggle), the route of the 27 January commemoration at 
Sachsenhausen ended with quiet, reflective mourning of the dead.194  
                                                
193 For a comparative analysis of the NMG at Buchenwald, Ravensbrück and Sachsenhausen, 
paying particular attention to architectural and topographical alterations made to the sites, see 
Peter Fibich, ‘Buchenwald – Ravensbrück – Sachsenhausen: Die städtebaulich-architektonische 
und landschaftsarchitektonische Gestaltung der Nationalen Mahn- und Gedenkstätten’, in Die 
Sprache des Gedenkens: Zur Geschichte der Gedenkstätte Ravensbrück 1945 – 1995 ed. by Insa 
Eschebach, Sigrid Jacobeit and Susanne Lanwerd (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1999), pp. 262-281. 
194 The impression of a personal ‘Totengedenken’ was heightened in the 2010 ceremony, as 
students of a local school read out the names of those who had died at Sachsenhausen on 27 Jan 
1940 whilst attendees laid wreaths.   
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At the same time the structure and format of the ceremony explicitly 
avoided imposing unitary readings on the history of the concentration camp. 
Though all of the speakers explicitly commemorated the victims of the camp, 
their approaches to doing so were markedly different. The site director Günter 
Morsch, for his part, combined commemoration with documentation, describing 
how the SS used overexposure to the freezing cold to assist them in murdering 
prisoners en masse. The survivor Adam König, who had been sent to 
Sachsenhausen as a teenager, also spoke. He concentrated for the most part on 
depicting conditions in the camp during the winter of 1939/1940. In addition, 
pupils from a local school performed a series of interpretative readings that 
addressed local ambivalence towards the fate of the camp prisoners. The pupils 
in particular performed a double role, engaging with the history of the site and 
symbolically passing down the testimony of survivors at the same time. One of 
the readings, for instance, was an extended passage taken from the memoirs of 
former camp elder Harry Naujoks, in which Naujoks recalls the commandant 
Rudolf Höß’s order to extend the prisoner roll call during a freezing day in 
January 1940.195 In the course of the ceremony, the historical site and the history 
of suffering at the concentration camp were approached from a range of subject 
positions: from the view of a professional historian, an eyewitness, and non-
expert local residents belonging to the so-called ‘Enkelgeneration’.         
Multi-perspectivity has been incorporated into the liberation anniversary 
ceremonies in much the same way. Indeed, certain traditions dating as far back as 
1945 have been carried forward into the post-unification period, now forming 
part of a more variegated programme on and around the anniversary dates at the 
two camps. To take the example of Buchenwald, the main ceremony, held on the 
Sunday nearest to the liberation anniversary on 11 April, continues to be held at 
the site where the very first ceremony commemorating the camp victims on 19 
April 1945 took place. In fact, this remains the central memorial to all victims of 
the camp, albeit in modified form eschewing the monumentality of the initial, 
cenotaph-like ‘KLB’ memorial (see introduction). As the president of the IKBD 
typically delivers an address at the ceremony, the voice of the communist 
prisoners continues to be prominent. Current president Bertrand Herz’s address 
at the 2012 ceremony, for instance, was a fairly standard rehearsal of the 
                                                
195 See Rainer Kuhn, Konzentrationslager Sachsenhausen, ed. by the Landeszentrale für 
politische Bildung (Berlin, 1989), p. 11. 
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communist-antifascist position, according to which camp life for the prisoners 
had been a more or less constant (political) struggle against fascist terror. Herz 
himself drew on the dichotomous poles of terror and resistance in his speech in 
order to trace a line from the Buchenwald Oath, proclaimed in the aftermath of 
liberation, to the latter-day fight to eliminate forms of racism, neo-Nazism and 
anti-Semitism. As such, he borrowed directly from GDR-era 
“Willenskundgebungen”, which as Ulrike Köpp observes ‘[führten] in der 
Tradition der Arbeiterbewegung die historische Erinnerung und das Gedenken 
für die jeweils tagespolitisch aktuellen Auseinandersetzungen mit dem 
politischen Gegner ins Feld’.196 
In the 2012 ceremony, the narrative of ongoing antifascist resistance was 
spatially emplotted in other ways too. Many of the participants in the liberation 
ceremony, and above all the so-called ‘Antifa’ groups in attendance, moved in 
train from the central memorial to the bell tower holding aloft banners and flags 
in the style of the rallies staged at the NMG. Not uncontroversially, several 
actually carried and waved the GDR flag, effectively telescoping earlier 
commemorative ceremonies organised by the SED onto proceedings 22 years 
after its demise.197 Other banners called for an ‘NPD-Verbot’, resonant in their 
militant tone of the active ‘struggle’ (‘Kampf’) that Herz had alluded to. It 
therefore represented a somewhat conventionally ‘East German’ way of coding 
an anti-extremist sentiment that other speakers at the ceremony had implicitly 
shared. Éva Pusztai, a Hungarian Jewish former slave labourer at a satellite camp 
of Buchenwald and current member of the memorial’s International Advisory 
Council, had for her part expressed the hope that the third generation in post-war 
society could live a life without institutionalised hatred and prejudice. The 
Thuringian SPD Minister for Culture Christoph Matschie, meanwhile, had 
enjoined participants to take lessons (‘Lehren ziehen’) from the history of the 
camp in order to secure a better future. Once again, on-site commemoration was 
able to sustain a multiplicity of perspectives.         
                                                
196 Ulrike Pöpp, ‘Das Gedenken wird zur nationalen Aufgabe erklärt: Das Kuratorium für den 
Aufbau nationaler Gedenkstätten und die Gedenkstätte Sachsenhausen’ in Von der Erinnerung 
zum Monument, ed. by Morsch, pp. 133-147 (p. 139). 
197 See ‘DDR-Fahnen in Buchenwald geschwenkt’, Ostthüringer Zeitung, 17 Apr 2012 (online) 
http://www.otz.de/web/zgt/politik/detail/-/specific/DDR-Fahnen-in-Buchenwald-geschwenkt-
217178305. Last accessed 20 Apr 2012; also ‘Politiker streiten über DDR-Fahnen in 
Buchenwald’, MDR.de, 15 Apr 2013 (online) http://www.mdr.de/thueringen/mitte-west-
thueringen/ddrfahnen-buchenwald100.html. Last accessed 05 May 2013.  
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Moreover, a separate ceremony was held on 11 April, beginning at 15:15 
to mark the time of Buchenwald’s liberation by US army units, assisted by the 
prisoners. Though this was an altogether more modest and less well-attended 
occasion, it did strip away the overt politicisation of the former camp as 
historical relic that had occurred in the GDR by incorporating a wider range of 
victims groups into the ceremony and tying commemoration to localised sites 
within the memorial. Breaking with the dramaturgy of the NMG Buchenwald 
and indeed the Antifa processions, the ceremony took the form of a walking tour. 
It began at the memorial to all victims of the concentration camp before stopping 
at the Soviet POW memorial, the Sinti memorial, the memorial plaque at the 
former ‘Kleines Lager’, the Jewish memorial, the memorial stone dedicated to 
Polish and Jewish victims of the Sonderlager, and the Krematorium respectively. 
At each station, a different text drawing on eyewitness accounts of victimisation 
and acts of solidarity amongst prisoners was read out and flowers were laid. 
Unlike the IKBD and Antifa commemorations, overt interpretation gave way to 
the voices of victims and the indexical connection of the site to narratives of 
perpetration and victimhood in the 11 April ceremony. 
The final ceremony I wish to discuss is another whose origins lie in the 
early post-war years. This is the annual commemoration of the 27 political 
prisoners of KZ Sachsenhausen murdered on 11 October 1944 after the Gestapo 
had uncovered the illegal underground resistance hitherto active at the camp. The 
resistance efforts, orchestrated chiefly by German communist prisoners, had 
involved, inter alia, secretly receiving radio broadcasts on devices hidden from 
the SS; several of the prisoners involved, such as Ernst Schneller, would later 
become iconic symbols of antifascist resistance in the GDR. Despite the 
ceremony’s self-evident link to forms of commemoration practiced at the NMG, 
it is now co-organised by the Sachsenhausen memorial and the 
Sachsenhausenkomitee in der BRD e. V. – a member of the ISK with its own 
roots in the pre-unification Federal Republic. If one factors in the involvement of 
local school groups as well, it is fair to say that the ceremony in its post-
unification guise is a decidedly cooperative undertaking. As I will indeed go on 
to show, the historical site as setting enables the Sachsenhausenkomitee to 
‘sacralize’ the 27 political prisoners without necessarily compromising other 
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readings of the concentration camp and of the victims of the Gestapo 
investigation more specifically. 
Much like the liberation ceremonies, relocating this particular act of 
commemoration to the redesigned ‘Station Z’ has lent it a more reverential 
dimension. Partially enclosed by the protective ‘shell’ (‘Hülle’) shielding the 
remains of the camp gas chambers from the elements, the ceremony no longer 
monopolises the memorial topography. In any case, it is of fairly modest 
proportions compared to events held at the NMG – around 30 people were 
present at the ceremony I attended in 2011. A further resemblance it now bears to 
other post-unification commemorative events such as the 27 January ceremonies 
is its structure. The programme now typically contains addresses by the 
memorial site directorship, a representative of the Sachsenhausenkomitee, and an 
eyewitness; local school pupils also read poems or give renditions of songs such 
as the ‘Sachsenhausenlied’ and ‘Moorsoldatenlied’, originally composed and 
sung by prisoners of the concentration camps. 
As could be expected, Günter Morsch, speaking in his capacity as 
director, fused commemoration with reconstruction of the historical sequence of 
events leading to the political prisoners’ murder upon opening the ceremony in 
2011. One could recognise the professional consensus around the material site, 
which held that it was a composite of distinguishable ‘traces’, in Morsch’s 
admission that the picture of the resistance efforts and subsequent Gestapo 
investigation was still incomplete. On this reading Sachsenhausen attested as 
much to the absence – of the prisoners who had been killed, but also of the 
erasure of the living proof of what took place in the camp – as to the presence of 
history. Fixity rather than texture and incompleteness characterised the 
Sachsenhausenkomitee’s conception of the site, however. In her speech, Regina 
Szepansky, the representative of the survivors’ organisation, concentrated on the 
internecine conflict between criminal and political prisoners at Sachsenhausen. 
In apportioning blame for denouncing the communist prisoners to the Gestapo 
and SS, she singled out individuals such as Samuel Kundke – a criminal prisoner 
who had become camp elder in 1944 – as ‘exemplary’ (‘examplarisch’) of those 
who had colluded. Such a neat division between honourable resistance and 
dishonourable self-advancement resembled the rhetoric of communist-dominated 
victims’ associations shortly after 1945, which had also sought to wrestle the 
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‘Opfer’ label away from notions of passive victimhood and align it with the 
unassailable (not to mention politically expedient) concept of resistance.198 In 
both cases inconvenient or ambivalent prisoners’ experiences were effectively 
sequestered at the former camps in order to maintain a singular association 
between the material remains and the triumph of antifascism. In the 2011 
ceremony, this was achieved not least by ‘sacralizing’ the 27 victims of 11 
October 1944. Wreaths were laid at Station Z in their honour and the 
‘Sachsenhausenlied’ was sung, signalling through its refrain a teleological 
understanding of the cause that the victims had fought and martyred themselves 
for: 
 
‘Wir schreiten fest im gleichen Schritt,  
wir trotzen Not und Sorgen,  
denn in uns zieht die Hoffnung mit  
auf Freiheit und das Morgen.’199 
 
Collectively, these ceremonies illustrate continuities in on-site 
commemorative practice that have been largely unaffected by the normative 
position on the memorials laid out in the Gedenkstättenkonzeption. In the case of 
the established, pre-1989 traditions, the basic narrative of the survivors’ 
associations in particular has remained the same, the only difference being that 
the ceremonies now form part of a de-centralized and diversified 
commemorative calendar. This change pre-dates the Federal Memorials Strategy 
in any case. Furthermore, the effect of the broadly similar re-conceptualisation of 
both Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen is that the two sites have established 
virtually the same parameters for commemorative discourses. At both, the 
pronounced continuities in the handling of the concentration camp owe a great 
deal to the prioritization of the ‘authentic’ relics over latter-day interpretations in 
the Neugestaltungen.   
                                                
198 See Susanne zur Nieden, ‘Antifaschismus und Kalter Krieg: Vom Hauptausschuss für die 
Opfer des Faschismus zur Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes’, in Von der Erinnerung 
zum Monument, ed. by Morsch, pp. 77-86 (p. 79). 
199 For the song lyrics, see ‘Sachsenhausenlied’, 
http://holocaustmusic.ort.org/places/camps/central-europe/sachsenhausen/sachsenhausenlied/. 
Last accessed 7 Oct 2013; see also Shirli Gilbert, ‘Songs Contest the Past: Music in KZ-
Sachsenhausen’, Contemporary European History, 13, 3 (2004), 117-134. 
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Before I come to discourses on the Speziallager, I address digital media 
produced by the memorials during the last decade that address the history of the 
concentration camps. Given the hand that site staff had in creating them, these 
sources represent an expert discourse on the former camps. What they prove is 
that institutionalisation has not noticeably affected patterns of interpretation. If 
anything, the past decade has seen educators, site staff and members of the 
memorials’ advisory councils firmly adhere to principles developed prior to the 
Federal Memorials’ Strategy and in some cases even before unification, as I have 
shown above. This is well illustrated by an educational CD-ROM and DVD 
produced by the Sachsenhausen memorial in 2004 and 2008 respectively. The 
CD, entitled Gegen das Vergessen: Häftlingsalltag im KZ Sachsenhausen 1936 
bis 1945, was released in conjunction with the exhibition on everyday life in the 
camp that opened in barrack 39 in 2001. It presented the prisoner biographies 
handled in the exhibition, as well as detailed and comprehensive information on 
life for the prisoners, organised under the headings ‘Wege nach Sachsenhausen’; 
‘Häftlingsgesellschaft’; ‘Raum und Zeit’; ‘Arbeit’; ‘Gewalt, Sterben, Tod’; and 
‘Leben mit der Erinnerung’.200  
Günter Morsch, who had acted as chief curator for the Alltag exhibition, 
was also named as the academic advisor for the DVD “Das kann sich keiner 
vorstellen”…Sachsenhausen. It was financed by the Förderverein der 
Gedenkstätte und des Museums Sachsenhausen, and provided a brief overview of 
the memorial, beginning with the establishment of the inspectorate of the 
concentration camp system in Oranienburg and concluding with the post-
unification redesign. Though they coincided with the CDU-initiated 2004 
memorial strategy and 2008 amendment of the Gedenkstättenkonzeption, which 
appeared to tip the scales of the ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ towards equation, 
the CD and DVD presented a quite different discourse on Sachsenhausen. 
Instead, they reflected a longer-term continuity that stretched back beyond the 
moment at which this and other memorials were formally co-opted into federal 
cultural policy.     
A section of the narrative voiceover accompanying the “Das kann sich 
keiner vorstellen” DVD proves the point well. In the penultimate section, 
addressing the years since unification, the narrative track covered both the 
                                                
200 Gegen das Vergessen: Häftlingsalltag im KZ Sachsenhausen 1936 bis 1945, prod. by United 
Soft Media Verlag GmBH, 2nd edn. (Munich, 2004). 
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Internationale Jugend- und Begegnungszentrum (IJBS) at Sachsenhausen 
(constructed in 2004) and the ‘Vermächtnis’ of the concentration camp survivors. 
Underlying their inclusion in the narrative was a stated aim of preserving the 
testimony bequeathed by survivors and communicating this to younger 
generations. In other words, the DVD acknowledged that the memorial in part 
pursued a moral, commemorative agenda. This moralism was expressed in fairly 
muted terms however; the emphasis was very much on prompting ‘weitere[…] 
Fragen’ rather than providing ‘endgultige[…] Antworten’ through confrontation 
with Sachsenhausen and its history, as the voiceover noted. Ultimately then, the 
moral discourse the DVD channelled was not so much the federal ‘anti-
totalitarian consensus’ as the moral injunction to remember contained in the 
‘Vermächtnis’.201 Thus, the role allocated to the memorial in the DVD was 
essentially indistinguishable from that assigned to it by Günter Morsch in 1993, 
when he had spoken of acting as ‘Sachwalter’ for survivors and victims of the 
camp.202 
Equally, the DVD evidenced the continuing influence of even older 
traditions upon the work of the memorials, namely the ‘Beutelsbacher Konsens’. 
Much like the on-site exhibitions, the DVD adopted an expositionary style that 
prioritised the site qua historical artefact – both the opening and closing frames 
were of the memorial – and primarily used eyewitness testimony as a means of 
commenting upon it. Taking the form of a walking tour around the memorial, it 
also grounded testimony and contextual information in specific locations across 
the site – much like the annual liberation commemoration at Buchenwald 
analyzed above. This was clearly the intention behind the CD too. It was 
recommended to users as a means of following up site visits, for example by 
revisiting the prisoner biographies or individual themes in greater detail.203 
Alternatively, it could be used to formulate questions in advance of visiting the 
memorial; in this case the production team suggested that teachers could use the 
CD as the basis for small-group tasks with school groups, who could then be 
                                                
201 “Das kann sich keiner vorstellen”…Sachsenhausen, prod. by Sanssouci Film GmbH and 
Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg (Oranienburg: Förderverein der Gedenkstätte und des Museums 
Sachsenhausen, 2008). 
202 ‘Einführungsrede vor Mitarbeitern’, AS, 02 Jan 1993, p. 9. 
203 Brauer, Juliane, ‘CD-Rom “Der ‘Alltag’ der Häftlinge im KZ Sachsenhausen 1936 – 1945”: 
Pädagogischer Leitfaden’, http://www.stiftung-
bg.de/gums/de/museumspaedagogik/paedagogischer_leitfaden_internet.pdf, p. 6 [accessed 3 Feb 
2013]. 
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directed to relevant eyewitness testimonies from which to glean further 
information when at the memorial.204 Both the DVD and CD expressly avoided 
proscribing fixed interpretations of historical issues and empowered users to 
reach their own conclusions – objectives that were written into the 
‘Beutelsbacher Konsens’ in the tenets ‘Überwältigungsverbot’ and ‘Der Schüler 
muss in die Lage versetzt werden, eine politische Situation und seine eigene 
Interessenlage zu analysieren’.205  
An additional consequence of this subjective, multi-perspectival approach 
was that differentiation, particularly (though not only) between the Nazi and 
Soviet camps, could be written into such commentaries on the material sites 
almost en passant. The CD content provides an elucidating example here. Users 
consulting the biography of the prisoner Heinz Wollmann, for example, can 
access an audio recording in which Wollmann recalls stuffing newspaper down 
his shoes in order to stay warm – and therefore stay alive. To hear him label an 
object as mundane as newspaper ‘lebenswichtig’ is undeniably unsettling for the 
listener, and offers a window into the abject conditions prisoners of the 
concentration camp faced.206 Interestingly, newspapers appear as a memory 
motif in pedagogical materials produced by staff members at Buchenwald too, 
though they instead accompany the Speziallager exhibition. In this instance 
newspapers convey a sense of the sheer monotony and enforced tedium of life in 
the Soviet camp, since prisoners only obtained them, very belatedly, in 1947. 
Different insights into the experience of imprisonment are thus derived from the 
same historical object, one existential and the other psychological, subtly 
encoding a reflex of differentiation and – when applied to a comparison across 
the 1945 divide – of distinction too.   
Both the CD and DVD very much carried forward the tenets of the 
Neugestaltungen into the 2000s. Whilst it is therefore reasonable to see the re-
conceptualisation at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen as a precedent that shaped 
discourses on the sites in the Berlin Republic, it was not in itself a structure (or 
cadre sociaux, to use Halbwachs’ term). Taking this view of institutional practice 
                                                
204 Ibid., p. 6; see also Juliane Brauer, ‘Neue Medien in der Gedenkstättenpädagogik: Beispiele 
zur Anwendung der CD-ROM: “Gegen das Vergessen” – Häftlingsalltag im Konzentrationslager 
Sachsenhausen 1936-1945’, Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 58, 3 (2007), 180-186 
(p. 183). 
205 See ‘Der Beutelsbacher Konsens im Wortlaut’ (online) http://www.bpb.de/die-
bpb/51310/beutelsbacher-konsens [accessed 7 Oct 2013]. 
206 Gegen das Vergessen: Häftlingsalltag im KZ Sachsenhausen 1936 bis 1945. 
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is to essentialize the landmark recommendations issued by the Historians’ 
Commissions. Applying concepts from systems theory however, these past 
decisions can be reconceived as ‘Ressourcen’207 that pre-figure the subsequent 
course of interpretation during the Schröder and Merkel chancellorships. To use 
Luhmann’s terminology, they act as ‘Erwartungsstrukturen’208 that steer the 
temporal dimension of systemic organisation and reproduction – or in other 
words, a system’s evolution over time. I find this a more useful way of 
explaining the discursive continuities I have identified so far, not least because it 
draws attention to the diachronic dimension of the interplay between past and 
present (not to mention action and context).  
 
 
Broadening parameters: the place of the Speziallager in 
the memorial concepts 
 
 
Perhaps the most fiercely contested element of the plans outlined by the 
Historians’ Commissions were the recommendations relating to the post-war 
camps. Here again the question of continuity and change across the steps taken to 
internalize an ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ in German political culture is key. As 
I will show, survivors’ representatives and politicians (belonging to both major 
parties) considered memory of the Soviet camps an integral element of this 
consensus from a very early stage, even though the Neugestaltungen had clearly 
prioritized the sites’ National Socialist pasts. Later, under CDU/SPD and 
thereafter CDU/FDP coalition governments, the post-war injustices at these sites 
would come into much sharper relief as increasing attention was paid to 
totalitarian crimes committed against as opposed to by Germans. 
Institutionalization has, therefore, driven on a process of commemorating and 
acknowledging the fate of the Speziallager victims, at least insofar as memory of 
their victimization is now enshrined in federal cultural policy. 
                                                
207 Luhmann, Soziale Systeme, p. 252. 
208 Ibid., p. 418. 
99 
 
 
What I argue, however, is that on-site at least, the changed political and 
cultural context has actually had relatively little impact upon how major 
stakeholders commemorate the Speziallager and situate it vis-à-vis memory of 
the concentration camps. Just as we saw in the first section of the chapter, 
distinct discursive codes appear to have been carried forward into the new 
millennium. In order to understand the stance of the memorial experts, for 
instance, we must look towards the Gedenkstättenbewegung and local history 
boom of the 1980s as well as the recommendations made by the Historians’ 
Commissions in the early 1990s. Likewise, claims made by many survivors of 
the special camps and their representatives about the moral rectitude of the wider 
prisoner contingent originated in the early post-unification years (or even 
earlier). Neither position responded directly to a proclaimed ‘anti-totalitarian 
consensus’. That said, I do not claim the interpretations of the Speziallager bore 
no relation at all to the precedent set at federal level. Indeed, there is certainly 
evidence that members of the survivors’ associations began to adopt this 
vocabulary in 2005. In the run-up to the federal elections that year, the VOS, 
perhaps registering the CDU’s attempts to reorient the ‘anti-totalitarian 
consensus’ around equation of Nazism and communism, intensified comparisons 
of its own between the Speziallager and concentration camps. 
On the whole however, my findings suggest a need to de-centre 
institutionalized discourse from a chronological survey of cultural memory 
around the two memorials. Instead, we need to attend to the site’s active role in 
shaping the memory landscape. That it exists in a kind of mutually constitutive 
tension with practices of commemoration rather than merely acting as a canvas 
onto which they are projected is clear in, amongst other things, the attitudes of 
particular Speziallager lobby groups. Only by appreciating the sense of 
proprietorship organizations such as the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Lager 
Sachsenhausen 1945 – 1950 e. V. (ALS) claim over the entire memorial grounds 
– the ALS, in fact, spoke in the early 2000s of ‘its’ memorial – can we begin to 
understand the rationale behind their support for joint commemoration of both 
camp phases. By the same token, the memorial experts have not ‘imposed’ a 
paradigm of contextualized and compartmentalized commemoration on the sites 
so much as developed it in response to the ‘traces’ (‘Spuren’) they have found 
there.  
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I once more follow a chronological narrative beginning in the 1990s and 
following debates either taking place at the memorials or directly related to the 
material sites through to the 20th anniversary of unification. Analysis of 
commemorative ceremonies – again as both a performance and discourse – forms 
a large part of my discussion. Though I do analyze the museological and 
commemorative strategies employed in the two Speziallager exhibitions, I do so 
primarily where there is a connection to be made to the central question of 
institutionalization and the dynamic of cultural memory. The underlying 
concepts and exhibition architecture have in any case been commented on 
elsewhere.209 I have relied in addition on specialist publications such as the 
newsletters of the various victims’ associations; exhibition catalogues; the audio 
guides available on-site; and commemorative speeches.     
To begin with, it is worth recapitulating the normative discourse that was 
beginning to crystallize at Buchenwald in the years prior to the opening of the 
Speziallager exihibition in 1997. Indeed, at the time of the symbolic ground 
breaking ceremony for construction on the Speziallager museum at Buchenwald 
in 1995, the first of the two Enquete Commissions dealing with the East German 
past had already proclaimed the need for an ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’. 
Speaking at the ceremony, Thuringian Minister for Science, Research and 
Culture Gerd Schuchardt portrayed Buchenwald as the testing ground for this 
consensus, noting ‘[p]olitische Kultur in Deutschland wird gemessen am 
Umgang mit seiner Geschichte an sensiblen Orten wie Buchenwald’.210 On this 
reading, the memorial’s dual tasks of developing a historically and ethically 
appropriate means of commemorating two overlapping pasts and dealing with 
the legacy of the GDR were more broadly relevant on a national level. 
Buchenwald’s ‘doppelte Zerreißprobe’211 was Germany’s ‘doppelte 
Zerreißprobe’ too. 
Implicit to Schuchardt’s line of reasoning was that there would be no line 
drawn under either past. As he went on to explain however, it was only within 
                                                
209 See Horst Seferens, ‘"Der systematische Schein des Unsystematischen": Eröffnung des 
Museums "Sowjetisches Speziallager Nr. 7/Nr. 1 (1945-1950)" in der Gedenkstätte und Museum 
Sachsenhausen’, GedenkstättenRundbrief (2002), 14-20. 
210 ‘Rede des Ministers für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur Dr. Gerd Schuchardt anläßlich 
des symbolischen ersten Spatenstichs zum Bau eines Ausstellungsgebäudes zur Geschichte des 
sowjetischen Speziallagers 2 Buchenwald 1945 – 1950’, in Speziallager 2 1945-1950: Rundbrief, 
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certain set parameters that a more inclusive model of commemoration 
referencing German perpetration and German victimhood was acceptable. 
Returning once more to Buchenwald, Schuchardt categorically stated: 
 
‘Sie [die Gedenkstätte, RB] wird sich nicht scheuen, das zwischen 1945 
und 1950 in Buchenwald begangene Unrecht beim Namen zu nennen. 
Aber sie wird das von Deutschen in den Jahren 1939-1945 in Europa 
begangene Unrecht nicht relativieren. Denn nur die schonungslose 
Erinnerung an diese Verbrechen legitimiert zur Kritik am Unrecht, das 
von anderen begangene wurde.’212 
 
Only by accepting that accountability remained vital, therefore, could 
remembrance of post-1945 injustices avoid charges of relativisation. The 
Holocaust-centred but inclusive paradigm advocated by Schuchardt mirrored the 
approach broadly favoured across the political parties involved in the Enquête 
Commissions. In fact, it foreshadowed the notion of a German ‘anti-totalitarian 
consensus’ that the commissions popularized and, with the 1998 Schlußbericht, 
wrote into federal discourse. Did such an interpretation percolate downwards to 
the groups involved in on-site commemoration with the issuing of the 
Schlußbericht? In the remainder of this section I trace the various patterns of 
interaction with the built relics of the Speziallager as well as the newly erected 
museums and commemorative symbols dedicated to the Soviet camps through to 
the present day. I begin with the respective museum openings in 1997 at 
Buchenwald and 2001 at Sachsenhausen, before assessing whether federal 
cultural policy of the early 2000s and the upcoming elections in 2005 impacted 
upon the memory discourses around the sites’ post-war topography. I conclude 
by taking stock of trends around the time of subsequent federal elections – and 
the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall – in 2009. 
The permanent exhibition on Speziallager Nr. 2 at Buchenwald, housed 
in a purpose-built documentation centre and inaugurated on 25 May 1997, was 
the first of its kind to open in Germany. It was also the second major project to 
be completed as part of the Neugestaltung following the opening of the 
permanent exhibition on the concentration camp, discussed above. As we have 
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seen, heated debates on the post-war camp had been ongoing since 1990, and by 
no means ended with the opening of the new museum. However, before I look at 
responses to the Speziallager at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen in the new 
millennium, I wish to provide an overview of the exhibition at Buchenwald, 
followed by a snapshot of how memorial specialists, victims’ organisations, and 
politicians initially interacted with the new documentation centre. Here I pay 
particular attention to the ways in which the site materiality and spatiality were 
perceived. 
Just as in the concentration camp exhibition, the Speziallager exhibition 
was structured around prisoners’ biographies. More than 20 of these biographies 
were presented in a series of drawers running along the left-hand side of the 
documentation centre. Both the exhibition layout and the tactile features such as 
sliding drawers and multimedia stations empowered visitors to engage critically 
and autonomously with the content on display; they invited deeper engagement 
with particular individuals and themes but proscribed no set sequence or manner 
in which to do so.213 In addition to the concept of Urteilsbildung, the 
Kontroversitätsprinzip served as a conceptual thread running through the 
exhibition – this was another principle outlined in the Beutelsbacher Konsens. 
Indeed, the exhibition utilized techniques such as juxtaposition and multi-
perspectivity to highlight the differing interpretations of the special camp. 
Information on the conditions there were set against panels on the opposite side 
of the exhibition space dealing with Allied internment camps in the Western 
Occupation Zones after 1945 in order to draw attention to differences between 
the camps. Likewise, the biographies cover a variety of prisoners, including not 
just de facto victims of arbitrary imprisonment but also those clearly guilty of 
collaboration with the National Socialist regime prior to 1945. As the 
museological concept applied here implied, the Speziallager defied 
straightforward categorization. 
This multi-perspectival approach carried over into the documentation 
centre’s design and embedment in the camp topography. Particularly ingenious 
was the architectural rendering of the camp’s dual origins in de-nazification 
protocol and Stalinist repression. The shell of the building and the exhibition 
itself were devoid of any commemorative elements, and the building was 
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positioned in such a way that it was not visible from the Appellplatz. As a 
consequence, the stipulation that the post-war camp at Buchenwald be 
‘subordinated’ to the concentration camp was met; it did not impinge visually on 
the topography of the National Socialist camp, and visitors were not presented 
with an overtly commemorative space in a way that might have invited false 
analogies between the two camp phases. That said, a single slit window in the 
documentation centre is located next to the Totenbuch for prisoners of the special 
camp and looks out onto the nearby mass grave. Even this muted element of 
pathos reminds visitors that, whatever the post-war camps’ putative connections 
to de-nazification, the Speziallager were nonetheless inhumane and characterised 
by mass death. 
Speaking at the museum’s inauguration, Volkhard Knigge and Eberhard 
Jäckel, the chair of the Thuringian Historians’ Commission, agreed that the 
exhibition served first and foremost the victims of the Speziallager.214 At the 
same time, Knigge commented on the design of the documentation centre, which 
had been the cause of significant friction between the memorial and the 
Speziallager lobby in the preceding two years. In his estimation, the building’s 
almost featureless exterior well captured ‘die Unwirtlichkeit des Lagers, seinen 
Charakter als Isolations- und Schweigelager’.215 Equally, he described the 
exhibition space’s uniformly grey palette as an ‘Elendsgrau’ that lent the 
exhibition objects and documents an unsettling prominence in their marked 
contrast to the general colour scheme.216 Günter Morsch would use an almost 
identical set of arguments in support of muted museum architecture in 2001, 
when the Speziallager museum opened at Sachsenhausen (see below). For the 
memorial professionals, it was important that the exhibitions implicitly honoured 
victims of the former camps, but the museum architecture should ultimately 
respect the primacy of the historical site. 
In addition, both Knigge and Jäckel saw in the documentation centre an 
implicit response to GDR memory culture. This was however framed in a 
narrative of (belatedly) re-conceptualising the memorial around rigorous 
empirical and scientific standards. Jäckel for instance noted that the newly 
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opened exhibition was ‘frei von Weisungen’,217 whilst Knigge argued that the 
exhibition allowed visitors to ‘engage autonomously and for the sake of 
historical enlightenment with German history’ (‘sich selbstverantwortlich und 
um historischer Aufklärung willen mit deutscher Geschichte 
auseinandersetzten’).218 Both therefore envisaged visitors’ interaction with the 
Speziallager museum as that of empowered, critically discerning ‘users’ of the 
exhibition space rather than passive ‘recipients’ of its message, much in line with 
developments in museological practice more broadly.219 Having already sketched 
out above how the exhibition both anticipates and facilitates this model of visitor 
behaviour, I now briefly consider the ways in which other stakeholders depart 
from it. 
Indeed, survivors and their representatives were less concerned with the 
respective epistemologies of museum display when it came to differentiating 
between the GDR and the reunified Federal Republic. For them, the new 
exhibition was not so much a corrective to earlier GDR memory culture as an 
indictment of the East German state as a whole. Gerhard Finn, in his speech at 
the inauguration, hoped that the Speziallager documentation at Buchenwald 
would immunize against GDR nostalgia.220 Consequently, an objective moral 
message was assigned to the exhibits, and the exhibition as a whole was 
positioned within an ideological deconstruction of post-1945 communist systems 
of rule in East Germany. 
Federal and regional politicians attached a similarly monolithic message 
to the documentation centre. One of the invited speakers at the inauguration was 
Markus Meckel, who was an instrumental figure in the two Enquete 
commissions, and in his address to the audience at Buchenwald he outlined a 
position that had been popularised by the work of the commissions. He was first 
of all careful to situate the Speziallager and Stalinist injustices within a chain of 
historical causality, in which ‘[d]er von Deutschland geführte totale Krieg…auf 
das eigene Volk zurück[schlug]’.221 Thus he recognised and reinforced the 
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continued centrality of German accountability for the Holocaust in an integrated 
narrative of the period 1933-1989. Mindful of this, Meckel could 
unproblematically argue that memorials to the double past, such as Buchenwald, 
were ‘unersetzliche Pfeiler einer demokratischen Erinnerungskultur und des 
antitotalitären Konsenses’222 – a formulation that normatively linked both the 
Nazi and communist pasts to a German polity united in the lessons it drew from 
its own dark history. Gerd Schuchardt, in a similar vein, referred to Buchenwald 
as a ‘Stätte der Begegnung und des Lernens für alle [...], die nach uns kommen’ 
(italics RB).223 Political discourse couched engagement with the Speziallager 
museum (and by extension the Buchenwald memorial as a whole) in the 
language of national identity politics. 
Perceptions of the documentation centre therefore hinged upon how one 
interpreted the memorial’s dual responsibilities of commemoration and 
documentation. The team behind the exhibition had clearly sought to keep 
commemoration and documentation separate, as was clear in the single visual 
link to the mass graves and objective, enlightenment tone of the exhibition 
content. Politicians by and large agreed that the history of the Soviet camp 
should be ‘subordinated’ to treatment of the concentration camp, following the 
recommendation made by the Historians’ Commission. Where they departed 
from the stance of the memorial specialists was in the function they assigned to 
the site: confrontation with Buchenwald’s double past should consolidate 
national identity in the present. Any separation of documentation and 
commemoration became, in this view, largely irrelevant. Members of the 
Speziallager victims’ lobby, by contrast, implicated the museum in a moral 
discourse of commemoration. 
The opening of the Speziallager museum at Sachsenhausen elicited 
similarly disparate reactions from survivors’ lobbies and the curatorial team. 
Whereas Günter Morsch spoke approvingly of the museum upon its 
inauguration, the former prisoners and organisations representing them were by 
contrast less taken with the finished product. A review appearing early in 2002 in 
Der Stacheldraht, the newsletter of the Union der Opfer kommunistischer 
Gewaltherrschaft (henceforth UOKG), was largely critical of the museum 
concept and exhibition style. Just as significantly, it revealed fundmental 
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differences between the memorial experts and the victims’ association 
concerning what a museum ought to represent and achieve. The review appeared 
for one thing to challenge the logic behind the museum’s muted architecture, 
defining it as ‘unzugänglich’224 and so evaluating it in terms of its appeal to 
visitors rather than its place in the ‘dezentrales Museumkonzept’.  
Morsch, on the other hand, had rejected unequivocally the argument for a 
symbolic form of commemoration, remarking that it was not the task of a 
museum to produce this. He instead praised the museum’s functional aesthetic, 
which he believed to encourage, through its conspicuous lack of any artistic 
features, a sense of consternation at the ambivalence of the perpetrators as well 
as sympathy for the victims of the special camp. Furthermore, he argued that the 
series of slit windows linking the museum building to the nearby mass graves 
and the inclusion of a central display cabinet dealing with ‘Tod und Sterben’ 
successfully fused the building and exhibition into an ‘ästhetische[...] Einheit’.225 
This was not to say that he limited his comments to the museum building; he also 
pointed to the inclusion of two prisoner barracks in the museum concept: 
 
‘Durch die Einbeziehung von zwei authentisch erhaltenen, unmittelbar 
benachbarten Häftlingsbaracken in das museale Konzept, wird darüber 
hinaus mit zurückhaltenden Mittel versucht, die Lethargie und 
Erbärmlichkeit des Haftalltags im Speziallager ein kleines Stück weit 
sinnlich vorstellbar zu machen.‘226 
 
The Stacheldraht review made no mention of these additional elements, 
focusing instead on the museum building. Tellingly, the reviewers appeared to 
misread the intention behind the concept and assumed that the exhibition lacked 
any kind of guiding narrative whatsoever, noting: 
 
‘Kein Lageplan, keine Übersicht, mit deren Hilfe man Ausstellungsteile 
auswählen könnte, keine Hervorhebungen oder Hinweise für den Weg, 
einfach nichts [...] Hier wird der Besucher in einem Maße alleingelassen, 
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daß er entweder den Weg ins nächste Cafe eintritt oder [...] nach einer 
flüchtigen Überschau glaubt, er „wisse“ nun etwas über Speziallager. 
Weder zur Vertiefung in die Interpretation der historischen Sachverhalte 
noch zu wirklichem Verstehen wird eingeladen.‘227 
 
Here the difference in functional understanding of the memorial museum 
was at its most pronounced. This was readily apparent not just in the review’s 
assumption that there should be a carefully explicitated ‘route’ (‘Weg’) through 
the exhibition, but also in a crucial misplacement of a section on the camp 
commandent, Alexander Kostiukhin, at the start of the exhibition. According to 
the Stacheldraht article, the visitor comes first of all to a section on the end of the 
war and the rise of figures such as Kostiukhin, who had cut their teeth in the 
Soviet GULag system and would soon play important roles in the administration 
of the special camps in Germany.228 This reading situates the Speziallager 
alongside, even perhaps within the GULag archipelago by tying them to figures 
such as Kostiukhin, whose own biography was closed entwined with that system 
of camps.  
Yet the exhibition in fact ‘begins’ – at least in the chronological sense – 
with a discussion of the situation in 1945 and Allied internment policy. The so-
called ‘Berija-Befehl’, the military directive from which the special camps 
emanated and which authorised the detention of both domestic and Nazi security 
threats, is documented in the first vitrine the visitor reaches, whilst wall panels 
on the far side of the exhibition space detail the polemical coverage of the camp 
in Cold War and post-unification newspaper reportage. Fittingly, the subjective 
and complex experience of prisoners that speaks through their biographies and 
the exhibits is situated in between the two. Thus, the visitor is enjoined to look 
beyond the polarising frames of the camp’s beginnings in domestic security 
measures and its afterlife in historical memory, both of which tell only a half-
truth about its true character. The Stacheldraht review and its somewhat skewed 
reading of the exhibition narrative, by contrast, betray the assumption that the 
camp can and should be more straightforwardly identified with the GULag. An 
article appearing in the same newsletter two years later reinforces this 
impression, referring to the special camps as ‘Außenstellen des GULag’ in its 
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title. Likewise, it cites the ‘Kraft der Versöhnung’ extolled in a sermon at that 
year’s commemorative ceremony and extended to all victims of the special 
camp, failing to distinguish between those unjustly persecuted as supposed 
political opponents of Stalinism and those who had been de facto Nazi 
functionaries.229    
In the pages of Freiheitsglocke too, victims of the Speziallager and their 
representatives reacted angrily to the content and format of the newly opened 
exhibition. Once more their objections rested on a disparity between expert and 
advocative stances vis-à-vis the role of memorial museums. This was relatively 
surprising, insofar as the Speziallager museum at Sachsenhausen was 
unequivocally critical of Soviet post-war internment practices. To give one 
particularly pertinent example, the museum displayed a name list compiled by 
Kurt Weiss, one of a group of 38 youths from Greußen arrested on ‘Werwolf’ 
charges (and referred to as the Greußener Jungs). The names of the deceased are 
marked with a cross or struck through, in effect combining the documentary 
function of naming the victims with the commemorative function of honouring 
the dead.230 Transposing the exhibit to the memorial museum setting naturally 
lent it a poignancy that went beyond its testimonial value, as the sparse, almost 
incantatory ‘list’ format resembled something closer to a memorial in and of 
itself, especially in the dimly-lit and quiet surroundings of the Speziallager 
exhibition. Arguably then, the sense of pathos here was unexpectedly 
pronounced, even if the exhibition, for the sake of narrative balance, cited 
accusations that certain inmates belonged to ‘[die] sogenannten führenden 
Kreise[…] der Nazis’ and were therefore not undeserving of imprisonment.231  
In spite of this, the decision to include a section documenting the 
perpetrators – namely Kostiukhin – in the museum elicited vocal protest from 
victims’ organisations. The exhibition planning team had if anything taken a 
strongly condemnatory tone in their treatment of camp personnel. Mention of 
Kostiukhin’s time as a guard in the infamous Solovetski camp in the White Sea, 
opened in 1923 as a prototype for the GULag system, was explicitly intended to 
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embed the special camps within the Soviet machinery of state terror.232 Yet this 
evidently was not enough for the Speziallager victims, who responded with 
outrage at the thought of a ‘Denkmal’ for the camp commandant making its way 
into the exhibition.233 Not only did they object in principle to the coverage of 
Kostiukhin; they also sought to discredit the exhibition planners and memorial 
professionals at Sachsenhausen by warning of a return to the ‘ohnmächtige 
Trauer’ of GDR times, as if the move purposefully aimed at restoring a veil of 
silence around the camp and its existence.234  
Two years later, the memorial site staff came under renewed criticism for 
their depiction of conditions in the special camps in a contribution to a volume 
reflecting the current state of research into the Speziallager. Published in 1998, 
the collection drew upon insights gained through research into newly opened 
Soviet archives, and grew out of collaboration between the Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen memorials and university departments in Hagen and Jena. 
Despite the scholarly rigour and meticulous research these solid credentials 
suggested, the volume was denounced as ‘[s]chamlose Geschichtsfälschung’ in 
Freiheitsglocke.235 In particular a chapter written by a former staff member at 
Sachsenhausen positing a liberalisation of conditions at camps in 1949 provoked 
a hostile response. The purported ‘Liberaliserungsschritte’ and the claim that 
prisoners could receive money and parcels from relatives as of 1949 were seen as 
‘absurde[…] und verlogene[…] Darstellungen’236 and vigorously contested by 
the victims’ organisation. So too was the chapter’s insistence that multiple and 
overlapping jurisdictional responsibilities for the camps rather than a deliberate 
strategy of liquidation were the cause of such a high mortality rate amongst 
prisoners.  
Both the putative ‘Liberalisierung’ of camp conditions and the prisoners’ 
right to receive packages and money were refuted a second time by a former 
inmate of the Speziallager at Sachsenhausen, who wrote in to Freiheitsglocke. 
Contradicting the view of the memorial experts, the survivor stated that neither 
packages nor money could be received or sent at any point during the camp’s 
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five-year existence; only letters could be sent from late 1949, and even then these 
were heavily censored.237 Once again the charge of ‘Fälschung’ was levelled at 
the memorial experts, and in this case attributed explicitly to the citation of 
‘angebliche[…] sowjetische[…] Dokumente’.238 As in the UOKG and VOS’s 
earlier objections to the documentation of Kostiukhin in the Speziallager 
exhibition, the fault lines in the debates surrounding camp conditions were drawn 
between critical, expert efforts at historical reconstruction and a survivor 
perspective fiercely protective of eye-witness testimony. In large part the 
victims’ organisations took issue with the use of perpetrator sources because they 
posed a challenge to the ‘total victimization’ trope. As we see, the notion of 
‘liberalisation’ called into question not only survivors’ recollections, but also the 
motif of complete isolation that had constituted an integral element of the 
victimization narrative. The VOS and UOKG were concerned first and foremost 
with mobilising in defence of this position, and less prepared to take on board the 
archival evidence presented in the exhibition and the publication by the memorial 
experts.             
Of course, the dual obligations of the memorials towards the victims on 
the one hand and towards the objective historical record on the other have 
imposed certain institutional limits of their own on the representation of state-
sanctioned injustice in general terms, and of the double past more specifically. 
Lutz Niethammer inverts the familiar dictum of the ‘Zeitzeuge als Feind des 
Historikers’ to convey a sense of the challenges that academic and curatorial 
staff at memorials to the double past face. Is it not in fact the case, Niethammer 
asks, that historians are the threat to eyewitness testimony, not least because, as 
custodians of this testimony, they assume control of the witness’ subjective 
identity? Might they reduce survivors to affirmative’ Ikonen der Unterhaltung’ if 
simply using their biographies to evidence suffering?239 Certainly the teams 
responsible for the new exhibitions at both Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen have 
done an admirable job of integrating the victims’ perspective into the redesigned 
memorial conceptions in a differentiated and reflexive manner, as I have argued 
for much of this chapter. Equally, the leitmotif of a memorial visit as 
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‘Spurensuche’ that underpins both sites explicitly challenges visitors to look 
beyond naturalised or stock narratives of victimisation by tying these to the 
specific place at which – and specific historical context in which – this 
victimisation occurred. But in certain instances this paradigm runs up against its 
own limitations in narrating the phenomenon of multiple camp phases, and I 
would like to briefly consider one such example here.      
As part of the Neugestaltung at Sachsenhausen, a new visitor signage 
system (‘Besucherleitsystem’) has been installed. An audio tour is also available, 
allowing visitors to access contextual information about particular stations within 
the ‘dezentrales Konzept’ by entering the corresponding number on the signage 
system into an audio device. In certain ways the ‘Spurensuche’ concept has been 
applied to the audio commentary too, as several stations include optional 
‘Vertiefungsebenen’ for those who wish to discover more about their historical 
function as well as how they were perceived both during and after the Third 
Reich. Whilst walking along the ‘Lagerstraße’ leading to the entrance to the 
former camp, for instance, visitors can access information on the audio guide 
relating to its place in the recollections of both concentration camp and special 
camp prisoners. Thus it is of interest firstly as an example of how the memorial 
specialists tasked with Sachsenhausen’s redesign have negotiated implicit 
comparisons between the Nazi and Soviet camps. In particular the audio guide’s 
approach to documenting and commemorating the double past forms an 
interesting contrast to the moralising narrative of total victimisation presented by 
the Speziallager victims’ organisations. Secondly, it is of interest as a reminder 
that context – namely, the auratic and material dimensions of the memorial as 
historical relic – conditions the forms these comparisons may take. 
The segment of the audio guide addressing the ‘Lagerstraße’ relays two 
anecdotes about prisoners’ experiences entering and leaving Sachsenhausen 
along this road in a ‘Verteifungsebene’. The first describes how locals often 
gathered by the side of the camp road to pelt prisoners entering the concentration 
camp with stones, whilst the second explains that, for certain Speziallager 
prisoners assigned to external work details, taking the road had provided a 
precious opportunity to furtively pass letters to their family. Visitors are referred 
in the audio commentary to several such letters sent between the prisoner Paul-
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Otto Helm and his children, now displayed in the Speziallager museum.240 This 
is a thoughtful and challenging narrative, designed to point out the multi-
layeredness of the ‘Lagerstraße’ as a historical relic and also critique the account 
of complete isolation in the Speziallager propagated by the victims of 
communism (though without devoiding Helm’s story of a strong sense of 
pathos). Looked at another way, however, the audio commentary can be 
understood as a mechanism of disentangling the complex strands of this 
multivalent relic and predicating comparisons between the two camp phases on 
difference. Indeed, juxtaposing hostility towards concentration camp inmates and 
familial solidarity with prisoners of the special camp arguably has the effect of 
bifurcating the ‘Lagerstraße’ into two distinct memory spaces – one attesting to 
the awful situation facing prisoners of the Nazi camp and the other suggesting a 
comparably more tolerable experience in the Speziallager. Moreover, as visitors 
must take the ‘Lagerstraße’ to enter the main camp it is one of the first stations 
on the audio tour. ‘Beginning’, as it were, with the dichotomous narrativisation 
of the road as a symbol of victimisation prior to 1945 and solidarity thereafter 
risks pre-figuring models of difference. 
This is not intended as a criticism of the audio commentary’s content, nor 
of the rationale behind differentiation. Rather, I wish to highlight the conundrum 
the memorial site is presented with as a result of its dual commemorative and 
documentary imperatives, as well as the auratic quality of the exhibition space 
itself. In relation to the demands of history and memory that memorial museums 
to the double past must contend with, Andrew Beattie has noted that the two are 
in practice hard to disentangle from one another. Their professed ‘physical and 
cognitive separation of documentation and commemoration’ notwithstanding, 
even the memorials’ enlightenment aims are in part derived from a humanitarian 
and moral commitment to the victims that suffered there.241 To this I would add 
that the multiple authenticities of the site architecture – what Günter Morsch has 
aptly labelled a ‘mehrfach gebrochene Scheinauthentizität’ in light of its reuse in 
the GDR memorial ensemble242 – further complicates matters. Many features of 
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the post-unification memorials such as the ‘Lagerstraße’ at Sachsenhausen attest 
to injustices that occured either side of 1945. Given this, could the audio 
commentary’s use of juxtaposition to explain and contextualize this multivalence 
in fact do an injustice to the memorial’s affective (and educational) potential as a 
palimpsestuous space? The question reinforces one of this chapter’s central 
contentions, namely that the memorials as discursive spaces set limits and 
possibilities of their own for representing the double past.   
I wish to return now to the victims’ lobbies and compare their attitudes in 
the mid-2000s to the positions I have recapitulated above. The first lobby group I 
address, on the evidence of a commemorative ceremony at Buchenwald in 2005, 
is the VOS. This is an elucidating example, as it suggests that shifts in the course 
of federal cultural policy may have prompted a hardening of their stance on 
communist injustices. Following this, I consider how the victims of National 
Socialism have responded to the Soviet camps at Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen since the Speziallager exhibitions opened there. Despite the 
overwhelming empirical evidence that the memorials now present in favour of 
commemorating the post-war victims, the concentration camp prisoners’ 
committees have on the whole maintained a skeptical distance to the issue of 
Stalinist injustices. 
For his part, the federal chair of the VOS Bernd Stichler saw little 
difference between Stalinist communism and ‘real existing socialism’. In a 
commemorative speech held at Buchenwald in 2005, Stichler effaced differences 
between the SBZ and GDR, regarding them both as part of an expansive 
‘Diktatur des Sowjetimperiums’.243 Equally, he subsumed victims of the SED 
regime, such as those shot attempting to flee to the West across the Berlin Wall, 
and German victims of Soviet post-war injustices together under the blanket 
label ‘victims of communism’. This category amounted to a total of 100m 
victims – a figure popularised by the 1997 Black Book of Communism. Not only 
did Stichler use the occasion of commemorating the Speziallager victims to 
construct an unbroken period of dictatorship from 1945-1989. He also contrasted 
the 100m victims of communism with the approximately 30m victims of Nazism 
                                                                                                                               
Geschichte und Zukunft eines geschändeten Denkmals, ed. by Günter Morsch (Berlin: Edition 
Hentrich and Stiftung Branenburgische Gedenkstätten, 1995), pp. 9-14 (p. 11). 
243 B. Stichler, ‘Es gibt kein Braun ohne Rot – Parallelen zwischen den Diktaturen sichtbar 
machen’, FG, 632 (Jun 2005), 10. 
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in order to refute arguments in favour of differentiating between the two 
dictatorships.  
In fact, as far as Stichler was concerned, was was truly ‘criminal’ 
(‘verbrecherisch’) was to refute any kind of comparison between the camps out 
of hand.’244 Pronouncements of this sort indicated that anti-communism was still 
a prevalent feature of the Speziallager lobby’s interpretation of Buchenwald in 
the run-up to the 2005 federal elections. Moreover, the initial circumvention of 
certain Speziallager prisoners’ initial culpability for National Socialism had 
given way to outright elision of this fact. The true crime, according to Stichler, 
was not to compare the two regimes. Enforced comparison now overrode, as it 
were, even the prerogative of internalising one’s own guilt or compromised 
victimhood that Gerhard Finn had spoken of in 1994. In this respect at least, 
then, the position of the post-war victims’ lobby appeared to keep pace with 
concurrent shifts in the federal political landscape, though not with advances in 
scientific knowledge of Soviet post-war internment practices.  
Stichler’s speech came in late May 2005, only a matter of months before 
the federal elections of that year. In it he observed with evident concern that 
right-wing parties were ‘öffentlich geächtet’ in Germany whilst the PDS was 
‘öffentlich hofiert’.245 He further warned that a governing SPD under Gerhard 
Schröder could become the ‘Wegbereiter einer neuen Diktatur’ by entering into a 
coalition with the PDS, attributing this danger to a ‘gemeinsame ideologische 
Basis’ in Marxism that these two parties shared with the Greens.246 Stichler’s 
commemorative speech was therefore also an overtly political statement, and one 
that unmistakeably sided with the CDU’s equationist approach to memorializing 
National Socialism, Stalinism and ‘real socialism’. This course had been 
signalled by the ‘Gesamtkonzept für ein würdiges Gedenken aller Opfer der 
beiden deutschen Diktaturen’ put forward by the party in 2003, and Stichler’s 
rhetoric certainly echoed its reference to the ‘beiden totalitären Diktaturen des 
20. Jahrhunderts’.247  
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Representatives of the concentration camp victims, meanwhile, proved to 
be rigidly inflexible in their interpretation of Sachsenhausen’s post-war history. 
A report written on the Speziallager museum in 2003 by the Niederländischer 
Freundeskreis Sachsenhausen, a group affiliated with the ISK, might just as well 
have been written a decade earlier, such was the extent to which it trivialised 
injustices committed by the Soviet Occupation forces. Describing the purpose of 
the post-war camps, the report categorically stated that they had at first 
‘primarily’ (‘hauptsächlich’) held ‘Naziparteibonzen…, SS-Leute[…] und 
andere[…] Kriegsgefangene[…]’. It conceded at another point that political 
opponents of the Soviet regime were increasingly prominent amongst the 
prisoners, though described them in highly ambiguous terms as ‘Menschen…, 
die sich gegen das Sowjetregime kehrten sowie Kriminelle’.248 In doing so, the 
report presented post-war internment as a legitimate form of criminal punishment 
and utterly ignored both the overwhelming evidence of arbitrary grounds for 
arrest and the presence of legitimately innocent prisoners in the camps. Likewise, 
it treated the ALS with a bewildering degree of scepticism. Despite (rather 
disingenuously) professing ‘Verständnis’ for this lobby group’s stance on 
commemoration of post-1945 injustices at Sachsenhausen, the Freundeskreis 
nonetheless proceeded to speculate that: 
 
‘Unter den Mitgliedern dieses Vereins [the ALS, RB]…sich vermutlich 
auch die Nazis [befinden], die unmittelbar nach ihrem Prozess in 
Nürnberg in das Sowjetische Speziallager Nr. 7 eingewiesen wurden.’249     
 
As well as indicting the prisoners of the Speziallager and the organisation 
representing them for having purportedly propped up the National Socialist 
regime, the Freundeskreis sought to trivialise conditions in the post-war camp. 
Relying on a reductive reading of the evangelical priest Heinrich Gruber’s 
comments upon visiting Sachsenhausen in 1947, the report noted: ‘[i]n seinen 
                                                
248 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Lager Sachsenhausen 1945 – 1950 e. V., ‘Neubau in Oranienburg 
erinnert an das Sowjetische Speziallager Nr. 7’, FG, 598 (Aug 2002), 4. The report appeared in 
Freiheitsglocke, evidently as the ALS and VOS wished to highlight its extremely tendentious 
reading of Sachsenhausen’s post-war history. The victims’ organisations neglected to say 
whether or not it had been redacted or amended for publication here however. As I was unable to 
locate a copy of this report in published material pertaining to the concentration camp victims’ 
lobby groups, I have had to rely on this copy.   
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Augen glich es [the Speziallager, RB] einem Sanatorium.’250 This comment in 
particular was singled out in a later article by the VOS rejecting the report as 
‘skandalös’.251 Moreover, as far as the VOS were concerned, the views espoused 
by the Freundeskreis were part of an ongoing campaign to trivialize the post-war 
camps. This latest intervention had, in the eyes of the Speziallager victims’ 
representatives, ‘once more’ (‘einmal mehr’) attempted to downplay post-war 
injustices at Sachsenhausen.252 Certainly there was little to distinguish it from the 
rhetoric of 1990, when survivors of the concentration camp had labelled the 
Speziallager lobby a ‘Tarnorganisation zum Schutz von Schwer- und 
Scwerstbelasteten’.253 
We have already seen above how the dogmatic anti-fascism of 
communist-dominated victims’ associations underlay interactions with the post-
unification memorials. Were there equivalent conventions or pre-suppositions 
behind the commemorative discourses of the various Speziallager victims’ 
organisations? Whereas the Freundeskreis clearly felt that the regional 
government in Brandenburg had ‘respected’ the wishes of the ISK254 by ensuring 
the Speziallager museum at Sachsenhausen was erected outside of the main 
camp triangle, the VOS vehemently opposed separate on-site commemoration of 
the two camp phases. Instead, siting the museum in Zone II was seen as 
‘nachträgliche Diskriminierung’ and an ‘offene[…] Verhöhnung der vielen 
unschuldigen Toten und Überlebenden des Speziallagers’.255 Furthermore, the 
museum itself was referred to in the Freiheitsglocke article as ‘die Gedenkstätte 
der Arbeitsgemeinschaft 1945-1950 e. V.’,256 suggesting a more proprietorial 
attachment to it. Unlike the memorial specialists then, for whom the concept of 
the ‘Gedenkstätte als multiple Institution’257 dictated its function and the 
constituencies it should serve, the Speziallager lobby foregrounded the 
museum’s role in commemorating and extending symbolic recognition to victims 
of the post-war camp.   
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It is noticeable that members of the Initiativgruppe make recourse to 
religious language and symbolism at commemorative ceremonies held in honour 
of the Speziallager victims at Buchenwald. A sermon has long been part of these 
ceremonies, and attests to the Christian connotations that remembrance takes on 
in this format. In the 1994 sermon, for example, Richard von Weizsäcker’s 
maxim that memory is the ‘Geheimnis der Erlösung’ was cited.258 Since then, it 
has become the norm to portray remembrance as an act of reconciliation; 
services over the years have, to cite a select few examples, drawn on the motif of 
a survivor who had pledged to lead a life without hatred after the war was 
over,259 called for the forgiveness of sins,260 and recited Paulus’ enjoinder: ‘Zur 
Freiheit hat euch Christus befreit. / Bleibt daher fest und lasst euch nicht von 
neuem das Joch / der Knechtschaft auflegen!’.261 The corollary of employing 
these Christian motifs is an elision of the culpability of certain Speziallager 
prisoners for lending their support to the Third Reich. Looking more closely at 
the language of commemoration on site thus reveals ways in which Luhmann’s 
concept of systemic codes could be applied to discourse at the memorials. It is a 
form of reducing complexity in the sense that it screens awkward questions about 
the grounds for imprisonment in the Speziallager and is repeated each year, 
thereby building a code into the act of commemoration.   
At Sachsenhausen, the position of the ALS in the years around 2009 is 
broadly the same. It also prioritizes redemptive narratives designed to restore 
honour to the victims over multi-perspectivity, recommending for instance that 
the post-war rehabilitation of many prisoners by the Russian government is 
included in the Speziallager museum. They have also erected a seven-metre high 
Christian cross in a commemorative space near to the Speziallager museum. The 
language and symbolism of commemorative ceremonies held beneath this cross 
by the ALS reflect a desire for ‘reconciliation’ (‘Versöhnung’) and ‘forgiveness’ 
(‘Vergebung’)262. They typically involve gathering to hear a Christian sermon, as 
at Buchenwald, and the cross itself is even referred to as a ‘Golgotha’ for the 
survivors and their relatives, evoking a Christian vision of salvation through a 
                                                
258 ‘Andachts-Predigt des Herrn Pfarrer Eric Kranz am Gräberfeld’, in 4. Buchenwaldtreffen, ed. 
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link to the Passion. The attempts on the part of the survivors’ association to 
efface lingering ambivalences through overtly religious forms of 
commemoration resemble what Tim Cole has referred to as ‘redemptive 
closure’.263 The way in which the ceremonies are staged implicitly serves the 
purpose of reclaiming an uncompromised and uncomplicated concept of 
victimhood for the survivors and their representatives. 
Despite this, the decentralized and plural memorial concepts enable such 
a form of commemoration without allowing it to dominate the site topographies. 
Of course, the imperative of democratizing the sites has on occasion come into 
conflict with the reconciliatory commemorative discourse, most recently when 
the Christian cross was unveiled at Sachsenhausen in 2009. This incident typified 
the differences between memorial experts and victims of the Soviet camp when it 
came to interpreting the Speziallager. Whereas the survivors’ association reacted 
angrily to a last-minute decision to shorten the cross from eight metres to seven, 
complaining to the local press that the move amounted to a ‘decapitation’ 
(‘Verstümmelung’) of the cross, the memorial staff claimed to be taking the 
necessary steps to ensure it did not visually impinge upon the concentration 
camp topography.264 Ultimately, it is not a question of whether the professional 
or advocative stance on commemorative ritual and iconography has won out on 
site; they both share the memorial space and interpret it according to their own 
specific internal differentiating mechanisms.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Looking in detail at discourses on the double past in the museum space has 
shown that developments on site have unfolded independently from the federal 
normalization narrative. There was perhaps some correlation between the 
commemorative rhetoric of the VOS in 2005 and the CDU’s attempts in the 
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years prior to that to supplant the 1999 Gedenkstättenkonzeption. However, since 
this was an oppositional discourse rather than the official government position, 
the VOS was actually articulating dissent from an institutionalized principle of 
differentiation. Likewise, as federal discourse did begin to shift closer to joint 
commemoration of the double past after 2005, interactions with the memorials 
upheld a strict spatial separation of their distinct historical phases. On this 
evidence it is fair to say that the sites are both spaces for and agencies in the 
cultural representation of the double past. As the chapter has shown, the redesign 
processes at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen have prefigured plural, 
differentiated commemoration by foregrounding the historical sites as well as 
introducing a layered approach to them.  
Admittedly not all commemorative practices on site take as nuanced an 
approach as the museum curators and advisors have. Nonetheless, the 
reorientation of the memorials around ‘authentic’ traces of the concentration 
camp – taking precedence over the Speziallager topography and the architecture 
of the GDR memorial complex where these phases overlap – has prevented any 
one discourse monopolizing the spaces. Viewing the architectural relics as 
‘Zeitschaften’265 that attest to the sites’ various historical functions allows a 
range of groups to hold commemorative ceremonies there and legitimize their 
narrative of the camp without impinging upon or undermining the legitimacy of 
other ceremonies. As I highlight in my analysis of the audio guide at 
Sachsenhausen, the multivalent auratic qualities of the sites do on occasion resist 
or complicate an attempt to separate these layers. On the whole however, the 
Neugestaltungen – which had been agreed upon if not implemented in their 
entirety by the point I begin my analysis – ushered in a differentiated spatial and 
narratological framework for handling the double past on site.  
This over-layered rather than necessarily modified the commemorative 
discourses and practices of the respective survivors’ associations. Indeed, 
concentration camp survivors’ lobbies such as the LAG and IKBD have 
continued to commemorate the anniversary of liberation at Buchenwald by 
holding rallies that are reminiscent of GDR-era mass Kundgebungen. They are 
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highly politicized and propagate an anti-extremist message. Moreover, by tracing 
a route from the camp memorial on the Appellplatz to the memorial complex on 
the Ettersberg, they perpetuate the antifascist narrative of the NMG epitomized 
by the phrase ‘durch Sterben und Kämpfen zum Sieg’. At Sachsenhausen, the 
Sachsenhausenkomitee in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland e. V. honour the 27 
communist functionaries murdered on 11 October 1944 in an annual ceremony, 
thereby preserving another tradition from the GDR. Though the committee 
representatives themselves continue to portray life in the concentration camp 
using the antifascist categories of ‘good’ resisters and ‘bad’ accomplices of the 
SS, they are not the only speakers at the ceremony; their narrative is 
complemented by a short speech by a representative of the memorial, musical 
elements and interpretative readings. In any case, as the ceremony is held at 
Station Z rather than at the foot of the 40m-high GDR-era obelisk, it is kept at a 
careful distance from the site’s communist iconography.  
Finally, the concepts of autopoiesis and systemic differentiation lend 
themselves to an analysis of on site commemoration. Most obviously, the model 
of ‘double contingency’ explained above, which understands the construction of 
meaning in communication between systems to be a process that is internal to 
each system, can be applied to the discourses I have surveyed. Certainly it is 
instructive to conceptualize the interaction between discourses through recourse 
to ‘systemic’ operations; they interpret communication about the double past in 
terms of the disjuncture between their structure and the (more complex) structure 
of their environment. The meaning that any one system derives from this 
communication is therefore opaque to the others.  
Using this model, we can differentiate within as well as between left 
wing, Holocaust-centred discourse and right wing, anti-totalitarian discourse. 
Both the memorial professionals and the victims of National Socialism, for 
instance, fall into the former category. Yet whereas expert protagonists orientate 
their work around empirical standards and the cornerstones of the 
Gedenkstättenbewegung, the victims – at least in the communist-dominated 
lobby groups – view the Holocaust as singular on account of their experiences 
under National Socialism (codified in the Buchenwald Oath of 1945). Likewise, 
both members of the CDU and victims of communism downplay differences 
between Nazism and communism, though to serve the respective goals of civic 
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governance and of extending recognition to victims of the post-war camps at 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen.   
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Ch. 3: Local patterns of 
representation 
 
Introduction 
 
Writing in the journal of the Brandenburg Museums Association in 2007, Günter 
Morsch outlined the three main objectives of construction work as part of the 
‘Neugestaltung’ at Sachsenhausen. The first objective entailed careful 
preservation of material ‘traces’ of the historical site (‘Spurensicherung’) as a 
means of documenting acts of perpetration and commemorating the victims. The 
second involved identifying and preserving the topography of the broader camp 
complex outside of the pre-1989 memorial grounds. Thirdly, the redesign aimed 
to develop a concept that handled both the GDR memorial architecture and 
‘authentic’ relics in a historically appropriate relationship to one another.266 The 
second has impinged most obviously on local memory culture, as it has often 
entailed memory work at sites that have since taken on local functions and 
designations separate to their historical identity as part of the camp topography. 
In Oranienburg, efforts to musealize a more complete picture of 
Sachsenhausen have centred around four particular sections of the camp 
topography: the industrial yard, where the SS carried out mass executions; the 
KZ-Sonderlager (later ‘Zone II’ of the Speziallager); the SS-Truppenlager; and 
the former Klinkerwerk sub-camp, a brick works to which prisoner details from 
Sachsenhausen were sent as slave labourers.267 Thus far, the former two have 
been successfully integrated into the redesigned memorial. The SS-Truppenlager 
was of course the subject of a high-profile architectural design competition and 
slated as the site of Daniel Libeskind’s ultimately unrealised Hope Incision 
project, which I discuss in section one. At the site of the former Klinkerwerk, 
meanwhile, an open-air exhibition has finally been inaugurated after many years 
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of torturous bureaucratic and financial wrangling that clearly tried the patience of 
the Internationales Sachsenhausen Komitee. In both cases the town had a 
protracted and significant role to play in the deliberations preceding the 
abandonment of the former project and the realisation of the latter; it also made a 
financial contribution to the Klinkerwerk exhibition.  
Similar projects have been undertaken since 1990 in Weimar, though 
these have also addressed the intellectual relationship between the camp on the 
Ettersberg and the town of critical modernity and Germany’s first democratic 
republic (a relationship reflected upon not least by prisoners of the concentration 
camp). Certainly local instances of National Socialist persecution, such as the 
round up and deportation of Thuringia’s Jewish residents in May 1942, are now 
commemorated, and indeed at the actual site of the round up itself in Weimar as 
part of a ceremony organised jointly by the memorial, the town and others on the 
70th anniversary of the round up.268 Other commemorative plaques in the town 
mark events such as the Death Marches in 1945 and the deportation of several 
thousand Jews to Buchenwald in the aftermath of ‘Kristallnacht’ in 1938. It was 
however engagement with the historical intertwinement of camp and town 
prompted by Weimar’s nomination as European Capital of Culture – a title it 
held in 1999 – that was arguably of most consequence for local Buchenwald 
memory. A number of events relating to the concentration camp featured in the 
cultural programme organised for the so-called Kulturstadtjahr and, given the 
prominent place they were afforded in it, constitute an important barometer of 
attitudes to the memorial and its multiple histories in Weimar.269 I analyse 
several of the major projects in detail in sections one and two. 
These and other ventures undertaken in and with the support of Weimar 
and Oranienburg provide, firstly, an illuminating insight into local memory of the 
double past. Whilst the concentration camps, as we see, quite literally branched 
out into the town proper and underwent re-signification with the collapse of the 
Third Reich, the Speziallager were very carefully (if not quite hermetically) 
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sealed off from the local population, leaving no such material traces with which 
to anchor a corresponding local culture of remembrance. Combined with the 
GDR’s circumscription of public discussion of the Soviet internment camps, 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen’s post-war usage could by definition be little 
more than a communicative memory in Weimar and Oranienburg (and beyond) 
up until 1989. In many ways, this discrepancy between the visibility of the 
concentration camp and the invisibility of the special camp outside the camp 
perimeter has prefigured the development of local discourses on the double past 
after unification. For it was the memorials’ National Socialist and post-1949 
GDR pasts that would have more of a bearing on the coordinates of memory 
culture in Weimar and Oranienburg.   
The fact that certain local memorial projects have come to fruition at all 
reflects the extent to which local opinion has evolved to embrace ongoing 
confrontation with National Socialism. Moreover, this was, it should be noted, a 
shift that was far from self-evident. Harold Marcuse has argued in relation to 
changing memory of the Nazi past in the pre-1989 Federal Republic that the 
popular myths of Germans as victims of National Socialism and as ignorant of 
the existence of the concentration camps were only really exploded in the late 
1970s and early 1980s.270 In the GDR, by contrast, official antifascism had 
effectively absolved East Germans of a sense of responsibility for brown-collar 
crimes, and the evidence of communist crimes that surfaced after unification 
threatened to offer a new form of self-exculpation. There were several good 
reasons, in other words, to expect that local opinion in Oranienburg and Weimar 
would cling tenaciously to the myths of victimization and ignorance. Instead 
however, what we see is a fairly rapid dissipation of local calls for a 
normalization of the past along conservative lines – that is, for a line under the 
past (Schlussstrich) – once engagement with the historical and material traces of 
National Socialism began. What we can infer from the widespread support for 
normalization pace Schröder relatively early on in the 1990s is that local 
discourses have developed independently of post-unification shifts in federal 
discourse.   
The first of two central arguments this chapter will make is that the 
reflexive incorporation of the memorials into constructions of local memory and 
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identity from the turn of the millennium onwards has produced normative 
frameworks in its own right. In both Weimar and Oranienburg press reportage 
and ‘official’ municipal actors make recourse to the same basic narrative of the 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ sides of local history to frame discussion of 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, generating specific local memory paradigms. 
These typically focus on the concentration camps rather than the memorials’ 
multiple pasts as archetypal symbols of ‘negative’ heritage and a counterpoint to 
more straightforwardly celebratory local traditions. In this particular context 
then, where memory debates can be described as relational, they relate not – or 
not only – to a national norm, but to local norms with their own implicit 
assumptions about confronting the past. As this chapter demonstrates, local 
memory actors commemorate the double past in a variety of ways and link this to 
differing identity narratives, taking their cue to varying degrees from the 
Holocaust-centred municipal discourse as much as from a federal standard. The 
concept of systemic ‘codes’ lends itself well to the picture that emerges, 
capturing as it does a sense of how, in one sense, cultural spaces consist of a 
centre and a periphery, whilst in another sense appearing to be made up of 
distinct discourses following their own internal logic and conventions.       
Secondly, and relating to the first argument, the chapter calls for a more 
nuanced view of the differences and similarities between the two ‘local’ contexts 
under discussion. For all the specificities of each case, it is notable that in both 
localities memory is typically Holocaust-centred and has, broadly speaking, 
remained so despite the recent tendency towards equationist readings of the 
double past at federal level. This is, I argue, a result of the particularly acute 
challenges to constructing normal identities local publics are presented with by 
the visibility of the camps. Finding a means of reconciling this negative history 
to local identity has indeed precipitated a shift in the perception of the camps – 
Jörg Skribeleit utilises the phrase ‘vom Stigma zum Standortfaktor’ to capture a 
sense of this271 – but in doing so the related issue of the double past has tended to 
be overlooked. On the other hand, it is important to stress the embededness of 
these memory discourses in the distinct local histories of Prussian tolerance and 
multiculturalism (in Oranienburg) and enlightenment, humanistic traditions of 
                                                
271 Jörg Skribeleit, ‘Vom Stigma zum Standortfaktor: Die Gemeinde Flossenbürg und das Erbe 
des Konzentrationslagers’ in Das Erbe der Provinz: Heimatkultur und Geschichtspolitik nach 
1945, ed. by Habbo Knoch (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2001), pp. 191-217. 
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literature, politics, and thought (in Weimar). Nor can one overlook the 
differences between the memory activists and networks of remembrance in each 
of the local publics. Thus, there is a need to differentiate in two regards when it 
comes to unpacking at local level what Caroline Pearce has termed the ‘dialectic 
of normality’272 – that is, constantly and implicitly invoking the nation’s 
dictatorial past in attempts to present oneself as normalized. One must 
distinguish the local dynamic of cultural memory from respective regional and 
federal dynamics with their own specific structural underpinnings and drivers, 
and also differentiate between the two iterations of ‘local’ memory, grounded as 
they are in specific historical and cultural constellations. 
The chapter itself analyses several different memory texts. It takes 
‘official’ and municipal discourses as a starting point, addressing how they 
inflect the relationship between memory, identity, and governmentality to 
produce local ‘exhibitionary complexes’. The official position is best gauged by 
looking at local press reportage, the work of local heritage institutions and the 
published output of cultural elites. As such, I have honed in on several of the 
most high-profile cultural events of the past decade or so – for instance the 
cultural programme accompanying ‘Weimar 1999’, when the town held the title 
of European Capital of Culture, and the popular flower show, the 
‘Landesgartenschau’, hosted by Oranienburg in 2009. As these events were 
extensively reported in local newspapers, programmatic of municipal 
interpretations of local identity and history, and often the precursor for protracted 
memory debates, they provide an invaluable window onto both the contents and 
construction of cultural memory across diverse local publics. In later sections, 
when I turn to civic memory activists, I have relied variously on specialist 
publications produced by lobby groups, interviews with key protagonists, and 
field research – above all exhibition analysis – at heritage institutions in Weimar 
and Oranienburg. Finally, the chapter is organised around a loose chronological 
narrative beginning in the mid-/late-1990s and running through to the present 
day. This structure made intuitive sense for two reasons. Firstly, it best conveys a 
sense of the underlying memory dynamic(s) I identify above. Secondly, it allows 
me to plot the initial construction of local memory paradigms at the turn of the 
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millennium before addressing their blind spots and the counter-narratives that we 
can identify when the lens is broadened beyond official and municipal groups.     
 
 
Constructing local memory paradigms 
 
  
 
In this first section I will map out the emergence of ‘official’ local memory 
paradigms in Weimar and Oranienburg prior to the turn of the millennium. 
Consequently, I focus for the most part on municipal opinion, which I have 
gauged through a systematic analysis of press reportage, marketing and 
promotional materials such as tourist brochures, leaflets and other publications, 
as well as the programme organised in connection with Weimar’s tenure as 
European Capital of Culture in 1999. In both cases a dualism emerges as a result 
of juxtaposing the concentration camps with more positive aspects of local 
heritage; that is, in Oranienburg’s case, a specifically Prussian history of 
tolerance and multi-culturalism, and the legacies of enlightenment and 
Classicism in Weimar. Thus I also seek to highlight the dimensions of 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen’s multi-faceted histories as well as the local 
groups that are marginalised by these monolithic cultural memory discourses. In 
sections two and three of the chapter I then hone in on, firstly, the blind spots of 
municipal memory and, secondly, the alternative memory narratives that emerge 
alongside or indeed in response to them. I explore memory of Sachsenhausen in 
Oranienburg before turning to the situation in Weimar. 
First of all, I wish to look in detail at discussions surrounding the future 
of the SS-Truppenlager in Oranienburg during the 1990s. Even as early as 1993, 
at about the time that the Sachsenhausen memorial was reopened under the aegis 
of the Stiftung Brandenburgische Gedenkstätten, the issue of a 44-hectare section 
of the town formerly integrated into the concentration camp topography was 
already the subject of controversy. Many of the buildings in this area of 
Oranienburg had served a functional purpose for the camp complex or housed 
the SS-battalion stationed at Sachsenhausen, meaning that the whole area was of 
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historical significance as an architectural relic of the perpetrators. After the end 
of the war, the housing estate had been re-designated as a residential area. In 
1991, the town convened a panel of specialists, who were to review a series of 
proposals for future uses of the SS-Kasernengelände. This Gutachterverfahren 
initially recommended a redesign proposal submitted by the Austrian architect 
Hermann Czech, in which commercial and residential use of parts of the site 
were planned.  
Yet by 1994, a year after the publication of the Gutachterverfahren, 
enthusiasm for Czech’s project had waned, and attention turned back to a 
proposal first submitted by the architect Daniel Libeskind at the time of the 
initial design competition. Though Libeskind’s radical idea of flooding the 
foundations of the SS-buildings and constructing a series of walkways that would 
allow visitors and locals to contemplate the gradual erosion of the 
Täterachitektur was dismissed, a revised proposal entitled ‘Hope Incision’ 
(‘Hoffnungsschneise’) was more enthusiastically received. Libeskind retained a 
confrontative architectural approach, albeit one that was somewhat toned down 
in comparison to his initial submission, in the design of ‘Hope Incision’. This 
included a raised platform of land pointing towards Schwerin, the planned 
destination of the death marches begun shortly before the liberation of 
Sachsenhausen in April 1945, which would house educational institutions and 
community centres. Given that enterprises both from Oranienburg and elsewhere 
would be invited to set up shop on the ‘Hope Incision’, the project seemed to 
signal a commitment to the forward-looking requirements of town planning too. 
Not least the change in name would appear to confirm this; the optimisms 
inherent to a notion of ‘Hope’ replaced ‘Dawn of a new Mo(u)rning’ with its at 
best faint promise of beginning anew. Before developments reached a more or 
less permanent impasse in 2001, the future of the area was even discussed at a 3-
day symposium held between Oranienburg and Berlin in March of the same year. 
The following analysis is based in large part on press coverage in the build up to 
and during the symposium, when the story was followed with interest in local, 
regional and national newspapers.  
Beginning with local press reportage, it is clear that, by the time the 
symposium was held in Berlin, there was widespread local enthusiasm for 
Libeskind’s proposed design concept. In Oranienburg’s case, this represented a 
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significant change of heart, given that the language of the earlier 
Gutachterverfahren bespoke a desire for residential and commercial usage. The 
result of this initial process had been to embrace ‘urbaner Vielfalt’ – that is, 
mixed-usage municipal architecture – as a means of breaking with the SS’s 
functional compartmentalisation of architectural ensembles in the area.273 Indeed, 
the Gutachterverfahren documentation proposed that ‘wo Lager war, soll Stadt 
werden’274, which though an altogether reasonable recommendation in itself 
makes quite emphatically clear the determination to build housing and 
commercial properties at this stage. As was made clear on the very first page of 
the documentation: 
 
‘[Es] bestehen erhebliche und wachsende Flächenbedarfe für soziale 
Infrastruktureinrichtungen, Handel- und Dienstleistungen und Gewerbe 
sowie für Verwaltungseinrichtungen…. Ehemals militarisch genutzte 
Flächen bieten hierfür ein hervorragendes Entwicklungspotential.’275 
 
Of course, the very nature of the Gutachterverfahren, requiring academic 
and in instances non-local specialists to draw up their recommendations for the 
Truppenlager, means it cannot be taken as entirely representative of opinion in 
‘the town’, but it is nevertheless elucidating to compare the language above with 
articles that appeared in the local press eight years later. In a comment article 
appearing in the Märkische Allgemeine Zeitung on 19 March 2001, for example, 
it was claimed that:  
 
‘Stadt und Architekt trotz längerer Denkpausen wieder miteinander 
[arbeiteten] und ein Vorschlag entstand, der die Züge des Ungewohnten 
hat, aber das Leben zulässt. Die Stadt wird weiter mitarbeiten. Das 
erklärte [Hans-Joachim] Laesicke [the town mayor, RB] und er will dafür 
Sorge tragen, dass die Oranienburger zur Vergangenheit ihrer Stadt 
stehen können. Auch zu diesem Projekt.’276  
 
                                                
273 Stadt Oranienburg (ed.), Gutachterverfahren: Urbanisierung des Geländes der ehemaligen 
SS-Kaserne Oranienburg (Oranienburg, 1993), p. 45. 
274 Ibid., p. 41. 
275 Ibid., p. 1. 
276 I. Nehls, ‘Die Zeit nicht verschlafen’, Märkischer Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 Mar 2001, p. 15. 
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The mention of ‘hervorragendes Entwicklungspotential[s]’ in the 
Gutachterverfahren, implying acute awareness of the benefits of an architectural 
redesign from the perspective of commercial redevelopment, had been toned 
down significantly by 2001. The main criterion now appeared to be that ‘die 
Oranienburger zur Vergangenheit ihrer Stadt stehen können’, whilst the once 
explicit expectation of commercial reward on the other hand had been discarded; 
it was now enough that the project merely avoided impinging too much upon life 
in Oranienburg (‘das Leben zulässt’). Local press reportage cited expressions of 
approval from academic experts and architects working with Libeskind, which 
had the effect of validating the town’s volte face. Libeskind’s colleague Matthias 
Reese was quoted praising the decision to embrace ‘Hope Incision’ as 
“zweifelsfrei die richtige.”277 Similarly an article appearing in the Märkischer 
Allgemeine on 16 March 2001 observed that: 
 
‘…Libeskind nicht nur bei der Stadt Oranienburg und der Stiftung 
[Unterstützung findet], sondern auch bei renommierten Wissenschaftlern, 
wie dem US-Amerikaner Prof. James Young, Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für 
Judaistik an der Universität Boston.’278     
 
An approach favouring confrontation with the past at the ‘Truppenlager’ 
was presented in normative terms by the local press. This was a feature of 
national and regional reportage too, as I discuss below. At local level, the 
normative force of the argument in support of Hope Incision manifested itself in 
a certain ambiguity surrounding who exactly had been won over to the proposal. 
In an article in the Oranienburger Generalanzeiger, it was ‘[d]ie politischen 
Gremien der Stadt Oranienburg’279 that had supposedly decided for Libeskind’s 
concept. In a separate piece sharing the same page, the enthusiasm of academic 
observers such as the American memorial expert James Young for the 
Hoffnungsschneise was reported.280 An opinion article in the same edition 
likewise styled the change of heart in Oranienburg over the ‘Truppenlager’ as an 
imposition of elite positions: if the town ‘anfangs die Idee des Wohnungsbaus 
                                                
277 H. Bergt, ‘Geschichtliche Symbiose’, Märkischer Allgemeine Zeitung, 17/18 Mar 2001, p. 17. 
278 H. Hohenhaus, ‘”Hoffnungsriegel” gegen den Verfall’, Märkischer Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 
Mar 2001, p. 17. 
279 ‘Experimenteller Ansatz’, Oranienburger Generalanzeiger, 17/18 Mar 2001, p. 3. 
280 ‘”Utopia neben Spree-Athen errichten”’, Ibid., p. 3. 
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[favourisierte]’, then it was ‘deren Verantwortliche’ who now categorically ruled 
this out.281  
 
What are we to make of the evidence that press discourse reinforces a 
normative position on Oranienburg’s relationship to the Nazi past? I suggest 
working once more with the tools of transcultural memory, Foucault’s dispositif, 
and systems theory to conceptualize representations of the Hope Incision project 
in the press. Departing from Klaus Naumann’s interpretation of press reportage 
on World War II and National Socialism as a repository of memory, I argue that 
it perpetuates a normative regime of interpretation.282 As a corpus, the various 
articles in local, regional and national newspapers dealing with Libeskind’s 
project and discussed here constitute a ‘vielstimmige[n] Text’.283 Collectively, 
however, they organize discourse around existing power relations. This picture 
emerges firstly out of the broad convergence that the text ensemble constructs 
between local and ‘elite’ national and international stances on the project, and 
secondly as a consequence of the marginal voice that it gives to local opinion. 
In order to further differentiate between local press reportage on the one 
hand and regional or national coverage of the story on the other, I trace the 
systemic characteristics of these discourses. Just as I have demonstrated 
elsewhere in this chapter, trends towards confronting the past at local level were 
not necessarily symptomatic of broader shifts taking place in the federal 
normalization discourse. Rather than assuming that one, monolithic dispositif 
shapes patterns of cultural representation across all of the contexts surveyed in 
this thesis, I propose thinking in terms of multiple dispositifs. Indeed, evidence 
would seem to bear out this approach. The local press clearly oriented debates on 
the redesign of the ‘Truppenlager’ around the consequences it would have for 
local life – much as the ‘Gutachtenverfahren’ had in the early 1990s, even if 
support for confronting the historical relics of the concentration camp was now 
more forthcoming.      
Andreas Röhl, writing in the Märkischer Allgemeine, clearly assessed the 
potential benefits of the Hoffnungsschneise from the perspective of local 
enterprises and businesses: 
                                                
281 D. Lange, ‘Impuls bietet Chance’, Oranienburger Generalanzeiger, 17/18 Mar 2001, p. 2. 
282 Naumann, Der Krieg als Text, p. 17. 
283 Ibid., p. 19. 
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‘Die hiesigen restriktiven Planungsbedingungen seien zudem ein Vorteil 
für den Standort und brächten Sicherheit für einen Nutzer, da Letzterer 
sein Interesse aus der räumlichen oder inhaltlichen Bindung zum Ort 
ableite.’284 
 
Following Röhl’s argumentation, the site provided security to its ‘users’ 
(the choice of word itself hinted at his consumerist appraisal), and its unique 
historical significance would create a connection between site and service too. In 
addition to these enthusiastic remarks, the author detailed Berlin town planner 
Rainer Emenlauer’s thoughts on a three-tiered usage of Hope Incision, designed 
to encourage institutions at federal, state and local level to relocate here. The 
article noted that the Dienstleistungszentrum Oranienburg envisaged by 
Emenlauer could house local institutions.285 An article in the same newspaper the 
previous day even went as far as to describe the State Finance Ministry’s hint at 
financial support as ‘[d]ie wichtigste Botschaft des dreitägigen Symposiums zum 
Thema Nachnutzung des ehemaligen SS-Truppenlagers…’.286 The verdict of the 
national press, however, was decidedly different, as perhaps best illustrated by 
the concluding sentence of an article in Der Welt on 23 March: ‘Die Diskussion 
um die Zukunft des SS-Truppenlagers Oranienburg wird die Zukunft deutscher 
Gedenkkultur entscheidend mitprägen.’287  
What is also noticeable about reportage within Oranienburg is the 
temporal spread of articles dealing with the architectural concept. This is quite 
distinct from the vicissitudes of national coverage, where surges in interest 
unsurprisingly coincide with moments such as the symposium in March 2001, 
when the action shifts temporarily away from Oranienburg to Berlin. Indeed, a 
keyword search in the Federal Press Archives using the terms ‘Sachsenhausen 
and Libeskind’ indicates that the symposium was reported by four separate 
national broadsheets during the week after it took place. After this point, 
however, no results are returned for the same search, suggesting that interest 
subsequently all but ebbs away. Conversely, the accent in the local press at this 
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point is on the need to develop discussion, as article headlines – ‘Symposium 
bringt Idee voran’ and ‘Impuls bietet Chance’288, for instance – seem to confirm. 
Furthermore, the story was picked up again later the same year when the local 
‘Forum gegen Rassismus’ publicly presented a model of ‘Hope Incision’ in an 
attempt to familiarise locals in Oranienburg with the project.289 This was barely 
registered in the regional and national press, consigned to a solitary and 
inconspicuous report in the ‘Regional’ section of the Berliner Morgenpost.290 
Where local reportage tended to recode the ‘Hope Incision’ project in 
terms of its perceived benefit to Oranienburg, national and regional newspapers 
framed the debate in terms of German identity and German rituals of coming to 
terms with the past. This is perhaps most apparent in the interest that Daniel 
Libeskind’s involvement in the project generated. In a number of articles 
Libeskind was referred to as the ‘jüdischen Stararchitekt’291 or ‘amerikanischen 
Stararchitekt’292, and in many instances the Jewish Museum in Berlin, which he 
designed and is arguably his most recognisable credential, was mentioned. An 
article in the Berliner Zeitung even referred to the ‘Libeskind-Plan’ without 
stating the name of the project in question or its relation to Oranienburg, pointing 
to an implicit assumption that the name of Libeskind was virtually synonymous 
with the redesign debate as a whole.293  
Collapsing together the figure of Libeskind and the broader debate of course 
abstracted Hope Incision from Oranienburg. For all the attention given in the 
regional and national press to Libeskind’s Jewishness and American nationality, 
conspicuously little was said as to his residency in Berlin. In none of the 
newspaper articles analysed (approximately 30) was this information given; it 
was only provided by an article in the weekly magazine Focus and the property 
newspaper Immobilien Zeitung, the latter of which in any case has a significantly 
lower circulation and took interest primarily in the development of real estate 
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envisaged as part of Libeskind’s architectural design.294 The architect’s 
connections to Jewish history, either through his own background or involvement 
in the Jewish Museum, by contrast, featured prominently. Thus, a metonymical 
link to Germany’s national accountability vis-à-vis Jewish victims of National 
Socialism was made by foregrounding Libeskind’s own intimate familial 
connection to the Holocaust and professional résumé, in which architecture 
imbued with Jewish iconography was well represented. The same affect was 
achieved by, conversely, downplaying his association with both the capital and 
Oranienburg as the stages upon which these architectural debates played out. The 
following extract from an article in the Berliner Zeitung in particular attests to 
this: 
 
‘Auftritt ein Popstar und reicht Oranienburg die helende Hand. Ein bisschen 
an Elton John erinnernd, wiederholt er zweimal seine knappen Thesen. Das 
klingt wie ein Refrain, der Star ist ein begnadeter Selbstvermarkungskünstler. 
Aber nicht fürs eigene Geschick, auch für Oranienburg könnte sich Daniel 
Libeskind als Glücksfall erwiesen. 
 
Nach der Podiumsrunde verschwindet er so plötzlich wie er gekommen ist, 
anders als Bürgermeister Hans Joachim Laesicke oder der Dirketor der 
Stiftung Brandenburgische Gedenkstätten, Günter Morsch, die sich für das 
Kolloquium über die künftige Nutzung des ehemaligen SS-Truppenlagers des 
KZ Sachsenhausen drei Tage Zeit nahmen…’295 
 
Libeskind was presented here – doubtless with a certain amount of wilful 
hyperbole – as a ‘brand name’, recognisable in pithy statements akin to song 
lyrics (‘Refrain[s]’) that were part of a slick marketing performance. He was the 
‘Popstar’ of debates surrounding the Truppenlager who wilfully enters and 
leaves a podium discussion as he sees fit, as opposed to the local mayor and 
director of the Sachsenhausen memorial, both of whom committed to attending 
all three days of the symposium. Yet despite the near risible pomp and celebrity 
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that characterised Libeskind’s ‘Auftritt’ –another term suggesting that his was 
more of a scheduled publicity appearance than anything – his participation was 
apparently a blessing for Oranienburg. His arrival was described as a kind of 
‘happy coincidence’ (‘Glücksfall’), and the article did not fail to recognise that 
he could attract new investment to an area otherwise at risk of complete 
dilapidation. This impression was only reinforced further by the comments of a 
town planning official, who in saying that the project ‘für Oranienburg an sich “-
zig Nummern zu groß” ist’296 and that the town alone “[es] sicher nicht 
realisieren [könnte]”297 presented an almost provincial image of Oranienburg. 
The juxtaposition of Libeskind’s ‘star’ qualities and the town’s meagre financial 
means implied that the ‘Hope Incision’ project belonged to a German discourse 
on the past and not simply to the a narrower debate about 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung conducted within this modest Markish town. 
On the evidence of certain articles in regional and national newspapers, the 
commercial pulling power exerted by Libeskind’s name reads as almost 
irresistible to municipal elements responsible for construction and development 
in particular. In Die Welt on 8 Nov 1999 – almost 18 months before the 3-day 
colloquium deciding upon a strategy for the ‘Truppenlager’ – the head of 
Oranienburg’s town planning office was cited, anticipating that ‘der Name 
Libeskind…[bei der Suche nach einem Projektträger] erhebliche Zugkraft 
ausüben [werde]’.298 Here in particular, the format and linguistic conventions of 
press reportage such as the tendency to use free indirect speech gave rise to a 
lack of specificity when addressing attitudes in ‘the town’. The only locals noted 
to be in favour of Libeskind’s proposal were senior municipal figures such as the 
mayor Hans-Joachim Laesicke.299 Even then, the reasons given for their support 
were usually consistent with a marketing metaphor of ‘rebirth’ that municipal 
discourse in Oranienburg had begun to appropriate (I analyse this in greater 
detail in section four of the chapter). Laesicke’s insistence that the project would 
bring new ‘life’ to Oranienburg, for instance, indicated that its appeal lay first 
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and foremost in its rejuvenative potential.300 To forego development on this area 
of land, by contrast, ‘würde ein Loch zwischen Stadt und Gedenkort reißen’301, 
leaving a damaging topographical and social cleavage in its place. The articles 
gave a sense of the ‘official’ line on redevelopment along the lines envisaged by 
Libeskind, but little beyond that.  
Indeed, it was not entirely clear – especially in national and regional reportage 
– what exactly other groups in Oranienburg thought of the Hope Incision project. 
In fact, the ‘town’ appeared as a loose and almost entirely rhetorical construct 
when it came to impressing the character of local responses upon the readership. 
It was, variously, ‘die Bevölkerung’302, ‘[die] Stadtoberen’303 and ‘[die] 
Oranienburger Stadtväter[...]’304 who appeared as the principal advocates of 
Libeskind’s proposal, for instance. The degree to which locals participated in and 
welcomed the idea of the Hoffnungsschneise was therefore debateable; on 
occasion they were recruited by linguistic formulations that implied widespread 
support for the plans, whereas in other instances the idea seemed to have been 
imposed from above or arisen in the minds of prominent civic officials. Whilst 
mayor Hans-Joachim Laesicke was clearly eager to emphasise the active role 
played by Oranienburg in the decision-making process, referring to the 
townspeople as ”nicht Betroffener, sondern Initiator, besser gesagt sogar 
Hauptakteur”305, his claims rang rather hollow given the use of such rigid 
collective categorisations. Indeed, the distanced medium of press reportage, 
where stylistic conventions such as free indirect speech are prevalent, if anything 
served to further expose the imprecision of these comments. The same article 
sketched out local attitudes towards the Truppenlager as follows: 
 
‘Laesicke: “Wir haben bald erkannt, dass eine Wohnbebauung nicht in Frage 
kommt.” Den Libeskind-Entwurf habe man in vielen Gesprächen auf das Maß 
verändert, den er heute mit dem Hoffnungsriegel angenommen hat. In 
progressiver Auseinandersetzung mit der Stiftung habe sich die Stadt auch 
dafür entschieden, gegen eine die Entwicklung lähmende 
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Denkmalbereichsatzung vorzugehen. Man habe immer befürchtet, dass dies 
eine Beerdigung erster Klasse für das 38 Hektar große Areal sein würde.’306    
 
Reference to the town took on several guises here. Laesicke’s use of ‘wir’ most 
likely referred to the select group of municipal officials and town planning 
commission members who, as elected local politicians or civil servants, were 
legally empowered to decide on the use of the area, though it could just as well 
have been a reference to the townspeople as a whole. Similarly, the terms ‘die 
Stadt’ and even the impersonal third person ‘man’ were used, the former 
denoting the town as a political entity and the latter presumably meant to imply 
broad consensus in Oranienburg. Combined with the use of indirect reported 
speech however, these statements – intended to convey support for preservation 
where reasonable – came across as normative pledges to prevent further 
dilapidation. There was little sense of who exactly was involved in actively 
fighting the corner of memorial professionals and others in favour of 
preservation, yet the reader was assured this was the case. It is interesting that 
this assurance was relayed in indirect speech, as the reporter (and, by extension, 
newspaper) was not so much channelling a palpable sense of engagement with 
Libeskind’s proposal in Oranienburg as reproducing the rhetoric used by 
municipal actors. 
Tellingly, where the specific opinions of members of the local community 
could be ascertained, support for the project appeared to be less forthcoming. 
Some locals even appeared to be styled as ‘victims’ of the proposals. An article 
appearing in Die Welt in July 1999, shortly after properties that had been part of 
the concentration camp grounds were placed under memorial protection order, 
described the situation faced by residents there: 
 
‘Eine Erhaltungssatzung soll im wesentlichen verhindern, daß Eigentümer 
Gebäude abreißen und durch unpassende Neubauten ersetzen. Eine 
Gestaltungssatzung regelt darüberhinaus Details. Und das heißt in erster 
Linie: Von außen muß alles weitgehend so bleiben, wie es ist. Die 
Hausbesitzer dürfen die recht kleinen Fenster nicht gegen größere 
ausstauschen. Die Dächer sollen auch in Zukunft steil ansteigen und mit 
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Biberschwänzen gedeckt sein. Die Fassade muß verputzt, hell angestrichen 
und der Sockel verklinkert sein.’307 
 
In this extract, it was clear that the owners of the former SS-houses (‘[d]ie 
Hausbesitzer’) felt disadvantaged. Certainly, the impression that they had been 
subjected to stringent property regulations was unmistakeable in the catalogue of 
restrictions listed in the article. Elsewhere too, terms such as ‘die Oranienburger’ 
were more carefully delimited when intended to invoke a sense of collective 
victimhood. The town’s mayor, for example, posited a clear elite-mass 
dichotomy when he opined in the pages of the tageszeitung that “kluge Leute und 
Institutionen den Oranienburgern Vorschriften machen wollen”.308 Laesicke was 
of course expressing his disapproval at the format of public debate focused on 
the Truppenlager, which was for the large part conducted as an academic debate 
amongst memorial specialists. Indeed, it was no coincidence that his comments 
coincided with a podium discussion in Berlin’s Akademie der Künste dedicated 
to the question of the SS barracks and attended by Libeskind, the director of the 
Sachsenhausen memorial, and academic experts.  
The articles in the Welt and tageszeitung discussed above are the only 
examples I was able to find of more precise reference to local groups. As we 
have seen, newspaper articles tended to collapse together the municipality’s 
confrontational approach to the Nazi past with the views of the ‘town’. On the 
other hand, a member of the editorial team for the Oranienburger 
Generalanzeiger – a local newspaper – conceded that readers rarely engage 
critically with stories concerning Sachsenhausen. They did not often ‘reply’ to 
stories concerning the memorial by sending letters to the editor, for example.309 
In light of this, we must ask whether cultural discourse is not also determined, at 
least in these local publics, by the groups who are able (or empowered) to make 
their voices heard.  
A sense of disenfranchisement amongst locals was certainly palpable. One 
aggrieved resident had even graffitied ‘Ehemals SS-Häuser – Heute ein 
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Denkmal?’310 onto a property in the former ‘Truppenlager’ in protest, giving 
voice to a fear that memorialization would come at the expense of homeowners’ 
concerns. Another resident, by contrast, recalled feeling a sense of personal 
exoneration as focus shifted from individual properties in the former 
‘Truppenlager’ and their occupants to the historical entwinement of town and 
camp more generally in the course of the debate.311 A further group organised a 
citizens’ initiative and participated in debates with architects, memorial 
professionals and town planners over the Hope Incision proposal. Some 
commentators have taken this as evidence of the emergence of a participatory 
civic space, consisting of multiple publics, in the wake of post-totalitarian 
transition.312  Whilst the processual nature of public debates on the past is well 
served by such a reading, my analysis of the Hope Incision debates indicates that 
certain discursive media such as the press in fact can and do perpetuate 
imbalances in power relations.  
In Weimar, a process of arriving at consensual local identity narratives was 
also underway in the 1990s. Whilst this section concentrates on ‘Weimar 1999’, 
when the town held the title of European Capital of Culture, it is necessary to 
trace the pre-history of the discourses that crystallised in the Kulturstadtjahr. The 
Buchenwald memorial emerges as an important early protagonist here; it began 
debunking attempts to separate out Weimar’s classical heritage from the history 
of the camp almost immediately after unification, invoking or commenting on 
the irony of the town’s multiple historical associations. An early example of this 
was the foreword to an edition of the Weimar Kultur Journal written by Thomas 
Hofmann, director of the Buchenwald memorial between 1991-1994. In it, 
Hofmann plainly stated that the Jewish memorial, scheduled for inauguration in 
November 1993, was ‘ein Mahnmal für Weimar’.313 He justified the assertion by 
pointing to the memorial aesthetic, which rendered the hollowed out foundations 
of what had formerly been barrack 22 as negative space. Symbolising the cultural 
void left behind by the targeted extermination of Europe’s Jewish population in 
this way would in Hofmann’s view resonate particularly acutely in the ‘Herz 
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deutscher Kultur’ that was Weimar.314 As Hofmann himself averred, the 
memorial form: 
 
‘…wird an unser heutiges Kulturverständnis appelieren und, so hofft 
man, an der Kruste kratzen, die sich um die althergebrachte Formel vom 
Spannungsbogen zwischen Weimar und Buchenwald gebildet hat.’315 
 
Following Hoffmann’s resignation, Volkhard Knigge, who had taken up 
the directorship at Buchenwald in 1994, continued to probe the metaphorical 
‘Fallhöhe zwischen schöpferischer Möglichkeit und der Wirklichkeit eines 
‘Höllensturzes’’316 at the heart of local memory culture, as the Kulturstadtjahr 
programme put it. Knigge was perhaps overly critical of Weimar, appearing to 
single it out for blame in a meta-narrative of failed enlightenment projects that 
had ultimately presaged a slide into genocidal dictatorship, chief amongst which 
were critical modernism and Germany’s first democratic republic in 1918. 
Remarking on this pointed duality, Knigge noted that Weimar had possessed 
both ‘die größten Chancen zum Guten [and] die höchsten Leichenberge’.317 Nor 
did he accept that Weimar’s exceptionalism should entitle it to a sense of 
‘Selbstgenügsamkeit’.318 Yet the line between deriving a critical and discerning 
historical consciousness from the town’s undeniably unique history and slipping 
into a comfortable and ritualistic discourse of particularism – in short, reworking 
the coordinates of the federal normalization discourse around local identity – 
would prove to be a fine one.   
At that point, the leitmotif of a ‘Janus-headed’ town that the memorial 
and other cultural institutions were pioneering was not in particularly wide 
circulation. When it was announced in March 1994 however that Weimar would 
be named European Capital of Culture for 1999, the same metaphor began to be 
invoked with increasing frequency. Soon local newspapers were routinely 
referring to the ‘janusköpfige Stadt’319 and the ‘Binom Weimar-Buchenwald’.320 
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Even outside of Weimar the town’s dual associations with ‘high’ and barbaric 
culture were registered, as an article in the daily newspaper Der Tagesspiegel 
illustrates:  
 
‘Wie wohl kaum eine andere deutsche Stadt ist Weimar gleichermaßen 
Synonym für Aufklärung, künstlerische Avantgarde und auch für die 
dunkelsten Stunden in diesem Jahrhundert: die Sichtweite zum 
Konzentrationslager Buchenwald, das noch zum Stadtgebiet gehört.’321 
 
Articles in the local press expressed this binary in similar terms, one noting that 
on the Ettersberg ‘…deutsche Janusköpfigkeit so dicht beieinander[liegt], wie 
andernorts kaum noch einmal.’322 This particular article was written as an 
imagined tour of Classical Weimar, and sought to connect the town’s illustrious 
history to the upcoming Kulturstadtjahr. Though it filled an entire broadsheet-
size page consisting of seven columns of text, reference to Buchenwald was 
restricted to the final paragraph – a trope that, as we will see, was characteristic 
of press discourse in both Weimar and Oranienburg. Yet equally, it also 
mentioned the mass graves in which victims of the Speziallager had been buried, 
interrupting the otherwise neat dualism it had constructed. Indeed, the 
chronology the article traced was ‘[v]on Goethe und Schiller zu Hitler und 
Stalin’,323 perhaps implying with this formulation that the true duality of 
historical Weimar was that of its twin legacies of Classicism and both National 
Socialism and Stalinism. Notably this had not been implied in the Tagesspiegel 
article, which juxtaposed enlightenment with the ‘Konzentrationslager 
Buchenwald’. An established repertoire of symbols and metaphors for 
representing the town’s multi-faceted history had not quite yet emerged at this 
early juncture. 
 By 1999, however, certain repeating motifs could be recognised, as the 
range of Kulturstadtjahr projects addressing the historical links between Weimar 
and Buchenwald indicated. Though I am interested here in the normative force 
this process of reification brought with it, it would be grossly unfair to suggest 
that the projects themselves lacked innovation. If nothing else they found 
                                                
321 ‘Weimar im Aufbruch’, Der Tagesspiegel, 7 Mar 1994. 
322 ‘Weimar – das “Athen an der Ilm”’, TA, 17 Mar 1994. 
323 Ibid. 
142 
 
 
numerous innovative ways of engaging with the spatial intertwinement of the 
town’s Classical and enlightenment heritage on the one hand and its associations 
with National Socialist terror on the other. Moreover, the projects were 
impressively varied, ranging from exhibitions and art installations to more 
conceptual workings with sound effects and outdoor trails that doubled as 
walking tours of historical Weimar. I first provide a brief overview of the major 
projects and explain how they too drew on the Goethe-Buchenwald paradigm, 
before critiquing some of them in the following section of the chapter, 
considering in particular what might have been pushed out of the historical frame 
of reference by their collective focus on the poles of Classicism and Nazism.    
Perhaps the most widely publicized of the Kulturstadtjahr events to deal 
with Buchenwald was the so-called Doppelausstellung – an exhibition swap 
jointly organised by the memorial and the Weimar Classic Foundation. As part of 
the swap, the Classic Foundation showed a series of Goethe’s sketches and 
watercolours at the memorial site, in an exhibition entitled Gezeichneter Ort: 
Goetheblicke auf Weimar und Thüringen. A second exhibition, Vom Antlitz zur 
Maske: Wien – Weimar – Buchenwald 1939, designed by the memorial site and 
documenting Jewish prisoners at Buchenwald who had been the subjects of racial 
anthropological experimentation in Vienna, was shown parallel to this in the 
Schillermuseum. The intention, as Volkhard Knigge explained, was to illustrate 
that ‘in Weimar Kultur und Barbarei nebeneinander existieren konnten und daß 
es eine Vorgeschichte gibt, die das Ganze erklärlicher macht.’324 One particularly 
striking aspect of this ‘Vorgeschichte’ pointed out by the accompanying 
exhibition catalogue was the presence of prominent völkisch and anti-Semitic 
circles in the town prior to 1933.325 In the camp, too, many prisoners drew 
inspiration from or reflected with bitter irony on the rich cultural legacy that 
surrounded them. ‘Stadt und Lager waren punktuell ineinander übergegangen’, 
as the exhibition catalogue noted.326 Indeed, the title Gezeichneter Ort – which 
can be translated as ‘marked site’ – itself conveys a sense of this ambiguity by 
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simultaneously implying a picturesque landscape and telescoping it onto the later 
existence of the concentration camp. 
The Buchenwald memorial also curated a temporary exhibition for the 
Kulturstadtjahr, entitled Leben-Terror-Geist: ZK Buchenwald: Porträts von 
Künstlern und Intellektuellen. Shown in the cellar of the memorial foundation’s 
administrative building, which also housed the library and archive, the exhibition 
displayed biographies of 73 renowned artists and intellectuals who had been 
imprisoned at Buchenwald. The location alone was enough to indicate that 
visiting was intended as a form of archival work in its own right. But this 
impression was made explicit by the highly tactile curatorial concept in which 
visitors were able to search out exhibits stored inside wooden boxes (‘Kisten’) 
and quite literally ‘research’ the biographies of former prisoners. As the boxes 
were laid out in no particular order or sequence and gave no indication of their 
contents, visitors were free to interact with them however they saw fit, and could 
by extension take away vastly disparate impressions of the exhibition and its 
subject matter. 
Moreover, the boxes were intended as a comment on the link between 
Weimar and Buchenwald. They were exact replicas of fourteen storage boxes 
that had been originally constructed by Buchenwald inmates at the behest of 
Weimar’s cultural elite, who wished to protect the town’s precious cultural 
patrimony from bomb damage. These boxes then remained neglected in the 
collections of the Weimar Classic Foundation after the war until they were 
rediscovered in 1998. In a deliberate inversion of the context in which they were 
first constructed, the replica boxes used in the exhibition stored precisely the 
culture that the Nazis had sought to eradicate, pointing to the long-standing but 
repressed connection between Weimar’s ‘high’ cultural traditions and the history 
of the concentration camp. 
 In addition to the exhibitions the memorial had a hand in creating, the 
Kulturstadtjahr programme included a number of minimalist art projects that 
provocatively (though just as creatively) challenged a bifurcated memory of 
Weimar and Buchenwald. In her installation Mohn und Gedächtnis (‘Poppy and 
Memory’) the artist Uwe Wrede pointed towards the historical link between the 
town and camp and also offered a meta-reflection on the work of memory itself 
by planting poppies along a section of the railway track that had brought 
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prisoners to Buchenwald. Rebecca Horn’s Konzert für Buchenwald, staged in 
two parts across an underground tram depot and the Ettersberg palace, was a 
conceptual art installation that incorporated iconography and relics from the 
concentration camp such as a skip truck on rails and heaped layers of tree and 
paper ash.327 Another inventive artistic comment on the town-camp connection 
was designed by Robin Minard, who electronically reproduced the tolling of the 
bell in the Ettersberg bell tower – itself formerly part of the GDR memorial – and 
played this at three points during the day so that it was audible across the 
town.328 Though space does not allow for a fuller consideration of the respective 
aesthetic and discursive intentions behind these projects, it is clear enough from 
these short descriptions that the metaphorical ‘Binom Weimar-Buchenwald’ was 
a popular leitmotif across the various Kulturstadtjahr projects that handled this 
aspect of the town’s history. 
 One of the first of the ‘Buchenwald’ projects to be inaugurated in 1999 was 
the so-called Zeitschneise, designed by the Berlin architect Walter Grunwald. It 
involved clearing and reopening a section of a centuries-old hunting track on the 
Ettersberg that linked the palace and the Buchenwald memorial, thereby drawing 
attention to the proximity of the respective sites to one other (the track was only 
around 1300m long). The Ettersberg palace, duchess Anna Amalia’s ‘muses 
court’ (‘Musenhof’) where she had entertained renowned composers and writers 
– including, famously, Goethe and Schiller – certainly formed a marked contrast 
to the history of the concentration camp, as the official brochure produced by the 
Buchenwald memorial was at pains to point out. As it reminds the reader, the 
very path through the forest that Goethe often walked would later come to be 
known as Blutstraße amongst the prisoners who were forced to concrete it over 
to provide a road to the concentration camp. And the Ettersberg itself, described 
as being once the ‘Ort geistvollen, höfischen Vergnügen’, would later be seen as 
the ‘Inbegriff des Grauens’.329 Reporting on the inauguration of the 
‘Zeitschneise’ in January that year, the local press played the same role that it did 
in Oranienburg, establishing a symbolic and linguistic canon that quickly 
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normalized an otherwise potentially ambivalent picture of local identity. 
Headlines noted how the Zeitschneise captured the ‘Gleichzeitigkeit 
geschichtsträchtiger Orte’330 in Weimar, and articles spoke of ‘die Kluft 
zwischen Schöpfertum und der Hölle’,331 ‘das siamesische Zwillingspaar 
Weimar und Buchenwald’,332 and – bearing perhaps the closest resemblance to 
press discourse in Oranienburg – of the ‘Höhenflug und Absturz deutschen 
Geistes und deutscher Geschichte’.333 
 Neat though these rhetorical flourishes were, they nonetheless marginalized 
the post-1945 history of Buchenwald in their emphasis on the concentration 
camp. Of the eleven newspaper articles covering the Zeitschneise that I 
consulted, only one made reference to the Soviet camp, and this was in fact an 
article published almost two years prior to the inauguration – far closer, it should 
be noted, to the opening of the Speziallager museum at Buchenwald.334 On this 
evidence, it seems that Buchenwald’s multiple pasts were increasingly collapsed 
together in the intervening period and more or less subsumed within the 
‘concentration camp’ label by the time the Zeitschneise was inaugurated. Indeed, 
two other articles included maps of the route, which clearly showed it to pass the 
mass grave for victims of the Speziallager, yet the more complex series of 
associations this would suggest was not addressed in either.335     
 Though the ‘myth of ignorance’ may have been well and truly debunked in 
Weimar, the question of the relationship between the Nazi and Soviet camps at 
Buchenwald (and the place of both in local history in the longue durée) was not 
yet settled. Moreover, we may surmise that the local cultural ‘elite’ – that is, the 
Kulturstadtjahr organisers, local press and so on – did very much present 
concepts of local identity and civic governance in Weimar as antecedents of the 
‘negative nationalism’ commonly attributed to Gerhard Schröder. As was 
intimated in an article on the Zeitschneise in the Thüringer Allgemeine, such an 
explicit engagement with the legacy of the Third Reich as this ‘träfe in Bonn im 
allgemeinen und im Bundesinnenministerium im besonderen auf eine, sagen wir: 
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zurückhaltende Resonanz.’336 Local memory, if one believed the official rhetoric, 
did not so much reproduce a dispositif emanating in Berlin as pioneer one of its 
own.  
Ultimately, efforts to construct local identity and memory around 
acknowledgement (as opposed to disavowal) of the Nazi past had become the 
norm in Weimar and Oranienburg by the turn of the millennium, even if the 
shape they took was not entirely agreed upon. Knigge and other memorial 
specialists evidently recognised the process that lay behind creating a culture of 
remembrance and accordingly treated 1999 as a significant milestone rather than 
an end point. In one interview Knigge indeed addressed ‘the question of finding 
an appropriate degree of commemoration’ (‘[d]ie Frage nach dem richtigen Maß 
[des Gedenkens]’).337 The Kulturstadtjahr, as part of such a process, was for him 
a ‘Probierfeld’, not least as it entailed efforts at remembering and coming to 
terms with the Third Reich outside the walls of the memorial.338 Individual 
exhibitions such as Leben-Terror-Geist also registered and commented upon the 
apparent beginnings of an institutionalised memory culture. In Oranienburg, the 
ultimate failure to realize the Hope Incision project did not signal a rejection of 
the confrontationalist approach to the Nazi past, but nor did it bear out claims of 
a consensus around confrontation found in the local press. 
 
 
 
Blind spots of local memory: the GDR 
 
 
As was intimated in the preceding section, the Speziallager and the GDR, not 
least GDR ideology as monumentalized at the Nationale Mahn- und 
Gedenkstätten, were often screened from view by municipal discourses that 
stressed the interrelatedness of positive and negative local cultural heritage, 
where National Socialism tended to stand in for negative history pars pro toto. In 
what follows I unpack how and why these blind spots have been constructed, and 
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in doing so am able to return to the question of normalized constructions of 
cultural memory, identity and civic governance that runs through this thesis. Is 
there a ‘disciplinary regime’ at work in the cumulative efforts of a local cultural 
and heritage apparatus to inculcate particular historical narratives of the double 
past, and if so is it different from an equivalent regime operating at national or 
regional level? Are there, further to this, differences between the two localities? I 
return firstly to the Kulturstadtjahr exhibitions, critiquing the Doppelausstellung 
and the temporary exhibition Leben-Terror-Geist, and then consider how the 
double past is handled in Weimar’s municipal museum. The section closes with 
an exploration of how the Speziallager and the GDR are commemorated (or, 
more accurately, not commemorated) in Oranienburg. It follows on from the 
coverage of the Hope Incision debates in section one and picks up on the 
emergent – albeit fragile – figurative tropes that were increasingly being 
employed to integrate Sachsenhausen into a narrative of local history. As we will 
see by exploring how the memorial’s various historical phases featured in 
coverage of the 2001 Preußenjahr, the emphasis placed on the (still fractious) 
town-camp juxtaposition often obscured other comparisons, for instance those 
between the Nazi and Soviet camps, from view.   
It is highly revealing that Weimar’s cultural elite linked the manifold 
projects dealing with Buchenwald in 1999 exclusively to finding the right 
proportions for commemorating ‘victims of the Nazi regime’ (italics RB).339 
Although it was not envisaged as part of the Kulturstadtjahr programme, the 
final exhibition of the ‘Neugestaltung’ dealing with the history of the Nationale 
Mahn- und Gedenkstätte Buchenwald did admittedly open in October (see 
chapter one), so the memorial’s pre-history in the GDR was by no means absent 
from this panorama. The fact that the opening signalled a formal ‘end’ to the 
memorial’s redesign, however, will certainly have played a role in how 
Buchenwald’s post-1945 history was expected to figure in local memory 
discourse in future. Combined with the overriding emphasis this discourse placed 
on Weimar’s implication in the rise of National Socialism, the completion of the 
‘Neugestaltung’ only compounded a sense of a definitive break with GDR 
antifascism. Rather than being regarded as an object of local memory after 1990, 
the outdated antifascist paradigm was pushed to the fringes of the 
                                                
339 Ibid, p. 11. 
148 
 
 
Kulturstadtjahr programme and presented only peripherally as a negative point 
of reference. Alongside the Weimar-Buchenwald comparison, a binary 
distinction began to emerge between the instrumentalised commemoration 
practiced in the GDR and the post-unification reorientation of the memorial 
around scientific principles of objectivity and differentiation. Press reportage in 
the run up to 1999 appeared to confirm this impression, observing flippantly that 
reunification presented a belated opportunity for the memorial ‘ideologiefrei mit 
historischen Fakten umzugehen’.340 
In order to trace the processes by which the GDR was pushed out of 
municipal discourse on Buchenwald, I wish to return first of all to the 
Doppelausstellung in the memorial and the Schillermuseum. The accompanying 
exhibition catalogue in particular embodied the duality of the relationship 
between town and camp. Its designers elected to bind the sections dealing with 
each discrete exhibition back to back, and print both exhibitions titles on the 
respective cover pages. Furthermore, translucent sheets of paper onto which 
quotes from Goethe and recollections of Buchenwald survivors had been printed 
were interleaved between pages displaying Goethe’s artwork. Thus the 
quotations over-layering the sketches and paintings differed depending on the 
catalogue one was reading. As Chloe Paver has pointed out, the catalogue design 
aimed to convey a sense of the ‘‘double-sidedness’ of Weimar’s memory’.341 She 
argues that though this (and other similar examples of symbolic and rhetorical 
figuration around 1999) certainly addressed the interrelationship between the 
poles of ‘Goethe’ and ‘Buchenwald’, it had the unintended effect of eliding the 
complex layers contained within each signifier.342 
A closer look at the exhibition catalogue does not entirely confirm this. 
Volkhard Knigge’s contribution, which provides a cultural history of the 
‘Goethe-Oak’ at Buchenwald does in face trace its reception across the political 
ruptures of 1933, 1945, and 1989.343 The reader in this case learns that the tree is 
a mutable symbol and invested with new meaning at different historical 
junctures. Indeed, the tree identified by Eckermann in his recollections of a visit 
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to the Ettersberg with Goethe in 1827 turns out to be located outside the 
concentration camp grounds, and so is evidently not the same tree Buchenwald 
prisoners later refer to as the ‘Goethe Oak’. Knigge also points to the role it 
played in the GDR as a symbol of international solidarity amongst the prisoners, 
fusing the legacy of antifascist resistance to that of Weimar Classicism. Finally, 
by remarking on a layer of symbolism – the tree as ‘[ein] Symbol des Trostes, 
der Würde, der Selbstbehauptung und der Anklage’344 – marginalized by the 
GDR narrative, Knigge implicitly points to the ‘Goethe-Oak’s’ embedment 
within a post-unification constellation of memory. In certain places at least, the 
catalogue’s narrative differentiates within as well as between the poles of the 
Goethe/Buchenwald binary. 
Even so, Paver’s claim that the GDR is not addressed on its own terms in 
local memory is justifiable.345 For all its efforts to differentiate between historical 
phases, the catalogue really only addresses GDR memory, and is, broadly 
speaking, dismissive of it. Though hardly guilty of the ‘Selbstgenugsamkeit’ that 
Knigge had cautioned against, the catalogue does come close to miring itself in a 
dichotomy of its own making, namely the opposition of ideologically 
instrumentalised memory in the GDR and a pluralistic, objective commemorative 
paradigm in post-unification Weimar. To a certain extent then, the politics of 
negation that was perceptible in Buchenwald’s redesign (and explored in chapter 
one) carried over into local memory at the turn of the millennium. One could 
admittedly raise few objections to the new form of cultural memory that was 
crystallizing in Weimar at this point. The rationale behind it however, which 
consisted of invoking the negative example of GDR memory, did raise a 
suspicion that remembrance was coming to be seen in normative terms here too, 
just as it was at federal level. Whereas the Schröder administration had rooted 
‘negative nationalism’ at the heart of German identity, there was a creeping sense 
that cultural memory in Weimar was beginning to orientate itself around a form 
of negative localism. 
Other exhibitions shown at Buchenwald in 1999 demonstrated a more 
reflexive awareness of their position within the memory landscape that was 
beginning to crystallise in the Kulturstadtjahr. The temporary exhibition, Leben-
Terror-Geist, in fact built reflexivity into its design and layout. I have described 
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above how the exhibition commented upon Weimar-Buchenwald connections, 
both intellectual and actual. But of course, by reasserting such links, it was 
effectively responding to the rigidly antifascist GDR narrative of Buchenwald 
that had previously obscured them. As one of the curators, Axel Doßmann, 
remarked, re-connecting the hitherto separate legacies of town and camp formed 
part of the broader agenda of the Kulturstadtjahr, given that it informed not just 
the Leben-Terror-Geist exhibition but also the Doppelausstellung; in this sense it 
explicitly ‘responded to’ (‘reagiert[e] auf’) the GDR narrative.346 Equally, where 
survivors had typically been reduced to symbols (of Nazi brutality, communist 
resistance and so on) in official memory in the GDR, in the temporary exhibition 
visitors were introduced to exhibits relating predominantly to prisoners’ lives 
before Buchenwald as well as afterwards, when living in the shadow of their 
experiences in the camp. The corollary of deconstructing this homogenizing 
identity label was to gesture towards multiple identities and authenticities, and 
thereby also to multiple histories beyond the flattened out poles of past and 
present.  
In a final departure from the museology of the Nationale Mahn- und 
Gedenkstätte, the temporary exhibition showed a degree of reflexivity in relation 
to present-day assumptions about and constructions of ‘collective memory’. As 
Doßmann explained, it explicitly interrogated the Halbwachsian concept of 
socially constructed memory by presenting, in visual terms, a disjuncture 
between the ‘authentic’ quality assigned to objects of memory and the practical, 
geopolitical and emotional contexts that determined their cultural visibility (or 
indeed invisibility). Thus, compartments within certain boxes contained 
exhibition objects whereas others were empty, indicating where either reluctance 
on the part of survivors to part with ‘authentic’ relics, difficulties transporting 
them out of war-torn areas such as the Balkans, or other factors had prevented 
their inclusion in the museum space.347 Certainly, by utilising a biographical 
approach and treating the concept of ‘collective memory’ reflexively, even 
dismissively, Leben-Terror-Geist invited critical engagement with – rather than 
straightforward condemnation of – historical heurisms such as antifascism. Yet 
                                                
346 A. Doßmann, ‘Vereint in der Differenz: Zur Asstellung “Leben-Terror-Geist. Kz Buchenwald: 
Porträts von Künstlern und Intellektuellen”’ in Kontexte und Kulturen des Erinnerns: Maurice 
Halbwachs und das Paradigma des kollektiven Gedächtnisses, ed. by Gerald Echterhoff and 
Martin Saar (Konstanz: UvK Verlag, 2002), pp. 181-201 (p. 190). 
347 Doßmann, ‘Vereint in der Differenz’, p. 187. 
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by the same token, it only handled the camp and town’s communist past 
indirectly, through the original lens of the concentration camp, much like the 
other Buchenwald projects included in the ‘Weimar 1999’ programme. 
Considering that 1999 was, amongst other things, the 50-year anniversary of the 
GDR’s creation and 10th anniversary of its demise, the East German’s state’s 
relative invisibility during the Kulturstadtjahr was striking.  
How did the Speziallager figure in municipal memory discourse at this 
point? Bill Niven has argued recently that comparisons between Weimar and 
Buchenwald, which the SED drew in order to fuse the town’s classical legacy to 
that of antifascist resistance, have since 1990 given way to the contested issue of 
comparing the concentration camp and special camp.348 Although this was 
certainly the case in the early 1990s, and is a trend that largely continues at 
national level, I would contend that, in local memory culture, comparisons 
between the respective camps have been steadily ceding ground to renewed 
efforts at framing Buchenwald within a micro-history of Weimar. An interesting 
example of both comparisons can be found in Weimar’s Municipal Museum 
(Stadtmuseum), where a permanent exhibition dealing with the History of 
Weimar from the first local settlements up to the town upon German 
reunification in 1990 is on display. The fact that it commented upon 
Buchenwald’s double past at all separated it from many of the other Buchenwald 
projects that opened in 1999, though it did also break from the municipal 
narrative in its somewhat outdated dramatization of the connection between 
camp and town. For these reasons it bears looking at in more detail, as it 
indicates that the established comparisons and figuration underlying local 
memory norms were not quite ubiquitous in addition to providing certain clues as 
to why this might be so.   
The museum building, constructed between 1780 and 1803, is named 
after its commissioner Friedrich Justin Bertuch (1747-1822), a prominent writer, 
publisher and businessman of the time. In 1903 it came under municipal 
administration, and has since 1954 housed the Municipal Museum. Though the 
current museum has understandably tailored the permanent exhibition around the 
particular strengths of the collection, which largely relate to 19th and 20th century 
clothing, Bertuch’s life and work, the National Assembly of 1919 and the 
                                                
348 See Bill Niven, ‘The GDR, Weimar classicism and resistance at Buchenwald’, Témoigner 
entre histoire et mémoire, 104 (2009), 175-190.  
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Weimar Republic, it nevertheless addresses the history of the town during the 
Third Reich and in the GDR. Given that this exhibition also dovetailed with the 
Kulturstadtjahr – it opened in 1999 after lengthy restoration work lasting a 
decade – the present concept offers a window onto the process by which publicly 
remembering the double past was institutionalised on a local level in the course 
of the 1990s. Moreover, it points to some of the blind spots and implicit 
assumptions behind the dual ‘Weimar-Buchenwald’ narrative whose emergence 
in and around 1999 I have charted above.349 
It is clear that the museum’s somewhat more sparse collections relating to 
the town’s post-1933 history present certain narratological obstacles, and the 
period 1933-1945 is indeed depicted for the most part through text, photos, and 
scale models. Likewise, the section of the exhibition dealing with the GDR is 
conspicuously short, raising the question of whether the Municipal Museum can 
possibly complement other institutions in the town’s densely populated 
landscape of museums of contemporary history. Could the museum’s 
comparative strengths in exhibiting especially 19th and early 20th century local 
history, combined with the presence of other sites handling more recent 
developments, have lead to a disavowal of overt responsibility for the years 
between 1933 and 1989? On the other hand, is it fair to expect the Municipal 
Museum to devote a level of attention to this period that is disproportionate to its 
place in the collections, particularly when foregrounding the Third Reich in a 
longer chronology of local history could have resuscitated the narrative of a 
German Sonderweg? In the context of the museum’s reopening during the 
Kulturstadtjahr, these questions of institutional profiling and embedment within 
a broader museum landscape, and how they relate to the work of local 
institutions in either reproducing or challenging the emergent memory paradigm 
of the ‘Binom Weimar-Buchenwald’, become all the more acute. 
In a number of respects the permanent exhibition in the Municipal 
Museum departed from the underlying narrative behind the Kulturstadtjahr 
exhibitions that addressed Buchenwald. The layout of the former did not lend 
itself to unpacking the question of local mobilisation in support of National 
Socialism as deftly as the interwoven structure of the Doppelausstellung did, for 
                                                
349 For an overview of the museum’s history, see http://stadtmuseum.weimar.de [last accessed 29 
July 2013]. Analysis and observations in the following section are based on a visit undertaken on 
4 Mar 2012. Field notes in the author’s possession.  
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instance. Whilst the thrust of the exhibition swap between the memorial and the 
Schillermuseum had been to provide an integrated account of the dual humanistic 
and inhumane legacies associated with Weimar, the Municipal Museum was 
prone to separating out the two. In one fascinating but problematic part of the 
exhibition handling the rise of National Socialism, a scale model of the Weimar 
Gauforum is displayed in an exhibition cabinet above a scale model of the area 
prior to its construction. This is a visually compelling way of demonstrating the 
militarization and careful regimentalisation of life under National Socialism, 
apparent here in the erasure of parks and green spaces in favour of imposing 
marching grounds. Yet the visual metaphor of concreting over local life and 
traditions arguably overstates the imposition of National Socialism on Weimar 
whilst giving short shrift to local support for it. Furthermore, the opposition 
constructed here supposes that locals were automatically and intrinsically better 
disposed towards a naturalised, ‘green’ Weimar, suggesting an underlying, 
unspoilt tradition that could be invoked as a rejection of Nazism.  
Where the Municipal Museum addresses the double past, however, the 
issue of accommodation with dictatorial regimes is handled sensitively. One 
particular example tackles not only the issue of this initial moral culpability for 
National Socialism but also its relationship to post-war justice and crimes 
committed against Germans. This is the biography of the local artist Bartold 
Aspendorf, which appears in a section of the permanent exhibition entitled ‘Tod 
im Speziallager’. Aspendorf had been interned in the Speziallager at Buchenwald 
and died there in 1946, and so his biography speaks on one level to the tragedy 
that befell those Germans interned by the Soviets under shockingly inhumane 
conditions and without due process. Yet the exhibit accompanying Aspendorf’s 
biography is one of his paintings, Ecce Homo, which captures the anxiety and 
unease with which the rise of the Nazis was greeted locally, at least in certain 
quarters. The essential tragedy of Aspendorf’s death can be approximated only 
through the frame of the earlier National Socialist dictatorship, lending a sense of 
historical causality and differentiation to the moment of viewing the painting. 
Additionally, this is the final exhibit the visitor reaches – followed only by a very 
brief institutional history of the museum to close the exhibition – and is 
displayed in a narrow and dimly lit corridor. As such it must by necessity be 
viewed from close up, enhancing the reflective (and subjective) quality of 
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encountering it. As this particularly effective museological arrangement and 
staging demonstrates, the institutional context of a local history museum thus 
holds distinct potential for addressing the double past in a balanced manner.    
Moving now to Oranienburg, I wish to return to the question of the 
‘normative force’ exerted by representations of the memorial that are popularised 
by municipal and press discourse. Early 2001, as well as seeing the debates 
surrounding the Hoffnungsschneise intensify, also marked the 300th anniversary 
of the first Prussian prince to be crowned king. To coincide with ‘Preußenjahr’ in 
Brandenburg, a new exhibition documenting Oranienburg’s history was opened 
in the palace museum. Newspaper coverage of the event lavished praise upon the 
fine baroque exhibits on display, but fell back upon the familiar trope of National 
Socialism as Prussia’s ‘dark chapter’ when explaining Sachsenhausen’s place in 
the town’s history. The following, taken from the Märkische Allgemeine Zeitung, 
is typical of this reflex: 
 
‘Dass Oranienburg nicht nur Sinnbild für fürstliche Lebensfreude und 
Pflege der Musen war, sondern in der NS-Zeit mit dem nahe gelegenen 
Konzentrationslager Sachsenhausen auch blutbefleckter Ort schlimmster 
Verbrechen, wird im Schlosshof auf Schautafeln deutlich. Für 
Oranienburgs Bürgermeister Hans-Joachim Laesicke ist es wichtig, die 
Höhenflüge und die schwarzen Schatten in der Geschichte der Stadt zu 
zeigen. Die Eröffnung des Schlosses als Museum rücke nun den ersten 
Barockpalast ins Bewusstsein, den sich Brandenburg nach dem 
dreißigjährigen Krieg leistete.’350   
         
This extract, which comes at the very end of the article (it is the last of 
ten paragraphs in total), presents the town’s baroque heritage as a counterweight 
to its National Socialist past, as implied by the juxtaposition of ‘Höhenflüge’ 
with the ‘schwarze[n] Schatten’ cast over Oranienburg by the Third Reich. 
Similarly, the act of metaphorically restoring the palace’s place in local memory 
can be read as a reassertion of positive Prussian history, and mirrors the use in 
another article of a quote from the director of the Prussian Palaces and Gardens 
Foundation, who praises the courage it has taken ‘aus der Kaserne [the palace 
                                                
350 H. Caspar, ‘Ausstellung für die Ewigkeit’, Märkische Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 Jan 2001. 
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housed the SS-Totenkopfwachverband Brandenburg prior to 1936, RB] wieder 
ein Schloss zu machen.’351 Finally, a third article refers to National Socialism in 
a similar vein as ‘[einen] düstersten Kapitel[…]’ of German history that ‘ein 
Regionalmuseum [sich] auch…zu widmet [hat]’. Once again, the reference is 
made towards the end of the article, this time in the penultimate paragraph.352 
Certainly the ‘dialectic of normality’ referred to in the introduction to this 
chapter appears to inform this method of acknowledging the town’s Nazi past 
almost as if a disclaimer. More to the point, though, it is a localised ‘dialectic of 
normality’, propelled not by a sense of national accountability for the Nazi past 
but the specific local history of Prussian tolerance and the legacy of the 
concentration camp.    
An additional local impulse was clearly provided by the acute problem of 
right-wing extremism in Brandenburg. In the months surrounding the Berlin 
symposium debating Libeskind’s project, this ongoing issue occupied many of 
the headlines, especially following an arson attack on a Jewish cemetery in 
Potsdam in early January. This in particular precipitated a flood of articles 
addressing the ‘Kampf…gegen Rechtsextremismus’353 and noting interior 
minister Jörg Schönbohm’s promise to combat the right-wing scene with great 
determination.354 The proposal by education minister Steffen Reiche that all 
schools in Brandenburg hold an ‘Extra-Stunde’ dealing with the issues of anti-
Semitism and right-wing extremism was also picked up upon by the press,355 as 
was a later podium discussion that coincided with the ‘nationalen Tag zur 
Überwindung von Rassismus’.356 Furthermore, this article stresses that 
condemnation of the rise in extremism was universal; the podium participants 
‘waren sich darin einig, dass…eine Sensibilisierung in Bezug auf das Thema 
Rechtsextremismus in der Bevölkerung stattgefunden habe.’357 Together, these 
articles point to a local identification with tolerant, cosmopolitan values, in turn 
providing a clue as to why the ‘dialectic of normality’ took the form it did in 
                                                
351 ‘Künst erster Güte im Schloss’, Oranienburger Generalanzeiger, 17 Jan 2001. The quote also 
appears in M. Voigt, ‘Oranienburg: Wertvolle Exponate’, Oranienburg Generalanzeiger, 17 Jan 
2001. 
352 ‘Wo Preußens Wiege stand’, Oranienburger Generalanzeiger, 17 Jan 2001. 
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355 ‘Entsetzen über Brandanschlag’, Märkische Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 Jan 2001. 
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Oranienburg at this point. Sachsenhausen served in these particular local identity 
constructions as a historical symbol of the very values the town professed to 
stand against, but in being used to shore up expressions of a local moral 
conscience it was divested of its own complex and multi-faceted past. 
Indeed, though 2001 represented a significant milestone in the 
memorialization of Sachsenhausen’s communist past, local press coverage of the 
annual commemorative ceremony marking the closure of the Speziallager and 
the inauguration of the museum several months later was surprisingly low-key. 
In the Märkische Allgemeine, for instance, a report on the commemorative 
ceremony was placed fairly inconspicuously on page sixteen of the 3 September 
edition under the title ‘Keine Opfer zweiter Klasse’.358 This was at once a 
reference to and dismissal of the accusation that Speziallager victims were not 
afforded the same recognition as victims of National Socialist crimes. Towards 
the end of the article however it was noted that several survivors of the special 
camp were retroactively rehabilitated by the Russian government, including the 
president of the ALS Gisela Gneist (‘[sie] wurden von jeder Schuld 
freigesprochen’).359 The effect was to underline the unqualified victimhood of 
Gneist and others as well as the arbitrary grounds for imprisonment that had been 
characteristic of the special camps. Yet accompanying this article on the page 
was another, smaller piece addressing an exhibition on the Inspektion der 
Konzentrationslager (IKL) displayed in the former administrative headquarters 
of the concentration camp.360 Such an arrangement can hardly have been 
coincidental, and moreover reminded readers of Sachsenhausen’s initial 
prominent place in the network of National Socialist camps (the concentration 
camps fell under the jurisdiction of the IKL until 1942). By extension, placing 
the two articles together drew a qualitative distinction between outright 
perpetrators such as those who administered the concentration camps and other 
Germans who had – however one judged initial accommodation with the 
National Socialist regime, and whether or not one regarded it as deserved – been 
unlawfully imprisoned in the special camps. Reportage thus made a case for 
differentiated commemoration, but did not really afford the thorny issue of the 
double past much coverage in the first place. 
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Where stories concerning the Speziallager in 2001 were positioned more 
prominently in local newspapers, reportage continued to follow the principle of 
differentiation. In the Oranienburger Generalanzeiger, an article covering the 
same commemorative ceremony openly criticised a member of the ALS 
delegation who was accused of having ‘left aside’ (‘beiseitelassen’) the 
differences between deliberate murder of concentration camp inmates and deaths 
as a result of starvation and disease in the special camps. By contrast, the article 
detailed Günter Morsch’s rejoinder to the ALS’s criticisms of the memorial at 
length.361 When the Speziallager museum was opened in December that year, it 
was Morsch’s stance that was adopted by the local press once more. In this case 
reportage cited the ‘relativisieren-bagatellisieren’ couplet (which was also used, 
incidentally, by Morsch in his inauguration speech).362 There could be few 
objections to the memory narrative advocated in the pages of the local press. In 
the context of this discussion, however, the casualness with which the case for 
differentiation was made suggested that the main objects of comparison in the 
local sphere remained the concentration camp and town.         
  
 
(Counter-) cultures of remembrance in Weimar and 
Oranienburg 
 
Much of this chapter so far has highlighted specific local discursive dynamics, 
pointing to the ways in which established local – usually municipal – paradigms 
have normalized and naturalized particular terms of reference to the double past. 
In the third section of the chapter I turn from the monolithic municipal discourse 
to other local memory activists, such as civic initiatives and local branches of 
survivors’ organisations. Broadening the focus to include these groups allows for 
a fuller investigation of the dynamic produced by the disposifis I have identified 
above. Do they produce counter-narratives of memory, or do such alternative 
interpretations of Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen owe their existence to other 
traditions outside of these complexes? This additionally sheds light on the 
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question of whether local memory is relational and centrifugal or whether it is in 
fact polycentric, clustered around several different nuclei. Responses to the 
controversial commemorative speeches held at Buchenwald by Hermann Schäfer 
and at Sachsenhausen by Jörg Schönbohm in 2006 (see thesis introduction) form 
the springboard for discussion here, and I will show that, in both cases, the 
Holocaust-centred memory paradigm established during the 1990s was forcefully 
reasserted. In both Weimar and Oranienburg however, this continuity owed to 
specific local contexts and was effected through by different means. Having 
demonstrated this, I will then analyze a range of local civic groups, exploring 
how (if at all) they challenge established local cultures of remembrance. 
In Oranienburg, response to Jörg Schönbohm’s speech in local 
newspapers differed quite considerably from the tone of press reportage at 
regional level, which as I explain in the following chapter appeared to implicitly 
endorse his conflation of the concentration camp and the Speziallager. This was 
a neat illustration of how key junctures in public commemoration of the double 
past could be negotiated disparately across different public spheres. Indeed, by 
the time Schönbohm’s remarks had been recognised as potentially incendiary, 
articles in local newspapers had gone to significant lengths to avoid fanning the 
flames of a scandal in waiting over the alignment of German commemorative 
culture. They mobilized not in defence of Schönbohm himself, but in defence of 
an existing memory paradigm. As one reporter pointed out, ‘[d]em “doppelten 
Schmerz” [i.e. the double past, RB] wird die Gedenkstätte Sachsenhausen schon 
seit Jahren gerecht’.363 Likewise, the same author insisted in an accompanying 
opinion piece that ‘[Schönbohm’s] unsensible Gleichstellung…auch deswegen 
unnötig [ist], weil der Opfer nach 1945 durchaus gedacht wird’, citing the 
Speziallager museum and the separate commemorative day on August 16 for the 
victims of the Soviet camp as evidence of this.364  
When the scandal initially broke, Schönbohm had unsurprisingly been 
criticised strongly by the speaker of the Internationales Sachsenhausen Komitee, 
Hans Rentmeister, who was cited in the local press too. Yet when, several weeks 
later, it was discovered than Rentmeister had formerly worked for the Stasi, the 
local press once again played down the episode. The paradox of Rentmeister’s 
work for the ISK and role in a central mechanism of the GDR surveillance 
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apparatus could quite easily have brought the entire victims’ organisation into 
disrepute, and by extension the Brandenburg Memorial Foundation, with whom 
the ISK cooperated. Indeed, the Speziallager lobby did claim that the revalations 
compromised the memorial site directorate, but local reportage for its part leapt 
to the defence of Günter Morsch and others. It focused primarily on the support 
shown for Morsch by Brandenburg’s Minister for Culture Johanna Wanka.365 
Other articles restated the validity of the criticism Rentmeister initially levelled 
at Schönbohm, despite Rentmeister himself having been undermined by the 
information that had come to light about his past.366 Together, the immediate 
moves to dismiss the challenge mounted by victims of communism and the 
placative tone of the articles suggest a perception of Sachsenhausen that 
remained rooted in a Holocaust-centred national memory discourse. 
That being said, evidence of a specifically local motivation behind this 
principled support for differentiated commemoration was also visible in the local 
press. In the initial reports that neglect to mention Schönbohm’s divisive 
comments, the passing down of a Vermächtnis drawn up by the various 
concentration camp survivors’ associations is foregrounded ahead of the scandal 
surrounding Schönbohm himself. The Vermächtnis and its explicit call to 
preserve peace and combat anti-Semitism is evidently considered all the more 
important in light of recent right-wing attacks on migrant Germans in 
Brandenburg. The following appears in the Oranienburger Generalanzeiger, for 
example: 
 
‘Besonders der immer noch grassierende Rassismus in Europa sowie 
Kriege und Gewalt in der Welt hätten das [Internationale Sachsenhausen] 
Komitee dazu bewogen, dieses Vermächtnis auszuarbeiten. 
Dabei seien die jüngsten Ereignisse in Brandenburg eine 
Bestätigung der Dringlichkeit dieser Aufgabe gewesen.’367   
 
Sachsenhausen is thus quite clearly aligned with the political exigencies 
of the present in Brandenburg; the ‘urgency’ (‘Dringlichkeit’) of preserving 
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memory of the camp amongst younger generations is felt most acutely when 
evidence of right-wing extremism is also on the rise. Criticism of Schönbohm too 
appears to have had a local trigger, in this instance the polemical attempt of the 
DVU to honour post-1945 victims at Sachsenhausen on Holocaust Remembrance 
Day in 2005, which had made plainly clear that relativisation of Nazi crimes 
remained deeply controversial. As an article in the Märkische Allgemeine 
concludes: ‘der Minister [hätte dabei] gewarnt sein müssen’.368  
In Weimar, meanwhile, the SPD mayor Stefan Wolf had been one of the 
more outspoken critics of Hermann Schäfer following his ‘Gedächtnis 
Buchenwald’ speech, and had also made a point of apologising personally to the 
survivors who had been sitting in the audience. Whilst the LAG Buchenwald-
Dora e. V. could with good reason call into question the stance of the federal 
government towards the Nazi past in the wake of Schäfer’s remarks (see chapter 
five), Wolf’s actions were calculated to make clear that the commitment to 
remember the Holocaust was taken seriously at municipal level. Not that this was 
necessarily in doubt in the first place. As the opening section of this chapter has 
reconstructed in some detail, a local memory paradigm began to be constructed 
around Weimar’s intertwined legacies of Classicism and National Socialist 
barbarity from the early 1990s onwards, and so in many respects Wolf was 
merely reaffirming long-standing traditions of avowing the town’s responsibility 
for brown-collar crimes. Around a year later Wolf then acted as signatory for a 
symbolic agreement between the LAG and the municipality to pass on the legacy 
of the concentration camp survivors to future generations. The agreement, 
published in the LAG’s newsletter Die Glocke vom Ettersberg, is an interesting 
example of the complex local-national-global interplay at work in the dynamic of 
Buchenwald memory and how this resolves itself in the context of municipal 
discourse. As such, it requires closer attention. 
Effectively the agreement committed the town to carry on the work of the 
survivors and safeguard memory of National Socialist crimes. It took the form of 
an initial appeal to municipal officials by the survivors, who asked ‘wer spricht 
und kämpft für uns, wenn wir nicht mehr sind?’, and a declaration in response 
from the town promising to take up the survivors’ call.369 There were noticeable 
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similarities, both in the language of the agreement and its several references to 
the imminent disappearance of the generation of survivors and eyewitnesses of 
National Socialist barbarity, to the earlier Vermächtnis; both sought to enlist 
popular engagement with the past in the long-term. The crucial difference 
however was the global civic space the survivors were implicitly addressing in 
the Vermächtnis as opposed to the specifically local agreement envisioned by 
Weimar and the LAG. Yet as I wish to illustrate here, the town’s pledge spoke 
implicitly to national and trans-national constituencies as well as to a local 
audience. Thus local discourse, or more accurately municipal discourse – it was, 
it should be pointed out, the town’s official ‘Vertreterinnen und Vertreter’ to 
whom the survivors directed their plea, and Wolf who spoke on behalf of 
Weimar – appeared to both appropriate and inflect the official federal position on 
the Nazi past at the time.               
First of all, the pledge expressed the town’s solidarity with the truly 
global network of former prisoners belonging to the survivors’ association. 
Bertrand Herz, president of the Internationales Komitee Buchenwald-Dora und 
Kommandos (IKBD), co-signed the formal agreement along with Stefan Wolf, 
symbolizing Weimar’s bond with a collective of survivors drawn from many 
different nations in their common repudiation of ‘nationalsozialistisches 
Gedankengut, Rassismus und Antisemitismus’.370 The specific form of 
Holocaust memory this collective of survivors advocated was however one 
rooted in the legacy of resistance in the camps, as has been pointed out already in 
earlier chapters. Looking at the way the former Buchenwald prisoners recounted 
the history of the camp in their appeal at the start of the pledge, this is quite clear. 
Buchenwald was and is for them:     
 
‘de[r] Ort, wo die Nazis erst Deutsche gefangen hielten, wo sie 
anschließend die Widerstandskämpfer und Gegner Nazideutschlands aus 
allen besetzten Ländern hin verschleppten, und schließlich auch Juden, 
Sinti und Roma, die ausgerottet werden sollten…’371 
 
In this sequence, Buchenwald was first and foremost a site of resistance 
and opposition to National Socialism and only secondarily of persecution and 
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attempted elimination of racial ‘enemies’ of the Third Reich. Furthermore, the 
deliberate signing of the agreement to coincide with the 70th anniversary of 
Buchenwald’s establishment in 1937 compounded a focus on the political (and 
particularly anti-communist) persecution characteristic of the pre-war years. 
Equally, the narrative allowed for a de-centering of 1945 and its attendant 
associations with the Holocaust, liberation, and the beginnings of a bipolar world 
order, all of which followed after the history of resistance, both chronologically 
and narratologically. There was no question, then, of inviting a ‘totalitarian’ 
reading of Buchenwald’s history that conflated events occurring there both prior 
to and after the caesura of 1945; post-war injustices did not for that matter figure 
at all in the rationale for committing to ‘eine neue Welt des Friedens und der 
Freiheit’372 as far as the camp survivors saw it. Thus the agreement, though it 
reflected the same basic assumptions about the singularity and centrality of the 
Holocaust in German memory culture held by the federal government, also 
foregrounded the international legacy of antifascist resistance.   
That being said, the joint declaration did resemble the federal position in 
other important ways. Indeed, the municipality, in its response to the survivors’ 
appeal, left no doubt about its position on the value of remembrance as a tool of 
political and humanitarian education, saying:        
 
‘Ihr Kommen bezeugt, wie unabdingbar die Ächtung der 
nationalsozialistischen Weltanschauung und ihrer aktuellen 
Ausprägungen in unserer Demokratie verankert sein und bleiben 
muss.’373  
 
If one follows the logic of the declaration, the political nation is created 
and held together by its internalisation of the lessons of the Nazi past, and 
Buchenwald thus constitutes a vital agent of civic governance. This is, of course, 
the very same normative link between Germany’s dictatorial past and its 
democratic present and future that underpins the institutionalised model of 
commemoration I subject to closer scrutiny in this thesis. As analysis of the 
declaration suggests, it is a position that is reproduced to a certain extent by 
municipal patterns of remembrance. 
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As will already be apparent, however, local memory is not simply a 
microcosm of an institutionalised memory dynamic. The relative novelty of a 
formal declaration issued jointly by municipality and survivor organisation and 
its unique hybridity, drawing upon an international, antifascist as well as 
national, ‘official’ discourse, suggests there is more to the picture. Indeed, this 
uniqueness was not lost on the municipality, which announced the declaration 
thus:        
 
‘[D]ie Stadt Weimar [setzt] heute ein Zeichen. Sie versichert, sich dafür 
einzusetzen, dass Ihr Vermächtnis [that of the concentration camp 
survivors, RB] zum Kern des demokratischen Selbstverständnisses und 
der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gehört und 
dauerhaft gehören wird.’374 
 
Notably, all three of the overlapping local, national, and global frames are 
contained in this statement. It points towards both the pacific world order 
outlined in the Vermächtnis and a national political identity orientated around 
remembrance of the Nazi past. Beyond that, it conveys a sense of local 
exceptionality; Weimar is setting a precedent (‘ein Zeichen setzen’) by 
committing to uphold the values underlying these global and national polities. 
Consequently, we can register a striking degree of similarity between municipal 
discourse in Weimar and the equivalent official local narrative in Oranienburg. 
Admittedly the latter utilised a different framing device – the concept of 
‘Toleranz’ – but it too countenanced local, national and universal models of 
remembrance. In Weimar the dialectic between national and transnational 
cultural frames on the one hand and the locally specific metaphor of the ‘Binom 
Weimar-Buchenwald’ on the other was explicitly acknowledged. In the 
agreement with the LAG it was noted: 
 
‘Wir wissen, dass die Geschichte unserer Stadt mit der Entwicklung eines 
humanistischen Menschenbildes, der Etablierung von Demokratie, aber 
                                                
374 Ibid., p. 2. 
164 
 
 
auch der Zerstörung aller Menschlichkeit verbunden ist.’375    
 
With this the text fell back upon the by-now familiar dualism of culture and 
barbarity. The local memory paradigm established in the course of the 1990s had 
clearly endured into the 2000s more or less unchanged. However the joint 
declaration with the LAG also revealed a capacity for the paradigm to 
accommodate or gesture towards other memory narratives – in particular in this 
instance towards the resistance narrative propagated by several of the 
concentration camp survivors’ associations. 
To what extent, though, did the paradigmatic discourses in Weimar and 
Oranienburg feed into and inform the activities of other civic memory initiatives 
in the two towns? Did these groups also assimilate the respective ‘double-sided’ 
narratives, or did they instead challenge them? I wish to address these questions 
by looking firstly at local anti-extremist groups, namely the Förderverein für 
interkulturelle Bildung und Begegnung e.V (FiBB) in Oranienburg (but active in 
the wider Landkreis of Oberhavel), and the Bürgerbündnis gegen 
Rechtsextremismus (BgR) in Weimar. Secondly, I assess other antifascist 
positions, taking the Weimar branch of the Vereinigung der Verfolgten des 
Naziregimes-Bund der Antifaschisten (VVN-BdA) as a case study. Lastly, I 
consider where in relation to local cultures of remembrance groups lobbying for 
commemoration of the Speziallager victims such as the Initiativgruppe 
Buchenwald 1945-1950 e.V. stand. 
The FiBB has appropriated the motif of ‘Toleranz’, so central to the 
image that Oranienburg has sought to present of itself in recent years. Indeed, 
amongst the organisation’s key principles are a commitment to combating all 
forms of racism, xenophobia and neo-Nazism, and support of ‘democracy as a 
way of life’ (‘Demokratie als Lebensform’).376 As such, it promotes historical 
and humanitarian education combining reflection on the Oberhavel district’s 
unique ‘[h]istorische Prägungen’377 with democratic sensitization in the present. 
Interestingly, though the website marks out the legacy of two concentration 
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camps (KZ Oranienburg and later KZ Sachsenhausen) as the most important of 
these ‘historische Prägungen’, members of the FiBB point out that it in principle 
supports projects dealing with various different phases of local history, ranging 
from the pre-1933 period to the post-unification years. That said, they equally 
accept that the National Socialist past logically takes on an ‘übergeordnete Rolle’ 
given the organisation’s specific focus on right-wing extremism.378 Thus a 
degree of overlap with both the municipality and the Sachsenhausen memorial is 
established. The FiBB’s agenda epitomises both Oranienburg’s Leitbild of 
‘Toleranz’ and the memorial professionals’ principle of historical differentiation 
(labels of ‘übergeordnet’ and ‘untergeordnet’ were first used by the Historians’ 
Commission to establish parameters for dealing with the double past). 
To a certain extent this parallels the position of the BgR in Weimar. It is 
also concerned primarily with combating neo-Nazism and right-wing extremism 
more generally, and was in fact established in 2000 precisely because of a series 
of incidents involving far right groups during the 1990s. As the group has a 
broad and heterogenous societal base, there are inevitably internal differences 
vis-à-vis the most appropriate means of resisting neo-Nazi gatherings.379 
Nonetheless, it is possible to glean an accurate picture of the attitudes of the elder 
cohort of the BgR who sit on its council. On this evidence the BgR, much like 
the FiBB, positions itself between the municipality and the memorial in 
Weimar’s memory landscape. The members of the council I spoke to were for 
instance unequivocal about the need for civic society to oppose right-wing 
extremism; they saw the murder of a number of Turkish-Germans (and one 
German with Greek roots) by members of a Thuringian National Socialist 
Underground (NSU) circle in the summer of 2011 as clear proof that the 
government was not doing enough either at local or national level.380 Equally, 
whilst the BgR has a strong relationship with the memorial and the two jointly 
organise events such as discussions and presentations involving Buchenwald 
survivors, the council members regard the memorial as a mediator or ‘moralische 
Instanz’.381 Thus, it can intervene in debates surrounding the politics of 
commemoration and provide an objective, scientific basis for discussion, and 
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indeed the BgR quite clearly supports the differentiated position the memorial 
has taken on contested questions such as the double past.382  
Yet as we have seen, the organisation has its roots in the distinct local 
political constellation emerging in the 1990s, and at an individual level too 
several of the BgR’s council members trace their memory activism back to 
circumstances they were confronted with in the GDR. Though they were aware 
that the history of the concentration camp presented at the NMG Buchenwald 
was ‘überhöht’, they recall the memorial nevertheless leaving a lasting 
impression upon them– one that, together with their exposure to the Allied films 
of Buchenwald upon liberation, convinced them of the heinousness of National 
Socialist ideology. Likewise, although they are critical of the GDR, and refer to 
it as ‘Europe’s largest prison’, they have been profoundly influenced by the 
legacy of non-violent protest epitomized by the events of 1989.383 Not only do 
certain GDR traditions therefore play an important role in the BgR’s work; the 
council members actually view the post-unification municipal paradigm of the 
‘double-sided’ town with a degree of scepticism. Indeed, they identify the turn to 
embrace a confrontational approach to the Nazi past primarily with the director 
of the Kulturstadt GmbH, Bernd Kaufmann, who had in their eyes virtually 
‘prescribed’ this as part of the Kulturstadtjahr. The renovation work that 
‘Weimar 1999’ set in train is also bemoaned in certain respects; restoration of 
certain National Socialist prestige buildings such as the Gauforum, for instance, 
has erased important and instructive traces of their pre-history during the Third 
Reich.384 From such comments one can infer that the BgR’s memory activism 
did not take its cue from the Kulturstadtjahr.       
Traces of a distinctly East German commemorative discourse can be seen 
in the local VVN-BdA presence. In this case memory work at Buchenwald, 
though shaped to a certain extent by cooperation with the post-unification 
memorial, stands in a longer tradition of antifascist commemoration. A brief look 
at the biography of the speaker of the Weimar VVN-BdA association, Heinz 
Koch, confirms these inextricable links between post-war interaction with 
Buchenwald and attitudes towards the memorial since unification. Engaged in 
organised political resistance to Nazism towards the end of the war, Koch was 
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involved in the work of local antifascist cells after 1945, and began to contribute 
to the pedagogical work of the NMG Buchenwald in the late 1960s, at a point 
when it was typically survivors who showed groups of visitors around the 
memorial. Koch has continued his efforts to document and communicate the 
history of the concentration camp as well as commemorate its victims since 
taking voluntary retirement shortly after unification – efforts that have frequently 
entailed close cooperation with the staff at Buchenwald.385 An example of this is 
a Wegweiser detailing sites of persecution and resistance under National 
Socialism in Thuringia, which he edited; the historian and staff member at 
Buchenwald Harry Stein co-wrote the chapter on Weimar for this volume.386 
In several other respects, however, Koch’s interpretation of Buchenwald 
diverges from the position of the memorial professionals, and the position of the 
municipality too, for that matter. Rather, its emphases and blind spots resemble 
those of the LAG’s narrative – hardly surprising, given that the LAG is also a 
member of the umbrella VVN-BdA organisation. For one thing, Koch sees the 
GDR memorial as an achievement of the survivors and not as a centrally 
controlled site of antifascist indoctrination. Besides noting the survivors’ 
pedagogical responsibilities, he draws attention to the fact that approximately 
100,000 of the NMG’s visitors in a given year came from the FRG, thereby 
internationalising the memorial (and downplaying the more narrowly political 
equations implicit in its domestic role). Likewise, whereas memorial 
professionals have emphasized the ‘Überformung’ and specifically the 
minimization of built relics387 that accompanied the construction of the NMG, 
Koch instead links topographical alterations to processes of de-nazification and 
de-militarization decreed by the Allies. It was, by this logic, the Potsdam Pact 
and not the ideological considerations of the SED that dictated the changes made 
to the landscape at Buchenwald.388  
Koch’s interpretation of the Speziallager and Buchenwald’s double past 
is consistent with this view of the post-war period. He concentrates for the most 
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part on de-nazification procedures, and accordingly focuses on prisoners of the 
special camps such as teachers whose (moral if not criminal) complicity in the 
National Socialist state was relatively indisputable.389 Notably, however, when 
referring to German society as a whole Koch rather projected guilt onto 
prominent industrialists and companies such as Krupp, Thyssen and IG Farben – 
the latter of course notoriously produced Zkylon B gas for use in Auschwitz-
Birkenau. Conversely, he was dismissive of the exhibition produced by the 
Buchenwald memorial to address the Erfurt-based company Topf und Söhne, 
which had provided the SS with incineration ovens (I discuss the exhibition in 
chapter five); he regarded this as singling out a company for simply doing its 
job.390 In effect, this argumentation enabled Koch to rather absolve the majority 
of Germans of responsibility for Nazi crimes whilst pinning the blame on large 
‘Konzerne’, just as the antifascist GDR narrative had done by positing a link 
between National Socialism and capitalism. 
Thus the local VVN-BdA, though hardly opposed to the hegemonic 
municipal narrative in Weimar, orientated itself around antifascist principles. For 
this group, it was the Buchenwald Oath rather than local post-unification 
developments that informed the interplay between identity, memory, and 
governance. In terms of the constellation of memory in Weimar, then, the VVN-
BdA neither challenged nor was structured by a normative local discourse. If its 
memory work was posited as a challenge at all, then it was more appropriately 
read as a restatement of East German identity and commemorative traditions in 
opposition to a federal discourse that had marginalised them. This was most 
readily apparent in Koch’s criticism of ‘offizielle Politik’ under Kohl, Schröder 
and Merkel in relation to the recent German past. Attempts to discredit the 
narrative of the prisoners’ ‘self-liberation’ (Selbstbefreiung) at Buchenwald – 
one of the cornerstones of the SED’s commemorative politics – in particular 
trouble him. He is for instance clearly dismayed at the difficulties he has 
encountered in securing funding from the regional government for publications 
that reference the Selbstbefreiung.      
Of the two towns under discussion here, local commemoration of the 
Speziallager is arguably most established and formalised in Weimar, where the 
Initiativgruppe has been active for well over two decades. In Oranienburg, by 
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contrast, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Lager Sachsenhausen 1945-1950 e.V (ALS), 
the Speziallager lobby, is based in Berlin – I therefore discuss this group in more 
detail in chapter four. The Initiativgruppe in Weimar, meanwhile, has provided a 
vital point of contact between survivors of the Speziallager, the memorial site 
staff, politicians, and official bodies tasked with working through the Soviet and 
East German past such as the Office of the Federal Commissioner for the 
Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic 
Republic. Returning to the documentation of the annual Buchenwaldtreffen can 
helpfully provide a handle on the group’s role in anchoring the Speziallager in 
local memory. Whilst I have already unpacked the symbolism of the on-site 
commemorative ceremonies in chapter two, I am interested here in the meetings 
(and the work of the Initiativgruppe more generally) as an expression of the 
memory dynamic in Weimar. It should be pointed out that the Initiativgruppe 
figures in a range of public spheres besides the more narrowly municipal and 
community-based frames I am addressing in this chapter.  
 Thus it is necessary to distinguish between the Initiativgruppe as a shaper 
of on-site rituals of commemoration, acting on behalf of victims and their 
relatives (analysed in chapter two); as a mobilising force in ‘local’ memory of 
the Speziallager (explored in greater detail below); and as part of broader 
regional and national lobby groups representing victims of communist injustice 
(see chapters four and five). Attended by a diverse range of lobbyists supporting 
victims of post-1945 repression, but organised by two residents of Weimar, 
Heidrun and Lothar Brauer, the Buchenwaldtreffen equally resist oversimplified 
characterisation as either ‘national’ or ‘local’ memory activism. Instead, they 
evidence once more the complex re-mediation of commemorative discourse that 
takes place when particular regional and national patterns of remembrance 
interact with local contexts. Moreover, as an event dedicated to Buchenwald’s 
post-war past, the Buchenwaldtreffen provide an interesting counterpoint to other 
Holocaust-centred local narratives, not to mention municipal discourse in 
Weimar.  
 A testament to the complexity of the Buchenwaldtreffen as a memory text 
is that the Initiativgruppe, though it of course shared the other participating 
groups’ fundamental concern for the victims of the Speziallager, articulated 
memory of post-war victimization in slightly different terms. Whereas the CDU 
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politicians speaking at the ceremonies typically drew implicit parallels between 
Buchenwald’s pre- and post-1945 histories, and in doing so attempted to appeal 
to a wide electoral base by rejecting ‘totalitarianism’ in all its forms, the 
Initiativgruppe advocated a dual approach of documentation and historically 
differentiated commemoration. Indeed, it had from a very early stage ensured 
that members of the memorial participated in the Buchenwaldtreffen and relayed 
the current state of research into the special camps to attendees. Likewise, annual 
updates were provided throughout the course of the Neugestaltung to ensure that 
the process was conducted in a transparent manner. Perhaps most tellingly, the 
Initiativgruppe explicitly lent its support to the recommendations made by the 
Thuringian Historians’ Commission, stating in 1992: 
 
‘Die Initiativgruppe stimmt dem Vorschlag der Historikerkommission zu, 
daß sowohl an das nationalsozialistische Konzentrationslager als auch an 
das sowjetische Speziallager erinnert werden sollte, mit dem Schwerpunkt 
auf das Konzentrationslager. Ausgangspunkt der Zustimmung ist die 
Anerkennung der Tatsache, daß erst durch die Verbrechen des 
Nationalsozialismus und durch den Angriff auf andere Völker die Existenz 
des Speziallagers möglich wurde.’391   
 
 The Initiativgruppe therefore followed the memorial professionals in 
orientating commemoration around a chain of historical causality and accepted 
the primacy of the period 1937-1945 in the redesign. Even after the memorial 
foundation’s decision to veto symbolic elements of the Speziallager museum had 
strained relations between the Initiativgruppe and the Buchenwald site staff, a 
podium discussion was convened in order to restore a measure of cooperation. 
Thereafter ‘[d]ie inhaltliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Mitarbeitern der 
Gedenkstätte und den Häftlingen und Angehörigen entwickelte sich positiv 
weiter’392 in the words of the Brauers. Since then, the working relationship has 
gone from strength to strength, and the tradition of hearing annual reports from 
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the memorial staff at the Buchenwaldtreffen was in fact continued until the very 
final meeting in 2010.    
 Besides the close cooperation between the memorial and Initiativgruppe 
that the Buchenwaldtreffen fostered, the annual meetings also consistently 
involved the municipality, represented by either the mayor or a member of the 
town council. Once again, this was not envisaged as a means of de-centering the 
National Socialist past in municipal discourse on the past, but rather of anchoring 
the Speziallager and communist crimes in official local Buchenwald memory 
alongside the concentration camp. It thus was wholly in keeping with an 
inclusive but differentiated model of remembrance when local councillor Dirk 
Hauburg, in his address at the 2007 Buchenwaldtreffen, recalled the joint 
declaration with the LAG Buchenwald-Dora signed that same year (see above) 
before restating the town’s solidarity with the Initiativgruppe and the victims of 
the Speziallager.393 The positions of the municipality and the Initiativgruppe vis-
à-vis Buchenwald were far from antagonistic, even if they differed in their 
respective priorities.    
 At the same time, the Initiativgruppe has tended to echo the chorus of 
disapproval with which other speakers at the Buchenwaldtreffen have greeted the 
rise of the PDS (as of 2007 Die Linke). Thus it frames its memory activism not 
just in relation to local identity or certain commemorative institutions, but also 
within the CDU’s discourse on the past at regional and national level. As 
Heidrun Brauer remarked at the meeting in 2008:  
 
‘Wir erleben gerade jetzt wieder mit dem Auftrumpfen der Linkspartei 
unter [Oskar, RB] Lafontaine, dass sich in Deutschland und besonders hier 
in Ostdeutschland eine erschreckende Kultur der Verharmlosung und 
Lobpreisung des diktatorischen DDR-Systems entwickelt hat.’394 
 
 Not unlike the CDU politicians, Brauer used the occasion to engage in a 
politics of commemoration. Indeed, in her address at the ceremony the following 
year, delivered only a matter of weeks before federal elections were to be held, 
she pledged the support of the assembled attendees to CDU candidates (‘[u]nsere 
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Unterstützung bei der Wahl haben Sie’), signalling an alignment with that party’s 
‘anti-totalitarian’ Geschichtspolitik.395 Some years earlier, she had also, in much 
the same vein, urged the SPD to join a coalition with the CDU in Thuringia when 
opening the Buchenwaldtreffen, admitting that a CDU-SPD government would 
better represent the interests of the victims of Stalinism. On this evidence it is 
reasonable to agree with Erik Meyer and Claus Leggewie’s suggestion that 
cultural discourse on the past be seen in relation to an underlying 
‘Politikzyklus’.396     
Ultimately, then, the Initiativgruppe’s position on Buchenwald did 
indisputably deviate from other local narratives, which tended to focus on the 
dual poles of the concentration camp and Weimar Classicism but rather neglect 
the Speziallager and the GDR. Yet as we have seen, it was not strictly speaking a 
counter-narrative insofar as it did not aim to supplant but to complement the 
emergent commemorative paradigm in Weimar, which took the concentration 
camp as one of its points of reference. The Initiativgruppe plainly stated its 
support for differentiated commemoration of the double past at a very early 
stage, in line with the recommendations made by the Historians’ Commission, 
and showed an evident interest in objective, transparent and solidly researched 
discussion of the Speziallager from thereon in. Though regional and national 
political constellations were certainly considered important, the 
Buchenwaldtreffen were equally linked to the pace of the ‘Neugestaltung’, 
continuing only as long as the process of memorializing and documenting the 
fate of Speziallager victims itself. In sum, the position reflected neither a 
straightforward adoption of the CDU’s rhetoric nor of the memorial site’s 
principles. It was determined by elements of an overarching national political 
discourse on the double past and longer-term patterns of cross-fertilisation 
specific to the locality. 
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Local specificity or local normativity? A prognosis 
 
 
Moving finally to the situation 20 years after German unification, this section 
rounds off my analysis of ‘local’ memory cultures by way of some concluding 
remarks on the dynamic of remembrance in Weimar and Oranienburg. Having 
already demonstrated the normative force that the triadic relationship between 
governmentality, identity and remembrance may exert, I wish to end this chapter 
by looking at where things currently stand in the two towns. In particular I am 
interested in whether established local dispositifs have obtained as the 20-year 
anniversary of 1989 has piqued popular interest in the GDR and Europe’s 
communist past more generally. Such questions of continuity and change are 
important for two reasons: firstly as they enable us to set local discourses against 
the official federal normalization discourse and secondly because they hold clues 
to the dynamic driving confrontation with the past. Finally, by relating local 
discourses to normative assumptions about cultural remembrance in the Berlin 
Republic and looking more closely at its dynamic since 1998, I am able to tease 
out the similarities and differences between the situation in Weimar and in 
Oranienburg, too. 
Several months before the 20th anniversary celebrations in 2009, 
Oranienburg was preparing itself for festivities of a quite different sort. The 
fourth annual Landesgartenschau, running from April 25 until October 18, was 
to be held in the town, and was expected to attract approximately 500,000 
visitors – more than Sachsenhausen (at that stage) recorded in a calendar year. 
Comparisons with the memorial were in some ways unavoidable, given that the 
Landesgartenschau drew comparable visitor numbers but for quite different 
reasons, and began in the same week as the 64th anniversary of the liberation of 
Sachsenhausen. How was this overwhelmingly positive and forward-looking 
celebration of local culture presented, and how was it reconciled to 
Oranienburg’s unique responsibility towards the legacy of National Socialism? 
And what, in turn, does this say about the respective weighting given to the pre- 
and post-1945 phases of the memorial site’s double past in the locality? 
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In the run up to the opening of the Landesgartenschau, much was made 
in the local press of how the town had outgrown its questionable reputation as a 
‘Bombenstadt’. The term itself was a reference to the aerial bombardment of 
Oranienburg in 1945, denoting the frequency with which unexploded allied 
bombs have been discovered there since the end of the war. As such, the 
imminent garden show opening signalled for one journalist a ‘[t]raumhafte 
Metamorphose’ that redefined Oranienburg as the town of Princess Louise 
Henriette.397 Another article pointed implicitly to the same shift in its title, 
‘Blumen statt Bomben’.398 In the piece the Baroque palace, which would be 
restored to public memory as the centerpiece of the flower show after remaining 
practically off limits for decades, became the focal point of the town’s dramatic 
change. The article recalled its usage by SS-guard units, Soviet troops and GDR 
border guards respectively, noting that these associations must not be forgotten 
despite the more positive associations it would be taking on: ‘Der Schritt in die 
Zukunft ist ein Schritt in die Vergangenheit. Jedenfalls für die Stadt 
Oranienburg.’399  
Elsewhere the palace’s different historical phases were subsumed into a 
single, negative counterpoint to present-day Oranienburg, thereby eliding its 
distinctive double history under National Socialism and Communism. In a 
service opening the garden show for example, the evangelical bishop Wolfgang 
Huber described the town’s past as ‘Bombenentschärfung, Bombenstimmung 
und Bombenpreise’ before declaring this rather dreary impression ‘outdated’ 
(‘überholt’). He believed that it was now more fitting to take pleasure in the 
‘Gartenwunder[…]’ on offer in Oranienburg.400 Huber was of course entirely 
justified in hoping for an end to the unwelcome discovery of undetonated bombs 
in the town, and Oranienburgers had every right to be pleased at hosting the 
Landesgartenschau. In terms of how he represented the town’s past and present, 
however, Huber showed that, when it came to narrating local history, the 
comparison between pre- and post-unification periods was still favoured by 
Oranienburg’s cultural elite over comparisons between the Nazi, Soviet and East 
German pasts. After all, it was the former comparison that lent itself more readily 
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to a narrative of progress and regeneration in which Oranienburg had 
successfully negotiated the post-Soviet transition to liberal democracy, even if, 
as I discuss below, this required taking a reductive view of the pre-1989 past.           
Firstly, however, the position of the Landesgartenschau and the memorial 
site relative to one another in the local press bears some consideration. Though 
coverage of the Landesgartenschau was virtually uninterrupted throughout April, 
it is worth noting that it was accorded less space in local newspapers than the 
64th anniversary of the liberation of Sachsenhausen for the duration of the 
liberation ceremonies. Between April 17 and April 20, five stories appeared 
altogether in the Märkische Allgemeine and the Oranienburger Generalanzeiger 
dealing with the anniversary, as opposed to two articles in the same period 
focusing on the garden show.401 The anniversary itself fell on April 22, and 
marked the beginning of a protracted search for the hitherto undiscovered mass 
graves of Jewish prisoners from Lieberose, a sub camp of Sachsenhausen. This 
story was covered more or less consistently for the three weeks that the search 
lasted, though revealingly there was no mention of it in the local papers on April 
25 – the opening of the Landesgartenschau – nor on the days immediately either 
side of this. The garden show, by contrast, did make the news on April 22, with a 
number of articles covering a visit made by regional SPD delegates to the show 
grounds. The search for the mass graves was however the leading article, and 
mixed terse reportage with tinges of pathos such as black and white photos of the 
search and references to the ‘bittere Erfahrung’ of relatives who had gone years 
without knowing where their loved ones’ bodies lay.402 Parallel coverage of the 
SPD delegates’ visit to Oranienburg, on the other hand, was replete with colour 
photos of the politicians appearing in sunglasses and looking relaxed as they 
enjoyed the excellent weather. The irreverent and jovial tenor of the articles also 
contrasted the somber tone struck by the Lieberose story: 
 
‘Die SPD-Landtagsfraktion hatte gestern viel Spaß in Oranienburg. 
Fraktionssitzung im Schloss, davor Laga- (Landesgartenschau, RB) 
Führung. Es gibt schlimmeres. Im Tagestouri-Outfit – Sonnenbrille, 
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Rucksack, Kamera – flanierten die Politiker durch die Rabatten und 
waren sich einig: Die Laga wird schön.’403 
   
The comparison is not to suggest, for one minute, that it was in some way 
unreasonable for the local press to be reporting this story. Nor is it helpful to read 
facile hierarchies out of the narrative sequencing in the newspaper reportage. 
What is important to stress is that for the most part, neither event was reported 
without the other also receiving attention, pointing to the central place the ‘dual 
poles’ of Prussia continue to occupy in press discourse. The fact that the two 
stories could appear in such close proximity to one another in the first place 
indicates, if anything, that the local press had well and truly internalized the 
‘dialectic of normality’ by this point. 
If one compares this almost reflexive coverage of Sachsenhausen to the 
initial public competition held to determine the redesign of the former SS troop 
camp and SS officer residences in 1992, the progress made in confronting the 
site’s history in the local sphere becomes particularly apparent. It is to the great 
credit of the various local publics engaged in memory work that this is the case. 
Yet over time this memory activism from below has been embraced by federal 
memory politics, such that the picture in Oranienburg now seems fairly 
unremarkable if one looks at other examples of negotiating the ‘dialectic of 
normality’. As such, there is a danger of misrecognising the fact that the East 
German past and, more specifically, Sachsenhausen’s own tripartite history make 
up part of the particular dialectic confronting Oranienburg.  
One such example of the parallels that are unwittingly being constructed 
between Oranienburg and Germany as a whole can be seen in Angela Merkel’s 
visit to the Dachau memorial on 20 August 2013. This formed part of a 
scheduled appearance in the town as part of Merkel’s election campaign, and 
drew mixed reactions. Whilst some, including notably the president of the 
Dachau survivors’ association Max Mannheimer, praised Merkel’s decision – 
she was the first chancellor to visit the memorial in an official capacity whilst in 
office – others criticized the move as blatant electioneering. Certainly the 
accusation was not altogether unreasonable, as Merkel’s next stop in Dachau 
after the memorial was a local Volksfest where she addressed CDU supporters 
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gathered in a beer tent.404 More to the point, however, Merkel’s itinerary 
unmistakably resembled the dual coverage of the Landesgartenschau and the 
Sachsenhausen liberation ceremonies in local newspapers during April 2009. In 
both cases the concentration camps were explicitly addressed, but in neither 
instance did this preclude presenting less inhibited pictures of local identity, 
whether in the form of a flower show or, in Dachau, a Volksfest. 
In addition, Merkel’s rhetoric at the Dachau memorial rested on the exact 
binary division between past and present typical of municipal discourse in 
Oranienburg. She averred, for instance, that the work of Dachau survivors who 
share their testimonies with younger generations was ‘eine Brücke von der 
Geschichte in die Gegenwart, die wir auch in die Zukunft weiterbauen 
wollen’.405 Besides the familiar presentism, the metaphor of a bridge linking 
Germany’s past to its democratic, morally and historically conscientious present 
and future had actually been used by Gerhard Schröder in a speech at 
Sachsenhausen in 1999 (see chapter five). It is interesting to note the assumed 
interchangeability of the two memorials given the latter’s importance to memory 
of Stalinism and East German communism, which neither Schröder in his earlier 
speech nor municipal memory narratives appeared to reflect upon. What we may 
infer from both the longer tradition of employing the ‘bridge’ metaphor and its 
use at sites with no connection to the GDR is that it is not so novel after all; nor 
is it particularly helpful in communicating Sachsenhausen’s uniquely complex 
and ambivalent multi-layeredness. Municipal discourse in Oranienburg has 
embraced memory of National Socialist crimes, but on the evidence of 2009 it 
may begin to see diminishing returns if it fails to break from framing devices that 
are becoming increasingly naturalised and in many ways screen memory of 
communism.                   
Popular opinion in the town appears to have followed largely the same 
pattern, judging by the responses of locals to the Landesgartenschau. In the swell 
of public pride that followed the show’s final days, local newspapers printed a 
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series of readers’ letters that showed a convergence between popular and ‘elite’ 
discourses. In fact, several letters appeared to borrow directly from the language 
of political rhetoric and corroborate its message of a vibrant, tolerant local 
identity. As a resident writing on behalf of a senior citizens’ organization in 
Oranienburg wrote: “Wir erlebten das Aufblühen einer Stadt”. This of course 
echoed the metaphor of a town ‘in bloom’ encountered in municipal marketing 
publications and evoked at points during the Hope Incision debates.406 An editor 
of the Oranienburger Generalanzeiger likewise drew upon the metaphor of 
renewal and regeneration in a comment piece, opining that ‘[die Stadt]…sich 
sozusagen an den Stängeln aus dem Stumpf der architektonischen Trostlosigkeit 
gezogen [hat]’.407 In this figurative image, Oranienburg was portrayed escaping 
the ‘dullness’ (‘Stumpf’) and ‘desolation’ (‘Trostlosigkeit’) of the past with the 
help of the Landesgartenschau, as the reference to ‘stems’ (‘Stängel’) suggested. 
Though it was not made explicit, the grey, dilapidated image that the new 
Oranienburg had managed to outgrow appeared to infer the GDR past, which as 
before had not been addressed on its own terms.  
What is more, the use of the term ‘cabin fever’ (‘Lagerkoller’) in the title, 
deliberately misspelled ‘Laga-Koller’ to reference the Landesgartenschau, which 
was known locally by the acronym ‘Laga’, only further yoked together the 
town’s past and present.408 If it was unclear in this article whether Sachsenhausen 
was to blame for such negative reflexes of identification in the past, there was no 
mistaking the claim made in another article that it had indeed been the primary 
association up until now in the eyes of Oranienburger. The author channeled 
their renewed optimism following the Landesgartenschau, observing: ‘”Ab 
jetzt”, so hoffen viele, “sind wir nicht mehr nur die Stadt, bei der man als erstes 
an Konzentrationslager denkt”’.409 This sentiment was not meant to imply a 
disavowal of links between the camp and town; locals simply hoped that 
Oranienburg would no longer be associated ‘primarily’ (‘als erstes’) with the 
concentration camp. Seemingly however the municipal narrative and its leitmotif 
of the ‘dual poles’ of Prussia more or less matched popular opinion in the town, 
as an ongoing awareness of Sachsenhausen’s legacy coexisted with (but showed 
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signs of being eclipsed by) a celebration of local identity and traditions in the 
eyes of residents too. 
 By contrast, the history of the Speziallager and of the NMG – in fact, of the 
period 1945-1989 more generally – hardly seemed to figure in local memory. 
The memorial site had evidently been eager to engage locals in the educational 
programme accompanying the temporary exhibition ‘Sachsenhausen Mahnt!’, 
and the 50th anniversary of the GDR memorial’s inauguration, with which the 
new exhibition opening coincided, provided an appropriate opportunity. In 
addition to guided tours of the exhibition and a number of public talks, a series of 
three Diskussionsrunden were held with the intention of gauging locals’ 
responses to the NMG and the new memorial museum. Yet only one other visitor 
attended the guided tour I took, and though she lived in Oranienburg, she 
admitted that her motivation for visiting the new exhibition derived partly from 
her agitation at the memorial’s stance towards the town (she believed that 
Morsch in particular was unduly critical of locals).410 Equally, it was Berlin-
based victims’ associations representing the Speziallager victims rather than 
local groups that took umbrage at the inclusion of former Stasi informants in a 
panel at the first Diskussionsrunde. Though the event in question took a broadly 
critical view of the NMG, as its title "Wir sind ja zu so vielen 
Massenaufmärschen gerannt..." – Oranienburg und die Nationale Mahn- und 
Gedenkstätte Sachsenhausen implied, prominent members of the UOKG alleged 
that giving an audience to locals with previous connections to the Stasi amounted 
to sanitising the East German regime.411  
 Given that only one of the three Diskussionsrunden was held outside of the 
memorial, there are perhaps grounds for arguing that relatively few local 
residents readily associate the site with the town proper. That said, the event held 
in the St. Nicolai-Kirche on 20 October 2011 was well attended and prompted 
lively debate. Once again, however, there was evidence of a proclivity to draw 
binary distinctions, whether between the perfidious National Socialist ideology 
represented by the historical camp and the town’s new Leitbild of ‘Toleranz’ or 
between absolute categories of either suppression of or confrontation with the 
(Nazi) past. An article advertising the ‘Diskussionsrunde’ in the Märkische 
Allgemeine typified this view, posing the question of whether locals ‘sich nicht 
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für den Terror [interessieren], der vor mehr als 60 Jahren vor ihrer Haustür 
stattfand’ rather than considering what form this interest took.412 Falling back on 
the paradigms of ‘[G]eschichtsvergessen[heit]’ and ‘Auseinandersetzung’ as the 
article did appeared to revisit debates that were characteristic of earlier decades, 
and certainly precluded any consideration of nuances within each position.  
Other steps taken in Oranienburg to promote a civic culture of 
confrontation with Germany’s 20th century past signal a further internalization of 
this binary view. As of 2010, the Stadt Oranienburg – that is, the municipality – 
and the Sachsenhausen memorial have jointly organized a biannual competition 
in recognition of civic initiatives that seek to combine historical and 
humanitarian education with the promotion of tolerance and mutual respect in the 
present. A jury, consisting of two municipal politicians, a representative of the 
memorial site, a journalist from a radio broadcaster in Brandenburg, a member of 
a regional anti-extremist group, a trade union delegate, and one representative 
each of the concentration camp and special camp prisoners, awards a prize to the 
most original and effective programme. An inclusive interpretation of historical 
engagement, by no means limited to the National Socialist period, is implicit in 
the jury alone. The same can be said of the call for applications that precedes the 
award of the Toleranzpreis (recently renamed the Franz-Bobzien-Preis after the 
Sachsenhausen inmate Franz Bobzien), in which applications are invited from 
projects that contribute ‘wirkungsvoll zu historisch-politischer Bildung und 
Demokratieentwicklung’.413 Admittedly however, ‘special consideration’ 
(‘[b]esondere Beachtung’) is given to those projects that explicitly combine a 
focus on National Socialism with democratic forms of civic engagement. 
Nonetheless, it is striking that all of the projects nominated in the two rounds of 
the competition that have taken place so far, in 2010 and 2012, have dealt with 
various aspects of persecution and victimhood during the Third Reich.414     
                                                
412 T. Gutke, ‘Unsere Gedenkstätte?’, OGA, 19 Oct 2011 (online) http://www.moz.de/artikel-
ansicht/dg/0/1/981072. Last accessed 25 Oct 2011. 
413 Stadt Oranienburg, Gedenkstätte und Museum Sachsenhausen, Franz-Bobzien-Preis für 
Demokratie und Toleranz: Bewerbungsverfahren 2014 
http://daten2.verwaltungsportal.de/dateien/seitengenerator/fbp_flyer_2013_end_web_neu.pdf 
[accessed 2 Sept 2013] (p. 1). 
414 See the brochures documenting the entries from each of the two projects: Stadt Oranienburg, 
Gedenkstätte und Museum Sachsenhausen (eds.), Oranienburger Toleranzpreis der Stadt 
Oranienburg und der Gedenkstätte und des Museums Sachsenhausen: Eine Dokumentation zur 
Verleihung des ersten Oranienburger Toleranzpreises 2010 (Oranienburg, 2011), 50pp.; idem. 
(eds.), Oranienburger Toleranzpreis der Stadt Oranienburg und der Gedenkstätte und des 
Museums Sachsenhausen: Eine Dokumentation zur Verleihung des zweiten Oranienburger 
181 
 
 
In Weimar, recent developments suggest a broadly similar trajectory to 
that registered in Oranienburg, which is to say a paradigm of Holocaust-centred 
memory looks likely to be upheld for the foreseeable future. Yet this has been 
enacted by different means, as is well illustrated by the discursive strategies 
underpinning Buchenwald memorial’s nomination to the UNESCO World 
Heritage list in 2012. Interestingly, though it was the Thuringian Ministry for 
Education, Science and Culture (MBWK) that made the nomination, the initial 
impetus for applying for World Heritage status came from the Council of the 
Buchenwald and Mittelbau-Dora Memorials Foundation.415 Moreover, both the 
municipality and the regional government of Thuringia supported the move. 
Indeed, Stefan Wolf and the SPD regional Minister for Education, Science and 
Culture Christoph Matschie joined Volkhard Knigge for the announcement of 
Buchenwald’s nomination at a press conference held at the memorial. As such, 
we are not simply dealing with an imposition of a universal ‘heritage’ concept 
upon what was indisputably a popular tourist site but an active attempt by the 
memorial, in concert with survivors’ associations, civic memory activists, 
political stakeholders and advisory bodies, to reconcile its own mission to that of 
UNESCO. Thus, by looking at the nomination we can glean not only what the 
local stance vis-à-vis Buchenwald was at this point, but also a sense of how it 
intersected in certain ways with professional, political and global heritage 
discourses too.    
Knigge laid out the objectives behind applying for World Heritage status 
in a statement prepared for the press conference. In it, he drew once more upon 
the Weimar-Buchenwald metaphor, whilst simultaneously positioning the 
memorial as a global actor: 
 
‘Mit diesem Antrag geht es darum – und deswegen konkurrenziert er an 
diesem Punkt auch nicht andere Bundesländer mit Gedenkstätten – den 
Doppelort Weimar-Buchenwald in seiner ganzen Orientierungskraft, das 
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Gewissen, das Herz und den Verstand bewegen zu können, in 
Deutschland und über Deutschland hinaus Ernst zu nehmen.’416 
 
Firstly, the reference to the memorial’s resonance ‘in and beyond 
Germany’ (‘in Deutschland und über Deutschland hinaus’) indicated that Knigge 
was in no doubt about Buchenwald’s international profile. Equally however, the 
phrasing tacitly accepted that the town’s popularity with tourists rested just as 
much upon the history of Weimar Classicism. Indeed, ‘Classical Weimar’ 
already belonged to the World Heritage list. Recommending the addition of 
Buchenwald was an artful expression of the town’s ambivalent and differentiated 
past – neatly conveyed by the term ‘Doppelort’ – that used World Heritage status 
to clever effect. Parity between Buchenwald and Classical Weimar in 
UNESCO’s terms would of course imply a duality to the legacies of 
enlightenment and barbarity, with neither privileged over (or subordinated to) the 
other.  
As a consequence, the application re-situated the Buchenwald memorial 
within a universal heritage discourse in order to ground it in the specific, local 
historical and spatial context of the ‘Binom Weimar-Buchenwald’. In this way it 
managed to avoid erasing the memorial’s specificity and subsuming it within an 
inflationary and imprecise global (negative) heritage valuation. Far from 
compromising the decentralised memory landscape, the application promoted a 
more clearly defined (and delimited) ‘profile’ for the memorial site. Thus, it 
actually resisted a tendency to normalize Buchenwald’s past by working against 
the construction of facile parallels between distinct camps – a tendency that we 
saw reflected in the indiscriminate use of almost identical narratological and 
commemorative tropes at Dachau and Sachsenhausen with little consideration of 
their very different histories. 
Whilst the UNESCO nomination and the text of the initial application 
largely avoided inadvertently creating equivalences between the various KZ-
Gedenkstätten in Germany, it nonetheless reproduced established 
commemorative motifs and symbols of a different kind. Auschwitz, for instance, 
had become a World Heritage site in 1979, and so almost inevitably the 
Buchenwald nomination picked up on certain justifications first used in support 
                                                
416 ‘Weltkulturerbe-Antrag’, (online) http://www.buchenwald.de/752. Last accessed 07 Dec 2012.  
183 
 
 
of adding that memorial to the UNESCO list. To cite just one example, the 
rationale for including Auschwitz, which was quoted in the press conference at 
Buchenwald, stressed the legacy of resistance amongst prisoners at the camp. 
Auschwitz was, accordingly, presented as a ‘Denkmal für die Stärke des 
menschlichen Geistes…’, a reading which the Buchenwald application echoed 
by pointing to the dual legacies of terror and enlightened humanism or even 
resistance there.417 Together with the Buchenwald memorial’s unparalleled 
collection of artwork produced by camp prisoners, now displayed in the former 
disinfection building, resistance narratives were identified in the application as 
part of a positive historical legacy, which was instructive precisely because it 
attested to the remarkable capacity for humanity to prevail even under the most 
barbaric of circumstances. The foregrounding of victimisation on the one hand 
and solidarity as well as humanism on the other effectively reproduced the 
coordinates of the ‘Doppelort Weimar-Buchenwald’. Much like municipal 
narratives in Weimar, and following their binary structure, the UNESCO 
application distilled memory into interconnected but oppositional poles. 
A distillation of memory could be seen at other points in the application 
and nomination too. Pursuing further the twin narratives of barbarity and 
enlightenment that featured in Kingge’s application text, the nomination traced 
two distinct memory threads linked to Buchenwald that had been enormously 
influential in trans-national post-war memory of the Third Reich and the 
Holocaust. The first thread began with the images of the camp upon liberation 
that quickly circulated across the world and shaped popular conceptions of 
National Socialist crimes. The second originated in the Buchenwald Oath of 19 
April 1945 and its considerable impact upon post-war antifascist politics. In 
addition, the nomination singled out former Buchenwald prisoners such as 
Stepháne Hessel, Eugen Kogon and Jorge Semprún. Besides highlighting the fact 
that all three had sought to utilise their experiences at Buchenwald in order to 
secure ‘eine menschlichere Zukunft’,418 it mentioned Hessel’s contribution to the 
drafting of the UN Declaration of Human Rights. In fact, the human rights 
regime was also frequently invoked in federal commemorative speeches at both 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen – and on occasion used to subtly equate 
National Socialist and Soviet crimes (see chapter five). Here however, universal 
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human rights concepts were fused to particular symbols, narratives and 
biographies in support of a differentiated (and Holocaust-centred) model of 
commemoration. 
Certainly on balance the UNESCO nomination, though a symptom of 
Buchenwald’s increasing implication in touristic scales of value, did not 
challenge the pre-existing consensus around a critical, historically informed 
process of dealing with the past. If anything, the nomination has continued an 
established local discourse that emphasises Weimar’s unique double-sidedness 
whilst simultaneously embedding it in international, multilateral networks based 
on universal moral standards and solidarities. Indeed, Buchenwald was 
nominated as an ‘elementares Zeugnis der nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen 
und der Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts’, a formulation that clearly spelt out a 
differentiated but historically appropriate approach to the site’s history.419 The 
National Socialist period was named first and thus clearly foregrounded, which 
had the additional effect of introducing the camp’s post-war history not as a 
means of equation but according to what Caroline Pearce has termed a ‘principal 
of contextualisation’.420 That is to say, each historical phase was treated on its 
own terms in the nomination. The Speziallager, for instance, was cited as a 
symbol of ‘die Inhumanität der sowjetischen Hegemonie Mittel- und Osteuropas’ 
and the NMG as a form of memorialisation that posed questions about 
historically, politically and ethically appropriate forms of working through 
difficult pasts.421 Whilst these were all ‘Fragen, die Menschen in Ländern mit 
Diktatur-, Verfolgungs- oder Genoziderfahrungen zunehmend bewegen’422, the 
nomination framed remembrance in such a way that it was loosened from 
collective identity politics and reoriented around an individual, open-ended 
process of Aufarbeitung. 
What does this particular memory text say about longer-term patterns of 
cultural memory in the local sphere? Firstly, reinforcing an argument that runs 
through this thesis, it shows that the globalisation of Holocaust memory has not 
necessarily presaged a concomitant shift from local or national to global patterns 
of identification. To be sure, the UNESCO nomination did frame 
                                                
419 ‘Nominierung’. Last accessed 30 May 2013. 
420 Pearce, ‘An Unequal Balance?’, in The GDR Remembered, ed. by Hodgin/Pearce, p. 193. 
421 ‘Nominierung’. Last accessed 30 May 2013. 
422 Ibid. Last accessed 30 May 2013. 
185 
 
 
commemoration of the victims of the concentration camp in a universally 
identifiable narrative of violating and standing up for individual rights. But it 
also reproduced the Weimar-Buchenwald leitmotif, indicating a considerable 
degree of overlap with municipal discourse in Weimar. In any case, as I have 
already alluded to (and will discuss further in chapter five), other groups 
appropriate human rights discourses in service of an ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ 
predicated on condemnation – and sometimes equation – of the Nazi and 
communist pasts. There is no uniform pattern to the globalisation of memory, 
and these globalizing processes are determined by specific local contexts. 
Nor however is there any evidence of memory in Weimar taking its cue 
from a federal ‘norm’. As I point out, the UNESCO nomination did not explicitly 
utilise the language of the ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’; if it followed a ‘norm’ at 
all then it was surely the municipal precedent, which was effectively written into 
international heritage standards in the form of the symbolic ‘Doppelort 
Buchenwald-Weimar’. The established paradigm had therefore not only been 
upheld but had actually been internalised by a range of publics to such an extent 
that it was fair to talk of a local normalization of the past taking place parallel to 
normalization at federal level. Indeed, both Bertrand Herz, the president of the 
IKBD, and Heidrun Brauer of the Initiativgruppe welcomed the nomination, 
praising the memorial site but also pointing out (in Brauer’s case) that a 
‘historisch korrekte[…] Form’ of memory had been fostered for many years at 
Buchenwald.423 The fact that the IKBD, the Initiativgruppe, the memorial, the 
municipality and the regional government could all agree upon this form of 
memory suggested, finally, that the dispositif I identified earlier in this chapter 
had indeed developed a ‘normative force’ of its own by 2012. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the locales stand out as cultural spaces in which a confrontational 
approach to the past has been adopted from a very early stage, even pre-empting 
the similar turn to confrontation initiated by Schröder when he became 
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chancellor in 1998. Like the normalization paradigm developed by his Red-
Green government, discourse in both Weimar and Oranienburg has centred 
around the Nazi past and sought to embed ongoing accountability at the heart of 
a more confident identity narrative. Repeating motifs such as the ‘Binom 
Weimar-Buchenwald’ and the ‘dual poles’ of Oranienburg’s Prussian history 
highlight the efforts that have been made to reconcile positive and negative 
aspects of local history to one another. Not least because of the physical presence 
of the concentration camps in the town, both historically and today still in the 
surviving built traces and memorial plaques, the ‘dialectic of normality’ 
negotiated by Weimar and Oranienburg since 1998 has been considerably more 
pronounced than at federal level. As a result of the binaries produced by setting 
the Nazi camps against more celebratory aspects of local history, however, 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen’s multiple pasts – particularly those between 
1945-1989 – have been somewhat lost from view.     
Certainly, there is ample evidence that certain elements of the 
Kulturstadtjahr programme and debates on the future of the Truppenlager in 
Oranienburg normativized the town-camp dualism. That said, particular 
exhibitions held during ‘Weimar 1999’ did in fact critique rather than reproduce 
the binary discourse. On balance, the paradigm remains central to if no longer 
ubiquitous in local processes of coming to terms with the past. Both the 
nomination of the ‘Doppelort Weimar-Buchenwald’ to Germany’s UNESCO 
World Heritage shortlist and the programme accompanying the Sachsenhausen 
Mahnt! temporary exhibition acknowledged the memorials’ tripartite histories, 
and explicitly problematized the contested relationship between these various 
historical phases. In the case of the temporary exhibition however, what little 
engagement it prompted fell back on the familiar Manichean opposition between 
repression of the past on the one hand and confrontation with it on the other. 
Little recognition was given to the fact that the exhibition was not so much 
asking whether but how to deal with the past. The 2009 Landesgartenschau also 
indicated a continuing proclivity for double-sided motifs, this time in the guise of 
a present-day town ‘in bloom’ and its negative counterpoint found in the grey, 
dilapidated image of Oranienburg conjured up by the GDR and the concentration 
camp. 
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It is hard to overlook the differences this chapter has registered emerging 
between discourse in Weimar and in Oranienburg in the course of the 2000s. 
Whereas local representations of Buchenwald have begun to touch upon the 
camp’s multiple histories, attention in Oranienburg remains largely fixed on the 
concentration camp. I should stress that I do not intend this to be an indictment 
of either approach. Rather, it is worth reflecting for a moment on how we may 
account for these differences. Firstly, there are historical explanations for these 
divergent developments; it is fair to say that Weimar’s ‘classical’ heritage is 
itself uniquely rich and varied, so that it is actually a misnomer to describe it as a 
single, positive counterpoint to the town’s ‘dark’ heritage. Oranienburg, by 
contrast, boasts an impressively cosmopolitan history that is linked to 
Brandenburg’s status in the 17th century as an Einwanderungsgebiet, but did not 
experience the same flourishing of a local educated bourgeoisie in the wake of 
the industrial revolution as Weimar. Present-day contexts are also influential; we 
should not overlook the particularly acute problem of right-wing extremism 
facing Oranieburg (and Brandenburg more generally).424 Altogether, it seems 
likely that the combination of historical specificities and latter-day concerns 
effectively prefigures oppositions between the concentration camp and the motif 
of Prussian tolerance in Oranienburg. By the same token, sensitisation to 
Buchenwald’s multiple pasts is not entirely unsurprising in a local culture that is 
by its very nature diverse and polycentric.      
Lastly, underlying virtually all of these discourses is the assumption is 
that remembrance – in the majority of cases Holocaust-centred remembrance – is 
a civic ritual that binds together local publics. It is a ritual, moreover, that has 
buttressed self-identification as German and especially as a ‘Weimarer’ or 
‘Oranienburger’. As such, the Foucauldian model of a dispositif captures the 
dynamic of discourse in these spaces quite neatly. In this case we are not 
referring to a national dispositif however, but instead to local orders of discourse 
conveyed by the binary motifs mentioned above. This notwithstanding, section 
three of the chapter in particular has explored a number of local civic groups and 
their positions vis-à-vis the memorials and proven them to stand in a more 
                                                
424 In 2009, Brandenburg was recorded as having the highest incidence of right-wing extremist 
attacks per 100,000 residents in the whole of Germany. See Verfassungsschutzbericht 2009: 
Vorabfassung, ed. by Bundesministerium des Innern (Berlin, 2009), p. 36. For a bleak description 
of the right-wing youth scene in Oranienburg, see Natalia Hantke, ‘Stichwort Nazi’, taz, 24 Jul 
2004. 
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complex relation to disposifs of any kind. To take as but one example the 
Initiativgruppe in Weimar, it is clear that it represents a hybridized form of 
discourse. The group’s stance has emerged out of local contexts (the 
municipality shows considerable solidarity with the group), cooperation with the 
memorials in running the Buchenwaldtreffen and providing humanitarian support 
for survivors of the Speziallager and their relatives, and broader political 
constellations, which on occasion have shaped the rhetoric of these annual 
meetings.  
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Ch. 4: Regional dispositifs? 
 
Introduction 
 
In a federally organized state such as Germany, it would be impossible to 
evaluate the ‘official’ discourse on memorialization without assessing the 
situation in the individual Länder (federal states). Besides acting as a check and 
balance on the power of the Bund, the state governments fulfil the so-called 
‘Subsidiaritätsprinzip’ by bringing democratic participation and decision-making 
as close as possible to citizens. Whilst their role in creating policy is relatively 
limited, they possess a considerable level of control over policy implementation 
– a task that is overseen by regional parliaments (Landtage). Pedagogical 
competencies are devolved to regional institutions too. In terms of confronting 
the double past, not only do regional education ministries work to raise 
awareness about National Socialism and the GDR; so too do non-partisan 
institutions such as the Regional Offices for Political Education (Landeszentralen 
für politische Bildung). Regional Commissioners for the Records of the State 
Security Service of the former GDR (Landesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des 
Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR) educate citizens about the GDR 
as well as offering advice and support for former victims. Accordingly, though I 
take a holistic view of culture as in previous chapters, I concentrate here on the 
role of political culture in shaping public remembrance and representation of the 
memorials on account of the predominance of political institutions in this 
particular space. 
The ‘Subsidiaritätsprinzip’ extends to memorialization of the double past. 
At the behest of the two Experts’ Commissions, formal steps to institutionalise 
remembrance in Brandenburg and Thuringia through the creation of foundations 
were taken in the early 1990s. The resulting Brandenburg Memorials 
Foundation, a public law foundation currently responsible for the Sachsenhausen, 
Ravensbrück, Brandenburg/Havel, and Below Forest memorials, was established 
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with effect from January 1993.425 A similar – though dependent – foundation was 
established in Thuringia the following year.426 Moreover, differentiation between 
the National Socialist and East German communist regimes was written into their 
respective statutes. The Brandenburg decree, for instance, listed the ‘structure 
and development of concentration camps in Brandenburg and their satellite 
camps as well as further institutions of SS-terror’ and the ‘history of NKWD-
camps and the political justice system of the GDR’ as two separate aspects of the 
foundation’s remit.427 In Thuringia, when the memorials foundation later became 
independent (see below), the text of the law likewise stressed that the history of 
the National Socialist concentration camp was to be handled ‘as a priority’.428  
At least on paper, then, commemoration of the double past at regional 
level in Brandenburg and Thuringia has for the past two decades been guided by 
a careful distinction between pre- and post-1945 injustice. As such, Günter 
Morsch could justifiably take pride in a ‘brandenburgisches Stiftungsmodell’429 
that assiduously avoided a conflation of the two separate histories in the 
foundation’s structure and remit. Yet for all Morsch’s enthusiastic endorsement 
of the institutional precepts pioneered in Brandenburg and Thuringia, the post-
1990 period has been marked by ongoing conflicts over the double past in these 
states too. This chapter surveys developments from the turn of the millennium 
onwards, focusing on questions of differentiation and equation as well as asking 
how the relationship between federal and regional discourses is best understood. 
To do this, it is again beneficial to utilize a situational and relational 
theoretical model. Only then can we assess whether the federal narrative 
embodied by the ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ exerts a kind of ‘normative 
power’430 over discourse in Brandenburg and Thuringia. By taking Luhmann’s 
‘autopoietic’ model of relationality – a model that concentrates on the operations 
                                                
425 See ‘Verordnung über die Errichtung der rechtsfähigen Stiftung öffentlichen Rechts 
“Brandenburgische Gedenkstätten” vom 30. Januar 1993’, Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für das 
Land Brandenburg Teil II – Nr. 8 (18 Feb 1993). 
426 Zimmer, Der Buchenwald-Konflikt, p. 19. 
427 ‘Verordnung über die Errichtung der rechtsfähigen Stiftung öffentlichen Rechts 
“Brandenburgische Gedenkstätten”’, p. 49..  
428 See Thüringer Landtag, ‘Thüringer Gesetz über die Errichtung der Stiftung Gedenkstätten 
Buchenwald und Mittelbau-Dora’, Drucksache 3/3052, 8 Jan 2003, p. 4. 
429 Interview with the author, 25 Jun 2010; see also G. Morsch, ‘Perspektiven und 
Entscheidungslagen, Chancen und Risiken der Entwicklung deutscher NS-Gedenkstätten in 
Zeiten des Wandels’, GedenkstättenRundbrief, 128, 12 (2005), 3-14 (pp. 6-7). 
430 S. Taberner and P. Cooke, ‘Introduction’, in Idem. (eds.), German Culture, Politics, and 
Literature into the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Normalization (Rochester, NY: Camden 
House, 2006), pp. 1-15 (p. 11). 
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of self-referential systems – and Foucault’s concept of the dispositif, we can trace 
more precisely how and by what means particular interpretations of the double 
past are produced and structured in these contexts. Specifically, this chapter 
argues that there is a particularly pronounced connection between regional 
discourses on the memorials and the post-unification transitional process. As I 
explain in the thesis introduction, during the 1990s it was the federal government 
that emerged as a major player in Germany’s internally initiated transition, 
issuing compensation legislation (both for former victims of forced labour in the 
Third Reich and victims of post-1945 injustice), trying prominent functionaries 
and accomplices of the SED regime, and launching formal commissions of 
enquiry into the GDR. The 2000s by contrast have seen the pursuit of retroactive 
justice give way to ongoing forms of education and commemoration. As such, 
the onus for stewarding Germany’s democratic transition has increasingly fallen 
on regional institutions such as those identified above.  
Taking documentary and commemorative measures introduced within 
Brandenburg and Thuringia at various points during the 2000s as its starting 
point, this chapter proves there to be a link between the perceived pace, depth 
and breadth of the transitional process and regional discourses on Buchenwald 
and Sachsenhausen. Whilst cultural representations of the double past at the 
former tend to be shaped by the perceived successes of the Thuringian transition, 
Sachsenhausen’s double past has, particularly since the mid-2000s, been framed 
in a narrative of unsatisfactory transition, reflected in the term ‘Brandenburger 
Weg’ to describe that state’s handling of unification and its consequences. 
Accordingly, although certain regional discourses may gesture towards national 
and even trans-national frameworks of accountability and responsibility towards 
the past, they are more often than not underpinned by distinct regional political 
cultures. The chapter begins with the situation in Brandenburg and Thuringia at 
the turn of the millennium, before addressing the regional fallout from Hermann 
Schäfer and Jörg Schönbohm’s highly controversial speeches in 2006. The third 
and fourth sections of the chapter look at more recent developments in the run-up 
to the twenty-year anniversary of German unity in 2010. 
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Institutionalising remembrance at the turn of the 
millennium 
 
Turning first to the situation in Thuringia, it appeared that the new 
millennium was as much of a watershed moment for memorialization of the 
double past at regional level as it was for Germany as a whole. Indeed, with 
effect from March 2003 the Buchenwald and Mittelbau-Dora memorials were 
formally brought under the purview of a public law foundation, the Stiftung 
Gedenkstätten Buchenwald und Mittelbau-Dora, thereby ‘institutionalising’ 
commemoration at regional level. Of course, this had in practice long since been 
the case – the Thuringian Minister for Education, Science and Culture had 
established a dependent foundation to oversee the memorials in 1994, and the 
decision to change this to a public law foundation was taken in 1997. 2003 
merely saw the change in status come into effect, and represented little more than 
a formality. Nevertheless, as the Minister for Education, Science and Culture at 
the time Dagmar Schipanski emphasised, there was a symbolic significance to 
the change in status. It corresponded, in her words, to the ‘hervorragende[…] 
Arbeit der Gedenkstätten und deren hohe[…] internationale[…] Wertschätzung’. 
Moreover, belonging to a public law foundation now entitled both memorials to 
federal funding.431 In effect, this was the regional gloss on a series of procedures 
at federal level, most obviously the Schlußbericht of the second Enquete 
Commission and the Gedenkstättenkonzeption.     
As it happened, the change in the foundation’s status came only shortly 
after the fourth and final permanent exhibition at Buchenwald, focusing on the 
history of the Nationale Mahn- und Gedenkstätte and memory culture in the 
GDR, had been opened. The feeling of a watershed was further reinforced when 
the exhibition opened in late October 1999, with press reportage unsurprisingly 
picking up on the ‘end’ it signalled for the redesign process. Tellingly, the 
German term ‘Abschluss’ was used in several articles in relation to the 
‘Neukonzeption’, implying that the overhaul of the outdated, antifascist GDR 
memorial was a finite process, even if remembrance itself would remain vital in 
                                                
431 See Thüringer Landtag, 3. Wahlperiode, Plenarprotokoll 3/28 (12 Oct 2000), p. 1988. 
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years to come.432 Certain other articles spoke of how the post-unification 
memorial site had managed to return commemoration of the victims to its 
rightful place at the centre of the design concept, as if it had been a question of 
undoing rather than ‘reconceiving’ the form of commemoration practiced prior to 
1989.433 As a new decade – and a new millennium – approached, it seemed 
increasingly as if the 1990s were now subject to historicisation in their own right 
as a phase on the way towards Thuringia’s now well-established post-unification 
memory culture. 
Somewhat overlooked in this reading, but at least peripherally registered 
nonetheless, was the fact that Buchenwald was now a major international 
landmark, with over 600,000 visitors expected in 1999.434 Dagmar Schipanski 
implied the same when she referred to the memorial’s ‘internationale 
Wertschätzung’. More deserving of attention however, above all in the eyes of 
the president of the Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse, who attended the exhibition 
opening, was the harassment of African visitors to the memorial by Neo-Nazis 
only a few days earlier. Thierse’s enjoinder to heed the lessons of the past, 
rendered all the more timely by the resurfacing of right-wing extremist attitudes, 
found its way into much of the coverage of the exhibition opening, highlighting 
the role authentic sites of brown-collar crimes continued to play in a nationwide 
fight against all forms of racism and intolerance.435    
If the focus is broadened for a moment, however, it becomes clear that 
not all regional discourses on Buchenwald at this juncture treated it primarily as 
a symbol of the Holocaust and part of a national project of remembrance, as 
Thierse did. One such example is the Thuringian history curriculum from the 
same year. On the face of it, it would be fair to say that it resembled the 
Buchenwald memorial’s pedagogical programme, discussed in chapter two, more 
closely than anything else. Certainly it was no deficit model of classroom 
education, as the talk of  ‘schülerbezogene[r] Unterricht’ made quite clear. 
Rather, the curriculum had at its core the goal of ‘empowering pupils to action’ 
                                                
432 See for example ‘Neukonzeption kein Stillstand’, Thüringischer Landeszeitung (henceforth 
TLZ), 13 Oct 1999; T. Rothbart, ‘Ende der Provisorien’, Thüringer Allgemeine (henceforth TA), 
25 Oct 1999, p. 2; T. Gerlach, ‘Erinnerungslandschaft Buchenwald’, taz, 26 Oct 1999. 
433 T. Rothbart and H. Müller, ‘Der Rest war Langeweile’, TA, 23 Oct 1999.  
434 See ‘Neukonzeption kein Stillstand’. 
435 See for example Rothbart, ‘Ende der Provisorien’; ‘”Die Vergangenheit nicht verdrängen”’, 
TLZ, 25 Oct 1999; J. Schneider, ‘Neue Ausstellung in Buchenwald, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 25 Oct 
1999; ‘Museum im früheren KZ Buchenwald eröffnet’, Die Welt, 25 Oct 1999. 
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(‘die Schüler zum Handeln zu befähigen’)436 a goal not unlike that of the 
Speziallager museum at Buchenwald. In fact, Rikola-Gunnar Lüttgenau, the head 
curator, had used similar language to explain the exhibition concept there, 
stressing that ‘[i]n der Ausstellung…es jedoch die Aufgabe jedes einzelnen 
[bleibt], sich mit der Vergangenheit auseinanderzusetzen, seine eigene 
Deutungen zu finden’.437 The curriculum, likewise, expressly included 
‘Kontroversität’ amongst its central didactic principles, suggesting that it too 
sought to respect historical and scholarly differences of opinion in the way it was 
implemented. Yet on closer inspection, the wording and structure of the 
curriculum actually undermined its claim to uphold multiperspectivity and 
betrayed a prescriptive approach to certain historical questions, which in turn 
impacted upon its presentation of Buchenwald. 
In the ninth and tenth Klassenstufen – the two school years preceding the 
high school diploma course or Qualifikationsphase – this becomes clear. 
Buchenwald first appeared in the curriculum in the ninth Klassenstufe, when 
pupils took a module on National Socialism. Appropriately enough, the focus 
was therefore on the concentration camp before it moved to the special camp, 
which was handled in a unit entitled ‘Die Welt und Deutschland vom Ende des 
Zweiten Weltkrieges bis 1949’ in the tenth Klassenstufe. Yet in spite of the 
historically appropriate sequential handling of the pre- and post-war camps, the 
Speziallager featured in the curriculum as part of an overarching comparison 
between ‘totalitäre Strukturen in der DDR’ and ‘demokratische[…] Strukturen in 
der Bundesrepublik’.438 In addition, a ‘kritische Auseinandersetzung mit dem 
Geschichtsbild der DDR’ ran through the unit as a whole, leaving little doubt as 
to the context in which the special camp was to be taught.439   
If anything, the curriculum arguably cemented its condemnation of the 
GDR in subsequent components such as the Qualifikationsphase. Here, pupils 
had the option of studying either the foundational or advanced course – the 
Grundfach and the Leistungsfach. In both cases, however, content from the tenth 
Klassenstufe was revisited and the dichotomous poles of Eastern European 
                                                
436 Thüringer Kultusministerium (ed.), ‘Lehrplan für das Gymnasium: Geschichte’ (1999), 54pp 
(p. 2). 
437 Lüttgenau, ‘Zur Konzeption der Ausstellung’ ,in Das sowjetische Speziallager Nr. 2 1945 – 
1950, ed. by Ritscher, pp. 12-13. 
438 ‘Lehrplan für das Gymnasium’ (1999), p. 31. 
439 Ibid., p. 31. 
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totalitarianism and Western European liberal democracy were applied even less 
discriminately to post-war East and West Germany. In the Grundfach, for 
example, pupils consolidated knowledge of the ‘Funktion und Wirklichkeit der 
Ideologie im System der DDR’, whilst the Leistungsfach considered historical 
consciousness from a comparative perspective under the headings of ‘[s]tarres 
Geschichtsbild’ and ‘pluralistische Geschichtsauffassung’, denoting the GDR 
and the FRG respectively.440 Another topic covered in the Leistungsfach was the 
handling of the Nazi past in both states.441 By restricting coverage of GDR-
antifascism to its propagandistic function and setting up unfavourable 
comparisons with the Federal Republic, the curriculum took an unequivocally 
critical position on memory culture in East Germany and, by extension, the East 
German state itself. Since the post-war camp at Buchenwald expressly featured 
in the unit dealing with the GDR, the curriculum clearly departed from political 
narratives that focused predominantly on the site’s history between 1937-1945. 
Whilst politicians such as Wolfgang Thierse had tied Buchenwald to efforts at 
confronting the legacy of Nazism, the singular association the curriculum drew 
between the site and the Speziallager – which it in turn subsumed into the topic 
of the GDR – rather downplayed its pre-1945 history. 
Where did things stand with cultural discourse in Brandenburg? As seen 
in chapters two and three, the state was confronted with a serious underlying 
problem of xenophobic and right-wing extremist attitudes following unification. 
The arson attack on the Jewish barracks at Sachsenhausen in the autumn of 1992 
was a prominent case in point. Mindful not least of how incidents of this sort 
could negatively impact upon Brandenburg’s image, the regional government 
drew up an action paper (‘Handlungskonzept’) entitled ‘”Tolerantes 
Brandenburg” – für eine starke und lebendige Demokratie’ in 1998.442 In light of 
the wide-ranging proposals the action paper made for fostering a strong and 
functional democracy at regional level, it is fair to say that it represented a 
programmatic statement of Brandenburg’s political culture at the turn of the new 
                                                
440 Ibid., p. 38; p. 50. 
441 Ibid., p. 52. 
442 ‘“Tolerantes Brandenburg” – für eine starke und lebendige Demokratie: Handlungskonzept 
der Landesregierung für eine demokratische Gesellschaft mit Zivilcourage gegen Gewalt, 
Rechtsextremismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit’, 
http://www.tolerantes.brandenburg.de/media_fast/5791/Handlungskonzept.pdf [accessed 10 Feb 
2013]. 
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millennium. Consequently, it serves as a helpful indictor of the context within 
which specific debates around Sachsenhausen were to play out in the following 
decade. 
Three frames emerge in the wording of the action paper: the regional, the 
national, and the international. The former and the latter are introduced 
immediately in the opening section outlining a Leitbild for Brandenburg. Indeed, 
the very first line described the state as ‘eine europäische Region mit Zukunft’, 
situated ‘[m]itten im neuen, erweiterten Europa’. Extending the frame even 
further, the Leitbild advocated a role for Brandenburg as a ‘weltoffenen 
Wirtschaftsstandort’. In order not to jeopardise its democratic image and hamper 
economic development, however, it was essential that foreigners and Germans 
from migrant backgrounds living in the state were not subject to any distressing 
treatment.443 Thus, the Leitbild presented both a specifically regional and an 
avowedly international dimension to the problem of extremism: it damaged 
Brandenburg’s reputation on the international stage, which in turn had knock-on 
effects for the regional economy.  
Elsewhere, the action paper appealed directly to a regional community, 
referring to a ‘politische Wertegemeinschaft’. The term itself effectively 
constructed a community of values by positing a common democratic 
worldview.444 Yet the construct did not rely solely on associations in the present. 
In a subsequent section assessing the causes for the spread of right-wing racist 
and xenophobic attitudes, the action paper alluded to both present-day and 
historical self-identifications as East German amongst Brandenburger. 
Significantly, the very first cause listed was GDR antifascism, which had 
allegedly prevented any kind of coming to terms with institutionalised 
persecution and injustice. There later followed the concession that ‘biografische 
Entwertungserfahrungen nach 1990’ – a somewhat oblique reference to the 
GDR’s accession to the Federal Republic – might also have given rise to 
intolerance and racist resentments.445 Unmistakeably, then, efforts at 
Brandenburg’s post-unification sensitisation to democratic values involved 
contending with the legacy of the GDR. 
                                                
443 Ibid., p. 2. 
444 Ibid., p. 3f. 
445 Ibid., p. 4. 
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Any such confrontation with the GDR past would necessarily run parallel 
to initiatives raising awareness about the historical circumstances under which 
anti-Semitism, racism, political extremism and xenophobia more generally took 
root, however. The action paper was especially clear on the essential role 
‘politische Bildung’ was to play in solidifying the bonds of the ‘politische 
Wertegemeinschaft’, and even singled out ‘Gedenkstättenpädagogik’ as one such 
means of democratic and rights-based education. In many ways, memorial sites 
actually featured in the action paper as a microcosm of its broader strategy, 
combining inward- and backward-looking, critical handling of the German past 
with outward-facing efforts at internationalisation. That is to say, they figured in 
all three of the regional, national, and international frames it mapped out. The 
regional ‘politische Wertegemeinschaft’ was the sites’ primary user, though the 
national project of confronting Germany’s dictatorial past was also a beneficiary 
of their pedagogical work, and a link to the international community was 
provided through the ‘Schülerbegegnungen’ that they facilitated.446 Of course, all 
of this amounted to a formal enshrinement of the memorial sites at the centre of 
political culture – an enshrinement that was also effected at federal level through 
the introduction of the Gedenkstättenkonzeption. The difference here was the 
specific motivation for and background to the action paper in Brandenburg: it 
had been prompted by increasingly prevalent right-wing extremism at regional 
level. 
Consequently, it is not possible to speak of a consensus on the double 
past in either state heading into the new millennium. This was in spite of 
significant moves towards institutionalisation at regional level, signalled by the 
creation of a public law foundation in Thuringia and the publication of the action 
paper in Brandenburg. As it was, the relationship between the memorials’ 
historical phases was inflected differently from state to state, and also within 
each state along public, political, and pedagogical dividing lines. Thus, even if 
the sites were at this point associated primarily with memory of the Nazi past, 
they were also increasingly seen in relation to Stalinist crimes in the SBZ and the 
GDR’s monodimensional memory culture.  
What did by contrast emerge consistently in regional discourse on 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen was recognition of three distinct dimensions to 
                                                
446 Ibid., p. 12. 
198 
 
 
these narratives. Both memorials were at once sites of an increasingly globalised 
Holocaust memory, as well as of a well-established nationwide culture of 
remembrance, and finally of the ongoing negotiation of regional identity and 
memory culture following the demise of the GDR. As will become clear in the 
remainder of the chapter, the latter two debates increasingly figured in regional 
discussion of the memorials as the 2000s wore on, whilst comparatively little 
mention was made of their place in a trans-national culture of remembrance. The 
tenacity of these ‘localised’ discursive frames is an interesting finding, not least 
as it reminds us that, in spite of memory’s inherent mobility in terms of the 
globalised and transcultural technologies, symbols and conventions governing its 
articulation, as an act of recall it remains grounded in specific places and 
contexts.447   
 
 
2006: challenging or upholding the centrality of the Nazi 
past? 
 
This section of the chapter concentrates on two episodes that can be seen as the 
most serious challenges to the existing coordinates of memory faced by 
Brandenburg and Thuringia in the 2000s. These were the speeches by Jörg 
Schönbohm at Sachsenhausen during the concentration camp liberation 
anniversary there in April 2006, and Hermann Schäfer’s opening address at the 
Kunstfest in August of that year. Though, as I discuss in the introductory chapter, 
the ultimately unsuccessful CDU-led proposal to revise the Federal Memorials 
Strategy and the Saxony Memorials Foundations controversy in 2003-4 had 
already raised significant questions about the place of the Nazi past in German 
memory culture, neither had the same direct regional impact as Schäfer and 
Schönbohm’s speeches did in Thuringia and Brandenburg respectively. 
Furthermore, the speeches must be seen in relation to the situation at the turn of 
the millennium, outlined above. In light of the fact that there was, even at this 
earlier juncture, little consensus around remembrance of National Socialism and 
                                                
447 See Susannah Radstone, ‘What place is this? Transcultural Memory and the Locations of 
Memory Studies’, Parallax, 17, 4 (2011), 109-23.  
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Communism, in-depth analysis of debates in 2006 can draw attention to longer-
term chronologies behind the regional construction of cultural memory. To what 
extent had attitudes towards the double past in the two federal states changed by 
the mid-2000s, particularly with regard to the assumed centrality of the Nazi past 
to the broader debate? The following section will explore, firstly, the fallout from 
both speeches in political circles and the pages of the regional press, before 
turning later on in the chapter to the position of civic memory activists. I begin 
with responses to Schäfer’s Kunstfest speech in the Thuringian press.  
On one level, coverage of the story in regional newspapers upheld a 
normative model of post-unification memory culture, rehearsing the standard 
position taken by both the Schröder and Merkel administrations in which the 
Holocaust was rooted firmly at the centre of national identity. Despite initially 
engaging with the possibility that a change of course in official memory of the 
Nazi past had been signalled by Schäfer’s speech at the Kunstfest, reportage was 
soon declaring the incident to be all but over. An article appearing in the 
Thüringische Landeszeitung (TLZ) on September 2 epitomised the volte-face, 
declaring ‘Weimarer Erinnerungskultur ist leitmotivisch und angemessen’.448 
The headline was a quote taken from the regional Minister for Culture Jens 
Goebel, whom the newspaper had interviewed about the scandal, yet neither 
Goebel himself nor the article clarified what ought to be understood as 
‘appropriate’ (‘angemessen’) in the first place. Rather, Goebel took the Kunstfest 
as tacit evidence of Weimar’s (and by extension Thuringia’s) exemplary role in 
remembering the Nazi past, describing it is a ‘Ritual des Gedächtnisses’.449 
When pressed on the question of whether ritualistic commemoration risked 
becoming little more than a ‘leere[…] Zeremonie’, he even countered that a 
ritual, understood as ‘etwas nach gleichen Regeln Wiederkehrendes’, actually 
ensured the vitality of remembrance. 
By restating the value of well-established commemorative rituals, Goebel 
was of course indicating his support – and that of the regional government – for 
the existing coordinates of memory in official commemorative discourse. The 
message was reiterated the following day in the TLZ, which reported the federal 
government’s desire ‘…die Debatte über die…befürchtete Wende in der 
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Erinnerungskultur in Deutschland zu beenden.’450 As understandable as it was 
for the government to wish to assay fears voiced by opposition parties and 
victims’ groups, the reference to ‘ending the debate’ (‘die Debatte beenden’) 
nevertheless betrayed an underlying assumption that the parameters of 
Germany’s memory culture were not normally open to discussion. Channelling 
first Goebel’s plea for continuity and now the position of the federal government 
unmistakeably aligned the press in Thuringia with an institutionalised approach 
to the Nazi past. A little over a month later, when Hermann Schäfer travelled to 
Paris to apologise in person to Bertrand Herz for the controversy his speech in 
Weimar had sparked, the impression given by the TLZ was of a return to 
normality. It declared the affair officially ‘aus der Welt geräumt’451 and several 
days later ran an article with the title ‘NS-Verbrechen nicht relativieren’. Though 
the headline was a quote taken from Bertrand Herz, the admonishing tone 
nonetheless elevated his appeal to the status of a watchword for the whole of 
Thuringia when it came to commemorating the Nazi past.452 
It is worth noting the space afforded to regional opposition politicians 
such as Carsten Schneider (SPD) and Birgit Klaubert (Linkspartei.PDS), who 
were critical of Goebel’s decision to withhold comment on Schäfer’s speech, in 
the pages of the regional press.453 Schneider in particular saw potentially 
damaging consequences for Germany if the incident in Weimar was not clarified, 
and even appeared to throw down the gauntlet to the SPD’s coalition party in the 
Bund, the CDU, categorically ruling out support for a ‘backdoor’ attempt to shift 
course in the handling of the past.454 Indeed, he believed the current policy to be 
integral to Germany’s newfound self-confidence, remarking that this ‘“im 
Wesentlichen auch aus der Beschäftigung mit der Vergangenheit [resultiert]”.’455 
Citing Schneider, the TLZ article arrived at the same basic position on the past as 
the CDU-SPD government, but via a different argument: it advocated the same 
brand of ‘negative nationalism’ but drew upon an oppositional political 
discourse, represented in this case by figures such as Schneider and Klaubert, in 
order to make its point. The TLZ was no mere mouthpiece for the CDU, then, 
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but nor was this a clear-cut example of playing politics with history – the picture 
in Thuringia was more complex than that. 
Though the Thuringian position vis-à-vis the National Socialist past was 
consistent with the federal government’s, the means by which it arrived at this 
position was not. Though the press stridently opposed the relativisation of Nazi 
crimes, the very process of coming to terms with the past appeared to be seen 
from a ‘regional’ perspective, as if what was at stake was Thuringia’s own record 
in Vergangenheitsbewältigung. This was clear for one thing in the way in which 
Volkhard Knigge featured in regional reportage at the time. Only shortly after 
Schäfer’s speech at the opening ceremony of the Kunstfest, a comment piece in 
the TLZ entitled ‘Auf Knigge hören’ appeared, urging regional and federal 
politicians to heed his advice.456 Several days later, the paper dedicated almost 
two pages to an interview with him, far more space than was allotted to other 
commentators on the incident, and indeed more, for that matter, than to either 
Goebel or the federal minister for culture Bernd Neumann.457 Admittedly, as 
both ministers were keeping a studied silence at this point, Knigge was in some 
respects the automatic choice for the press to speak to, but it is significant 
nonetheless that the TLZ chose to foreground his views. The effect of citing 
Knigge, who spoke of the fallout from the incident as ‘eine Frage von 
Sensibilität und Aufmerksamkeit und Haltung’,458 especially when it came to the 
survivors of the concentration camp, was to imply an almost self-evident regard 
for the National Socialist past and its victims in Thuringia – he was after all 
speaking in his capacity as director of a prominent Thuringian concentration 
camp memorial. Regardless of the fact that he represented an internationally 
recognised institution and thus spoke for Germany’s memorial industry on a 
broader level, Knigge was presented in the press as a regional authority and the 
personification of a distinct Thuringian discourse on the Nazi past. 
Even if Knigge’s primary concern was the survivors of Buchenwald, who 
he felt had been let down by Schäfer, the interview for the most part focused on 
the praise he gave to local and regional protagonists in the ensuing debate. For all 
that Knigge insisted the issue was not just a ‘Parteiproblem’ and that ‘es…nicht 
mehr um das Ansehen Weimars [geht]’, the headline nonetheless singled out the 
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vital intermediary role he assigned to the state president Dieter Althaus, whose 
actions would supposedly decide how the affair was handled at federal level.459 
Furthermore, the article picked up on Knigge’s mention of regional ‘Standards’ 
in the handling of the past that should be brought to Berlin by Althaus. 
Accordingly, this was a case of exporting regional memory culture beyond 
Thuringia – an impression only underscored further by the depiction of Althaus 
as a ‘Botschafter zu dem, was wir in Thüringen erreicht haben’.460 Actors in 
Berlin, by contrast, came across as, at best, unenlightened in their own attempts 
to commemorate victims of Nazism. Schäfer’s clumsy attempt at excusing his 
choice of words at the Kunstfest – he expressed surprise that one was still 
expected to mention Buchenwald when in Weimar – was conveyed with 
bewilderment by the Thüringer Allgemeine (TA), which labelled it ‘mehr als 
peinlich’.461  
In this regard, comparison with the audience in Weimar could not have 
been more pronounced. Newspapers made much out of the award of the 
Bundesverdienstorden to Volkhard Knigge in recognition of his work at 
Buchenwald, which was said to have ‘set the tone’ (‘deutliche Akzente setzen’) 
for Germany’s memory culture more generally.462 Though Knigge’s record was 
in this sense exemplary, reportage did not restrict its praise to regional 
figureheads. The entire audience at the ‘Gedächtnis Buchenwald’ concert, 
somewhat misleadingly referred to as a ‘Weimarer Publikum[…]’ despite the 
event’s nationwide popularity, were congratulated in an article in the TA for 
audibly expressing their disapproval at Schäfer’s speech. A guest from Trier was 
also quoted to this effect, and ventured to suggest that the audience might not 
have intervened had the concert been held elsewhere. By contrast, the events in 
Weimar were in her estimation just one step short of resembling the East German 
popular protests of 1989: ‘” [es] fehlte nur noch, dass jemand ruft ‘Wir sind das 
Volk’”’.463 Overblown though her comment was, the link to the ‘Wende’ was 
pointed, insofar as it established a line of continuity between the protesters in 
1989 and post-unification civic culture in Thuringia. Even Knigge himself was 
moved to recall successful protests against a planned Neo-Nazi march in Weimar 
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in 2000 when interviewed by the TLZ, in effect vouching for the tradition of 
solidarity with the victims of National Socialism that had existed in Thuringia 
long before 2006.464     
The Thuringian press’ presentation of regional memory culture as 
‘leitmotivisch und angemessen’ – to use Jens Goebel’s words – can therefore be 
understood in two ways. On the one hand, its focus on the Nazi past and 
internalisation of ‘negative nationalism’ looked from the outside like a fairly 
straightforward iteration of the ‘official’ federal memory narrative. At neither 
regional nor federal level was the existing consensus on the place of the 
Holocaust and German perpetration in contemporary national identity seriously 
called into question by press reportage. Given the timing of Schäfer’s speech, 
coming as it did in the wake of heated debates on the dual legacies of German 
suffering and Nazi crimes in the memory culture of the Berlin Republic, it was 
hard not to imagine it provoking impassioned responses. Yet in the event, 
commentators from both political and intellectual circles in Thuringia, far from 
positing a link between the Kunstfest episode and the bitter polemics that had 
accompanied Buchenwald’s redesign in the 1990s as might have been expected, 
spoke almost unanimously of the state’s proud achievements in facing up to the 
Nazi past since unification. In light of the debates raging in Brandenburg over 
Sachsenhausen’s double past in 2005-6, moreover, it is remarkable that none of 
the articles surveyed here seized upon Buchenwald’s own multiple histories. 
After all, the double past and Schäfer’s speech threw up the same thorny 
question of how, if at all, a nation that had a historical and moral responsibility to 
remember the Third Reich could acknowledge its own suffering (whether at the 
hands of the Allies or Soviet communism) alongside crimes committed in its 
name. 
To be sure, there were some – such as Knigge – who did recognise that 
the question of finding a ‘historisch angemessene Proportionierung’ subtended 
the broader debate set in motion by Schäfer’s speech.465 But his intervention was 
converted by the press into implicit praise for Thuringia’s memory culture rather 
than engaged with in its own right. Herein lay a clue as to what the regional press 
might actually have meant by ‘leitmotivisch und angemessen’. Reportage gave to 
understand that the status quo would not be challenged in Thuringia, for sure, but 
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it also attributed the impetus for confronting the Nazi past to regional actors and 
institutions as opposed to directives coming from Berlin. In a curious paradox, 
memory culture at state level corresponded almost exactly to a normative model, 
but had been constructed from the bottom up and owed to the initiative of 
protagonists in the regional commemorative landscape.     
Unlike reportage of the story outside of Thuringia (see chapter five), the 
regional press made at least a notional attempt to gauge the opinions of readers, 
who were invited to send in letters. Even if this forum for discussion was short 
lived, as indicated by the speed with which the debate on Schäfer’s speech died 
down, it was noticeable how few letters took the newspapers’ positivist view of 
regional memory culture. If anything, the impression gleaned from the readers’ 
letters is one of scepticism towards a debate on the past that was seen to exclude 
most Thüringer and be confined to a political elite. In two instances, it was rather 
cynically suggested that the debate was intended above all to raise Weimar’s 
profile, challenging Volkhard Knigge’s claim that it went beyond the matter of 
the town’s reputation. The first letter suspected that the audience’s interruption 
of Schäfer’s speech – attributed more narrowly to a ‘hustende[…] und 
klatschende[…] Gruppe auf dem Balkon’ – was in fact premeditated and 
triggered by high-profile audience members ‘issuing instructions’ 
(‘Anweisungen geben’) from the front rows.466 The second letter feared that 
Thuringia was being used as a stage upon which ‘westliche Alt-
Achtundsechziger und Neo-Konservative’ could revive familiar disputes over the 
Nazi past.467 In both cases the implication was clear: locals were all but excluded 
from the entire affair, and shaping memory culture in Thuringia remained the 
preserve of external actors – whether in the guise of West Germans or 
‘Prominente’ intent on attacking Schäfer’s narrative of 20th century German 
history.    
On one level, the response to Schäfer’s speech within Thuringia appeared 
to be fundamentally ‘East German’. Besides several readers’ obvious irritation at 
archetypal ‘Western’ figures such as the ‘Achtundsechziger’ or 
‘Neokonservative’ hijacking the Kunstfest, the press argued that it was in fact 
Berlin that had something to learn from the memory culture established in 
Thuringia rather than the other way around. This was even reinforced ex negativo 
                                                
466 B. Wiederanders, ‘Wirkungsvolle (Zer)Störung’, TLZ, 2 Sept 2006. 
467 E. Döbler, ‘Wird alter Streit in neuem Gewand ausgetragen?’, TLZ, 2 Sept 2006.  
205 
 
 
in several instances. The TLZ for one thing responded touchily to Schäfer’s 
discussion of post-war flight and expulsion in his speech, alleging that he had 
lectured the audience (‘obrigkeitlich sprechen’) and ‘shown a low opinion of 
East Germans’ (‘die Ostdeutschen…gering geschätzt’) by assuming they were ill 
informed about the topic.468 In other words, it was in the newspaper’s estimation 
untenable to argue collective memory in post-unification Thuringia was any 
longer constrained by taboos dating from the GDR.   
Likewise, a reader who had written in to the newspaper chided locals for 
failing to live up to Weimar’s historical tradition of free and enlightened thought. 
Particularly provocative in this context was the letter’s allusion, by way of 
negative comparison, to first and second generation Germans ‘who all too readily 
revered the Führer’ (‘[die[ nur allzu bereit dem “Führer huldigten’). The same 
could be said about mentioning a ‘narrow, conservative’ Weimar in which 
everything was ‘predetermined [from above]’ (‘vorgegeben’).469 It is unlikely 
that the totalitarian shades of this presumably GDR-era Weimar escaped the 
attention of the East German readership. Certainly the decision to print the letter 
seemed calculated to instil confidence in Thuringia’s recent memory work, since 
the subtext was essentially that GDR mentalities and memory culture had, but for 
this uncharacteristic blip, been left behind for good. Moreover, the fact that the 
letter appeared in the TLZ alongside another article relaying Dieter Althaus’ 
intermediary work in Berlin only reinforced the expectation that the new federal 
states should now lead the way when it came to remembering National Socialist 
crimes.  
Consequently, the differentiated positions of certain readers did not affect 
the overwhelmingly positivist tone adopted by the regional press when it came to 
remembering Buchenwald and the National Socialist past more generally. Even 
where readers had voiced scepticism about the very concept of ‘memory culture’ 
or questioned its inclusiveness, newspaper reportage maintained that East 
Germans – and above all Thüringer – were committed to working through 
brown-collar crimes all the same. Even if the motivation for doing so derived in 
part from a specifically East German desire to shake off the stereotype of a 
population beholden to ‘verordneten Antifaschismus’, it did not preclude 
supporting the federal government’s stance on remembering the dual legacies of 
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National Socialism and Communism. No doubt the conventions of press 
reportage, such as quoting from a small elite consisting almost exclusively of 
politicians and prominent memory activists, helped to reinforce this normative 
picture. However, turning now to discussion of Sachsenhausen’s double past in 
the Brandenburg press, we will see that it is not memory media alone that shape 
discourses on the past.     
Several months prior to Schäfer’s disastrous speech at the Kunstfest, the 
SPD-CDU coalition government in Brandenburg became embroiled in a 
controversy of its own surrounding Sachsenhausen’s double past. Just as in 
Thuringia, the incident revolved around a speech given at a ceremony 
commemorating the victims of the concentration camp. In this instance, the 
speaker was the CDU Interior Minister for Brandenburg, Jörg Schönbohm, who 
as a senior official in the East German army had overseen the absorption of the 
Nationale Volksarmee (NVA) into the Army of the Federal Republic of Germany 
in the early 1990s before moving into politics. Speaking at the commemorative 
ceremony marking the 61st anniversary of the liberation of the concentration 
camp, and in front of survivors from that camp, Schönbohm had elected to also 
commemorate the victims of the Speziallager, pointing out that they had been 
entirely denied the right to commemoration prior to unification.  
Predictably, his comments met with strong protest from the concentration 
camp survivors’ organisation, the Internationales Sachsenhausen-Komitee (ISK), 
whose spokesperson Hans Rentmeister described the speech as an 
‘Unverschämtheit’. Rentmeister cast the Speziallager in over-simplistic terms 
when he spoke flatly of the prisoners there as ‘Mörder, Peiniger und Quäler’470 
of the survivors of the Nazi camp, but he and others in the ISK had justifiable 
grounds for denouncing Schönbohm. After all, he had been speaking at the 
central site in the redesigned memorial dedicated to victims of the concentration 
camp, the former Station Z. This cynical name denoted the final phase of a 
prisoner’s time at Sachsenhausen, just as entering the camp through Turm A 
marked the beginning. Station Z was, moreover, the site of mass murders by the 
SS, such as the targeted liquidation of approximately 12,000 Soviet POWs in 
autumn 1941. It did not, by contrast, belong to the topography of the special 
camp. As for Schönbohm himself, he was speaking in his capacity as deputy 
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President on behalf of the entire regional government at the ceremony, standing 
in for the convalescent Matthias Platzeck. In the following, reactions to 
Schönbohm’s speech in the regional press will be mapped out before comparing 
the positions taken in Thuringia and Brandenburg on the respective ‘crises’ that 
erupted in 2006. 
Coverage of Schönbohm’s speech at Sachsenhausen concentrated 
overwhelmingly on political actors, just as reportage in Thuringia would later do 
in the wake of Schäfer’s remarks at the Kunstfest. In this case, however, the 
scandal caused by Schönbohm was seen almost exclusively in party-political 
terms. Virtually as soon as the story had broken, the Potsdamer Neueste 
Nachrichten (PNN) detailed a range of reactions to the speech, which pointed to 
a divide within the coalition over its exact implications. Whilst the CDU denied 
that Schönbohm had any intention of conflating the two separate histories of the 
concentration camp and special camp at Sachsenhausen, or, worse, of relativising 
the Nazi past, the head of the SPD faction Günter Baaske accused him of giving 
the ‘wrong speech at the wrong place at the wrong time’.471 A day later, it 
appeared that the situation had reached a head. The PNN now reported demands 
for Schönbohm’s resignation from members of the SPD and noted the 
‘considerable tension’ (‘erhebliche Spannung’) within the party, clearly 
exasperated by the damage done to the government’s reputation by its coalition 
partner at Sachsenhausen.472 
Along with its narrow focus on the political ramifications of the speech, 
regional reportage also concentrated its attention on Schönbohm, resulting in 
Sachsenhausen and the broader issue of the double past being pushed to the 
sidelines. Newsworthy though the deputy president’s precarious position was, the 
over-emphasis on his embattled place in the coalition came at the expense of 
pausing to consider what the implications of his speech for Brandenburg’s 
memory culture actually were, and why this was important in the first place. 
Instead, it sufficed to reference the criticism Schönbohm’s comments came in 
for, leaving the reader to draw the implicit conclusion that they were 
problematic. Remarkably, only one article broaches this issue at all, and even 
then in the space of a single sentence relaying Günter Morsch’s reaction to the 
speech. Morsch noted that it was an ‘Abweichung bisheriger Praxis’ to 
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commemorate victims of both camps at the concentration camp liberation 
ceremony, and therefore raised the question of the coordinates of regional 
memory culture.473 Regional reportage was, however, conspicuously silent on the 
matter.  
In this sense, it paralleled nationwide coverage of the incident, which also 
personalised the story rather than concentrating on the regional government’s 
memory politics. An article in the Stuttgarter Zeitung neatly illustrates this. It 
went as far as to suggest that Schönbohm deliberately courted controversy as part 
of a distinctive personal brand of conservative politics; ‘starke Sprüche als 
Markenzeichen’, as the author put it.474 By this logic, the speech at 
Sachsenhausen was merely in keeping with Schönbohm’s uncompromising 
character, career path, and personal quest to discredit the GDR. Indeed, he is 
even referred to as the ‘Exgeneral’ at one point, perhaps hinting at his style of 
politics, and his desire to ‘castigate’ (geißeln) the East German state is said to 
outweigh even his concern about offending the attendees at the Sachsenhausen 
ceremony. What this added up to, of course, was a reaction to the speech that 
deflected attention away from the testing questions of continuity and change in 
Brandenburg’s official stance on the double past. 
A second prominent feature of regional reportage was its conjoining of 
Schönbohm’s speech at Sachsenhausen and an ongoing dispute he was engaged 
in with the Bundesgeneralanwalt, Kay Nehm, regarding a violent attack on a 
German-Ethiopian resident of Potsdam. Though the victim was still in critical 
condition some time after the attack and an extremist motivation seemed highly 
probable, Schönbohm vigorously refuted the attack’s connection to 
Brandenburg’s right-wing scene, and expressed irritation at Nehm’s attempt to 
wrest jurisdiction of the case away from regional authorities. The PNN made 
clear the extent to which one issue had become inseparable from the other when 
it reported on the ‘zwei Fronten’ Schönbohm now faced, referring to opposition 
firstly within the ranks of regional government after his speech at Sachsenhausen 
and secondly to his stance on the earlier attack in Potsdam.475 What was 
remarkable about reportage in this case was the way in which the underlying 
issue of right-wing extremism in Brandenburg had permeated into the discourse 
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on the double past, and vice versa. Take for instance the PNN’s perspective on 
the two incidents. Reporting accusations levelled by Schönbohm’s critics, the 
newspaper stated that the Sachsenhausen speech had ‘damaged’ the fight against 
extremism by ‘weighing up’ (‘aufwiegen’) Nazi crimes against other historical 
atrocities. Likewise, Schönbohm’s refusal to acknowledge extremist motives 
behind the attack in Potsdam ‘trivialised’ (‘bagatellisieren’) the matter – a term 
that had itself gained currency in debates over how to commemorate victims of 
National Socialism and of Stalinism.476 Regional reportage appropriated the 
‘relativisation-trivialisation’ couplet at the heart of the ‘Faulenbach Formel’, 
which had long been the maxim for addressing the double past, and 
recontextualised it to fit with ongoing efforts at combating right-wing extremism 
in Brandenburg. 
Several days later, the PNN published a series of readers’ letters relating 
to the ‘aktuelle[…] Politik des Innenministers Jörg Schönbohm’, once more 
lumping together the distinct stories under a common rubric.477 Two letters took 
Schönbohm to task for his handling of the Potsdam attack, decrying this as 
further evidence of Brandenburg’s ‘traurige[n] Rekord’ in tackling extremist 
violence. A third expressed disappointment that his Sachsenhausen speech had 
been misused to air party political disputes, but apparently saw a connection to 
the extremism discourse too. Here the terminology was particularly revealing: 
politicians and the press were alleged to have consigned the speech to the ‘rechte 
Ecke’, suggesting just as earlier articles had that the real issue facing 
Brandenburg (and especially Schönbohm) was the threat of the radical right. The 
coordinates of regional memory culture played at most a secondary role in the 
incident. 
In addition to couching the controversy at Sachsenhausen in a regional 
discourse on right-wing extremism, the PNN accorded CDU politicians a 
considerable amount of space in its coverage of the story. Unsurprisingly, 
Schönbohm’s party defended his decision to honour victims of both camps at the 
commemorative ceremony. More unusual was the argumentation the head of the 
CDU faction, Thomas Lunacek, used to justify joint commemoration, which 
rested on the fact that Brandenburg’s SPD president, Matthias Platzeck, had 
honoured the victims of the Speziallager at Jamlitz the previous year. That 
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Platzeck had attended a ceremony marking the opening of that camp 60 years 
previously, and not a ceremony commemorating victims of National Socialism, 
did not deter the CDU from drawing the comparison with Schönbohm’s speech 
anyway.478 Furthermore, the justification drew upon two important arguments 
that, as we will see, reappear frequently in regional discourse on the Speziallager 
at Sachsenhausen. The first argument foregrounded imprisonment of children in 
the special camps in order to divert attention away from many of the older 
prisoners’ active or passive support of the National Socialist state. The second 
emphasised that Social Democrats who had opposed the forced merger with the 
KPD in the Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ) had also been held in the camps. By 
this rationale, the special camps had less to do with Stalinist crimes than they did 
with the GDR and its prehistory in the SBZ. By extension, the debate on the two 
camps at Sachsenhausen was reducible to the question of the relationship 
between memory of National Socialism and East German Communism. As 
Andrew Beattie has recently pointed out, addressing the singularity of brown-
collar crimes through comparison with the GDR, as opposed to Bolshevism or 
Stalinism, marks a fundamental change in the tenor of German memory contests 
since the Historians’ Dispute (the Historikerstreit).479 On the evidence of 
Sachsenhausen’s place in Brandenburg’s memory culture, which I discuss at 
greater length later in the chapter, this trend appears set to continue.              
A final dimension to the controversy surrounding Schönbohm’s 
Sachsenhausen speech exposed a creeping tendency to equate National Socialism 
and Communism in the Brandenburg press. When news later surfaced that Hans 
Rentmeister, one of Schönbohm’s most outspoken critics, had in fact been a 
long-serving employee of the Stasi, reportage revisited the initial incident at 
Sachsenhausen and now appeared to side with Schönbohm and the CDU, at least 
if the zeal with which it attacked the GDR was anything to go by. Shortly before 
Rentmeister resigned from his position in the ISK, the Brandenburg Memorials 
Foundation formally terminated cooperation with him in light of the new 
revelations – a move which the press seemed to greet. An article in the PNN for 
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instance relayed the praise given by Thomas Lunacek and the Minster for 
Research, Science and Culture Johanna Wanka (also CDU) for this decisive 
action, evidently sharing their relief that potential damage to regional memory 
culture had been ‘averted’.480 Although Rentmeister insisted that his initial 
criticism of Schönbohm remained valid, newspapers did not lend much 
credibility to his position. Instead, the Berliner Morgenpost averred that 
concentration camp memorials in East Germany had served the ‘Legitimierung 
der SED-Ideologie’, preventing a ‘seriöse Darstellung der Vergangenheit’ here 
until unification.481 Besides condemning the practices and ideology of the SED, 
this position also appeared to normalize Schönbohm’s comments by banishing 
the truly inappropriate commemorative practice at the memorial to the period 
prior to unification. The speech at Sachsenhausen in 2006 might have been 
controversial, but by this logic it nevertheless belonged unequivocally on the 
‘right’ side of 1990.           
Tellingly, both Rentmeister himself and Pierre Gouffault, the president of 
the ISK, registered the mounting hostility. Gouffault stated with some irritation 
that no-one could ‘force’ (‘zwingen’) the survivors of the concentration camp to 
honour the ‘Verantwortlichen des NS-Terrors’, by which he meant the prisoners 
of the Speziallager.482 His choice of words perfectly illustrated the underlying 
assumption on the part of the survivors’ association that powers in Brandenburg 
were now actively lobbying in support of post-war victims. Rentmeister, for his 
part, commented dryly on the irony of the situation. Punning on the recent 
unearthing of the file incriminating him, he alleged that the regional government 
had ‘drawn a card’ of its own (‘eine Karte gezogen’) in response to criticism of 
Schönbohm: outing his work for the Stasi.483 Gouffault and Rentmeister’s 
agitated retorts in the press indicate that, at least in this particular medium, 
consensus had perhaps moved away from the ‘singularity’ theory and towards a 
position that equated the National Socialist and Communism pasts. Certainly, the 
willingness of the press to largely disregard Rentmeister’s original criticism of 
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Schönbohm for the sake of distancing itself from him suggested that the 
coordinates of memory had begun to shift.        
These impassioned disagreements about how to commemorate the two 
camp phases at Sachsenhausen must be seen in the context of a particular 
scepticism in Brandenburg as to the rigorousness with which the region’s GDR 
past has been addressed since unification. Against this background, it is not hard 
to see how and why equationist readings of Sachsenhausen’s double past 
(detailed below) have begun to creep into regional discourse. Comparing events 
here to developments in Thuringia only further reinforces the impression of a 
distinct ‘Brandenburger Weg’. Whilst Volkhard Knigge was able to surmise that 
the multiple ‘round’ anniversaries in 2005 (of the liberation of the concentration 
camps, and the establishment – or dissolution, depending on how one looked at it 
– of the special camps) passed more or less without incident at Buchenwald, the 
same cannot be said of Sachsenhausen.484 Here, the regional DVU faction 
provocatively laid a wreath at the memorial on January 27 explicitly honouring 
victims of Soviet special camps, despite the day’s connection to and focus on 
victims of National Socialism.485 Though the DVU’s action was calculated to stir 
up controversy (the memorial staff were left with little choice but to remove the 
wreath), it also attested to the difficulties inherent to discussion of the double 
past in Brandenburg. Looking at a more diffuse range of newspaper articles on 
the post-war camp at Sachsenhausen, as well as on the GDR past more generally, 
sheds some light on these factors. 
The title of an article in Die Welt in the summer of 2006, appearing in the 
wake of Schönbohm’s controversial speech at the concentration camp liberation 
ceremony, epitomised the hypersensitivity towards communist injustice in 
Brandenburg. Under the headline ‘Stalins Opfer gehen in die Offensive’, the 
article detailed the complaints levelled at the Sachsenhausen site staff by the 
chair of the ALS, Gisela Gneist, and the litany of shortcomings in addressing the 
East German past identified by CDU politicians.486 Gneist claimed that the 
survivors of the Speziallager felt like ‘Opfer 2. Klasse’, whilst senior CDU 
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figures such as Schönbohm himself and the head of the parliamentary faction 
Thomas Lunacek recommended that the injustices suffered by the camp inmates 
be ‘made clear’ (‘deutlich machen’) and the camps be addressed in school 
history lessons (‘im Geschichtsunterricht…vertiefen’).487 Sandwiched between 
Gneist’s allegation and the coverage of CDU demands was a very brief section 
detailing the position of the Stiftung Brandenburgische Gedenkstätten. As a 
result of this sequencing, the foundation was made to seem as if it had a 
considerable amount to answer for. The fact that the organisation’s speaker, 
Horst Seferens, was forced to correct Gneist (‘[der Stiftungssprecher] sagt 
dagegen…’)488 and reiterate the foundation’s fundamental opposition to playing 
off victim groups against one another suggested an oppositional rather than 
cooperative relationship between the memorial site and the ALS. Moreover the 
coverage of CDU-backed moves to scale up a working through of the GDR past 
highlighted an underlying assumption that there had been a failure to do so 
satisfactorily thus far.  
Gneist had been reacting to a quote from an earlier article in the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, in which Günter Morsch was cited warning of 
‘revisionistische Kräfte’ at work in efforts to commemorate victims of the 
Speziallager.489 In fact, the article had taken Morsch’s quote out of context, and 
moreover it noted the separate commemorative ceremonies held on consecutive 
days by the memorial and the ALS in 2005 as well as Gneist’s hostility towards 
Morsch. This only added to the impression of a supposed inability to adequately 
confront post-1945 injustice in Brandenburg (and specifically at 
Sachsenhausen).490 The same conclusion could surely be drawn from comments 
made by Brandenburg’s Minister for Science, Research and Culture, Johanna 
Wanka, who advocated the ‘Ausbau’ of memory culture in the state. Given that 
Wanka’s pledge came after she remarked that the special camps had been a taboo 
topic in the GDR and that, in this spirit, a new Speziallager museum had been 
opened at Sachsenhausen in 2001, it can only be assumed that ‘Ausbau’ here 
meant an increased focus on injustice committed in the SBZ and GDR.491 It is in 
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the context of this ongoing broader debate about working through the East 
German past in Brandenburg that the Speziallager must be understood. 
Taking a situational and relational view of press discourse on the Schäfer 
and Schönbohm episodes reveals both the distinct drivers behind regional 
engagement with the double past and the differences within this regional space 
from state to state. First of all, newspaper coverage of the two speeches, though 
broadly conforming to the federal normalization paradigm as it stood in 2006, 
did not simply reproduce it. Rather, both speeches were placed in the context of 
specifically East German attempts to break decisively with the GDR past, 
whether this context was the proclaimed achievements of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung on a regional level (as in Thuringia) or the 
proclaimed lack of attention paid to post-1945 injustice in the initial post-
unification period (as in Brandenburg). Indeed, the ‘deficit’ trope relating to 
Brandenburg’s perceived failure to implement rigourous transitional justice 
measures informed how the press framed responses to Sachsenhausen’s double 
past. In Thuringia, however, a comparable framing device was not as 
forthcoming. As a result, Volkhard Knigge was able to state retrospectively that 
the mid-2000s at Buchenwald were relatively free of controversy.492 Günter 
Morsch, by contrast, was of quite the opposite mind when reflecting upon the 
same period at Sachsenhausen, noting that external attempts to steer the work of 
the memorial site had perceptibly increased during this time.493 The events of 
2005-6 discussed here certainly seem to bear out his assessment.   
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the clusters of newspaper articles 
dealing with the speeches, when constituted as discourses, are entwined with the 
exercise of cultural hegemony. Giving a voice primarily to political or elite 
actors and focusing for the most part on regional political disputes, newspaper 
reportage legitimizes dominant interpretations, and therefore has a normative 
function. In Thuringia, this took the form of defending regional efforts to come 
to terms with the past, which were presented as ‘leitmotivisch und angemessen’. 
In Brandenburg, the slippage of a consensus around Holocaust-centred 
commemoration was effected in the regional press by condemning Hans 
Rentmeister’s work for the Stasi, thereby undermining his criticism of 
Schönbohm and offering a damning indictment of the GDR. This was an 
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altogether different position to that of the local press in Oranienburg, which had 
concentrated not just on Schönbohm’s speech but on the ISK’s Vermächtnis and 
therefore on the legacy of the concentration camp.   
Looking closely at the controversies of 2006 has indeed shown distinctive 
patterns of engagement with the double past emerging in Brandenburg and 
Thuringia, the principle of equation appearing to characterize the former and the 
principle of differentiation applying to the latter. It has also pointed to the 
mechanisms by which these positions are normativized, finding that, on balance, 
regional ‘orders of discourse’ and the conventions of press reportage are more 
influential than a precedent coming from Berlin.  
 
National Socialism and Communism in regional pedagogy 
 
In the third section of this chapter, we will turn to the latter half of the 2000s, 
during which time a series of centrally initiated steps were taken in Brandenburg 
and Thuringia that were to have direct consequences for engagement with the 
double past. These came in the form of revisions to the existing history curricula 
in both states around 2010, and a decision by the Brandenburg regional 
government to draw up guidelines for ‘active civic confrontation with the SED-
dictatorship’ in 2007. By comparing them to contemporaneous texts produced by 
the memorials and their intermediaries for use in the classroom or in the context 
of visits to the sites, it is possible to trace, firstly, continuity and change in the 
shape of the respective regional memory cultures over the course of the 2000s. 
Thus we get a sense of the extent to which patterns of hierarchical, Holocaust-
centred commemoration in Thuringia and equationist commemoration in 
Brandenburg emerging already in the first half of the decade become entrenched 
by the end of it. Secondly, the comparison further elucidates the ‘travelling’ 
character of memory by pointing to the transmission of certain memory 
narratives across distinct discourses both within each state and between the two.  
What is immediately clear from the comparative analysis that follows is 
that discourse on the double past in these states has retained an inward-looking, 
localised frame of reference. As for the interrelationship between National 
Socialism and East German communism, this continues to be inflected quite 
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differently, though the trends identified above – differentiation in Thuringia 
versus equation in Brandenburg – do appear to persist. I will demonstrate this by 
looking firstly at the 2007 government proposal in Brandenburg and reactions to 
it, before turning to the pedagogical materials used in both states. Finally, I will 
reflect on the recent revisions made to history curricula and their implications for 
memory of the double past.    
In March 2007, Brandenburg’s regional government suggested putting 
forward a Konzept that was intended to encourage active civic confrontation with 
the SED dictatorship. Tellingly, the formulation ‘SED-Diktatur’ was repeated 
throughout the draft document and seemingly considered interchangeable with 
the more value-neutral ‘GDR’ when referring to East Germany. The draft 
concept itself took an explicitly didactic approach to the GDR past, made clear in 
its subtitle ‘Umgang mit Geschichte zur Stärkung der Demokratie’.494 The 
inference was that, whatever form this confrontation ultimately took, is should 
serve to strengthen democracy and in particular improve awareness amongst 
school age Germans in Brandenburg of the differences between democracy and 
dictatorship. The proposal went on to state: 
 
‘Um Freiheit und Demokratie als Werte zu vermitteln und dauerhaft zu 
sichern, stehen wir in der Verantwortung kommenden Generationen den 
fundamentalen Unterschied von Diktatur und Demokratie zu vermitteln 
und ein lebendiges Verhältnis auch zu unserer jüngsten Geschichte zu 
entwickeln.’495  
 
The overtly political goal of the concept was emphasised once more in 
the recommendation that it be integrated into other ‘Maßnahmen der 
Demokratiebildung’, foisting a rather large burden of responsibility upon it 
considering that the proposals largely concerned curricular strategies of teaching 
and learning about the GDR.496 Elsewhere in the concept the tone was not 
dissimilar from Günter Morsch’s when he spoke of the ‘Emanzipation’ of 
visitors to the Sachsenhausen memorial in his speech at the inauguration of the 
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Speziallager museum. In the concept too, an awareness and understanding of 
history was advocated as a means of vouchsafing ‘Emanzipation’, but in this case 
it was also assumed to lead to ‘Verantwortungsbewusstsein und die Bereitschaft 
zur Teilhabe an der Gesellschaft’.497 Although it was not made explicit, the 
educational tools and institutions dealt with by the concept – including 
Sachsenhausen, of course – were clearly understood to function collectively as 
an ‘exhibitionary complex’.   
This was apparent not least in the timing of the concept. It preceded the 
20th anniversary of the peaceful revolution by enough time for the parliament to 
enjoin political parties, the regional government and other public institutions to 
participate in the ‘Kulturland Brandenburg’ campaign of 2009, which had chosen 
democracy and democratic movements as its theme. The concept even 
recommended how to use a comparison between present-day parliamentary 
democracy and the criminal GDR could be utilised to best effect: 
 
‘In der Auseinandersetzung mir der Geschichte spielen Themen wie 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen und antidemokratische Herrschaft eine 
wichtige Rolle, da aus diesen Erfahrungen Konsequenzen gezogen 
wurden, die für die Gestaltung der Grundordnung der Bundesrepublik 
und des politischen Lebens in Deutschland essenziell und kennzeichnend 
sind.’498 
 
First of all this contradicted the concept’s professed support for an ‘open’ 
process of historical-political education by prescribing closed definitions of the 
GDR and the Federal Republic and loading them with normative value for 
German ‘political life’. Secondly, it contributed to a black and white picture of 
the GDR in which the East German state was reduced to the binary of repression 
and resistance. For besides the litany of negative examples the GDR provided in 
support of parliamentary democracy, the concept was keen to stress the 
instructive value that opposition to the SED regime held as well. It praised not 
only the oppositional movements that contributed to bringing about the end of 
the GDR, but also stressed the need for an (Eastern) European dialogue on the 
forms of resistance utilised against the Communist dictatorship in former Soviet 
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satellite states. These were referred to collectively as ‘Ansätze für Traditionen 
demokratischen Engagements in Europa.’499  
Comparing the terminology and focus of the Konzept to the report of a 
Historians’ Commission tasked with drawing up directives for the work of the 
Geschichtsverbund Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur in 2006 bears out 
suggestions that the former adopted a binary approach. The report of the 
Historians’ Commission recommended that the Geschichtsverbund base its work 
around the concepts “Herrschaft – Gesellschaft – Widerstand”, thus 
incorporating a more nuanced approach that also dealt with everyday life in the 
GDR.500 The Brandenburgian concept, by contrast, evidences a fixation for the 
most part on ‘Herrschaft’ and ‘Widerstand’, to the exclusion of everyday 
experiences. This is best demonstrated by an extract that begins with reference to 
the ‘spannungsvolle Wechselbeziehung zwischen Akzeptanz und Auflehnung, 
Begeisterung und Verachtung, Loyalität und Nischenglück’ that characterised 
GDR society. Despite this apparent concession to the ambivalent nature of the 
East German state, it is then on the very same page reduced to the ‘SED-
Diktatur’: 
 
‘[Die Landesregierung] strebt…eine breite und vertiefte Kenntnis über 
die Geschichte der DDR in der Gesellschaft an mit dem Ziel, einen 
grundsätzlichen gesellschaftlichen Konsens über die historische 
Einordnung und die Bewertung der SED-Diktatur zu fördern.’501         
 
Having ostensibly promised a differentiated handling of the GDR, the 
concept then virtually in the same breath advocated a consensual historical 
evaluation, one that evidently revolved around the state’s essentially criminal 
nature as implied in the use of ‘Diktatur’. As I will show, this served an 
equationist cause at memorials such as Sachsenhausen, even though the concept 
in itself was hardly a radical departure from prevailing commemorative trends. 
Furthermore, it was evidence of a ‘political’ code that blurred the lines drawn by 
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parliamentary Geschichtspolitik, cross-cutting ideological divides over the 
double past.   
In a section that followed an initial clarification of the concept’s tasks and 
guiding principles (‘Leitlinien’), the responsibilities of the regional government 
were outlined and organised by governmental department. Of particular 
importance to the discussion here is the jurisdiction of the Ministerium für 
Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur (henceforth MWFK), which extended not 
only to memorial sites such as Sachsenhausen, but also other museums and 
research institutions in Brandenburg whose work was of relevance to the 
concept. It is telling that the concept could name only three institutions under the 
department’s purview dedicated primarily to a socio-cultural history of the GDR. 
What is more, the definition of ‘Alltag’ – ‘everyday life’ – was rather restrictive, 
narrowing its focus to the ways in which the dictatorial East German state 
impinged upon the life of its citizens.502 
 Thus the definition of ‘Alltag’ was not linked to the experiences of East 
Germans, but rather seen as emanating from the state, in particular through what 
it could offer to or withhold from its charges. This is quite consistent with the 
overwhelming numerical dominance of memorial sites at East German 
penitentiary institutions and other sites of persecution in the overview of the 
MWFK’s spheres of activity. The first of these to be discussed were the 
Speziallager, described as follows: 
 
‘Sie waren Instrumente der stalinistischen Geheimpolizei und gehören 
zeitlich in den Gründungsprozess der kommunistischen Diktatur. Sie 
schufen ein Klima von Unrecht, Gewalt und Terror, das zur Durchsetzung 
der kommunistischen Herrschaft beitrug.’503    
 
Whilst the description undoubtedly captures several crucial characteristics 
of the special camps, it makes no mention of the Allied denazification procedures 
jointly agreed upon at conferences in Yalta and Potsdam amongst others that also 
explain their genesis. The ambivalent beginnings of the special camps are lost in 
the focus on their role in propping up the communist dictatorship. The omission 
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is curious given that the double past of many of the memorials listed in the 
concept is mentioned only a few pages later: 
 
‘Die genannten Beispiele sprechen … für die zunehmend 
gleichberechtigte Aufmerksamkeit der demokratischen Gesellschaft 
gegenüber der zweifachen Vergangenheit dieser Orte. Bei einer 
Bewertung des bisher Erreichten darf nicht vergessen werden, dass das 
Unrechtssystem der DDR erst 18 Jahre zurückliegt, eine Zeitspanne, die 
für eine umfassende historische Aufarbeitung eher kurz ist. Zudem ist 
verständlich, dass die Betroffenen ein berechtigtes Bedürfnis nach 
schneller und gründlicher Aufklärung und Dokumentation aller 
menschenunwürdigen Geschehnisse haben.’504  
 
The concept is quite justified in highlighting the deficits in working 
through the GDR past in relation to the more extensively documented National 
Socialist history of many of the named memorials. This applied not least to 
Sachsenhausen, where the site director had already in 1998 pointed out the 
likelihood to members of the regional government working-group for Science, 
Research and Culture that the Speziallager museum would open no earlier than 
2006.505 Likewise, the temporary exhibition on the special camp that had opened 
there in 1993 was described by the StBG as ‘inhaltlich überholt[…]’ and no 
longer corresponding to the ‘historischen Erkenntnisstand über das System der 
sowjetischen Lager in der SBZ.’506 Yet referring to the right of those affected to 
see prompt explanation and documentation of all inhumane historical events 
immediately after admitting shortcomings specifically in handling the GDR past 
arguably set an accent on the post-1945 period. This perhaps even unwittingly 
nourished hopes of a paradigmatic change in the coordinates of regional memory 
culture by seeming to endorse a rush to make up ground in the working through 
of the GDR history at sites with a double past. 
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Political discourse in Brandenburg thus showed signs that a creeping 
desensitisation to the differences between National Socialism and East German 
Communism had set in. This was not helped by an image of the GDR 
characterised by the binary of repression and resistance. But political discourse 
in the regional parliament is of course not interchangeable with regional 
discourse per se, or even for that matter with elite discourse, so the picture 
requires fleshing out somewhat.  
On the face of it, discussion of the Konzept in the regional parliament 
shows a more or less identical rehearsal of the party-political positions towards 
the double past evident in debates at memorials outside of Brandenburg.507 The 
political left, for instance, showed greater concern at the concept’s focus on the 
criminality of the GDR, making a plea instead for greater differentiation. For the 
regional faction of Die Linke, this meant vociferously defending against attempts 
to demonise the GDR in favour of ‘eine um Verstehen bemühte Perspektive’.508 
As might be expected of the successor party to the SED, however, Die Linke 
eschewed a frank elaboration of the manifest restrictions on civil liberties that 
existed in the GDR, choosing instead to mention only the tame-sounding 
curtailment of ‘political freedoms’.509 As for the SPD, they too argued for more 
differentiation in the treatment of the GDR, making a point in particular of 
placing East Germans (as opposed to the SED) at the centre of the processes of 
confronting history:  
 
‘Wir sollten stets fragen, weshalb Menschen unter bestimmten 
Bedingungen so und nicht anders gehandelt haben. Dann werden wir die 
Auseinandersetzung so führen, dass wir selbst diese Auseinandersetzung 
als Teil unserer demokratischen Entwicklung begreifen und handhaben. 
Das bedeutet vor allen Dingen, Achtung vor dem Menschen zu haben, was 
das Verständnis seines Handelns, seiner Größe und seiner Irrtümer 
einschließt.’510  
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 This did not stop the speaker for the SPD, Sieglinde Heppener, from 
supporting an outright condemnation of state-perpetrated injustices and the 
criminal activities of the Stasi; both ought to be ‘schonungslos gebrandmarkt’ in 
her words.511  The point was that state and society both warranted scholarly as 
well as popular attention. By contrast, the CDU saw no problem in equating the 
GDR with National Socialism, regarding both as products of anti-Semitism and 
imperialism. The CDU speaker Wieland Niekisch even ventured a revival of 
1950s anti-totalitarian thought, citing Hannah Arendt’s 1951 work The Origins of 
Totalitarianism with approval and arguing that the regional government could 
build upon the ‘menschliche[…] und wissenschaftliche[…] Leistung aus den 
50er Jahren’ in its search for a means of interpreting the GDR.512  
 This parliamentary debate could well be viewed through the lens of 
‘Geschichtspolitik’, given that the interpretation of the GDR (and the double 
past) underlying the Konzept was clearly subject to political competition amongst 
the respective Landtag factions. But this is to say little of how the wrangling over 
the historical narrative at stake here related to regional cultural discourse on the 
double past more generally. The parliamentary hearing and the text of the 
concept reveal, for one thing, a cross-party consensus on the governmental 
function that confrontation with the past ought to serve. For another thing, the 
same did not necessarily apply to other discourses; memorial professionals for 
instance did not share the view that governmentality was the object of engaging 
with historical sites of injustice. Rather than extend the concept of memory 
politics to the wider cultural formation, then, we must look beyond differences in 
the memory-identity interplay to grasp how different discourses on Buchenwald 
and Sachsenhausen are constituted. As we see, the regional parliament was not 
only an arena for the political contestation of the past but also the locus of a 
distinct governmental discourse.  
 Shortly before discussions surrounding the Konzept began, Günter Morsch 
submitted a list of guidelines for commemorating the double past to the regional 
government working-group for Science, Research and Culture. The document 
illustrated several crucial differences between politics and academic discourse 
when it came to setting commemorative paradigms. In the very first point on the 
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list, for instance, Morsch emphasised that: 
 
‘Politik [sich] darauf beschränken [sollte], die Rahmenbedingungen 
demokratischer Erinnerungskultur allgemein zu schaffen. Die Inhalte der 
Erinnerungskultur dagegen sollten weitestgehend durch Wissenschaft und 
Zivilgesellschaft im demokratischen, pluralistischen, freien und 
öffentlichen Diskurs ermittelt, konzeptualisiert und kommuniziert 
werden.’513  
 
 Though the position adopted in the concept was hardly incompatible with 
Morsch’s plea for a ‘democratic, plural, free and public’ discourse on the double 
past, it was impossible to overlook the more marginal role he accorded to 
political institutions. The content of memory culture should be established, as far 
as Morsch was concerned, by civic society – that is, from ‘below’ – in dialogue 
with the standards set by historical research.  
 It was no small surprise that Brandenburg’s CDU minister for Science, 
Research and Culture and chair of the working-group, Johanna Wanka, took 
umbrage with such a division of responsibilities. She viewed sceptically the 
argument that politics should only shoulder the responsibility of setting 
parameters for memory culture, taking it to mean merely the ‘Bereitstellung von 
Geldern’. Furthermore, she believed Morsch’s theses afforded ‘Wissenschaft’ 
alone the privilege of determining memory culture’s content, unjustly ignoring 
the fact that he had actually assigned the task to ‘Wissenschaft und 
Zivilgesellschaft im … öffentlichen Diskurs’ (italics RB).514 Even the SPD 
delegate in the working-group, Klara Geywitz, appeared to have reservations 
about Morsch’s proposal. She argued that the role Morsch envisaged politics 
playing was in fact the exact role it already did play within Brandenburg. On the 
evidence of the later Konzept though, it is debateable whether her contention that 
regional politics restricted itself to setting ‘die notwendigen Rahmenbedingungen 
                                                
513 ‘Anlage 2: Thesen zur Darstellung der Geschichte und zum Gedenken an die Opfer des 
Konzentrationslagers sowie des sowjetischen Speziallagers an Orten zweifacher Vergangenheit’, 
Landtag Brandenburg, Ausschuss für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur, 26. Sitzung, 
Ausschussprotokoll 4/425, 17.01.2007, Bibliothek des Landtages Brandenburg, p. 1. 
514Landtag Brandenburg, Ausschuss für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur, 27. Sitzung, 
Ausschussprotokoll 4/446, 07.03.2007, Bibliothek des Landtages Brandenburg, p. 4. 
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für die Schaffung einer demokratischen Erinnerungskultur’ remained the case.515 
 Likewise, Geywitz stressed a need for close discussion between politics, 
academic research, and the victims of both National Socialism and the SED in 
determining these ‘Rahmenbedingungen’.516 Evidently the rest of the SPD 
faction shared her view, and indeed when it later came to discussing the Konzept 
in the regional parliament, the SPD minister for Education, Youth and Sport, 
Holger Rupprecht, marked out a specific intervention he felt politics should 
make in steering the debate: 
 
‘Ein aus meiner Sicht besonders hervorzuhebender Grundsatz des 
vorliegenden Konzeptes lautet: Wir wollen in der Geschichte der DDR jene 
Ansätze demokratischen Denkens und Handelns sichtbar machen und 
herausstellen, die dazu beigetragen haben, dass die friedliche Revolution 
1989/90 die SED-Herrschaft beenden konnte.’517    
 
 As laudable an intention as this was, it made quite clear that factions across 
the political spectrum advocated a didactic approach to the double past, and in 
particular to the history of the GDR. Günter Morsch, by contrast, seemed happier 
to uphold the inherent historical ambivalences that characterised sites of memory 
such as Sachsenhausen. As he clarified in another point on his list: 
 
‘[D]ie Entstehungsgeschichte der Speziallager [lässt sich] von der NS-
Diktatur und dem Zweiten Weltkrieg als Ursachen nicht abkoppeln. 
Andererseits sind die sowjetischen Speziallager mindestens ebenso ein 
Ergebnis der jahrzehntelangen Praxis kommunistisch/stalinistischen 
Terrors. Diesen Dualismus der Ursachsen, der zu vielen Widersprüchen 
führte, gilt es anzuerkennen und auszuhalten.’518 
 
 Morsch therefore wished to recognise the contradictions behind the special 
camp system – itself a composite of Stalinist terror and fundamentally legitimate 
post-war internment practices. Unlike the concept, however, in which the special 
                                                
515 Ibid., p. 4. 
516 Ibid., p. 4. 
517 Plenarprotokoll 4/60, p. 4450. 
518 Ausschussprotokoll 4/425, Anlage 2 
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camp memorials featured primarily as illustrative examples of state repression in 
the Soviet Occupation Zone and GDR, he did not attempt to either prescribe (or 
indeed proscribe) any particular interpretation. The recommendations in many 
ways echoed the on-site museological concept that had been adopted at 
Sachsenhausen (see chapter two). Just as the ‘dezentrales Museumskonzept’ 
attempted to do justice to the site’s complex, multifaceted history and safeguard 
the ‘Emanzipation’ of visitors, Morsch too espoused the principles of 
multivalence and open-ended yet historically contextualised learning, this time in 
relation to political-pedagogical discourse in Brandenburg. 
 As we have seen, the debates surrounding the Konzept in Brandenburg 
revealed two distinct approaches to the double past, one advocated by political 
actors more or less across the board, and the other consistent with the ideas of the 
memorial professionals already implemented in the redesign of Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen during the 1990s and early 2000s. But which vision for 
communicating the double past and the specific history of Sachsenhausen in 
particular has filtered down to other educators and memory activists in 
Brandenburg? Is there evidence that the position of the memorial professionals 
has gained traction in these circles, or have the views of regional political parties 
reflected in the Konzept had the most influence? The following section will 
consider teaching materials produced by the sites and their intermediaries that 
handle both the concentration camps and the special camps at Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen, beginning with the latter.  
The link between individual memorials dedicated to aspects of the 
National Socialist and East German past in Brandenburg and the teaching of 
Germany’s double past in the region’s schools is established through a total of 
seventeen so-called Gedenkstättenlehrer. These are educators who work closely 
with schools in designing educational projects that explore the history of certain 
memorials as well as organising and leading group visits to memorial sites – a 
scheme that is the only one of its kind in the Federal Republic.519 Their time is 
divided evenly between the classroom and external on-site activities. Though not 
                                                
519 One or more Gedenkstättenlehrer are assigned to a total of eleven memorial sites in 
Brandenburg (in Sachsenhausen’s case it is three). These include the Ravensbrück Women’s 
Concentration Camp, the Brandenburg-Görden prison, the former Special Camps in Mühlberg 
and Ketschendorf (Fürstenwalde), and the Lindenstraße 54 prison in Potsdam, amongst others. 
See http://bildungsserver.berlin-brandenburg.de/gedenkstaetten.html#c5075 [last accessed 25 
Mar 2013].     
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employed by the memorials (they are financed by the ministry of education), the 
work of the Gedenkstättenlehrer directly supports sites in their efforts at 
providing a multifaceted pedagogical programme and, crucially, can reach 
groups – particularly of school age – that could otherwise not be supervised or 
given a guided tour of the memorial by members of the in-house staff. At 
Sachsenhausen, where visitor numbers are now above 450,000 p/a, the shortfall 
in meeting rising demands for some form of pedagogical support amongst visitor 
groups is particularly pronounced. The site director Günter Morsch painted a 
bleak picture of the situation the site now faces in a recent statement, in which he 
explained that around 50% of requests have to be turned down on account of 
limited staff capacity (the recent introduction of official certification for external 
guides will however offset a good deal of this deficit).520 
In the documentation summarising the role of the Gedenkstättenlehrer, 
close cooperation with the sites is listed as one of five central responsibilities. 
Significantly, the document also circumscribes any kind of impingement upon 
the autonomy of the memorial sites and reiterates their right to operate without 
fear of political instrumentalisation (‘keine Vereinnahmung, Autonomie 
bewahren’).521 Whilst the Gedenkstättenlehrer do also coordinate initiatives that 
are administered by the regional Ministry for Education, Youth and Sport, such 
as talks in schools given by eye-witnesses, they do not appear to share the 
regional government’s vision for a ‘grundsätzliche[r] gesellschaftliche[r] 
Konsens über die historische Einordnung und die Bewertung der SED-Diktatur’ 
as proposed in the 2007 Konzept.522 As far as pedagogical activities involving the 
memorials are concerned, the Gedenkstättenlehrer have in fact upheld the 
principles of open-ended, reflective historical learning advocated by the 
memorial professionals.  
Projects devised for the Konzentrationslager Sachsenhausen by the 
Gedenkstättenlehrer, for instance, follow the example of the ‘dezentrales 
Museumskonzept’ adopted by the memorial professionals in the wake of 
unification in their structure and thematic focus. Just as the Museumskonzept 
foregrounds historical relics (‘Überreste’) by tying on-site exhibitions to the 
                                                
520 Günter Morsch, ‘Stellungnahme’, Ausschuss für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur, 
Ausschussprotokoll 5/26, 18 Jan 2012, pp. 7-12. 
521 ‚Historische Themenfelder und Aufgaben der Gedenkstättenlehrer‘, 6 Mar 2012, 2 pp. (p. 2).   
522 ‘Konzept’, p.32. 
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original camp architecture and muting any kind of overarching museological 
narrative, the projects begin with independent work conducted in small groups at 
a number of ‘stations’ corresponding to sections of the historical camp.523 It is 
only after each focusing in detail on one specific site that the small groups 
reconvene to tour the memorial, and even then the goal is a ‘Gegenseitiges 
Führen’ in which the respective small groups present their findings to the others 
at the appropriate juncture in the tour.524 The reflective element of the project is 
underlined in a concluding section, in which participants discuss their 
impressions of the tour and the method of delivery before having the chance to 
ask questions or address uncertainties.525 By contrast, the role of the project 
leader is relatively secondary to the processes of self-reflection and independent 
learning; he or she ‘greift, wenn nötig, koordinierend und korrigierend (taktvoll) 
ein’, but is otherwise fairly peripheral.526 
Günter Morsch has observed that definitions of concentration camp 
memorials and their role in society have typically fallen into two categories (with 
few, even in the academic community, agreeing upon which is the more fitting): 
either a ‘Bewahrungsort humanistischer Gesinnung’ or an ‘Ort selbstkritischer 
Suche nach wissenschaftlich präzisen Darstellungen und Erklärungen.’527 To my 
mind the projects coordinated by the Gedenkstättenlehrer follow Morsch by 
drawing upon both definitions without explicitly favouring either. Indeed, there 
is evidence of both an interest in the fates of those victimised at the hands of the 
Third Reich and a commitment to verifiable factual standards in the way they are 
structured; the small group work encourages engagement (and empathy) with 
stories of victimization, whilst the (albeit restrained) corrective role of the project 
leaders – that is, the Gedenkstättenlehrer – prohibits a slide into historical 
relativism and establishes some kind of accepted factual basis. 
What about projects focusing on the Speziallager? Do they advance – 
even if only inadvertently – the equationist reading of the double past found in 
                                                
523 For an overview of the ‘museumspädagogische Grundüberlegungen’ behind the decision to 
adopt the Gesamtkonzept, see Günter Morsch, ‘Zur Entwicklung der Pädagogik in der 
Gedenkstätte Sachsenhausen’, in Geschichte als Last und Chance: Festschrift für Bernd 
Faulenbach, ed. by F.-J. Jelich and S. Goch (Essen: Klartext, 2003), pp. 55-67. 
524 ‘Thema: Angeleitete Selbstführung durch Gedenkstätte und Museum Sachsenhausen: Das 
ehemalige Konzentrationslager Sachsenhausen 1936 – 45’, 16 Dec 2011, 2 pp. (p. 1) 
525 Ibid., p. 1. 
526 Ibid., p. 1. 
527 Morsch, ‘Sachsenhausen – auf dem Weg zur Neugestaltung’, in Gedenkstätten im vereinten 
Deutschland, ed. by Dittberner and von Meer, p. 50. 
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the Konzept? It is striking that the projects utilise approaches that are person- and 
space-based, whereas political discussion of the Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ) 
and GDR concerned itself for the most part, as we have seen, with the 
mechanisms and characteristics of the state  – in particular those that could be 
deemed repressive. Whilst this meant that subjective appraisals of life in the 
SBZ/GDR were all but squeezed out of the Konzept, it is precisely this 
subjectivity that the projects can address through the use of biographical case 
studies.  
A number of worksheets used in these projects set out tasks that involve 
researching the biography of an individual prisoner of the Speziallager. In most 
cases the task entails creative work too, such as writing a fictitious Kassiber that 
has been smuggled out of the camp and is addressed to the family of a prisoner 
who appears in the special camp exhibition. The worksheet outlines the task as 
follows: 
 
‘Das Speziallager Sachsenhausen war ein sogenanntes Schweigelager. 
Dies bedeutete u.a., dass es fast über den gesamten Zeitraum seiner 
Existenz den Häftlingen nicht gestattet wurde, Briefe nach Hause zu 
schreiben. 
Manchmal boten sich aber Möglichkeiten, geheime Briefe (Kassiber) aus 
dem Lager zu schmuggeln. 
Wähle eine Biografie eines Speziallagerhäftlings aus und studiere sie 
genau. 
Versuche, dich in seine Lage zu versetzen und schreibe einen solchen 
Brief. 
Überlege genau, was du deiner Familie mitteilen würdest!’528 
 
Beyond the obvious room for creativity built into the task, it is noticeable 
that an empathetic relationship to the historical victim is also established. The 
individual or group taking on the activity is asked to ‘put themselves in the 
situation’ of the prisoner (‘sich in seine Lage versetzen’) and thus adopt his 
perspective in writing the Kassiber. Another task involves writing the inner 
monologue of a prisoner forced into falsely confessing to belong to a National 
                                                
528 ‘Thema: Speziallager Sachsenhausen Nr. 7/1 1945 – 50’, undated worksheets, 5 pp. (p.1). 
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Socialist ‘Werewolf’ unit. Here too the adoption of the prisoner’s perspective is 
stipulated in the wording of the task.529 Further activities seek to highlight the 
inherent difficulty of defining the special camps, either on account of the Cold 
War political climate of the late 1940s and early ‘50s or the historical issue of 
German culpability for National Socialist crimes. For instance, the task of 
writing a newspaper article based on the biography of a Speziallager prisoner 
invites reflection upon the differences in interpretation that exist between the 
‘Boulevardpresse’ and ‘seriöse Zeitungen’ in terms of objectivity and realism.530 
Whilst the parliamentary debate on the Konzept in Brandenburg betrayed a 
proscriptive approach to categorising what were in many cases experiential 
dimensions of life in the SBZ/GDR, the project materials problematize complex 
phenomena such as the special camps by taking the question of perspective into 
account.  
Unquestionably then, the pedagogical activities relating to the 
Speziallager uphold differentiation and careful distinction between the two 
camps at Sachsenhausen. As I have attempted to show, they do this by adopting 
the concepts and language of the memorial professionals. That is, they adhere to 
empirical standards and scientific verifiability; they embrace controversy and 
plurality as a means of critiquing both historical and contemporary assessments 
of the site’s double past; and they are structured around an empathetic approach 
to victims.  
Pedagogical materials relating to the Buchenwald concentration camp 
and special camp draw upon language and concepts virtually identical to those 
used by the Sachsenhausen memorial and the Gedenkstättenlehrer in 
Brandenburg. As I have demonstrated, a dissemination of the ideas behind the 
dezentrales Museumskonzept at Sachsenhausen has accounted for similarities 
between professional and pedagogical narratives on the double past in 
Brandenburg. In Thuringia too, the pedagogical concepts developed on-site have 
carried over into classroom materials. Indeed, it may be the regional Ministry for 
Education, Science and Culture and the federal Ministry for Culture and 
Education who finance the worksheets used in Thuringia, but it is members of 
the Buchenwald site staff who author them. Furthermore, the Buchenwald and 
Mittelbau-Dora Memorials Foundation publishes the worksheets together with 
                                                
529 Ibid., p. 2. 
530 Ibid., p. 3. 
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the Thüringer Institut für Lehrerfortbildung, Lehrplanentwicklung und Medien 
(ThILLM). Like the projects run by the Gedenkstättenlehrer, many activities are 
‘dialogisch angelegt’, utilising the familiar format of a group tour followed by 
small team work and a final series of presentations, moderated by a member of 
the pedagogical team.531 The emphasis on critical engagement with authentic 
material and biographical ‘traces’ of the historical site is incorporated too – so 
much so that the small group fact-finding work is explicitly referred to as a type 
of ‘Spurensuche’. As at Sachsenhausen, the format upholds multi-perspectivity 
by constructing, ‘Stück für Stück’, a holistic impression (‘ein neues Gesamtbild’) 
from the respective group presentations.532     
In two collections of worksheets intended to support group visits to 
Buchenwald, one relating to the concentration camp and the other to the special 
camp, an identical overview introduces visitors to the cornerstones of 
‘[f]orschendes Lernen in der Gedenkstätte Buchenwald’.533 These are defined as 
‘Sehen’, ‘Begreifen’, ‘Reflektieren’, and ‘Kommunizieren’, immediately 
distinguishable in their subjective, processual character from terms such as 
‘Stärkung der Demokratie’ and ‘Bereitschaft zur Teilhabe an der Gesellschaft’ 
favoured by the Brandenburg parliament.534 In fact, the framework outlined in 
the pedagogical materials resonated clearly with the approach taken on-site at 
Buchenwald, prioritising the historical site as the ‘Ausgangspunkt’ in a learning 
process that would empower visitors to think critically about how and under 
what circumstances basic humanistic instincts and values have historically been 
contravened. The overview stressed that knowledge acquisition was 
‘handlungsorientiert’ – in other words the basis for a discerning, self-aware 
‘Grundsolidarität mit dem Menschen als Mensch.’535 Thus it sought to promote 
‘selbstständige historisch-ethische Urteilskraft’ in relation to concepts of 
                                                
531 Konzentrationslager Buchenwald 1937 – 1945: Arbeitsmaterialien für Projekttage in der 
Gedenkstätte Buchenwald, Heft 143A, ed. by Stiftung Gedenkstätten Buchenwald und Mittelbau-
Dora, Thüringer Institut für Lehrerfortbildung, Lehrplanentwicklung und Medien, revised 2nd ed. 
(Weimar, 2011), 40pp.; Sowjetisches Speziallager Nr. 2 1945 – 1950: Arbeitsmaterialien für 
Projekttage in der Gedenkstätte Buchenwald, Heft 149, ed. by idem., revised 2nd ed. (Weimar, 
2011), 38pp (p. 3; p. 9). 
532 Ibid., p. 9. 
533 Ibid., p. 3. 
534 ‘Konzept zur aktiven gesellschaftlichen Auseinandersetzung mit der SED-Diktatur’, 
Drucksache 4/5325, p. 1; p. 7. 
535 Arbeitsmaterialien, Heft 143A, p. 3; Arbeitsmaterialien, Heft 149, p. 3. 
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perpetration and victimhood on an individual level rather than fix broader 
interpretations of political systems in stone.536  
Worksheets relating to the Speziallager in particular indicate how the site 
staff’s characterisation of the post-war camp at Buchenwald and the special camp 
system in general, especially relative to the concentration camps and other post-
war internment and de-nazification camps, has permeated into regional 
pedagogy. An activity relating to ‘Jugendliche’ in the special camp, for example, 
balances a sense of pathos with an acknowledgement of the camp’s functional 
relation to the culpability of many Germans in National Socialist society. The 
task itself requires visitors to search out biographies of young prisoners in the 
Speziallager museum, but the contextual information provided on the worksheet, 
though clarifying that some prisoners held in the special camp were as young as 
thirteen, concentrates primarily on the internecine relationships between older 
and younger prisoners. Notably it is the dismay felt by many younger prisoners 
at the complicity in the National Socialist state of their elders and fellow inmates, 
given the blanket label of ‘NS-Funktionäre’ here, that is described – the majority 
are said to have viewed the elder generation as ‘Verführte des NS-Staates.’537 
The moral culpability of older special camp prisoners in the functioning of the 
Third Reich therefore pervades the entire exercise.  
On the other hand, the worksheet lists a number of biographies that 
visitors can research in the museum in which a sense of complicity in Nazi 
crimes is either minimal or entirely illusory. Gerhard Nattke, one of the prisoners 
listed in the worksheet, was arrested by the NKWD on the evidence of a 
photograph showing him on a school excursion (‘Klassenfahrt’) in 1942; he was 
not formally rehabilitated until 1995, and in fact was rearrested for alleged 
‘Boykotthetze’ in Cottbus in 1954.538 Likewise, Elli Marshall was denounced 
and interned at Buchenwald for using a newspaper dating from the Third Reich 
to wrap goods in a store she worked at. A document addressed to Walter Ulbricht 
and displayed in the special camp museum advises that, in the case of prisoners 
such as Marschall who were released rather than tried at Waldheim in the early 
1950s, their time in the Speziallager ought to count towards the sentences they 
were originally given by Soviet authorities in order to avoid the impression that 
                                                
536 Ibid., p. 3 
537 ‘Arbeitsblatt 12’ in Arbeitsmaterialien, Heft 149, p. 35. 
538 Das sowjetische Speziallager Nr. 2 1945 – 1950, ed. by Ritscher, pp. 268-69. 
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they had been ‘unschuldig inhaftiert’.539 As if to counterbalance the 
incriminating contextual information given in the worksheet, these biographies 
serve to illustrate the striking arbitrariness of imprisonment in the Speziallager 
and the extreme cynicism of the SED when it came to dealing with victims of the 
camps. 
A further example of this balanced approach can be found in a worksheet 
dealing with the so-called ‘Beerdigungskommando’ at the Speziallager, a work 
detail responsible for burying the dead in unmarked mass graves. The exhibit 
used as the basis for the activity here is an illustration by the prisoner Otto von 
Kursell, a sparse pencil drawing that depicts the work detail dragging a wooden 
cart loaded with dead bodies.540 Whilst obviously establishing a link to mass 
death in the camp as well as highlighting the callous cynicism of the Soviet and 
GDR regimes – the worksheet describes how members of the work detail were 
sent to the USSR upon closure of the camp in order to maintain secrecy – the 
exhibit is itself embellished with sober factual detail. Deaths are carefully 
attributed in large part to hygienic conditions and food shortages through 
reference to the ‘Hungerwinter’ of 1946/7, and research into Kursell’s own 
biography in the museum forms part of the task on the worksheet. Accordingly, 
visitors are confronted with the reality of his participation in the Munich Beer 
Hall Putsch and membership in the SS, and cannot overlook his moral 
responsibility for National Socialist crimes. Yet equally, his biography is located 
next to a slit window in the museum that looks out on to the mass graves for 
prisoners of the Speziallager. In a final association, his artwork – on one level an 
artistic testimony conveying the abysmal conditions in the Speziallager – is also 
a reminder of the blurring of boundaries between victims (of post-war injustice) 
and perpetrators (of crimes during the Third Reich) in the special camps. Kursell 
had been director of the Hochschule für Bildende Kunst in 1944, yet his plea for 
a director’s pension was later rejected by a court on the grounds that it was his 
close connection to the National Socialist regime and not artistic merit that got 
him the post in the first place.541 A newspaper article outlining the court’s 
decision is displayed as part of his biography in the Speziallager museum, 
carefully balancing the commemorative impulse established through the visual 
                                                
539 Ibid., pp. 260-65. 
540 ‘Arbeitsblatt 6’ in Arbeitsmaterialien, Heft 149, p. 23. 
541 See Ritscher (ed.), Das sowjetische Speziallager Nr. 2, p. 251. 
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link to the mass graves and the subject of his drawing with a critical sense of 
historical perspective. 
The worksheet’s fusion of pathos and condemnation borrows from the 
empathetic, biography-driven approach of the site exhibition. It also shows how a 
commemorative paradigm that is ‘doppelt geprägt’ in the sense of mourning both 
an original moral failure to resist Nazism and the continuation of injustice after 
1945 – a paradigm originating, moreover, in the redesign of the Buchenwald 
memorial – has travelled beyond the site itself. Indeed, the site director Volkhard 
Knigge’s own interpretation of the special camp could quite easily sum up the 
thrust of the worksheet: 
 
‘Die Trauer um die Opfer des sowjetischen Speziallagers ist […] doppelt 
geprägt. Dem Innewerden des geschehenen Unrechts und des erlittenen 
Leides entspricht das Erschrecken an der Tatsache, wie wenig Deutsche 
sich Hitler verweigert haben und in welch hohem Maße willentliches 
Wegschauen und Mitmachen “im Kleinen” im nationalsozialistischen 
Deutschland an der Tagesordnung waren.’542      
 
How did the materials designed and published by the sites compare to 
contemporary school curricula? And did these in turn represent a continuation of 
the Brandenburgian Konzept, or mark a decisive break from it? This final section 
will analyse the place of the double past in recent school curricula, beginning 
with Thuringia. Following on from previous sections covering political and 
professional pedagogical discourses, it will in particular consider the extent to 
which concepts from these have found their way into classroom teaching. 
In 2009, a revised and updated history curriculum for the 
Qualifikationsphase was released in Thuringia. Besides changes to the course 
structure – the Grundfach and Leistungsfach were replaced by the grundlegendes 
Anforderungsniveau (gA) and erhöhtes Anforderungsniveau (eA) – a notable 
emphasis was now placed on reflexivity in the style and delivery of the course 
content. As such, pupils taking the eA were expected ‘sich sachgerecht mit 
Geschichtskultur und Rezeptionsgeschichte auseinander[zu]setzen’.543 
                                                
542 V. Knigge, ‘Vorwort’, in Das sowjetische Speziallager Nr. 2, ed. by Ritscher, pp. 7-10 (p. 10). 
543 Thüringer Kultusministerium, ‘Ziele und inhaltliche Orientierungen für die 
Qualifikationsphase der gymnasialen Oberstufe im Fach Geschichte’ (2009), 16pp. (here p. 9). 
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Significantly for the teaching of the double past, this shift in approach also 
carried over into the structure of individual units on the National Socialist past 
and divided German. Furthermore, the Qualifikationsphase was to consist from 
now on of core courses and an additional range of elective subjects as opposed to 
the four prescribed thematic units in the 1999 curriculum (one for each half-year 
of the two-year course). The core and elective subjects were organised around 
five headings, each of which spanned several centuries in its chronological 
scope.  
Thus, the Third Reich as well as the GDR and FRG were subsumed under 
the theme of ‘[p]olitische Ordnungsvorstellungen und Gestaltungskräfte im 19. 
Und 20. Jahrhundert’. Questions relating to the post-war ‘Umgang mit Schuld 
und Verantwortung’, meanwhile, belonged to a unit on ‘Konflikte und 
Konfliktlösungen’, in which the Potsdam Pact for instance was analysed against 
other historical peace treaties rather than placed in the context of the emergent 
block system, as it was in the previous curriculum.544 Both the considerably 
broader chronological sweep of this curriculum and the emphasis it placed on 
methodological reflexivity profoundly impacted upon the possibilities for 
communicating the history of Germany’s ‘short twentieth century’.  
Given the focus here on developments in the longue durée, one could be 
forgiven for expecting an exclusively diachronic approach to the double past in 
which developments either side of 1945 were looked at sequentially. In fact, 
however, there is considerable evidence of a synchronic approach to political 
ideologies and systems of rule in the revised curriculum. Though the teaching of 
Germany’s post-war division was once more guided by the ‘democracy’ and 
‘dictatorship’ labels that featured in the previous curriculum, consideration was 
also given to ‘everyday experiences (‘Alltagserfahrungen’) in both states. 
Equally, political structures were handled under the rubric of ‘Selbstverständnis, 
Demokratieanspruch und –wirklich-keit’, which appeared to acknowledge a 
discrepancy between ideology and historical reality.545 This was markedly 
different to the essentialist position taken the 1999 curriculum, which had 
presented historical circumstances in divided Germany as the ‘Ergebnis 
unterschiedlicher Anschauungen und Zielsetzungen der Besatzungsmächte’.546  
                                                
544 Ibid., p. 12; p. 14. 
545 Ibid., p. 12. 
546 ‘Lehrplan für das Gymnasium’ (1999), p. 38. 
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Its 2009 counterpart, by contrast, combined analysis ‘from above’ with a 
more open-ended comparative approach, not least when addressing the matter of 
how the Holocaust was remembered in the GDR and FRG. Pupils taking the eA 
were additionally tasked with comparing National Socialism and Stalinism, and 
evidently expected to look at the historiography of the comparison; by way of 
orientation, the curriculum referred to both the ‘Totalitarismusdebatte’ and the 
‘Kontroverse um die Singularität des Holocausts’.547 At other points in the 
curriculum too, such as in the ‘Revolution und Reform’ unit, pupils enrolled on 
the eA dealt with ‘Geschichtskultur’ – in this case contemporary remembrance of 
the Nazi past. Here one subheading read ‘“NS-Verbrechen weder relativieren, 
noch kommunistische Verbrechen bagatellisieren” – Auseinandersetzungen um 
Erinnerungskultur’.548 Once again, the topic was framed in a way that invited 
critical discussion and directly broached the issue of comparison. Yet just as with 
the Holocaust singularity debate, some orientation was provided, this time in a 
quote paraphrasing the ‘Faulenbach Formel’.  
It is interesting that the curriculum should adopt a maxim first developed 
by the memorial site professionals when it came to redesigning the GDR 
Nationale Mahn- und Gedenkstätten after unification. Undoubtedly it had a great 
deal more in common with the pedagogical programmes at Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen than it did with the Konzept in Brandenburg, which was more 
interested in cementing a negative image of the GDR that concentrated on state 
repression and the top-down exercise of power. The ‘reflektiertes und 
(selbst)reflexives Geschichtsbewusstsein’549 promoted by the Thuringian 
curriculum closely resembled the ‘handlungsorientierende[…], kritische[…] 
historische[…] Selbstreflexion’ Volkhard Knigge himself recommended as an 
appropriate means of confronting the German past.550 Indeed, cross-fertilisation 
of this kind took place several discourses in Thuringia; as illustrated above, 
regional teaching materials also appropriated the language and principles 
underlying the memorial site exhibitions and the history curriculum.  
Before concluding, it is worth looking briefly and by way of contrast at 
the most recent history curricula in Brandenburg. If the new curriculum in 
                                                
547 ‘Ziele und inhaltliche Orientierungen für die Qualifikationsphase’ (2009), p. 12. 
548 Ibid., p. 15. 
549 Ibid., p. 8. 
550 Volkhard Knigge, ‘Zur Zukunft der Erinnerung’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 25-26 
(2010), 10-16 (here p. 10). 
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Thuringia was symptomatic of a stable and established consensus around the 
‘Faulenbach Formel’ there, then its counterpart in Brandenburg showed up the 
lack of any such consensual paradigm for handling the double past in that state. 
This was all the more remarkable for the fact that the Brandenburg curricula 
were not all that dissimilar to the 2009 version in Thuringia, at least on the face 
of it. Indeed, the same principles of multiperspectivity, controversy and 
subjectivity were explicitly written into the curricula at both Sekundarstufe I and 
the Qualifikationsphase.551 Nor were the thematic units drastically different to 
what was taught in Thuringia, as familiar-sounding titles of ‘Demokratie und 
Diktatur in Deutschland und Europa 1918-45’, ‘Konflikt und Konfliktlösung in 
der Welt seit 1917’, and ‘Ereignis und Struktur am Beispiel der doppelten 
deutschen Geschichte’ indicate.     
Where the difference does become clearer is in the more pronounced 
presentism of the Brandenburg curriculum. This is not to say that the version in 
Thuringia denied or ignored the role latter-day contexts played in the 
interpretation and assessment of history. Nevertheless, a passage from the 
preamble to the Brandenburgian Sekundarstufe I curriculum went one step 
further, stressing that the choice of themes ‘sich…an gesellschaftlichen 
Schlüsselproblemen [orientiert]’.552 The thematic units (‘Langschnitte’) that 
synthesised certain topics covered elsewhere in chronological sequence also 
responded explicitly to these current problems, and considered ‘in particular the 
establishment of democracy’.553 Since, by this logic, the history curriculum 
should essentially follow from the most pressing issues of the day, it is perhaps 
no surprise that unresolved debates on how to define and explain the GDR – 
since Jörg Schönbohm’s Sachsenhausen speech a priority of the regional 
government and civic activists, as I have shown – were taken up here. Thus, 
pupils were to learn about democracy in the ‘Langschnitte’ primarily by 
engaging with the National Socialist past, the GDR, and the ‘dictatorship of the 
                                                
551 See Ministerium für Bildung, Jugend und Sport Land Brandenburg, ‘Rahmenlehrplan für die 
Sekundarstufe I: Geschichte’ (2010), pp. 9-10; Ministerium für Bildung, Jugend und Sport Land 
Brandenburg, ‘Vorläufiger Rahmenlehrplan für den Unterricht in der gymnasialen Oberstufe im 
Land Brandenburg’ (2011), p. 17. 
552 ‘Rahmenlehrplan für die Sekundarstufe I’ (2010), p. 10. 
553 Ibid., p. 22. 
237 
 
 
SED’.554 It was no coincidence that, in this tripartite definition of undemocratic 
systems of rule, the GDR featured on two counts. 
Elsewhere in the Brandenburg curricula there was a discernable 
narrowing of focus on the criminality of the GDR. The Sekundarstufe I 
curriculum, for example, included a unit on ‘Deutschland im Ost-West-Konflikt’, 
which covered amongst other things ‘politische Systeme und Herrschaft in 
beiden deutschen Staaten, Alltag und Menschenrechte’.555 Balanced enough as 
this was, it did not seem to carry over into the history curriculum for the 
Qualifikationsphase introduced in 2011. In this case, the unit covering 
Germany’s divided post-war history had evidently dispensed with the ‘Alltag’ 
label altogether, mentioning only ‘Menschenrechte und Verfassungswirklichkeit’ 
as focal points. Likewise, the reference to ‘in both German states’ had been 
omitted, somewhat downplaying the comparative approach; indeed, one could 
even have inferred a sole focus on East German contraventions of human rights.    
Unlike in Thuringia, the recent history curricula in Brandenburg were 
decidedly political in their structure and wording. More than anything else they 
appeared to be responding to perceived deficits in the working through of the 
GDR past – a perception that itself increasingly held sway with many political 
groups and memory activists in the state. On one level this was rather surprising, 
since the regional government in Brandenburg has been since 2009 a coalition 
between the SPD and Die Linke, neither of which has pursued a condemnatory 
agenda when it comes to public memory of the GDR (and particularly of its 
crimes), as many CDU politicians have. Seen in another light, however, the 
example actually strengthens the case for reassessing how we define cultural 
discourse on the double past. On the basis of the evidence presented by the 
curricula in Brandenburg and Thuringia, it would be an over-simplification to 
simply collapse patterns of remembrance together with political objectives. In 
reality, the relationship is more complex and interdependent.  
Politics may of course seek to influence and instrumentalise memory, as 
was the case with the Konzept, initiated by an SPD-CDU grand coalition. 
Equally however, a repertoire of cultural symbols and narratives may be required 
before political articulations of memory can take shape at all, as appeared to be 
the case with the curricula. In Thuringia, this was evident first and foremost in 
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the transmission of a principle of differentiation, in the form of the ‘Faulenbach 
Formel’ and the ‘singularity’ theory, across several discourses on the double 
past. In Brandenburg, by contrast, voices in favour of differentiating between 
National Socialism and Stalinism – or indeed East German communism – 
appeared isolated, as the prevailing cultural narrative of a ‘deficient’ regional 
working through of Germany’s ‘second dictatorship’ began to filter into 
pedagogy and politics.         
 
 
An end to the ‘Vereinigungskrise’? The double past after 
20 years of German unity 
  
It is perhaps instructive to look in this final section at the most recent ‘round’ 
anniversary ceremonies in 2010, the 20-year anniversary of German unity, which 
were marked quite differently by the special camp victim organisations in 
Brandenburg and Thuringia. Of course, 2010 was a loaded year for more than 
one reason; January marked the 65th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, 
and in April similar anniversary events were held at Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen. Yet whilst commentary on the latter anniversaries attested to the 
global resonance of the camps, mentioning the dwindling cohort of survivors and 
thereby implying that a transition from communicative to mediated memory was 
under way,556 the special camp anniversaries were primarily regional milestones. 
As a closer look at both anniversary ceremonies will demonstrate, a reading of 
the memorials that situates them in a landscape of increasingly globalised 
Holocaust memory – a reading implicit in the responses to the concentration 
camp anniversaries in 2010 – has not eclipsed their relevance to the process of 
German unity. Commemorating the double past at Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen, at least at regional level, remains inextricably bound up with this 
question, as we will see first in Thuringia and then in Brandenburg.   
At the Thuringian ceremony, a convivial ‘Tag der Begegnung’, the 
Initiativgruppe-Buchenwald e. V., the Buchenwald memorial and the regional 
government celebrated 20 years of cooperative work researching and 
                                                
556 See for instance C.-D. Steyer, ‘Wer zu spat kommt’, Der Tagesspiegel, 19 Apr 2010. 
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commemorating the Speziallager and its victims. Symbolically, the 
Initiativgruppe chose to end publication of the annual ‘Buchenwald-Treffen’ 
with the proceedings from the ‘Tag der Begegnung’, indicating their obvious 
satisfaction with what had been achieved in the intervening decades. As the 
introduction to the final volume of the ‘Buchenwald-Treffen’ stated: 
 
‘Die Geschichte der sowjetischen Lager nach 1945 in Deutschland ist 
durch die Historiker, die uns bisher jährlich über ihre wissenschaftlichen 
Erkenntnisse berichtet haben, so gut erforscht, dass grundsätzliche neue 
Ergebnisse nicht mehr zu erwarten sind…. Dass wir zwanzig Jahre nach 
der Wende umfassend über die Ereignisse im Speziallager der Sowjets in 
Buchenwald informiert sind, hat mehrere Ursachen. 
 
[…] 
 
‘Eine…Ursache ist, dass die Bundesregierung und die ostdeutschen 
Länder, besonders Thüringen und Sachsen, Gedenkstätten und 
Einrichtungen schufen, in denen Wissenschaftler alle Möglichkeiten 
hatten, um effektiv die Zeit nach 1945 und die Repressionsmaßnahmen 
der sowjetischen und deutschen Kommunisten zu erforschen, 
darzustellen, und zu publizieren.’557 
 
At Sachsenhausen, by contrast, Johanna Wanka’s successor as Minister 
for Science, Research, and Culture, the independent candidate Martina Münch, 
echoed her predecessor’s demand for an extension of regional memory culture, 
stressing the importance of making the site ‘noch präsenter…, um ihn noch 
stärker ins Bewusstsein der Menschen zu bringen.’558 As Münch was speaking at 
the commemorative ceremony marking the opening of the Speziallager, her 
comments unmistakeably applied first and foremost to making the post-war 
camp and its history more visible. In very much the same vein, and only shortly 
                                                
557 Heidrun Brauer and Lothar Brauer, ‘Vorbemerkungen’ in 17., 18., 19., und 20. Buchenwald-
Treffen, ed. by Initiativgruppe Buchenwald, pp. 1-2 (p. 1).  
558 ‘Ansprache zum 65. Jahrestag der Verlegung des sowjetischen Speziallagers Nr. 7 nach 
Sachsenhausen -  Gedenkveranstaltung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Lager Sachsenhausen 1945-1950 
e. V. und der Stiftung Brandenburgische Gedenkstätten am 04.09.2010 in Oranienburg’, text 
kindly provided by Victoria Heydecke. 
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after the ceremony at Sachsenhausen, a former political prisoner of the GDR 
published a withering critique of the ‘Aufarbeitung des [DDR-]Unrechts’ since 
unification in the Neue Züricher Zeitung that focused above all on Brandenburg. 
In it, the author referred to the many members of the regional parliament, ‘die 
hauptamtlich oder als Spitzel für den DDR-Staatssicherheitsdienst tätig waren’, 
as proof that the revolution of 1989 had now turned on the very changes it had 
initially promised to bring about (‘hat ihre Kinder gefressen’).559 He rejected the 
term ‘friedliche Revolution’ in favour of the more negatively connoted and 
disembodied ‘Wende’. Whereas it was precisely the first term that had been 
insisted upon by the Bürgerbündnis gegen Rechts in Weimar in order to present a 
sustained and unbroken tradition of civic engagement in support of democracy, 
in the Brandenburg context ‘Wende’ was used to convey a turning away from the 
values of civic protest embodied in the events of 1989 and return to the 
suppression of communist crimes typical of the GDR.560 Unsurprisingly, the 
Speziallager and Sachsenhausen’s double past featured in the article as a 
testament to the supposed ‘Ungleichbehandlung der Opfer der beiden deutschen 
Diktaturen’ – meaning in this case an unfair treatment of the victims of 
communism, as additionally implied through the reference to the 
‘Schattendasein’ led by the special camp museum.561 
If anything, the ‘deficit’ narrative has only become stronger in 
Brandenburg in recent years, resulting in a pronounced polarisation between 
those advocating the primacy of the Holocaust and those adopting an equationist 
position when it comes to interpreting the double past. The commemorative 
ceremonies held in 2011 by the ALS in particular illustrate a hardening of fronts 
in several respects, and can undoubtedly be attributed to political and cultural 
developments in Brandenburg. 
A ceremony marking the anniversary of the special camp’s relocation to 
Sachsenhausen from Weesow in 1945 provided occasion for the ALS to reissue a 
Vermächtnis (‘legacy’) that they had first presented publicly the year before. 
Much like the Vermächtnis symbolically passed down to the president of the 
Bundestag Norbert Lammert by survivors of the concentration camps in 2009, 
                                                
559 A. W. Bauersfeld, ‘Die Opfer der DDR-Diktatur sind noch immer benachteiligt’, Neue 
Züricher Zeitung, 25 Sept 2010, p. 5. 
560 See interview with the author, 17 Apr 2012. 
561 ‘Die Opfer der DDR-Diktatur’, p. 5. 
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this particular legacy enjoined younger generations to continue the work of the 
ALS and preserve the memory of the Speziallager victims. At first glance there 
were apparent similarities between the two; indeed, the concentration camp 
survivors’ call for a ‘gerechte, friedliche und tolerante Welt’562 resembles the 
importance accorded to ‘die Achtung des Anderen, Toleranz und Versöhnung’ 
by the Speziallager survivors.563 Conversely, the ALS articulated a desire for 
‘peace over the graves’ (‘Friede über den Graben’).564 Whilst this was an 
embodiment of the pacifist message underlying their Vermächtnis, it also 
appeared to advocate an end to uncomfortable discussions of certain prisoners’ 
initial complicity in National Socialism that have hung over the camp since 
unification.  
 In this latter sense, then, the ALS seemed to be proposing a type of 
remembrance and reconciliation that actually screened ambiguity, and was 
therefore consistent with the structure and language of earlier commemorative 
ceremonies they had held on site (see chapter two). Certainly the legacy’s 
attempt to present a ‘complete’ (‘vollständig’) picture of Sachsenhausen came 
closer to suggesting, in the way it was formatted and presented, a sense of 
parallelism rather than causality when separating the concentration camp from 
the post-war special camp: 
 
‘Macht Schluss mit dem selektiven Gedenken! Zeigt klar und deutlich, was 
Sachsenhausen lehren sollte:  
 
       Dies war ein Ort nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen.  
   Dies war ein Ort kommunistischer Verbrechen.’565 
 
 Beyond its somewhat reductive interpretation of ‘completeness’, the 
Vermächtnis betrayed the assumption that what had hitherto been missing from 
practices of commemoration at Sachsenhausen was recognition of post-war 
                                                
562 A German version of the text can be accessed at 
http://www.gedenkstaettenforum.de/nc/offenes-forum/offenes-
forum/news/preserve_remembrance_conserve_authentic_places_assume_responsibility/. Last 
accessed 20 Oct 2013. 
563 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Lager Sachsenhausen 1945 – 1950 e. V., ‘Vermächtnis’, 31 Jul 2011 
(online) http://www.uokg.de/sachsenhausen/archiv/AG%20Sachsenhausen-
Vermaechtnis_2011.pdf. Last accessed 19 Feb 2013.  
564 Ibid. Last accessed 19 Feb 2013. 
565 Ibid. Last accessed 19 Feb 2013. 
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crimes, as if filling in the gaps required simply greater attention to the victims of 
the special camp. Though this was problematic on a number of levels, not least 
because of the overtly anti-totalitarian mode of commemoration foisted upon 
both camps, the Vermächtnis took essentially the same view as the Konzept, 
which also sympathized with ‘die zunehmend gleichberechtigte Aufmerksamkeit 
der demokratischen Gesellschaft gegenüber der zweifachen Vergangenheit 
[solcher] Orte’.566 Likewise, it could be argued that the Konzept, insisting as it 
did upon the right of victims of all inhumane treatment to proper redress, was 
comparing the ‘bisher Erreichte[…]’ in working through the GDR to restitution 
for and symbolic recognition of the victims of National Socialism – hardly a fair 
historical yardstick against which to judge an Aufarbeitungsprozess that had 
begun only seventeen years ago.567 In any case, the interpretation of the National 
Socialist past as all but ‘mastered’ did seem to resonate in the Vermächtnis. As 
the ALS itself underlined upon first unveiling it in 2010, it was now essential for 
both state and society ‘”die auch nach dem Ende der braunen Diktatur und des 
schrecklichen Krieges verübten Verbrechen deutlicher als bisher öffentlich zu 
benennen.”’568 In both the Konzept and the Vermächtnis, the handling of the Nazi 
past was not a matter for critical reflection but instead represented a benchmark 
that could be applied to confrontation with the GDR past. Though it goes without 
saying that all parties, whether victims of pre- or post-1945 injustice, have a right 
to expect equal standards when it comes to historical redress, the evident rush to 
make up ground in working through the history of the SBZ/GDR in Brandenburg 
was not unproblematic. At sites such as Sachsenhausen in particular, it in effect 
opened the floodgates for a paradigmatic shift away from Holocaust-centred 
commemoration. 
Of course, it was not especially surprising that the ALS and UOKG 
perceived there to be ground to make up in the first place. The UOKG, after all, 
had formed in 1992, in the wake of sensational debates surrounding the Stasi and 
the Speziallager and at a moment when, as commentators such as Bernd 
Faulenbach have noted, popular interest in the GDR and its history was at high 
                                                
566 ‘Konzept’, pp. 24-25. 
567 Ibid., p. 25. 
568 Quoted in R. Probst, ‘Sachsenhausen – der Ort des langen Leidens’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6 
Sept 2010, p. 6. 
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ebb.569 Yet for several survivors of the special camp at Sachsenhausen who 
supported (and in many cases actively assisted) moves to document the Soviet 
camp, public response – in particular from survivors of the concentration camp – 
fell far short of their expectations. Whilst the Speziallager survivors themselves 
were flatly dismissed as Nazis, the ‘Initiativgruppe’ representing them was 
suspected of being a ‘Tarnorganisation zum Schutz von Schwer- und 
Schwerstbelasteten’;570 a deeply sceptical view that paralleled Pierre Durand’s 
later ‘Vertreter unserer Henker’ slight at the hearing of the Enquete Commission 
at Sachsenhausen in 1996. In light of these undifferentiated reactions, which 
effectively branded all special camp survivors perpetrators, it is perhaps little 
wonder that they should have regarded themselves as ‘zweite Wahl’571 behind 
the victims of the concentration camp, or indeed as ‘Opfer zweiter Klasse’, as 
Gneist had alleged. Sustained lack of interest in the fate of Speziallager prisoners 
on the part of the ILK goes some way to explaining the belief, prevalent amongst 
the special camp victim organisations, that the injustice that occurred after 1945 
had not yet been properly addressed. 
Why though, in that case, did the issue come to a head much later in 
Brandenburg than it did in Thuringia? In many respects the debates being 
conducted around Sachsenhausen resembled those that had first emerged at both 
memorials in the aftermath of unification, when a similarly equationist position 
had been taken by conservative sections of regional politics and the press. Then 
again, the debates in the early 1990s and early 2010s did both take place at points 
when the persistent legacy of the GDR could be most acutely felt: the former at a 
time when Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen were still synonymous with the 
antifascist mythology that had been relentlessly peddled by the SED, and the 
latter amidst concerns about the background of many East German politicians 
and leading officials in Brandenburg. The difference was simply where this 
supposed continuity of GDR mentalities and politics was perceived to lie. In 
Thuringia, the problem was seen to be one of personnel at Buchenwald and their 
credentials (several had belonged to the SED and had worked closely with the 
overwhelmingly communist concentration camp survivor associations). In 
                                                
569 See Faulenbach, ‘Diktaturerfahrungen und demokratische Erinnerungskultur in Deutschland’, 
in Orte des Erinnerns: Gedenkzeichen, Gedenkstätten und Museen zur Diktatur in SBZ und DDR, 
ed. by Anne Kaminsky (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2007), pp. 15-24.  
570 See Haustein, Geschichte im Dissens, p. 101fn42. 
571 ‘Stalinismus-Opfer bleiben zweite Wahl’, FG, 599 (2002), p. 2. 
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Brandenburg, however, it was the Rot-Rote Koalition between the SPD and Die 
Linke and the comparatively laissez-faire approach to investigating the 
involvement of ministers and public officials with the Stasi prior to 1989 that 
caused concern. Here the issue was not so much with Sachsenhausen itself, but 
rather a projection of fears that one-time GDR functionaries and informants now 
held a monopoly of power onto the memorial. If Buchenwald had previously 
been ‘total Stasi-verseucht’,572 according to the more polemical headlines of the 
day, then it was now Brandenburg that was home to the ‘Nomenklatura-Kader 
der ehemaligen SED’,573 as it were. 
It is certainly striking how closely the rhetoric in Brandenburg matches 
that of the conservative press in Thuringia in the early 1990s. Here too, when the 
controversy surrounding Buchenwald’s staff and the future of the memorial was 
at its peak, the prospect of a return to GDR traditions evinced great concern. 
Newspapers such as the conservative Thüringische Landeszeitung provocatively 
asked whether ‘die restaurativen Kräfte, die einem neuen Konzept [for the 
memorial, RB] kritisch gegenüberstehen, an Boden [gewinnen]’,574 and even 
prophesized ‘Schlüsselpositionen’ within the memorial for those whose activity 
prior to 1989 rendered them ‘belastet’.575 Equally, the doubt cast on the incoming 
(West German) site director Ulrich Schneider’s competence by reportage focused 
on his KPD-membership in retrospect set a pattern that later reappeared in the 
highly personalised attacks on specific figures in Brandenburg. Indeed, just as 
the criticism of Buchenwald’s redesign appeared to be reducible to questions of 
the directorate’s ‘Lauterkeit’576 and the ‘ungeheure[…] Herausforderung’577 
several staff members’ backgrounds presented for victims of the SED, so too was 
the failure to adequately work through the GDR past in Brandenburg frequently 
attributed to presidents of the regional parliament such as Manfred Stolpe and 
Matthias Platzeck. 
                                                
572 ‘Zum Heulen! Buchenwald total Stasi-verseucht’, Bild Thüringen, 6 Feb 1995. As Hasko 
Zimmer has pointed out, the allegations, for all their zeal in attacking the memorial and its staff, 
in fact stood in stark contrast to the efforts of many at Buchenwald and across the political 
spectrum in Thuringia to pacify the controversy. See Zimmer, Der Buchenwald-Konflikt, pp. 81-
122; 220-223.  
573 Bauersfeld, ‘Die Opfer der DDR-Diktatur’, p. 5. 
574 H. Kaczmarek, ‘Machtkampf um Zukunft Buchenwalds’, TLZ, 22 Feb 1994. 
575 Idem, ‘Schlüsselposition für alte Kräfte?’, TLZ, 22 Feb 1994. 
576 ‘Zweifel an der Lauterkeit’, Thüringer Tageblatt, 13 Mar 1993. 
577 ‘Endlich sauber aufarbeiten!’, Thüringer Tageblatt, 13 Mar 1993. 
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At the ALS ceremony too, sideswipes at reluctance to pursue a more 
extensive working through of the East German past, this time directed at regional 
politicians, were barely concealed. One speaker, a professor belonging to the 
Historical Institute at Munich’s Universität der Bundeswehr, made a startling 
metaphorical allusion to the practice of selecting prisoners for extermination at 
the National Socialist Vernichtungslager in his address. With the situation in 
Brandenburg in mind, he opined that: ‘[s]elektive Erinnerung…selektive 
Bewertung [ist] und selektive Bewertung führt erst gedanklich und dann wirklich 
zur „Selektion“.’578 Though this may have gone further than others in the ALS 
by suggesting that inattentiveness to the victims of injustice in the SBZ and GDR 
was simply the thin end of the wedge eventually leading to genocide, it was 
nonetheless quoted by the chair of the ALS in a report of the ceremony, 
published in the newsletter of the UOKG. Even if it did not necessarily share the 
belief that ‚selektive Erinnerung’ was actually mendacious, the report certainly 
did not neglect to reiterate the criticism that ‘in Sachsenhausen das Gedenken an 
die Opfer der Kommunisten immer noch nicht anständig und wahrhaftig sei.’579 
Besides referring once again to the victims of communism as opposed to 
Stalinism (see above), the report also bemoaned the ‘Gleichgültigkeit, mit der die 
Gesellschaft den Opfern der Kommunisten begegnet’, thereby embedding the 
commemoration of the post-war camp at Sachsenhausen in the broader context of 
GDR memory in Brandenburg.580 
Only speeches from the first of two distinct commemorative ceremonies 
are discussed in the article. Though rather glossed over in the wording of the 
text, which referred to a ceremony consisting of ‘two parts’, it is clear that the 
ALS had proceeded to independently plan a programme of its own and hold the 
ceremony, later described by the speaker of the Brandenburg Memorials 
Foundation as a ‘Konkurrenzveranstaltung’, immediately prior to the second 
event, jointly organised by the ALS and memorial staff.581 Both the separate 
ceremonies and the response from the memorial staff indicate the considerable 
                                                
578 ‘“Sachsenhausen mahnt uns”. Grußwort von Prof. Dr. Michael Wolffsohn anlässlich des 66. 
Jahrestags der Verlegung des Speziallagers Nr. 1 von Weesow nach Sachsenhausen’, Jul 2011 
(online) http://www.uokg.de/sachsenhausen/archiv/Sachsenhausen_Grusswort_Wolffsohn-
2011.pdf. Last accessed 22 Feb 2013. 
579 V. Heydecke and M. Pense, ‘Wildwuchs am Ort der Verbrechen’, Stacheldraht (7/2011), pp. 
10-11 (p. 10). 
580 Ibid., p.11. 
581 H. Seferens, ‘Einspruch’, Stacheldraht, 8 (2011), p. 16. 
246 
 
 
rift between the two groups, who each appeared to suspect the other was 
engaging in ‘competition’ over the interpretation of the Speziallager and the 
double past.  
Moreover, the ALS could now count on support from Brandenburg’s 
Commissioner for working through the GDR past, Ulrike Poppe, as well as 
several others from CDU circles, all of whom had voiced concern at how victims 
of East German political injustice were integrated into the memorial landscape at 
a hearing of the regional Enquete commission into Brandenburg’s handling of 
the ‘SED-Diktatur’ earlier in the year. Poppe even issued a press release calling 
for Martina Münch, who as Minister for Science, Research and Culture also 
acted as chair of the Brandenburg Memorial Foundation’s Council, to use her 
position to ensure funds earmarked for the Speziallager were made use of.582 
Others such as Klaus Schroeder, the Sachverständiger nominated to the 
commission by the regional CDU faction, also directed criticism at the 
Brandenburg Memorials Foundation for its handling of the victims of post-war 
injustice. At the same time, Schroeder spoke out against an appraisal of the GDR 
that was ‘ergebnisoffen’ – proposing in effect that a normative characterisation 
of the state as ‘dictatorial’ should guide how it was taught in schools.583 Victoria 
Heydecke, then the chair of the ALS, pointed out that prejudice shown towards 
the victims and the ALS came from victims of National Socialism and their 
representatives in the advisory council of the Brandenburg Memorials 
Foundation too.584 Indeed, much of her statement to the commission consisted of 
complaints about institutional structures such as the division of the Foundation’s 
advisory council into a (larger) group concerned with matters pertaining to the 
concentration camp and a second group consulted on the special camp. Tellingly, 
she noted that there were ‘viele Kommunisten’ amongst the first and supposedly 
more influential group.585  
The result of this was to (perhaps unintentionally) revitalise the notion 
held by many survivors of the special camps at both Buchenwald and 
                                                
582 Beauftragte des Landes Brandenburg zur Aufarbeitung der Folgen der kommunistischen 
Diktatur, ‘Opfer kommunistischer Verfolgung fühlen sich in den Gedenkstätten im Land 
Brandenburg unzureichend vertreten’, Pressemitteilung 06/2011, 18 Mar 2011, 
http://www.aufarbeitung.brandenburg.de/sixcms/detail.php?template=archiv_lakd&skip=135 
[accessed 6 May 2011]. 
583 Landtag Brandenburg, Protokoll-Enquete-Kommission 5/9, 18 Mar 2011, p. 14. 
584 See ibid., pp. 48-52; p. 67; p. 68.  
585 Ibid., p. 49.  
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Sachsenhausen in the immediate aftermath of unification that communists 
continued to call the shots at the memorials. In this case, however, alleged 
institutional bias was for the ALS over-layered by societal prejudice: it was now 
the special camp survivors who were ‘immer wieder von Neuem verletzt’ at 
Sachsenhausen, treated by the survivors of the concentration camp with an ire 
that was out of all proportion to German society’s responsibility towards the 
victims of National Socialism.586 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, it is essential to recognize the challenges presented by unification 
and the post-GDR transition as the key underlying context if we are to 
understand how debates on the memorials have unfolded in the political culture 
of Brandenburg and Thuringia since 1998. How these challenges were perceived 
to have been handled (or indeed not handled) largely determined the ways in 
which the double past at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen was represented. Once 
again a Foucauldian approach proves useful in revealing how contexts specific to 
the new federal states have restructured the very language of coming to terms 
with the past, creating networks of discourses. What these networks suggest is, in 
short, a wider proliferation of the principle of differentiation in the way the 
double past is approached in Thuringia, and more prevalent equationism in 
Brandenburg. I will briefly recapitulate the findings of this chapter below, 
beginning with Brandenburg and finishing with a summary of the position in 
Thuringia.   
If the ‘Jagd auf rote Socken’ at Buchenwald shortly after unification 
appeared to foreshadow the debates that later followed in other eastern federal 
states, then this can be of little surprise given the almost identical transitional 
situation in which they were framed. Whereas Buchenwald was viewed through 
the lens of anxieties about the continuation of SED structures and personnel 
fairly early on, this has only belatedly come to apply to Brandenburg. 
Nonetheless, it can explain the perceptible shift towards an equationist discourse 
                                                
586 Ibid., p. 67. 
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around Sachsenhausen. Increasing calls to refocus attention on post-war 
injustices at the site are tied to unease about the ‘Brandenburger Weg’, a term 
that implies – somewhat inaccurately – that there has been a laissez faire regional 
approach to former SED functionaries and Stasi informants in public sector 
positions and a form of politics by consensus for the sake of societal cohesion. 
Indeed, looking at how the victims of Speziallager Nr. 7 / Nr. 1 have been 
commemorated in recent years, there are signs that both conservative political 
and press discourse as well as the organisations representing the victims of 
Communism have appropriated the trope of a deficient working through of 
injustice in the SBZ/GDR.  
What this ultimately shows is that the term ‘Vereinigungskrise’, used by 
Hasko Zimmer to describe Buchenwald’s post-unification redesign, can now 
more accurately be applied to the situation at Sachsenhausen.587 Fourteen years 
after Zimmer’s study, and in spite of an increasingly transnational cultural 
memory characterising the concentration camp memorials in the new millennium 
(a development to which I turn in the next chapter), the example of Brandenburg 
reveals that Sachsenhausen at least cannot be seen in isolation from ongoing 
regional struggles with the process of German unity. What, then, has determined 
how Buchenwald is remembered? To a certain extent the conclusions here 
relating to more recent years are negatively drawn, insofar as there is 
significantly less evidence of disputes between protagonists in Thuringia after 
2005 (a fact that the memorial director Volkhard Knigge himself vouches for).588 
Indeed, stakeholders such as the Initiativgruppe if anything sounded remarkably 
appeased when reflecting in 2010 on the steps taken since unification to research 
and document the Speziallager as well as commemorate victims of the camp. 
What is clear from the preceding discussion is that there has been a broader 
proliferation – and acceptance – of the principle of differentiation in Thuringia 
since 1999. 
As responses to Hermann Schäfer’s speech at the Weimar Kunstfest in 
2006 show, this owes to a specific regional dispositif. Upholding the centrality of 
the Nazi past was explicitly aligned with preserving Thuringia’s exemplary 
record in confronting the double past. An interesting question that presents itself 
at this juncture is the extent to which the dispositif manifesting itself in the 
                                                
587 See Zimmer, Der Buchenwald-Konflikt, p. 32. 
588 Knie, ‘Die Umgestaltung der DDR-Gedenkstätten’. 
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Thuringian press has itself become ‘normalized’ over time. Given the prominent 
place the medium affords to regional political groups and the regional filter it 
tends to apply even to events of nationwide proportions such as the Schäfer 
scandal, it may be more appropriate to foreground its role in perpetuating 
memory discourses than to look to it for evidence of dissenting voices. Indeed, it 
would be rather selective to view Thuringia solely as a space for the contestation 
and revision of federal discourse without considering whether this presents 
norms of its own. Rather than taking at face value an opposition between 
national normalization of the past and regional exclusion from or incompatibility 
with this discourse, then, the possibility of both German and Thuringian 
permutations of normative memory must be taken seriously. 
Of course, the fact that the Buchenwald staff are directly responsible for 
producing pedagogical materials used in Thuringia to prepare school visits 
accounts for a degree of this proliferation too. We can recognize certain 
biographies such as the prisoner Otto von Kursell or the trope of mourning both 
an original moral failure to oppose Nazism and the injustices of Soviet 
Occupation – what Volkhard Knigge termed ‘doppelt geprägte Trauer’ – in both 
discourses. Circulation of these tropes and symbols extended, moreover, to 
classroom teaching, as reflected in the content and approach of the revised 
history curriculum, which explicitly appropriated the ‘Faulenbach-Formel’. This 
was noticeably different to the situation in Brandenburg, where the proscriptive 
Konzept and history curricula stood virtually in direct opposition to the approach 
to the double past advocated by the memorial professionals. However one 
chooses to interpret these localised frameworks, the fact remains that they have 
proven particularly consequential in both Brandenburg and Thuringia since 1999. 
Regional commemoration of the memorials and their double pasts was and is, in 
the final analysis, inextricably bound up with the transitional situation that East 
Germany still finds itself in.  
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Ch. 5: On national and trans-national 
discourses 
 
Introduction 
 
Having demonstrated in the previous three chapters how sub-national discourses 
have shot through a national memory culture, in this final chapter I approach the 
place of Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen in an ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ from 
the opposite direction. That is to say, I show that the memorials are in fact 
appropriated by multiple ‘national’ discourses, as well as others that are trans-
national; across the four thematic chapters of the thesis I therefore cover a 
comprehensive spectrum of cultural representations ranging from the local to 
global. The very fact that there are, first of all, various federal discourses vying 
for hegemony at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen confirms that the sites can 
indeed be seen as national Lieux de mémoire. This should not be mistaken for 
implying they are, after all, ‘Fixpunkte des antitotalitären Konsenses’ in a 
normative sense. Whether or not the concept of a homogenous German memory 
culture corresponds to realities on the ground, however, the fact remains that the 
national significance of Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen has been repeatedly 
invoked and demonstratively linked to an ‘official’ memory paradigm since 
1998. Secondly, efforts beginning in the 2000s both in Europe and globally to 
root civic identity in memory of mass injustice have posed a challenge to the 
frame of the nation state in managing public discourse on the past. The latter half 
of the chapter addresses this trend, considering what it reveals about the current 
(and future) role of the memorials to the double past in the memory culture of the 
Berlin Republic.     
Returning to the national profile of Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, one 
can justifiably argue that their prominence placed them in direct relation to, and 
arguably even confrontation with, concurrent plans to memorialize Jewish 
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victims of the Holocaust in the centre of Berlin.589 It is worth pointing out that 
the former had both historically been, at one stage or another, ‘central’ sites, 
whether as the ‘ZK der Reichshauptstadt’ during the Third Reich in 
Sachsenhausen’s case or as the GDR’s most important Nationale Mahn- und 
Gedenkstätte in Buchenwald’s. But did their historical centrality carry over into 
the post-unification period? The questions the opening section of this chapter sets 
out to answer are, firstly: do the memorials remain central to a nationally defined 
memory culture in the Berlin Republic, or have they now been subordinated to 
other central sites such as the Neue Wache or the Memorial to the Murdered Jews 
of Europe? Secondly, do they help perpetuate official memory culture or 
articulate dissent? Several exemplary episodes serve to ground the analysis in 
empirical case studies. The section begins by looking at debates surrounding the 
relationship between the KZ-Gedenkstätten and the Berlin ‘Holocaust Memorial’, 
before turning to the various models of ‘national’ commemorative discourse that 
could be read out of the Schäfer scandal in 2006.  
Recent years have seen a globalisation of Holocaust memory in more 
general terms, symbolized most pointedly by the Stockholm International Forum 
on the Holocaust in 2000. Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider have spoken aptly of 
a ‘cosmopolitan’ Holocaust memory, in which memory of the historical event 
itself has on the one hand become a universally valid morality tale – a ‘symbol of 
transnational solidarity’, in their words – but interacts on the other hand with 
local contexts at its point of reception.590 Thus global transmission has not led to 
a totalizing meaning of the Holocaust; rather, this meaning is context-specific. 
More recently Michael Rothberg has developed the concept of ‘multidirectional 
memory’ in recognition of the fact that memories of separate forms of historical 
injustice are not necessarily mired in a ‘zero-sum struggle for preeminence’.591 
Instead, efforts at representing other, especially colonial, histories may 
productively gesture towards the Holocaust and vice versa.    
Yet as Dirk Moses has recently pointed out, universalizing the historical 
trauma of the Holocaust does not always usher in articulation of other injustices 
or a concomitantly global sensitization a to human rights culture; it may just as 
                                                
589 Leggewie and Meyer, “Ein Ort, an den man gerne geht”, ch. 1.4.   
590 Levy and Sznaider, ‘Memory Unbound’, p. 93. See also Levy and Sznaider, Erinnerung im 
globalen Zeitalter: Der Holocaust (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001). 
591 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of 
Decolonization (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 3. 
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well lead to a ‘‘calamitization’ of politics’592 whereby the Holocaust is used to 
justify even the most hostile and terroristic action on behalf of particular groups 
or states. He focuses on the Israel-Palestine conflict, and whilst I do not mean to 
suggest a simple parallel between that unique case and the memory debates 
addressed here, his intimation that the trans-national pathways of Holocaust 
memory can trigger instrumentalisation of history as much as intercultural 
understanding is valid nonetheless. The transmission of memory across cultures 
is, in Rothberg’s idealistic sense, multidirectional and dialogic, but it is important 
not to overlook the fact that interactivity in increasingly global, connected spaces 
may well continue to take the form of zero-sum competition.  
Section two of this chapter looks for evidence of multidirectionality and 
memory competition in the role the memorials have played in shoring up (or 
indeed critiquing) constructions of a common European history and identity. The 
analysis focuses on how various stakeholders at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen 
have responded to the initiative to introduce a European-wide memorial day for 
victims of 20th century totalitarian regimes on 23 August (see thesis 
introduction). Given that what is at stake here is not German but European 
identity, and given that the context is not German unification but the broader 
transitional process following the collapse of the Eastern bloc, discourse on the 
memorials’ double past can logically no longer be viewed as part of a German 
‘Vereinigungskrise’. Whereas regional discourse, as we have seen, is clearly 
implicated with processes of transitional justice that are by definition orientated 
around end goals of ‘unification’ and ‘inner unity’, a European discourse 
imposes different demands on the commemoration of the double past. It has 
created a new identity disposif that demands greater cohesion across various 
discourses but, at the same time, has the potential to produce deeper and more 
divisive competition. This has inevitably affected not just memory activism at 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, but also the position of the memorial sites as 
agencies in the pursuit of objective historical truth.  
Beyond Europe, the memorials serve global constituencies as generic 
symbols of dark pasts in an age in which both human rights concepts and 
                                                
592 A. Dirk. Moses, ‘Genocide and the Terror of History’, parallax, 17, 4 (2011), 90-108 (p. 91).  
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memory are enjoying a ‘new conjuncture’.593 Beginning, as recent scholarship 
argues, in the 1970s with the rise of humanitarian organisations such as Amnesty 
International and agreements such as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, today’s human 
rights regime is by no small coincidence contiguous with an increased interest in 
memory. After all, without ongoing memory of human rights abuses there would 
be nothing to justify calls for such rights in the first place. One of the results of 
this inherently political and moral mission to sensitize against and prevent future 
human rights abuses has been the emerging global phenomenon of the ‘memorial 
museum’.594 Taking into consideration Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen’s 
implication in this universal rights regime, section three of the chapter illustrates 
the ways in which it is nonetheless reconciled to narrower identity constructs. 
Political discourse, for instance, fuses the universalist message of the memorials 
to a nationally-defined ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’, whilst concentration camp 
survivors’ lobbies link the rights paradigm to antifascist activism. Consequently, 
my findings refute the proposition that trans-national narrative frames have 
entirely eclipsed national and parochial contexts even as we have entered an age 
of global memory. 
As in other chapters, I adopt a systems-theory approach alongside tools 
taken from critical discourse analysis and cultural memory studies to explain the 
formation and transmission of discourse on the memorials’ double past. This 
triadic approach avoids over-privileging memory as a method of historical 
analysis.595 For their part, the concepts of a dispositif and ‘travelling’ memory 
cast the debates on Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen in relation to underlying 
structures, whether an ‘order of discourse’ (in the case of the former) or a 
borderless, connected cultural space (in the case of the latter). The concept of 
autopoiesis, by contrast, can open up discourse to conceptualization as the 
‘komunizierbare Differenz von Handeln und Beobachten’596 – that is, a kind of 
internal self-organisation of discourse through interaction with its environment – 
rather than as the result of an external structure. As such, we need not necessarily 
assume changes in a discourse’s environment – in this case the emergence of 
                                                
593 Andreas Huyssen, ‘International Human Rights and the Politics of Memory: Limits and 
Challenges’, Criticism, 53, 4 (2011), 607-624 (p. 607); see also S. Moyn, The Last Utopia: 
Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
594 See Williams, Memorial Museums, p. 131f. 
595 On this point, see Alon Confino, ‘Telling about Germany: Narratives of Memory and Culture’, 
The Journal of Modern History, 76, 2 (2004), 389-416 (p. 390). 
596 Luhmann, Soziale Systeme, p. 408. 
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national and trans-national cultural frames – dictate how the discourse evolves. 
Indeed, I propose that identifiable ‘codes’ according to which certain 
stakeholders at the memorials interpret the double past are to an extent apparent 
on the national and trans-national stage too. 
 
 
Germany’s ‘other’ Holocaust memorials? 
 
 
In this opening section of the chapter I begin by tracing the establishment and 
contestation of the normalization paradigm under Gerhard Schröder on the 
ground. I do this by engaging with some of the discussions surrounding the 
planned Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin, commonly known 
as the Holocaust Memorial, which opened in May 2005 after a more than fifteen 
year gestation period. During this time, and as the proposed memorial 
increasingly generated an almost frenzied level of public interest, several 
colloquia were held by the project organisers and the federal government, at 
which the memorial specialists (including both Knigge and Morsch) as well as 
politicians, academics and civic memory activists gave lengthy statements. 
Additionally, the memorial was subject to criticism from certain groups even 
after its inauguration, not least from victims of communism and their 
representatives, indicating the extent to which it was identified with a political 
project to embed remembrance of the Holocaust at the centre of German identity. 
I hone in on a public hearing of the parliamentary Committee for Culture and 
Media in April 1999, a speech given by Schröder at Sachsenhausen later that 
year, and a scathing polemic against the memorial and the red-green government 
delivered at Sachsenhausen by the right-wing author and publicist Ulrich Schacht 
in the summer of 2005. Together these moments convey a sense of the 
internalisation of the Nazi past in political culture during Schröder’s two terms in 
office and of the challenges that were mounted against this project. 
Political change followed not long on the heels of the Holocaust 
Memorial’s inauguration, as the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition led by Angela Merkel 
was elected into power in September 2005. To a considerable extent, the politics 
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of the past practiced by the Merkel administration were characterised by 
continuity with those developed by the Social Democratic government after 
1998, as outlined in the introductory chapter. At most one could perhaps speak of 
a broadening of the existing paradigm under Merkel’s chancellorship, whereby 
the federal government continued to unequivocally accept responsibility for the 
Holocaust whilst simultaneously commemorating Germans as victims of war and 
dictatorial repression too.597 Consequently, the section concludes by assessing 
how the project of normalization has negotiated political transition in 2005 and 
the consequences this has had for commemorating the double past. It returns to 
the scandal precipitated by Herman Schäfer’s speech at the Gedächtnis 
Buchenwald concert already discussed in chapter four, this time gauging the 
fallout in the national press in order to establish whether the coordinates of 
Germany’s culture of remembrance are drawn in the same way as in Thuringia. 
Furthermore, by accounting for the (very different) response the speech elicited 
from victims’ associations – namely the LAG Buchenwald-Dora – it pinpoints 
continuing uneasiness in relation to any kind of ‘nationally’ defined German 
identity, even one predicated on the very recognition of German criminality 
under National Socialism.         
Several memorial experts, and particularly the directors of the KZ-
Gedenkstätten in the new federal states, actively participated in the early debates 
surrounding the proposed Holocaust Memorial. Prominent figures in the 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen directorates also weighed in with a number of 
criticisms of the proposed memorial in a parliamentary hearing on 20 April 1999. 
These were both consistent with the group’s broader misgivings with centralised 
commemoration and indicative of a significant degree of homogeneity across the 
respective memorials involved in the debate. As early as 1995, Jürgen Dittberner, 
director of the Stiftung Brandenburgische Gedenkstätten at the time, questioned 
the logic of setting aside several million Mark to a centralised memorial whilst 
authentic sites faced considerable financial hardship. He recommended that the 
                                                
597 See in this regard Bernd Faulenbach, ‘Eine neue Konstellation? Der Umgang mit zwei 
Vergangenheiten in Deutschland nach 1989’, in Aufarbeitung der Diktatur – Diktat der 
Aufarbeitung? Normierungsprozesse beim Umgang mit diktatorischer Vergangenheit, ed. by K. 
Hammerstein, U. Mählert, J. Trappe,E. Wolfram (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2009), pp. 37-47 (here p. 
44); also Ruth Wittlinger ‘The Merkel Government’s Politics of the Past’, German Politics and 
Society, 26, 4 (2008), 9-27. 
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planned memorial in Berlin be reconsidered on a more ‘modest’ scale.598 Whilst 
he perhaps over-exaggerated the dichotomy of federal funding decisions in 
implying that either centralised or decentralised commemoration of the National 
Socialist past would be financed, his concern with the implications for 
Germany’s existing decentralised memorial landscape was emblematic of the 
memorials experts’ position more generally. 
Undoubtedly the Berlin memorial project compounded the sense of a 
growing opposition between artificial, central memorials and authentic, pre-
existing sites of National Socialist crimes. Indeed, it can have been of little 
coincidence that the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der KZ-Gedenkstätten in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland was formed in March 1997, in the midst of a series 
of experts’ colloquia in Berlin dedicated to the Holocaust Memorial.599 It is 
important to recognise however that the memorial experts did not necessarily 
oppose the construction of a central memorial out of hand; nor was the AG der 
KZ-Gedenkstätten interested in seeing the proposal dropped.600 The pressing 
issue that required clarification was, for the representatives of the memorials, the 
uncertain relationship between the proposed central site and the existing 
memorial landscape. It was resolving this matter that gave the concentration 
camp memorials impetus to more forcefully articulate their own position, as 
indicated by the decision to establish a national network in the form of the AG. 
More to the point, the discrepancy between ‘official’ federal commemorative 
policy and the stance of the memorials at this juncture indicates the limited use 
of reading Germany’s culture of remembrance in terms of a simplified opposition 
between differentiation and relativisation. Both discourses upheld the singularity 
of the Holocaust, but by different means and to different ends. 
This was well illustrated by a point Günter Morsch made in his statement 
at the 1999 parliamentary hearing. In it he asserted that the ‘durchaus 
begründbare Singularität des nationalsozialistischen Völkermords an den Juden’ 
was in fact obscured in the memorial’s design concept, which in addressing a 
variety of phenomena, from the persecution of political prisoners to latter-day 
                                                
598 Welt, 29 Jun 1995. 
599 Jan-Holger Kirsch, Nationaler Mythos oder historische Trauer: Der Streit um ein zentrales 
“Holocaust-Mahnmal” für die Berliner Republik (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna: Böhlau, 2003), p. 
98. 
600 Ibid., p. 108. 
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camps in Serbia, presented the Holocaust as a ‘Metatheorie’.601 Thus he 
dismissed the catchall rubric as an effective means of addressing the National 
Socialist dictatorship at an inauthentic central commemorative site. More 
advisable in his estimation was to continue to encourage confrontation with the 
Nazi past in situ, where the link between crime (‘Tat’), perpetrator (‘Täter’), and 
site of the crime (‘Tatort’) and therefore the ‘broader societal responsibility’ 
(‘gesamtgesellschaftliche Verantwortung’) for persecution could be explained.602 
At the same time, Morsch delegated the parallel task of embedding the Third 
Reich into a chronology of German history in the longue durée to historical 
museums, in effect suggesting a slightly different division of labour in 
Germany’s commemorative landscape than had been outlined in the revised 
Holocaust memorial design by architect Peter Eisenmann. As with Jürgen 
Dittberner’s earlier criticism, this did not constitute an outright objection to a 
central Holocaust memorial. Rather, Morsch was (re-)stating the value of 
decentralised, site-based memory work in response to the centralised and 
symbolic form of commemoration provided by the Berlin memorial.     
Defining German memory culture at the turn of the millennium was not 
therefore reducible to the Manichean dilemma of whether to oppose or support a 
central Holocaust memorial. As Morsch intimated in his comments at the 
hearing, the task at hand was to establish which commemorative paradigm the 
federal government would pledge its support to. The first option, represented by 
the Holocaust Memorial, was to embrace a form of memorialisation predicated 
on abstract mourning and Betroffenheit – implying in Morsch’s opinion a 
simultaneous turn away from ‘historisches Wissen und Kenntnisse’.603 The 
second, which Morsch spoke out in favour of, was to adopt the consensus view 
on memorialisation reached by a broad spectrum of politicians, civic activist 
groups, and museum and memorial professionals in the hearings of the second 
Enquete Commission into the GDR past. Here Morsch picked up on the 
Commission’s Schlußbericht, published in 1998, which embraced the principle 
of decentralisation and the transformation of the memorials from sites of 
                                                
601 Günter Morsch, ‘Stellungsnahme in der öffentlichen Anhörung des Ausschusses für Kultur 
und Medien des Deutschen Bundestages in Berlin am 20. April 1999’ in Der Denkmalstreit – das 
Denkmal: die Debatte um das “Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas”: eine 
Dokumentation, ed. by Ute Heimrod, Günter Schlusche and Horst Seferens (Bodenheim: PHILO, 
1999), pp. 1276-1279 (p. 1277). 
602 Ibid., p. 1277. 
603 Ibid., p. 1276. 
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mourning and commemoration to ‘Orte[…] zeithistorischer Museen und aktiven 
Lernens’.604 In both form and function, memory work of the kind advocated by 
Morsch consequently had less in common with the new SPD-Green 
government’s normalized terms of reference to the past than the common 
foregrounding of the Third Reich may suggest.     
On one issue, Morsch did fall back on the binary reading of the German 
memory landscape that his contribution to the parliamentary hearing had 
otherwise avoided. This was the matter of what exactly one understood by the 
term ‘authentic’. The definition Morsch offered was in this instance fairly 
imprecise, resting primarily on a demarcation from inauthentic – that is, 
interpretative, post hoc – memorials erected at sites bearing no direct relation to 
National Socialist crimes and/or their victims. Yet when it came to sites such as 
Sachsenhausen and Buchenwald, which had seen successive reuse as 
Speziallager and GDR Sites of Memory and Warning respectively after 1945, 
authenticity was a somewhat problematic concept anyway. The topography of 
the original concentration camp therefore possessed an at best secondary (or even 
tertiary) authenticity, refracted through its post-war re-designation as special 
camp and, later, memorial. Though the memorial professionals very effectively 
problematised the concept of ‘authenticity’ in the post-unification redesign 
concepts (see chapter two), Morsch now, albeit out of necessity, defined the 
concentration camp memorials as a counterpoint to the Eisenmann concept in 
order to restate the case for a decentralised culture of remembrance. Almost 
inevitably, this resulted in a rather flattened out and rhetorical notion of 
‘authenticity’.  
Here, Morsch appeared to contradict himself. He stressed that ‘historical 
sites’, unlike an artistic, central memorial that if anything stood to benefit from 
an absence of contextualisation, should be furnished with historical 
information.605 Implicitly however, the need for exposition meant that the sites 
derived context and meaning from prevailing interpretations of the past. In turn, 
their status as ‘authentic’ depended upon existing within a time and epistemology 
that attributed this quality to them. Morsch regarded calls for a central Holocaust 
                                                
604 Ibid., p. 1276. 
605 As Morsch asserted with the planned Berlin memorial in mind: ‘die Halbwertszeit der 
künstlerischen Anmutung eines Denkmals [steht] im umgekehrt proportionalen Verhältnis zu 
seiner Eindeutigkeit’. See ibid., p. 1278. 
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memorial as the result of a paradigmatic ‘introvertierte Betroffenheit’,606 but 
seemed to understand ‘authenticity’ (when applied to relics of the National 
Socialist period) as a fixed, ontological label. He would later broach the 
embedment of memorials and their work within current cultures of remembrance 
when addressing commemorative politics in Europe, and once more take a 
somewhat contradictory stance (see below), but in the meantime it is important to 
note the connection between his position and the nature of the memory debate 
being conducted in 1999. Indeed, the commemorative paradigm he advocated 
cannot be understood in isolation from the federal government’s explicit support 
of Eisenmann’s revised proposal and the fact that the memorial itself, when 
completed, would represent a de facto ‘Nationalisierung negativen Gedenkens’, 
to borrow Volkhard Knigge’s phrase.607 It was primarily the Bund’s involvement 
in remembering the Nazi past that precipitated the memorial professionals’ use of 
‘authenticity’ as a rhetorical tool with which to engage in Erinnerungspolitik.          
The role the Red-Green administration assigned to the concentration camp 
memorials was epitomised by Gerhard Schroeder’s speech at Sachsenhausen on 
22 September 1999, marking the visit of the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. 
The very act of inviting Barak to the memorial in the first place signalled 
Schroeder’s willingness to openly acknowledge German responsibility for the 
Holocaust, though the fact that it was Sachsenhausen seemed largely irrelevant. 
Indeed, it was the symbolic value of the site that the speech chose to emphasize: 
 
‘Es fällt mir nicht leicht, an diesem Ort tiefster Demütigung und Qual der 
Menschen, die hier waren, zu sprechen. Der Name Sachsenhausen steht, 
zusammen mit vielen anderen Lagernamen, für das schlimmste Verbrechen 
in der deutschen Geschichte. Sachsenhausen steht wie Auschwitz, 
Treblinka, Majdanek, Buchenwald und die vielen anderen Lager für die 
planmäßige Vernichtung von Millionen von Juden und anderen Opfern.’608   
 
 The location therefore functioned as little more than a backdrop for 
political gestures of atonement and reconciliation directed towards Israel. 
                                                
606 Ibid., p. 1276. 
607 Volkhard Knigge, ‘Abschied von der Erinnerung: Zum notwendigen Wandel der KZ-
Gedenkstätten in Deutschland’, GedenkstättenRundbrief, 100 (2001), 136-143. 
608 ‘Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder anlässlich des Besuchs von Ministerpräsident 
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Schroeder himself referred not so much to any specific event in the concentration 
camp’s history but rather to the ‘name’ Sachsenhausen, in effect reducing the site 
to a cultural symbol. Furthermore, his suggestion that this particular memorial 
stood ‘together with many other camp names…for the calculated annihilation 
[Vernichtung] of millions of Jews and other victims’ produced an alarmingly 
ahistorical and homogenous category of camp in which the same basic chain of 
events played out. This not only elided crucial historical distinctions between the 
extermination camps and concentration camps (Schroeder mentioned both in his 
list), but also created a historical memory of the Holocaust that was quite distinct 
from the narratives found in the on-site exhibitions, for example. Whereas 
Günter Morsch had explicitly distanced the Sachsenhausen memorial from a 
cultural narrative of the Holocaust as a ‘metatheory’, in Schröder’s speech it was 
exactly that: a synecdoche for the crimes committed by Germans in the name of 
the Third Reich. Equally, it was less important how or by what means National 
Socialist crimes were remembered. Decisive was, rather, the normative, gestural 
commitment to remember in the first place, as Schröder himself implied: 
 
‘Es gibt nur einen Weg, mit dem Unvorstellbaren dieser Verbrechen 
umzugehen: Wir müssen uns und alle anderen wieder und wieder daran 
erinnern.’609 
 
 At another point in his speech Schröder averred that it was precisely 
Germany’s commitment to remember the Holocaust and prevent its recurrence 
that facilitated its re-entry into the European ‘Völker-Gemeinschaft’.610 
Membership in turn presupposed a commitment to safeguard human rights, and 
the chancellor did not miss the opportunity to stress that this was indeed the 
intended function of Holocaust memory – Germany’s ‘sichere[s] moralische[s] 
Fundament’.611 The choice of Sachsenhausen as a staging post for Schröder’s 
memory politics should not be overlooked. Admittedly, it was virtually 
interchangeable with other concentration camp or even extermination camp 
memorials, given that the association between the historical site and the message 
of the speech remained firmly in the abstract. Yet its geographical proximity to 
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the German capital elevated the chancellor’s rhetoric to a programmatic 
statement of federal policy, both domestically and also towards Israel. Thus, 
Sachsenhausen did in fact serve – at least for the federal government – as a 
microcosm of a broader Holocaust complex. As we will see in the remainder of 
this section, the memorial’s disputed status as, variously, a national Holocaust 
memorial and a site at which to mount challenges to normative official memory 
narratives was far from resolved as of 1999; contests of interpretation persisted 
throughout the 2000s.   
At a ceremony marking the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the 
Speziallager at Sachsenhausen in 2005, the Red-Green government’s stance on 
the Nazi past came in for criticism this time from the political right. It came in 
the form of a polemic launched against the Schröder administration by the guest 
speaker at the ceremony, the author Ulrich Schacht. Clearly Schacht had 
intended to stir up controversy with the speech, coming as it did little more than 
three months after the inauguration of the Holocaust memorial, and just a month 
before the 2005 federal elections, for that matter. In terms of polemical effect, 
the content more than matched the speech’s timing. Sachsenhausen was barely 
mentioned at all, and the single occasion Schacht did reference the victims of the 
Speziallager amounted to an unashamed instrumentalisation of eyewitness 
testimony in service of his own agenda (see below). Though very different from 
the objections to the Holocaust memorial raised by the memorial professionals, 
and far more problematic, Schacht’s comments nevertheless underlined the 
extent to which Sachsenhausen served as a platform for challenging federal 
memory politics, which had found their apogee in the recently opened memorial 
in Berlin. 
Schacht’s speech was entitled ‘Wider die Republik der Opfer-Sortierer’, 
leaving no uncertainty as to his opinion of officially mandated memory in the 
Berlin Republic.612 The accusation he levelled throughout was that victims of 
post-1945 injustice were met with a ‘kalte[…] Provokation asymmetrischer 
Empathie für das am eigenen Leib erfahrene Unrecht und Leid’ in Germany.613 
What is more, he argued that this asymmetry was institutionalized, referring 
                                                
612 U. Schacht, ‘Wider die Republik der Opfer-Sortierer: Zum 60. Jahrestag der Errichtung des 
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http://gedenkbibliothek.de/download/Ulrich_Schacht_Wider_die_Republik_der_Opfer-
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sardonically to ‘Gedenkpolitik, die sich zugleich in hoch-symbolisierter Gestalt 
als konstitutive Staatspolitik gefällt.’ Shortly afterwards he mentioned Foreign 
Minister Joschka Fischer’s invocation of Auschwitz in justifying military 
intervention in Kosovo, and alleged that the symbol of the camp had become the 
‘Gründungsmythos der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.’614 By evoking GDR 
antifascism, which was referred to in the propaganda of the SED as the East 
German state’s own ‘Gründungsmythos’, Schacht sought to level the same 
charge of instrumentalising and centrally controlling memory discourse at the 
Schröder administration. He may not have mentioned the Memorial to the 
Murdered Jews of Europe in his speech, but as the leitmotif of the Holocaust-
centred official memory paradigm that he was so disparaging of, it was 
peripherally present throughout. 
As for Sachsenhausen and its double past, these featured as little more 
than anecdotal evidence for Schacht’s claim that an ‘asymmetrische Empathie’ 
for victims of pre- and post-1945 injustice had been institutionalised under the 
red-green government. This was questionable to say the least, given that he was 
speaking at an occasion intended to commemorate the victims of the special 
camp. Whilst he did describe conditions in the Speziallager by citing Gisela 
Gneist, a former internee and as of 2005 the chair of the ALS, her testimony was 
used to further pillory commemorative culture in the Berlin Republic. Thus, 
rather than allowing Gneist’s description of the awful conditions in the 
Speziallager to stand on its own, Schacht used it to ‘prove’ (‘beweisen’) that the 
citing of the Speziallager museum in the redesigned memorial concept was 
‘moralisch abgrundtief abwegig’.615 Aside from anything else, there was nothing 
in Gneist’s testimony that referenced the experience of imprisonment in the 
special camp and in the concentration camp in comparative terms, so the 
comparison Schacht nevertheless attempted to draw - as well as his assumption 
that the memorial concept was based on a victim hierarchy – rested on a wilful 
misreading of her words. Ultimately, then, this constituted a misuse of the 
witness’ voice in service of latter-day memory politics. 
Indeed, Schacht’s language alluded to a broader agenda that was tied to 
his criticism of the incumbent administration. At the very beginning of the 
speech, he referred to the Speziallager as ‘Gulag-Außenstellen’ and ‘die einst 
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westlichsten Lager des stalinschen Massenverfolgungs’,616 effectively effacing 
their link to Allied post-war denazification. At another point, however, he 
described the Gulag camps as the ‘[logische Endkonse-quenz des] 
kommunistischen Weltreinigungs-Entwurfs’ and therefore directly comparable to 
Auschwitz and the racially motivated ‘Weltreinigung’ attempted by the National 
Socialist regime.617 Finally, he drew on Karl Dietrich Bracher to argue that both 
Socialism and National Socialism evidenced ‘totalitäre[…], antiliberale[…] 
Züge[…] und [eine] Tendenz, den Menschen zu organisieren und zu 
reglementieren’.618 The overall effect was to blur completely the distinction 
between Stalinism, Communism, and Socialism and collapse all three together 
with National Socialism in a vague anti-totalitarian message. Given the 
interchangeable use of the terms, it was obvious that Schacht was interested in 
repudiating ‘communism’ per se and thus in challenging the federal 
government’s supposed fixation on the National Socialist past. 
For Schacht, this fixation was ideological, as he made clear by repeatedly 
linking the coordinates of official memory to a clutch of died-in-the-wool 
‘1968ers’ who had come to occupy hegemonic positions in politics, media, and 
the academy.619 Figures such as Fischer, whose activist past Schacht revelled in 
mentioning, were not just indifferent to recent evidence of the crimes committed 
by the Stalinist regime, he suggested, but actively concerned with suppressing it. 
Of course, this almost conspiratorial argument, predicated on the assumption that 
leftist cliques exerted control over memory culture in the Berlin Republic, 
resembled the stance of the UOKG, which has been discussed in chapter three. 
Here however, the logic was taken to the extreme, as the final sentence of 
Schacht’s speech demonstrated: 
 
‘Es geht also um einen weiteren geistigen Gesundungsprozess dieses 
Landes, dessen diesbezügliche Pathologie allerdings eher ein Merkmal 
seiner Funktions-Eliten in Bildung, Politik und Medien ist. Aber 
vielleicht macht gerade das ja – seiner macht-politischen Aspekte wegen 
– die Schwierigkeiten des notwendigen Heilungsprozesses aus. Bis dahin 
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kann deshalb die durch uns zu verabreichende Medizin ebenso notwendig 
nur bitter sein.’620  
 
According to this metaphor, the ideological hegemony of 1968ers in the 
political and public life of the Berlin Republic constituted a ‘pathological’ 
obsession with National Socialist crimes, which could only be ‘cured’ through 
counter-commemoration of German victimhood at the hands of the Stalinist and 
SED regimes. Evidently Schacht did not see the unfortunate overtones of a 
‘kranken Volkskörper’ in his rhetoric – a metaphor used by sections of the 
political right to describe German society in the interwar period.621 His concern, 
in any case, was rather to establish two opposing fronts in the struggle over 
memory of the past under the Red-Green government, pitting the attendees at the 
commemorative ceremony (‘uns’) against the state and its politics of 
remembrance.  
In light of this, there can be little doubt that Schacht intended his speech 
as a belated intervention in a debate that the inauguration of the Holocaust 
memorial had, on the face of it, already settled. For as we have seen, the 
memorial in many ways crowned the Social Democrat-Green coalition’s project 
of normalizing the Nazi past, insofar as it marked both an enshrinement of 
Holocaust memory in German political culture and a new, less obsessive 
relationship to it. After all, it was “ein Ort, an den man gerne geht”, to use 
Schröder’s own words,622 as much as a proclamation of remorse for National 
Socialist crimes. Schacht’s objective had been to express, in overblown terms, a 
refusal to accept this vision. His was the latest in a series of criticisms directed at 
federal commemorative policy over a number of years and from various quarters, 
as demonstrated above. Ultimately, then, the official internalisation of the 
injunction to remember did not persuade all Germans to follow suit, even if there 
is much to suggest that Schröder’s second term did in fact see a normalization of 
the past along the lines the chancellor himself envisaged.  
 
                                                
620 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
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Sachsenhausen, it should be noted, provided the stage – both 
metaphorically and, in Schacht’s case, literally – for several of these challenges 
to the federal position. It understandably seems difficult to square this with the 
fact that the memorial was itself in receipt of federal funding, and by dint of its 
proximity to the capital a ‘central’ site of National Socialist memory too. Yet the 
suggestion that it has moved not from but to the periphery of post-unification 
memory culture is not altogether unfounded. As Karen Till has argued, after 
1990 Sachsenhausen was ironically ‘displaced as a central, highly visible GDR 
place of memory and became a less visible national place of memory.’623 
Certainly, attention has been deflected from the site’s pre-1945 history by the 
parallel working through of Stalinist and East German communist crimes since 
unification – often with questionable motives, as indeed Schacht’s were. 
Moreover, the memorial experts’ insistence on drawing a distinction between 
‘authentic’ and artificial, central memorials in the debates on the Denkmal für die 
ermordeten Juden Europas encouraged a view of the former as parochial sites of 
remembrance. The following section looks at the extent to which this same 
tension between normative Holocaust remembrance and the handling of a more 
specifically East German double past at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen 
continued under Angela Merkel’s CDU/SPD Grand Coalition government. 
To illustrate this, I return first of all to Herman Schäfer’s controversial 
opening address at the 2006 Gedächtnis Buchenwald concert. Judging by 
responses in the national press, it does certainly seem that the memorial’s double 
past – not to mention its location, away from the seat of government but in the 
heart of formerly East German Thuringia – was strategically downplayed to 
avoid its intrusion into the story. In terms of newspaper articles that appeared 
immediately after the scandal, print media coverage was undeniably slow to 
recognise the significance of place and addressees for the debate that 
subsequently unfolded. Many of the larger newspapers relied on the Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur (dpa) newswire for the information that made its way into their 
reportage, and there was consequently a considerable deal of homogeneity in the 
content and shape of articles that appeared between August 26 and 28 2006. A 
quote from the Kunstfest organiser Nike Wagner, in which she referred to 
Schäfer’s failure to mention the victims of Buchenwald and focus on German 
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victims of flight and expulsion as ‘bedauerlich und unverständlich’, appeared 
without exception.624 These terms suggested an unprecedented but also 
unfortunate misjudgement rather than a calculated attempt at realigning memory 
discourses to include German victims.  
Indeed, only one article - ‘Beleidigung der Überlebenden’ in the Berliner 
Morgenpost – bore a headline indicating the potential harm caused by Schäfer’s 
comments, and in any case this felt like something of an anomaly, as other 
papers belonging to the Springer Press did not follow suit. That the speech was 
held near to Buchenwald and in the presence of several survivors of the camp 
was likewise of little consequence for early reportage. Primary emphasis fell on 
Schäfer’s cabinet position and institutional affiliation (he is a member of the 
advisory council to the foundation Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen and was 
formerly president of the foundation Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland based in Bonn). Thus the initial interpretation of the scandal at 
Weimar was clearly that of a senior politician’s lapse in judgement when 
speaking in an official capacity. 
By contrast, there appeared to be some recognition of the potentially serious 
implications of Schäfer’s speech in the left-liberal press. In both the taz and the 
Spiegel Online, reportage based on the dpa feed was accompanied by a comment 
piece; the only other newspaper to do this was the Bonn edition of the General-
Anzeiger, though in this case the interest was most likely on account of Schäfer’s 
previous connections to the city. Moreover, the latter regarded the deputy culture 
minister’s speech as simple ‘Instinktlosigkeit’ and his actions as a questionable 
exploitation of the occasion’s inevitable media echo – referred to as 
‘Profilbildung am ungeeigneten Thema’.625 The taz, by contrast, admonished 
Schäfer for the specific offence his speech caused to former Buchenwald 
prisoners who were in attendance, including the president of the International 
Buchenwald Committee Bertrand Herz, and in doing so perceived much more 
than rash judgement in his choice of words.626 By mentioning Herz and other 
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former prisoners amongst the ‘Zuhörer’, this article provided a clearer idea of 
whom Schäfer was addressing – a crucial element of the scandal his speech 
precipitated. In many of the articles above however, more vague reference was 
made to ‘[das] Publikum’. Furthermore, the accompanying comment article 
observed that Schäfer’s relativisation of wartime and post-war suffering, whether 
intended or not, was ‘auch den Initiatoren des “Zentrums gegen Vertreibungen” 
nicht fremd’, thereby aligning his actions with the those of what many in 
Germany regarded to be a highly polemical organisation.627 The Spiegel Online 
article of the same day begins: 
 
‘Die KZ-Ofper kamen in der Festrede des stellvertretenden 
Bundesbeauftragten für Kultur und Medien, Hermann Schäfer, anlässlich 
eines Gedenk-Konzerts in Buchenwald nicht zur Sprache. Volkhard Knigge, 
der Direktor der Gedenkstätte, fragt nun an höchster Stelle nach: Ist 
Verdrängung konsensfähig?’628    
 
Here, the article began with explicit mention of the very group Schäfer had 
ignored in his speech. Unlike other articles printed on the same day in the 
regional and conservative press, where Buchenwald appeared as a peripheral 
presence, the problematic nature of the site as a symbol of several distinct 
historical narratives of victimhood and suffering became patently clear. In the 
Frankfurter Rundschau two days later, this issue was also recognised, although 
the tone of the article was altogether different:  
 
‘Schäfer wollte die Gelegenheit nutzen, “ohne Scheu und offen” zu sagen, 
dass die deutschen Vertriebenen Opfer geworden seien. Vor sechzig Jahren. 
Als der große Krieg aus war. Daran zu erinnern gehöre auch “zur Pflege 
unseres Geschichtsbewusstseins”. Schäfer sprach ohne Unterlass darüber. Zu 
diesem Anlass. In der Stadt Goethes. Und ließ sich auch von Zwischenrufen – 
“Aufhören!” – überhaupt nicht irritieren. Schäfer redete einfach weiter. 
Immer weiter.’629 
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In this extract Schäfer’s poor judgement was criticised once again, but this 
time the article was clearly at pains to stress the inappropriateness of the speech. 
The staccato effect of shorter sentences imparted a clear sense of dismay and 
disbelief at Schäfer’s comments, which were relayed by an almost 
uncomprehending authorial voice. Indeed, Schäfer was depicted speaking ‘on 
and on’ despite calls from the audience to end his speech, lending it a 
masochistic quality – far more troubling than the comparatively naïve 
‘Unsensibilität’ that earlier reportage attributed to the speaker’s choice of 
words.630  
Thus we see the vocal criticism of Schäfer that was noticeable already in 
reportage from the previous day reach a crescendo. The language of this article 
was altogether more polemical, explicitly casting the speech as an affront on the 
credibility of German memory culture. It cited Volkhard Knigge’s praise for the 
audience’s intervention, in which he implicitly presented Schäfer’s speech as a 
threat by claiming that those who interrupted him ‘defended’ (‘verteidigt[en]’) 
memory culture. It is no small coincidence that these more scandalised responses 
and searching criticisms all came from left-liberal sections of the national press. 
Also, and perhaps more significantly, the Frankfurter Rundschau article 
represented the high watermark of focus on the scandal’s implications for 
memory debates in Germany. Whilst they were noted at this point, there was an 
increasing tendency in subsequent reportage to address them only as a corollary 
of other discussions focused on the protagonists in these debates. If articles 
appearing on August 30 referenced, in addition to Knigge’s comments, concerns 
of a ‘Gezeitenwechsel im Gedenken der Bundesrepublik’ raised by the vice-
president of the Central Council of Jews, then it was less than a week before the 
tenor of coverage in several newspapers had shifted. For on 4 September, the 
Hamburger Abendblatt offered an irreverent treatment of the episode, joking that 
Schäfer might well have brought the wrong notes with him to Weimar.631 An 
article that appeared in the Spiegel on the same day, too, diverted focus away 
from Buchenwald to consider Schäfer’s role within the Department for Culture 
and Media in the longue durée. As such, the scandal which erupted at the 
Kunstfest was only considered in light of what it revealed about this department’s 
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memory politics in the long term, and the article ended in any case with a 
comment on the ‘persönliche[n] Folgen’ of this episode –Schäfer was unlikely to 
be selected to succeed Norbert Lammert as chairperson of the Holocaust 
monument commission.632 
Even if both articles addressed memory culture to a certain extent, this was 
clearly subordinated to an interest in the individual(s) under discussion. In a 
Frankfurter Rundschau article from the following week, too, a retrospective 
analysis of the events at Weimar divested them of their significance for 
commemorative paradigms and instead saw personal consequences, specifically 
for the organiser of the Kunstfest, Nike Wagner, as having the greatest lasting 
resonance. The controversy caused by Schäfer’s speech was reduced here to a 
further thorn in the already strained relations between the countries forming the 
‘Weimarer Dreieck’ (Germany, France, Poland) and thus as damaging to 
Wagner’s continued custodianship of the Kunstfest, which had typically brought 
together contributions from all three states.633 
Was this evidence of a gradual decontextualisation of the original episode in 
the way it was reported over time? Certainly the discussion of German memory 
culture continued, but it was quickly uncoupled from the event itself in press 
reportage, and the specific context of the incident at Weimar – not to mention its 
entanglement with the historical significance of Buchenwald – seemed to be 
neglected altogether after little more than a week has passed. Accordingly, the 
following appeared in an article in Die Welt eight days after Schäfer’s 
controversial speech: 
 
‘Der Eklat von Weimar um den Kulturbürokraten Schäfer, dem zu 
Buchenwald nur das Leid der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945 einfiel, 
hat mit Recht im Lande große Empörung ausgelöst. 
 
Politische Instinktlosigkeit vermengt sich hier mit einem mentalen Muster, 
das viel schwerer wiegt. Es handelt sich um jenen Mangel an Empathie, 
jenes Unvermögen, mit den Leidenden und Bedürftigen zu fühlen, dem die 
Welt auch den Holocaust insgesamt verdankt, eine nicht nur, aber eben 
doch leider auch sehr typisch deutsche Furchtbarkeit, die offenbar in 
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gewissen Amtsstuben und wahrscheinlich weit darüber hinaus noch immer 
außerordentlich gut gedeiht.’634 
 
What began as a discussion of Schäfer’s speech in fact led into a general 
comment on the inability to respect and empathise with suffering (part and 
parcel, according to the author, of a broader democratisation of access to 
culture and an increasing desensitisation to it).635 Buchenwald was mentioned 
only once, and the survivors of the camp, the clear victims of Schäfer’s 
comments, received no mention at all. Furthermore, the author 
problematically advocated relating to all forms of culturally manifested 
suffering without distinguishing between them. As controversial a proposition 
as this historically de-contextualised form of empathy might have been, the 
article nevertheless failed to address a more pressing question posed by the 
debates set in motion by Schäfer’s speech, which was: to what extent was it 
permissible (rather than simply inappropriate) to mention post-1945 
victimhood at an occasion specifically honouring the victims of a National 
Socialist concentration camp? To what extent were historically separate and 
distinctive forms of suffering collapsible into a catch-all commemorative 
rubric, and to what end might this have been deemed acceptable?  
Where the backdrop to a commemorative act was Buchenwald, 
emblematic of Germany’s double past and evoking two entirely different 
victim complexes, a discussion of Empathie surely invited discussion of 
Parteilichkeit too – and this was entirely absent from the press reportage 
under discussion here. The initial mention of a possible 
‘Paradigmenwechsel’636 or ‘Akzentverschiebung’637 in Germany’s memory 
culture was not developed in later articles, leaving the crucial question of 
what Schäfer’s comments signified for the place of the Holocaust in public 
memory unanswered. That several articles cited Volkhard Knigge’s demand 
to know the federal government’s view on whether ‘der Konsens über die 
Sicht auf das dritte Reich aufgekündigt worden ist’ made this all the more 
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ironic.638 Symptomatic of this tendency to eschew the cultural dimensions of 
the ‘Eklat’ was an article that appears in the Berliner Zeitung on 29 August:  
 
‘Die Aufregung sollte indes nicht vergessen machen, dass die 
Eröffnungsveranstaltung des Weimarer Kunstfests ihren Schwerpunkt ja in 
einem Konzert hatte, das der Aufgabe des Gedenkens in berührender 
Weise gerecht wurde. Michael Gielen, Sohn eines jüdischen Emigranten, 
dirigierte die Neunte Symphonie des Juden Gustav Mahler; ein Werk, das 
auf unvergleichliche Weise den Gestus des Abschiednehmens und der 
Traurigkeit verbindet mit dem Trost. Gielen hat die brüchige, 
zersplitternde und dann doch wieder zu visionärer Entrücktheit 
zusammenfindende Textur dieser Musik mit der Weimarer Staatskapelle 
inständig und genau dargestellt. Es war Gielens erste Zusammenarbeit mit 
diesem Orchester. Die Staatskapelle Weimar ist kein Ensemble, mit dem 
ein Landesfürst renommiert, und wird auch immer wieder mal von 
thüringischen Fusionierungsgelüsten in ihrer Existenz bedroht. Die 
großartige Leistung, die sie erbrachte, hat solche Absichten hoffentlich 
entmutigt.’639 
 
Mentioning the Jewishness of both the conductor Michael Gielen, and 
Gustav Mahler, whose Ninth Symphony was performed at the Kunstfest under 
Gielen’s direction, ostensibly set up a counterpoint to Schäfer’s comments; 
given this event’s obvious connection to Holocaust memory, both the musical 
programme and inclusion of Gielen appeared to be apposite choices. Yet the 
connection was largely ignored, as are the questions it posed for the 
continuing primacy of Holocaust-centred memory politics in the respective 
approaches of the festival organisers and the federal government. Instead, the 
article shifted to routine reportage of the festival itself.   
How does one account for the receding interest in the cultural implications 
of the news story that was so quick to set in? The Frankfurter Allgemeine, for 
example, did not just ignore the potentially fruitful debate on memory politics 
                                                
638 See in particular ‘Regierung soll ihr Geschichtsbild darlegen’, Spiegel Online; also ‘Schäfer 
entshuldigt sich bei KZ-Opfern’, Spiegel Online, 28 Aug 2006 [online] 
<http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,434052,00.html>, last accessed 19 Apr 2011.  
639 Fuhrmann, ‘Gedenken in Klängen’. 
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that is to be had; it was positively dismissive of it. Basing its argument on the 
text of Schäfer’s speech, it allegeed that ‘[d]ieser von Buchenwald-Direktor 
Knigge geäußerte und sofort von Politikern aufgegriffene Verdacht [einer 
Veränderung der Gedenkstättenpolitik des Bundes]…im Redetext ohnehin 
keine Stütze [fand].’640 Yet this failed to recognise the importance of when 
and where something was said - not to mention who was saying it. As with so 
many of the newspaper articles analysed here, the context of Schäfer’s speech 
was underplayed, and Buchenwald, as backdrop, was elided almost 
completely. Ultimately then, Nike Wagner’s retrospective assessment of the 
scandal as a public ‘performance’ of complex memory debates did not hold 
up to scrutiny.641 Several sections of the national press were if anything intent 
not to participate in such a performance.     
Taken together, reportage of politicians and memorial experts’ 
mobilisation in defence of Holocaust-centred memory, and the absence of any 
prolonged debate in the German press dealing with official memory politics, 
suggest that this episode was more of an aberration than a seismic shift in the 
nation’s memory landscape. Far from seeking to challenge the ‘order of 
discourse’, press reportage normalized the scandal emerging from Hermann 
Schäfer’s speech by treating it as a personal lapse in judgement and divesting 
it of a sense of place. Buchenwald and its survivors appeared in press 
coverage sporadically at best, and even then, the distinctive Opferkonkurrenz 
centred on the site and Schäfer’s unintended intervention in this ongoing 
debate was barely elaborated upon. A normative view of the Holocaust as the 
defining national memory narrative was quickly reasserted, and eclipsed the 
more probing analysis found initially in the left-liberal press. By 12 October, 
the issue was arguably settled for good, as an article entitled ‘Streit über 
Buchenwald-Rede beigelegt’ suggests. Indeed, there was a perceptible 
element of closure to the debate here, as the reader learned of Schäfer and 
Bertrand Herz’s common desire for a ‘neue[...] erinnerungskulturelle[...] 
Sensibilisierung in Deutschland.’642 Just as in the Thuringian press (see 
                                                
640 ‘Gute deutsche Sätze’, FAZ, 30 Aug 2006, p. 33. 
641 F. Adrians and S. Schwager, ‘Nicht in Sack und Asche: Ein Gespräch mit Nike Wagner’, 
Thüringer Allgemeine, 15 Sept 2006. 
642 ‘Streit über Buchenwald-Rede beigelegt’, Die Welt, 12 Oct 2006. 
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chapter four), a conspicuously ‘neat’ resolution was reached without 
necessarily envisioning continued debate.  
Even if press discourse failed to recognise the constructedness of a national 
memory culture and the work that went into sustaining it, there is little doubt that 
it did however define memory culture in national terms and see it as inseparable 
from the nation-state. This view was by no means universally held, and indeed 
met with considerable opposition from other memory activists, not least the 
concentration camp victims’ associations. The Lagergemeinschaft Buchenwald-
Dora, in particular, took Schäfer to task in its newsletter, Die Glocke vom 
Ettersberg, chastising his failure to mention the victims of Buchenwald. Whilst 
the LAG recognised the political capacity in which Schäfer was speaking, and 
understood his involvement to lend the opening of the Kulturfest ‘einen politisch 
angemessenen Rahmen’, it clearly expected more than a hollow re-statement of 
the Bund’s position on the Nazi past.643 This was, of course, an occasion that by 
its very name – Gedächtnis Buchenwald – implicitly commemorated victims of 
the camp on the Ettersberg, but for the LAG its commemorative function was 
obvious enough in the choice of location. Consequently, Schäfer had misjudged 
not only the ‘Anlass’ but also the ‘Ort’ by failing to dedicate even a sentence to 
the victims of Buchenwald.644 As far as the LAG was concerned, then, on this 
occasion Weimar stood metonymically for Buchenwald; the hallowed ground of 
the memorial extended into the town proper. Later in the article, moreover, 
Weimar’s mayor Stephan Wolf is noted to have objected to Schäfer’s speech, 
claiming that ‘[d]er Inhalt der Rede…Weimars Umgang mit seiner 
Vergangenheit [nicht entspreche].’645 In the LAG’s eyes Weimar was both a 
commemorative and political space, and Schäfer’s miscalculation was therefore 
all the more severe for having transgressed both commemorative and political 
norms.  
The article’s almost sacred interpretation of the locality as an extension of 
the memorial site was carefully distinguished from national and international 
memory spaces. Schäfer himself, deputising for the Cultural Minister Bernd 
Neumann, represented the national (that is, federal) position, which was 
                                                
643 Ulrich Schneider, ‘Politischer Skandal zur Eröffnung der “pélerinage”’, Die Glocke vom 
Ettersberg, 183, 3 (2006), p. 1. 
644 Ibid., p. 1. 
645 Ibid., p. 1. 
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unsurprisingly regarded with suspicion. Citing the president of the IKBD, 
Bertrand Herz, the LAG spoke of a ‘“nationalistische[…] Rede”’, indicating a 
latent fear that Schäfer’s – and by extension the federal government’s – agenda 
had been to resuscitate a conservative vision of German normality. Evidently the 
LAG did not share the Schröder and Merkel administrations’ view that a normal 
Germany was one that faced up to past crimes. Instead, the national norm looked 
to the victims’ organisation more like a renewed attempt to draw a line under the 
Nazi past. It was not without reason that it implicated Schäfer in triggering a 
‘Grundsatzdebatte über das Geschichtsverständnis der Bundesrepublik’.646 
Unlike in the national press, here the notion of a ‘national’ memory discourse 
was in and of itself a cause for concern. On the evidence of the article, the 
LAG’s fretfulness vis-à-vis German national memory owed to an underlying 
assumption that German nationalism in whatever form was problematic – hence 
its refusal to accept the CDU/CSU’s assurances that Schäfer’s speech had no 
political implications. Far from seeing German self-assertiveness and a 
commitment to remembering German crimes as two sides of the same coin, as 
Schröder and Merkel did, the LAG derived an imperative to remember from the 
European legacy of resistance to fascism. Thus, when it spoke of an 
‘antifaschistische Öffentlichkeit’, it was not Germanness but rather the 
international resistance movements with their roots in opposition to Nazism that 
defined the term’s parameters.647  
  It almost goes without saying that the national culture of remembrance 
advanced by the normalization paradigm since 1998 does not hold up to closer 
scrutiny. Though it is clear that the press reportage discussed above internalises 
and reproduces this normative view of national memory, there is equally ample 
evidence of attempts to challenge or subvert it. Furthermore, looking specifically 
at the question of the double past and the situation on the ground at Buchenwald 
and Sachsenhausen allows for a more fine-grained picture of cultural 
representation that moves beyond the simplistic view of Holocaust singularity 
versus Holocaust comparability. As has been shown, there are also differences 
within these two positions. Whilst associations representing survivors of the 
concentration camps may, for instance, share the federal government’s vision of 
Holocaust centrality, they distance themselves from federal attempts to fuse 
                                                
646 Ibid., p. 1. 
647 Ibid., p. 1. 
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remembrance to a revitalised concept of national identity. For their part, 
memorial professionals were uneasy about a central Holocaust memorial not 
because of a concern at nationalising negative commemoration but because of 
the memorial’s uneasy and ill-defined relationship to other, ‘authentic’ sites 
advancing their own claims to commemorate the victims of National Socialism. 
Decisive in accounting for these discrepancies is the quality of the sites 
themselves, as putatively ‘authentic’ but speaking to multiple histories of 
injustice and historically performing ‘central’ functions of different kinds. 
Consequently the memorials served somewhat paradoxically to prop up the 
dominant ’68er memory discourse for politicians such as Schröder, and to de-
centre it, both spatially and narratologically, for others such as Ulrich Schacht. 
Indeed, Sachsenhausen’s proximity to Berlin made it particularly amenable to 
articulating and drawing attention to a disconnect between the national 
dimensions of Holocaust memory and the parochialism of the double past. It was 
simultaneously collapsed together with the capital and banished to its fringes, 
both mimetic of ‘memory culture’ in the Berlin Republic and external to it at the 
same time. In Buchenwald’s case, it was only the erosion of a sense of place in 
normative iterations of memory discourse, such as press discourse, that allowed 
it to stand in metonymically for a culture of remembrance focused on the 
National Socialist past. 
Finally, there is a clear sense emerging from the discussion so far of an 
underlying dynamic behind the discourses at and around both memorials. What 
we are dealing with are self-evidently ‘memory contests’, to use Anne Fuchs and 
Mary Cosgrove’s instructive term, insofar as they resemble ‘retrospective 
imaginings that simultaneously articulate, question and investigate the normative 
self-image of groups of people’ – the group being in this case the German nation-
state.648 Yet the concept of ‘memory contests’, with its emphasis on the ongoing 
negotiation and re-negotiation of prevailing memory paradigms, cannot 
adequately convey the fact that protagonists in these debates operate within 
particular institutional contexts, themselves governed by pre-existing norms and 
conventions, which are crucial to understanding the communicative situation in 
which such contests play out. 
 
                                                
648 Anne Fuchs and Mary Cosgrove, ‘Introduction’, German Life & Letters, Special ed. on 
German Memory Contests, 59, 2 (2006), 163-168 (p. 164). 
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Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen on the frontier of 
European memory politics 
 
The ‘Europeanization’ of Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen since the 1990s has 
occurred on two distinct planes. The first is the plane of Holocaust memory, 
which as an increasingly global phenomenon has re-contextualised German 
memorials to the victims of National Socialism – and not least the concentration 
camp memorials – within a trans-national landscape of remembrance. The 
second plane, the legacy of communism (in its Stalinist, Soviet, and East German 
variants), has also since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 been opened up 
to pan-European discussion. Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, quite uniquely, 
feature prominently in both memory frameworks, though as we will see this very 
rarely results in a productive form of dialogue. Far more often the sites find 
themselves at the frontier of European memory wars fought over the legacy of 
National Socialism and communism for the continent. This section looks at these 
struggles for hegemony in European memory discourse as a further dimension of 
memory debates at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen.         
The backdrop to the discussion that follows is the sustained efforts on the 
part of several pan-European political bodies to institutionalise memory of 
communism in Europe. These efforts are characterised by recent calls for a day 
of remembrance dedicated to the victims of totalitarian regimes on August 23, to 
coincide with the anniversary of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact signed in 
1939 (the so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, named after its signatories). 
Amongst other things, the proposal’s explicitly anti-totalitarian message has been 
heavily criticised by those who see it as an attempt to marginalise the place of the 
Holocaust in European memory. The following section maps out the attempts to 
implement an anti-totalitarian commemorative paradigm in Europe, above all 
through the August 23 day of remembrance, and pays particular attention to the 
responses of stakeholders at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. It asks to what end 
they intervene in European memory debates, and how these interventions both 
shape and are shaped by national and international cultural contexts. Thus it 
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takes as its starting point the proposition that the memorials’ place in these 
European-wide memory contests is integral to a critique of an institutionalised 
narrative on the double past. The process of Europeanisation has unfolded in 
complex interplay with a parallel national discourse, and is further crosscut by 
the autopoietic configuration of discourses within and across these spaces.     
First it is necessary to map out the main protagonists in debates on 
European identity and memory. Of the various supranational political institutions 
in Europe, those most active in efforts at working through and representing the 
National Socialist and communist pasts have been the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe (PACE), the EU Parliament, and the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The PACE was the first to issue 
concrete recommendations, passing Resolution 1096 ‘on measures to dismantle 
the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems’649 in 1996. It dealt above 
all with the process of post-communist democratic transition, and therefore 
promoted decentralisation, de-militarization, privatisation, de-bureaucratisation, 
and the opening of secret police archives, paying comparatively little attention to 
the question of historical memory. Ten years later, the PACE issued Resolution 
1481 ‘Need for international condemnation of crimes of totalitarian communist 
regimes’,650 indicating the organisation’s strongly anti-communist stance. 
Ultimately, as the resolution did not achieve the two-thirds majority required in 
order to pass on to the ministerial committee or for the measures it outlined to be 
implemented, it possessed little more than a ‘deklatorischen Charakter’.651 In a 
sense, then, it typified the memory wars being fought out in post-unification 
Europe: it was of a largely symbolic nature, concerned with valuations of 
political systems and focused on the acknowledgement rather than on the 
concrete redress of historical suffering.   
The EU, meanwhile, energetically pursued what Stefan Troebst refers to 
as a ‘To do-Liste zur “EU-einheitlichen Überwindung diktatorischer 
                                                
649 ‘RESOLUTION 1096 (1996) on measures to dismantle the heritage of former communist 
totalitarian systems’, 27 Jun 1996 (online) 
http://www.assembly.coe.int//main.asp?link=http://www.assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedT
ext/ta96/ERES1096.htm [last accessed 13 May 2013] 
650 http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta06/Eres1481.htm. Last 
accessed 10 Oct 2013. 
651 Hammerstein and Hofmann, ‘Europäische Interventionen: Resolutionen und Initiativen zum 
Umgang mit diktatorischer Vergangenheit’ in Hammerstein et al. (eds.), Aufarbeitung der 
Diktatur, pp. 189-203 (pp. 199-200). 
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Vergangenheiten’652 in the late 2000s, passing a resolution in 2008 
recommending the commemoration of the Ukrainian famine of 1932/33, the 
Holodomor, and issuing a statement on the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in 2009. 
On the basis of these recommendations, even extending, in the case of the 
Holodomor proposals, beyond member states, it was made abundantly clear that 
the EU wished to stake out a claim for itself as a prominent memory activist in 
Europe. Already in 2005 it had sought to place the Holocaust at the centre of 
European historical memory and identity through a resolution on 
Commemoration of the Holocaust, anti-Semitism, and Racism.653 It was passed 
on 27 January 2005 – the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz – and 
established an International Holocaust Remembrance Day, following similar 
initiatives introduced earlier in Germany (1996) and the UK (2001). Yet a later 
motion on the Future of Europe 60 Years after the Second World War appeared 
to then undermine the centrality of the Holocaust, making amongst other things 
repeated allusions to a narrative of unbroken dictatorship and continuing 
victimisation in the Soviet Bloc. As Katrin Hammerstein and Birgit Hoffmann 
have suggested, the effect of the EU parliamentarians’ rhetoric was to create a 
homogenizing European ‘Befreiungsnarrativ’ predicated on both 1945 and 1989 
that emphasized shared victimhood and conveniently sidestepped the thorny 
issue of complicity in National Socialist atrocities.654 
By 2008, this anti-totalitarian form of history politics had gained 
considerable traction. Indeed, the Prague Declaration on European Conscience 
and Communism, issued on 3 June 2008 by a number of prominent Eastern 
European politicians and historians, amongst them Václav Havel and Joachim 
Gauck, contained the first call for a day of remembrance in honour of the victims 
of European totalitarian regimes.655 Brussels evidently took heed of the demands 
formulated in the Prague Declaration, as the European Parliament itself issued a 
call for the 23 August day of remembrance in September of the same year. An 
official resolution followed on 2 April 2009. In mid-2009 the Organisation for 
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Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also advocated the August 23 
memorial day. Pan-European memory discourses were now widely embracing 
anti-totalitarian readings of the continent’s ‘short twentieth century’.  
How did stakeholders at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen react to these 
developments on the European stage? For its part, the LAG Buchenwald-Dora 
mobilised against what it perceived to be historical revisionism 
(‘Geschichtsfälschung’) by critcising the OSCE’s stance in its newsletter.656 The 
latter was accused of advancing a ‘reaktionär[es] Geschichtsbild’ that was for 
one thing reminiscent of Cold War-era anti-totalitarianism, and for another aimed 
at supplanting the ‘Vermächtnis der politischen Gemeinsamkeiten der Anti-
Hitler-Koalition für ein demokratisches und friedliches Europa.’657 For the 
antifascist milieu, the OSCE resolution, as an intervention in European memory 
debates and civic politics, has raised the stakes to a continental struggle for 
hegemony over the past. In response, the LAG propagated its own model of 
trans-national memory as the basis for a European identity. This was a decidedly 
Western and Holocaust-centred model, given that the LAG foregrounded 
opposition to Nazism – this was after all the ‘Anti-Hitler-Koalition’ – and 
explicitly extended solidarity to Israel. If a commitment to publicly remembering 
the Holocaust did indeed constitute, as the late British historian Tony Judt 
pointedly observed, an entry ticket into the EU,658 then the memory community 
envisaged by the LAG would presumably have resembled an EU in its pre-2004 
guise prior to eastwards expansion.  
This appeared all the more true in light of the LAG’s justification for 
upholding human rights and civil liberties. Rather than derive this from anti-
totalitarian imperatives, the LAG took the Buchenwald Oath as a historical 
precedent, thereby challenging the OSCE’s (not to mention the PACE’s and the 
EU Parliament’s) narrative of European memory on two important counts.659 
Firstly, the LAG used the history of resistance to Nazism and not the Russo-
German pact of 1939 as its temporal point of reference. Secondly, it used a 
spatial point of reference that was westwards of the former Soviet satellite states 
that had driven on the 23 August initiative: Buchenwald. By enacting such a 
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657 Ibid., p. 6. 
658 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (London: Vintage Books, 2010), p. 803. 
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shift, the LAG was able to align its vision of European memory with an 
ideological – that is, Western communist – vision of internationalism predicated 
on the narrative of resistance at Buchenwald.         
What about the response of the memorial professionals to the European 
anti-totalitarian narrative? In short, they opposed equation of the National 
Socialist and communist pasts, though this hardly comes as a surprise given the 
evidence presented in previous chapters. Perhaps the more pertinent question for 
our purposes then is whether, in propagating a differentiated model of sites and 
their double past in Europe, the memorial professionals implicated Buchenwald 
and Sachsenhausen in a trans-national as opposed to German cultural space. 
Günter Morsch for one concedes that the memorials are ‘sites for the collective 
memory and national identity of the European peoples’.660 What I intend to 
highlight in the remainder of this section of the chapter, however, is that the 
memorial professionals frame their discourse on the sites around scientific 
principles as well as moral appeals to collective memory. On this reading, 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen belong less to one or another European 
narrative of the “age of extremes” than to a scientific code. Indeed, on the 
evidence of two recent exhibitions curated by the staff at Buchenwald and the 
Sachsenhausen memorial’s engagement with the 23 August initiative, 
Europeanization has not altered the principles underlying professional discourse 
on the site’s multiple pasts. On the other hand, the position of the memorial 
professionals attests to the difficulties of separating objective documentation of 
history from the social and cultural – not to mention moral – contexts within 
which this takes place. I turn first to Sachsenhausen before looking at 
Buchenwald. 
I begin with Günter Morsch’s response to the proposed day of 
remembrance. This came in the form of an article published in the journal Blätter 
für deutsche und internationale Politik, in which Morsch cautioned against 
exacerbating existing disagreements over the interpretation of the past by 
supporting an ahistorical European commemorative master-narrative. He 
objected in particular to the effect of arbitrarily attributing dictatorial crimes to a 
common totalitarian plan for Europe, as implied by singling out the signing of 
                                                
660 Günter Morsch, ‘Concentration Camp Memorials in Eastern Germany since 1989’, in 
JRemembering for the Future: The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide, ed. by. John K. Roth and 
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the Hitler-Stalin Pact on 23 August 1939 and thereby obscuring the link between 
pre-war anti-Semitism, the policy of Lebensraum, and conflict and genocide in 
Europe.661 In response, he pointed to the European Parliament’s 1993 resolution 
on the concentration camp memorials and the Vermächtnis as evidence of the 
international consensus surrounding the principle of historical differentiation.  
Notably however, he took the view that the memorial professionals 
operated outside of this consensus, acting as a neutral party interested only in 
defending institutional autonomy. This was apparent not least in his claim that 
‘Wissenschaft [es] schwer [hat], sich gegen Instrumentalisierungen und 
Vereinnahmungen zu behaupten’.662 The fact was, however, that the memorials 
to the double past were unavoidably political actors in the debate over European 
memory, whether they professed to be or not. After all, Morsch himself had 
openly criticised the 23 August day of remembrance in the name of the 
Brandenburg Memorials Foundation, and it was hard to see how this defence of 
autonomy did not also constitute a political statement. Rather than frame his 
intervention as such though, he laid out a set of principles (‘Grundsätze’) in his 
article that he felt ought to serve as guidelines for international memorial sites.663 
Yet one needed only to look at these to see that his broader ideal of memorial site 
practice was informed by the lessons learned in the course of Sachsenhausen’s 
post-unification redesign. Morsch recognised that the work of memorials existed 
within particular times, spaces and epistemologies, yet presented the concept 
developed at Sachsenhausen – itself a product of a specific set of historical 
circumstances relating to German unification – as a normative model. Moreover, 
his proposed guidelines were soon adopted almost word-for-word into the 
International Memorial Museums Charter (see below), creating a precedent for 
site-based documentation and commemoration in a wide range of contexts. 
Where the politics of this lay was in the (un-reflected) link between ensuring 
institutional autonomy and the more specific goal of resisting the anti-totalitarian 
paradigm within Europe.    
Morsch’s consternation at the proposed day of remembrance was shared 
by the Working Group of the Memorials for the Victims of National Socialism in 
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Berlin and Brandenburg. The Working Group decided to voice its concern by 
addressing an open letter to the governing mayor of Berlin, Klaus Wowereit and 
the Minister President of Brandenburg, Matthias Platzeck. Historically speaking, 
the objections raised in the open letter were perfectly valid, and the ‘anti-
totalitarian’ position did indeed rely upon a number of questionable and/or 
reductive interpretations of both National Socialism and the various 20th century 
communist regimes it addressed, as discussed above. All the same, the Working 
Group’s intervention highlighted the extent to which the memorials’ neutral role 
as ‘Sachwalter der ermordeten und überlebenden Opfer’664 advocated by Günter 
Morsch in 1993 was tested by developments in Europe.  
It should therefore come as no surprise that the Brandenburg Memorials 
Foundation – and Morsch himself, who was the speaker for the Working Group 
at the time – lent their support to the open letter, as the conundrum posed by the 
23 August initiative was felt most acutely at memorials to the double past such as 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. Opposing the August 23 day of remembrance 
could be seen as an expression of partisanship, not least because certain groups 
representing the victims of the Speziallager welcomed the establishment of an 
anti-totalitarian commemorative paradigm in Europe.665 Despite this, the open 
letter did seem intent on politicising the objection it raised to the anti-totalitarian 
narrative by drawing attention to the political consensus surrounding Holocaust 
commemoration. It was published on 19 January 2012, shortly before the 
German Memorial Day for the Victims of National Socialism and international 
Holocaust Memorial Day on 27 January. As was pointed out, this juncture 
therefore presented ‘eine gute Gelegenheit, um dem “Vermächtnis” der letzten 
Überlebenden von Holocaust und NS-Terror Gehör zu verschaffen und uns 
ihrem Appell anzuschließen….’666 Even if the focus was on civic actors – the 
survivors of the Holocaust – and their commitment to remembering National 
Socialist terror, it was the political initiative in the form of the 27 January 
memorial day that would provide the vehicle for propagating their legacy. The 
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Working Group was invoking one institutionalised memory discourse in order to 
combat another. 
Indeed, setting up an opposition between 27 January and 23 August lent 
the Vermächtnis political dimensions, as it now functioned as a counter-argument 
intended to discredit the case for collectively memorializing all victims of 
‘totalitarianism’. There could certainly be no argument with the section of the 
Vermächtnis the open letter quoted, which merely opposed a hierarchisation of 
victims or equation of separate instances of historical suffering. 667 Yet this was a 
letter addressed to the political representatives of Berlin and Brandenburg, 
making an outright demand of them: 
 
‘Wir bitten die beiden Landesregierungen…, diesen Initiativen zur 
Einführung dieses Gedenkstages [sic] sowohl in den beiden 
Bundesländern als auch auf nationaler und europäischer Ebene nicht zu 
folgen, sondern sie abzulehnen und ihnen zu widersprechen.’668 
     
In principal, the open letter was consistent with what Morsch had outlined 
several years earlier in relation to the double past, namely that political actors 
were responsible for establishing the ‘Rahmenbedingungen’ for a democratic 
culture of remembrance.669 Resisting the attempts to establish a memorial day to 
victims of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, it could legitimately be argued, 
was a defence of democratic and plural remembrance rather than a political 
impingement upon it.  
On the other hand, the Working Group sought to enlist prominent 
regional politicians in mounting this defence, and aimed to use the 27 January 
Memorial Day as its own strategic platform. There was, it should be said, 
nothing in the open letter to suggest that criticising an ahistorical ‘relativisation’ 
(‘Relativierung’) of the Holocaust came at the expense of recognising 
victimhood under communist regimes. The open letter was very clear that the 
victims of communism should be commemorated, and welcomed a separate 
memorial day. What it proposed was rather that it should be the victims 
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themselves who decided upon the proposed August 23 commemorations and not 
political will.670 Yet when it came to advocating the singularity of the Holocaust 
in European memory, the political implications were more opaque to the 
Working Group, which arguably took the self-evident historical grounds for 
singularity to mean, logically, its commemoration as a singular event throughout 
Europe. As this chapter has shown however, differentiation between National 
Socialism and communism in commemorative discourse has become a very 
different prospect with considerably different political cache in the expanded, 
post-2004 EU. Even domestically in Germany, differentiation as opposed to 
equation remains some distance away from becoming an automatic reflex, as the 
lingering after-effects of the Historikerstreit have shown. On a continental scale 
the matter is complicated further still by the more than 40-year experience of 
communist rule that many EU member states from Eastern Europe have in 
common. 
This of course presented the memorial professionals with an ethical 
dilemma. Indisputably they must continue to treat persecution and terror under 
National Socialism as a moral absolute and historical fact, for to fail to do so 
would come perilously close to a form of historical relativism that would play 
right into the hands of Holocaust deniers. Yet by adopting this approach, it 
conversely becomes harder to highlight the cultural constructedness of Holocaust 
memory. Given that this is, in turn, integral to understanding how and why 
memorials such as Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen could be re-designed in the 
1990s, and now find themselves in the position they do today, it is a (changing) 
context that cannot be ignored. Not that the Europeanization of the memorials 
ought to trigger an abandonment of the historically and scientifically sound 
principles agreed upon during this re-design process. Rather, the primarily 
German context of the Neugestaltung in the 1990s should be distinguished from 
the European dimensions of the memory politics Morsch and the Working Group 
were addressing in 2012.671    
The open letter, however, betrayed little recognition of this distinction. It 
overlooked the fact that the case for differentiation – and by extension for 
                                                
670 ‘Offener Brief’, p. 3. 
671 The regional governments of Berlin and Brandenburg were enjoined to resist measures at 
introducing the 23 August memorial day ‘sowohl in den beiden Bundesländern als auch auf 
nationaler und europäischer Ebene’. ‘Offener Brief’, p. 2.  
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opposition to the 23 August initiative – was shored up by an at least partial 
institutionalisation of Holocaust remembrance. Whereas federal discourse and 
press reportage overstated the extent of this institutionalisation, as we have seen 
in this chapter and chapter four, the Working Group was for its part too quick to 
dismiss it. 2012 was not 1991, after all, and the Berlin and Brandenburg 
memorial sites could call upon a repertoire of established commemorative 
traditions, symbols, and institutions to justify their defence of the Holocaust’s 
singularity, as they did when they tactically referenced International Holocaust 
Memorial Day. Neither this initiative, nor principles such as the ‘Faulenbach 
Formel’ had by contrast been available to the Historians’ Commission when it 
began its work re-conceptualising the GDR memorial at Sachsenhausen. As it 
was, the Neugestaltung served the autopoietic operation of a discursive system 
orientated around scientific distinctions when it came to commemorating 
Europe’s ‘short’ twentieth century. It was a resource for dealing with the dual 
legacies of National Socialism and communism that was carried over onto the 
European stage in 2012. 
As for Buchenwald, the memorial site has operated somewhat differently 
on the European stage, preferring for the most part to remain quiet on the 
proposed anti-totalitarian memorial day. Members of the Buchenwald staff have 
for the past few years been involved in curating two large-scale travelling 
exhibitions. The first of these to open, in September 2010, was an overview 
exhibition on forced labour in the Third Reich entitled Zwangsarbeiter: Die 
Deutschen, die Zwangsarbeiter, und der Krieg. The second, Gulag: Spuren und 
Zeugnisse 1929-1956 was the result of collaboration between the Buchenwald 
and Mittelbau-Dora Memorials Foundation and the Russian civil rights initiative 
Memorial, and constituted the first comprehensive exhibition on the topic in 
Germany. The dual exhibitions can be interpreted in two ways. Given the 
decidedly European spirit of cooperation out of which they grew, and the fact 
that both have toured in and outside of Germany, I would argue that they can be 
seen on the one hand as a dyadic intervention in the European memory discourse. 
Besides, in the foreword to the Gulag exhibition catalogue the editors explicitly 
position it as a response to the late Jorgé Semprún’s enjoinder to work towards a 
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collective European memory of National Socialism and Soviet communism.672 
Taking this view, it follows that the process has entailed displacing memory 
work from the physical memorial itself and in turn altered the role of the 
Gedenkstätte from a site of remembrance to an actor in European memory 
debates. 
On the other hand, the exhibitions constituted bodies of historical 
research and fulfilled a documentary function. Indeed, Semprún’s incitement to 
create a unified European memory did not automatically imply a political 
agenda, and certainly not one that overtly took aim at the 23 August initiative in 
the way the open letter did. In fact, the decision to curate two separate 
exhibitions covering the periods before and after 1945 respectively indicated 
adherence to the principle of differentiation that the Historians’ Commission had 
first recommended as a guideline for Buchenwald’s redesign in the early 1990s. 
Likewise, the Zwangsarbeit exhibition was the first of the two exhibitions to 
open, which could be read as a prioritisation of the National Socialist past – 
another principle established by the Historians’ Commission. Together the 
exhibitions might well have provided some of the factual raw material necessary 
for the creation of a European memory, but they attested to a self-referential 
mode of operation insofar as they reproduced existing institutional norms and 
standards.  
What the forced labour and Gulag exhibitions do also illustrate is that 
such discursive ‘systems’ do not operate in a cultural and political vacuum. This 
is borne out by a closer inspection of the commemorative and financial 
circumstances that gave rise to each of the exhibitions. Funding for the forced 
labour exhibition came from the Foundation for Remembrance, Responsibility 
and Future (Stiftung Erinnerung, Verantwortung, und Zukunft; hereafter Stiftung 
EVZ), which had been established at the turn of the millennium to administer 
compensation payments to forced labourers in the Third Reich. This process had 
been formally completed by the time work on the exhibition began, such that it 
received money from the foundation’s ‘future funds’ – effectively remaining 
funds that had been ring-fenced and dedicated to the project of ensuring ongoing 
remembrance. The exhibition highlighted the advanced stage at which 
                                                
672 ‘Vorwort der Initiatoren’ in Gulag: Spuren und Zeugnisse 1929-1956: Begleitband zur 
Ausstellung, ed. by Volkhard Knigge and Irina Scherbakowa (eds.),  (Göttingen: Wallstein, 
2012), pp. 4-7 (p. 7). 
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Germany’s post-Holocaust transition found itself, having effectively satisfied 
material terms such as restitution and institutionalised symbolic redress in the 
form of remembrance too.  
By contrast, the Gulag exhibition was explicitly intended to address 
something of a lacuna in German historical consciousness. 673 Tellingly, by the 
project leader Volkhard Knigge’s own admission funding had been in this 
instance much harder to come by.674 This was symptomatic of the place Soviet 
terror occupied on the fringes of German cultural memory and the ground the 
post-communist transitional process still had to make up. Thus, even taking into 
account the European themes and touring itineraries of the exhibitions, they in 
many ways owed to the specific imbalance of German memory culture. The 
foundation upheld its commitment to the scholarly principle of differentiation – it 
produced exhibitions dealing with both National Socialism and Soviet 
communism, and completed the forced labour exhibition before turning its 
attention to the Gulag. It would be shortsighted, however, to separate a codified 
historical practice out from the cultural contexts in which it takes place.    
For Gerhard Finn, a representative of the Speziallager victims in the 
international advisory council of the Buchenwald and Mittelbau-Dora Memorials 
Foundation and honorary chair of the UOKG, the Gulag exhibition was not so 
much historical research as propaganda. In a review of the exhibition catalogue 
written for the Memorial Library in Honour of the Victims of Communism in 
Berlin, Finn offered a damning indictment of the foundation, which he believed 
to be pursuing a political agenda. As he concluded in the final line of the review: 
‘Die Gulag-Dokumentation zeigt bei aller Qualität erneut, wie geschickt man 
politische Meinung verbreiten kann.’675 As far as he was concerned, the 
publication effectively propped up an ‘antifascist’ interpretation of Soviet crimes 
– which is to say an interpretation that wilfully downplayed them. The currency 
of this particular narrative, meanwhile, was attributed to a 
‘Meinungsführerschaft’ led by ‘Neue Antifaschisten’ who were able to ‘establish 
                                                
673 Knigge/Scherbakowa, Gulag, p. 5. 
674 See H. Wetzel, ‘Gulag-Ausstellung mit viel Prominenz in Weimar eröffnet’, TA, 20 Aug 2012 
(online) http://www.thueringer-allgemeine.de/web/zgt/suche/detail/-/specific/Gulag-Ausstellung-
mit-viel-Prominenz-in-Weimar-eroeffnet-909937724. Last accessed 3 May 2013. 
675 Gerhard Finn, ‘Review of Volkhard Knigge and Irina Scherbakowa (eds.), Gulag: Spuren und 
Zeugnisse 1929-1956. Begleitband zur Ausstellung (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012)’, 4pp. (online) 
<http://gedenkbibliothek.de/download/Gerhard_Finn_zu_-
_Volkhard_Knigge_Irina_Scherbakowa_Hg._Gulag_-_Spuren_und_Zeugnisse_1929-
1956._Begleitband_zur_Ausstellung.pdf> [last accessed 30 Apr 2013], p. 4.  
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themselves’ (‘sich einnisten’) following German unification.676 This resembled, 
most obviously, Ulrich Schacht’s attack on the memory politics of the ‘68er 
generation. Beyond that, however, Finn’s allegation that a conspiratorial 
consensus had been constructed around the primacy of the National Socialist past 
in German memory culture was a hallmark of the UOKG’s broader rhetoric, as 
Martin Jander has recently shown.677 Finn, much like Schacht and the UOKG, 
claimed that the national memory establishment’s exclusive fixation on the 
period 1933-45 was calculated to screen the victims of communism from view.   
It was hypocritical to say the least for Finn to suggest a political motive 
behind the exhibition catalogue when his own intention in reviewing it was 
clearly to lobby for the Speziallager victims. Indeed, his overwhelming focus on 
the ‘”deutsche Seite” des Gulag-Bereiches’, which he felt to be ignored in the 
catalogue, and his attack on the ‘linke[…] Stiftungsleute[…]’ at German 
memorials to the double past (especially Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen) was 
just as much an instrumentalisation of the history of the Gulag.678 Not only did it 
overlook the transnational, decade-long history of the Gulag camps, which was 
virtually bracketed off from the (far longer) excursion into the history and 
commemoration of the Speziallager and confined to a single introductory 
paragraph. It also assumed the latter should be afforded far more space in the 
catalogue, when the fact that they were only under the administration of the 
Gulag between 1948-1950 would hardly seem to justify such prominence in a 
publication expressly dealing with the period 1929-1956. In any case, two 
German prisoners in the special camps did feature in the catalogue: one a 
member of the camp personnel at KZ Mittelbau-Dora and the other an inmate 
belonging to the burial work detail at Buchenwald, who was deported to the 
Soviet Union in 1950.679 To the extent that the catalogue did handle the 
Speziallager, then, it was fair to say that it touched upon both their role in de-
nazification and the lack of any due process afforded to prisoners.  
Thus Finn’s claim that ‘[p]olitische Voreingenommenheiten…den 
Anstand vor den Opfern [überdecken]’ was a rather unfair assessment of the 
                                                
676 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
677 Martin Jander, ‘Kultur der Aufrechnung: Erneute deutsche Opfermythologie und radikaler 
Antikommunismus: Die Union der Opferverbände Kommunistischer Gewaltherrschaft (UOKG)’, 
in Ein Kampf um Deutungshoheit, ed. by Benz, pp. 125-161 (esp p. 161). 
678 Finn, Review of Knigge/Scherbakowa (eds.), Gulag: Spuren und Zeugnisse, p. 3. 
679 Gulag: Spuren und Zeugnisse 1929-1956, ed. by Knigge/Scherbakowa, pp. 100-101 
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catalogue, all the more so as he himself lost sight of non-German victims by 
insisting on such extensive coverage of the Speziallager.680 But he did raise a 
valid point by questioning the extent to which the principle of differentiation, 
too, was more than a matter of professional standards. Bernd Faulenbach notes 
that post-unification Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Germany has tended to 
follow the principle of ‘Arbeitsteiligkeit’, according to which respective 
sectional interest groups deal with specific aspects of the national past.681 Put 
another way, it is typically the case that certain groups concern themselves with 
the National Socialist dictatorship, others with communist regimes, and a final 
group with both phases of the double past. Faulenbach concedes, however, that 
these divisions within the memory establishment are at least partially explained 
by ‘besondere Erkenntnisinteressen…, die von verschiedenen, zuweilen wohl 
auch politischen Motiven geleitet wurden.’682 Though the Buchenwald memorial, 
counting amongst the third group in this schema, has in the recommendations of 
the Thuringian Historians’ Commission a set of institutional guidelines for 
working through both phases of the site’s history, it can hardly have hoped to 
extricate itself entirely from the politics of memorialisation. 
Finn went one step further than this, accusing the memorial foundation of 
omitting politically inopportune details from the catalogue. As evidence he 
adduced the fact that the foundation had curated an entire exhibition dealing with 
the history of Topf und Söhne during the Third Reich, but neglected to mention 
in the Gulag exhibition catalogue that the firm had also delivered incineration 
ovens to the Soviet Union. He pointed to the example of the Donskoj cloister in 
Moscow, where several thousand German prisoners who had been sentenced by 
Soviet Military Tribunals were executed and cremated before being buried in 
mass graves.683 ‘Arbeitsteiligkeit’ was therefore, as far as Finn was concerned, 
implicitly political; what he took to be the division of the foundation’s remit into 
projects dealing with either National Socialist or Soviet persecution led to the 
singular association of Topf und Söhne with the Holocaust and the elision of the 
firm’s connection to Stalinist crimes.  
                                                
680 Finn, Review of Knigge/Scherbakowa (eds.), Gulag: Spuren und Zeugnisse, p. 3. 
681 Faulenbach, ‘Eine neue Konstellation?’, in Aufarbeitung der Diktatur, ed. by Hammerstein et 
al, p. 43. 
682 Ibid., p. 43. 
683 Finn, Review of Knigge/Scherbakowa (eds.), Gulag: Spuren und Zeugnisse, p. 2. 
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Of course, there were equally valid and historically justifiable reasons for 
not mentioning the connection in the Gulag catalogue. For one thing, the mass 
graves at Donskoj contained German victims, whilst the Gulag, as already 
discussed, was a far more expansive camp system in which prisoners of many 
different nationalities were held. To concentrate on German prisoners in this way 
would not only have been misrepresentative, but may well have also nourished 
charges of historical revisionism by appearing to exaggerate German suffering 
under Soviet communism. Finn, for his part, certainly invited this accusation in 
his review, where he drew no distinction between the unlawful imprisonment and 
murder of Germans after the war and the genocidal policy pursued by the Third 
Reich (in which Topf und Söhne was knowingly complicit). More to the point, 
the parallel he drew misleadingly implied that National Socialism and Stalinist 
communism were practically mirror images of one another whose crimes were 
not only equally deplorable but more or less identical in nature too. 
Unjustifiable as Finn’s objection was, the question remained whether the 
strict separation of National Socialism and communism that had guided the 
Buchenwald redesign could be unproblematically applied to the memorial’s work 
in an increasingly Europeanized memory space. Certainly on the face of it the 
expansion of memory’s geographical parameters risked creating a shallower 
form of historical memory on account of the vastly divergent experiences of 20th 
century dictatorship between (and even in some cases within) Europe’s East and 
West. Levy, Sznaider, Rothberg, and others suggest rather that the opposite is the 
case, and their concepts of ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘multidirectional’ memory are 
inherently more optimistic about the possibility for re-inscribing received 
narratives of the Holocaust as they interact with diverse local contexts – often in 
productive and unforeseen ways. I do not deny this potential, but rather wish to 
consider how it collides with an ethical imperative to manage the kind of 
historical consciousness that the transmission of memory throughout Europe 
produces – an imperative that the Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen memorials, as 
museums and sites of humanitarian education, must by definition fulfil.  
Tacitly both exhibitions embody the principle of ‘Arbeitsteiligkeit’, 
insofar as they perpetuate a strict separation of National Socialism and Soviet 
communism in public memory discourse. Does such a compartmentalisation of 
memory work limit the possibility for confronting Europe’s ‘short’ twentieth 
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century in its entirety, even if it does make innate sense for exhibitions in a 
decentralised memory landscape to stake out a clearer ‘profile’ for themselves? 
On the one hand it is unreasonable to expect any single site or institution to offer 
a ‘quick-fix’ solution to the problem of European memory by providing an 
integrated account of the entire period, especially when they happen to be sites 
that are linked inextricably to the Holocaust. Moreover, the intrinsic advantage of 
a decentralised arrangement whereby individual sites convey snapshots of certain 
aspects of the ‘ages of extremes’ is that it places the responsibility for memory 
work squarely in the hands of civic society; individuals must seek out and visit a 
range of sites themselves rather than allow a memorial to do this work for 
them.684 But on the other hand, might ‘Arbeitsteiligkeit’ simply entrench existing 
tendencies and ensure that groups that previously engaged with either the 
National Socialist or the communist past, whether professionally, as survivors, 
visitors, or activists, continue to do the same in future? Then again, given the 
dual educational and commemorative remit of the memorials, is it not in fact 
incumbent upon them to discourage relativisation and/or trivialisation of 
particular pasts. Whatever the answer, the Buchenwald memorial will need to be 
attentive to these challenges if it is to find a balance between opening up fruitful 
dialogue between competing European memory narratives, as Rothberg and 
others believe is achievable, and safeguarding against dangerous, ahistorical 
relativisation.  
Furthermore, the dual exhibitions at Buchenwald mark an intervention in 
European memory discourse characterised by standards of empirical and 
scientific rigour, multiperspectivity, and differentiation between separate forms 
of injustice. As self-evident as these standards may appear to us today, they are 
not without a history. And indeed theirs is in this case a specifically German 
history, tied to the 1990s redesign and in part also a response to the discredited 
principles that had underpinned the GDR memorial. Just as at Sachsenhausen, 
the Neugestaltung at Buchenwald functioned as a kind of template for the 
memorial professionals to project onto subsequent memory activism at a 
European level. Far from representing merely an 
‘Entproblematisierungsgeschichte’ aimed at resolving the questions surrounding 
                                                
684 James Young points to the risk of society divesting itself of the responsibility to remember by 
externalising memory in memorials and monuments. See Young, The Texture of Memory: 
Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 5.  
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memorialization of the double past thrown up by unification, the outcomes of the 
initial period of memory work at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen must be 
understood in more dynamic terms.685 As the part played by the memorial 
specialists in European memory debates indicates, these institutional norms have 
developed into a kind of code in their own right. This in turn explains the 
consistency with which the memorial foundations have addressed the National 
Socialist and communist pasts, despite the transition the sites themselves have 
undergone from post-unification German to European sites of memory.  
  
    
 
The ‘double past’ and the ‘de-territorialization’ of memory  
 
As intimated in the introduction to this chapter, the transnational movement and 
circulation of memory is not bound by the frontiers of Europe. In a mediatized, 
hyper-connected world, memory spans global spaces too. In what follows I will 
therefore examine Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen’s place within a universal 
human rights regime, asking how this inflects patterns of commemorating the 
double past at each site. The memorials have figured in this regime more 
pointedly since moving to the centre of German political culture in the late 
1990s, and so it is crucial to the overarching questions of institutionalisation and 
normativity I seek to address. I will look closely at the intersection between a 
rights discourse, memory of the double past, and the role of the memorials across 
a range of discourses. I begin with political discourse and a close analysis of a 
series of recent commemorative speeches, before reflecting on the position of the 
concentration camp survivors’ lobby, and that of the memorial professionals 
(programmatic in this regard is a recently issued International Memorial 
Museums Charter). Certainly there is a danger of naturalizing the impact of the 
camps and their histories by couching them in what is by now a very familiar 
(and rather hollow) rhetoric of human rights, and this is evident to an extent in 
the speeches. What I demonstrate however is that these ostensibly normative 
                                                
685 On this point, and in particular on the notion of post-1990 developments as an 
‘Entproblematisierungsgeschichte’, I am grateful to Norbert Frei for helpful observations that he 
was kind enough to share with me whilst I was in Jena during July 2012. 
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rituals also code human rights to produce divergent readings of the double past, 
some of which accommodate (and even conflate) both histories of injustice, and 
others which tie the memorials exclusively to one or other of the dictatorships.  
Under the current CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government, both memorials have 
continued to serve the rituals of an institutionalised Holocaust memory. Yet as 
debates on the legacy of the GDR have intensified in recent years, no doubt 
helped by the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 2009, so too has 
the double past at Buchenwald and particularly Sachsenhausen come into sharper 
relief. The evidence relating to regional constellations of memory in 
Brandenburg and Thuringia presented in chapter three indicated that the looming 
20th anniversary mainly underscored (and in some cases accelerated) changes in 
commemorative discourse that were already underway rather than triggering 
them. As I will go on to suggest, the same is true of federal memory narratives; a 
shift can be registered around 2009, but the origins of this shift as well as the 
means by which it is enacted are altogether different. Indeed, honing in on the 
developments at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen reveals that commemoration of 
the double past emerges out of a complex interaction between bounded-ness in 
particular spaces, histories and discursive media on the one hand, and an 
underlying commemorative grammar provided by the human rights regime on 
the other. It is not driven by the direction of federal policy alone.    
In the following analysis of commemorative speeches held between 
2009-2011, I suggest paying particular attention to the intersection between a 
universal human rights discourse and the specific sites (and histories) that 
provide the backdrop for these commemorative occasions in order to better 
understand how memory of the double past is produced. For it is in these 
speeches that Holocaust memory and the human rights regime that it articulates 
is overlain by the indexical relationship of the memorials to suffering under both 
National Socialist and communism. Only by recognising this can we appreciate 
how it is possible for representatives of the federal government to continue a 
policy of unequivocally admitting German responsibility for the Holocaust on 
the one hand, whilst simultaneously (but cautiously) integrating German victims 
of communism into the history of suffering that is being commemorated. 
How the tension between these two ostensibly incompatible trends 
resolves itself in the speeches is thus not only a question of political intentions. 
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Rather, it is also shaped by the limitations and possibilities presented by the 
memorial sites as mediatory spaces. A universal rights-based memory narrative 
focused primarily on the Holocaust may derive its authority and legitimacy from 
being performed by senior German politicians at ‘authentic’ sites of National 
Socialist persecution. Yet equally, the narrative may be re-contextualised and its 
exclusivist focus on the Holocaust offset or unsettled by the intrusion of 
additional layers of historical memory. In other words then, the memorials on the 
one hand stage ceremonies in which Holocaust remembrance is symbolically 
reaffirmed by state representatives as a kind of repeating ‘code’ (insofar as the 
ceremonies stand in a now established annual tradition). On the other hand, 
however, the multiple historical forms of persecution and victimhood 
documented at the sites invite a somewhat expanded conceptualization of rights 
and their violations. The commemorative ‘code’ has the potential to be subtly re-
inscribed as it is repeated.       
Addressing an audience gathered to commemorate the 65th anniversary of 
liberation at Sachsenhausen, the SPD vice-president of the Bundestag, Wolfgang 
Thierse, rehearsed the by now well-accepted principle of differentiation by 
exclusively commemorating victims of brown-collar crimes. In his speech he 
paid a good deal of attention to the experience of ‘Befreiung’, but unlike in other 
commemorative speeches analyzed below, he avoided the temptation to link 
‘liberation’ from the yoke of National Socialism to the later liberation of 1989, 
and instead related the term specifically to the liberation of the camp in April 
1945.686 Whilst this may indicate a form of Geschichtspolitik at play, insofar as 
Thierse, a representative of the political left, appeared to come down more 
strongly than senior CDU politicians on the side of a Holocaust-centred national 
memory culture, his example also illustrates the limitations of matching 
approaches to the double past exclusively to points on the political spectrum. 
After all, Thierse couched his speech in the same rights-based terminology that 
featured in the political rhetoric of certain CDU politicians, as we will see. 
Indeed, his closing remarks amounted to an almost reflexive advocacy of exactly 
the civic values that underpinned commemorative speeches given by prominent 
members of the Merkel administration, including the chancellor herself: 
                                                
686 ‘Grußwort auf der Zentralen Gedenkveranstaltung anlässlich des 65. Jahrestages der 
Befreiung der Häftlinge des Konzentrationslagers Sachsenhausen am 18. April 2010’. See 
http://www.thierse.de/reden-und-texte/reden/grusswort-gedenkstaette-kz-sachsenhausen/.  
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‘Nur Menschen, die sich erinnern, wie es gewesen ist, und daraus 
entschieden Konsequenzen ziehen, werden ein Bewusstsein von der 
Fragilität unserer Zivilisation entwickeln. Wenn in einer Gesellschaft 
Frieden und Freiheit herrschen, dann ist das kein Zufall, sondern es ist von 
Menschen gemacht. Daran mitzuarbeiten, dass sich nie wiederholt, was 
geschehen ist, bleibt immerwährender Auftrag an uns – und an folgende 
Generationen.’687 
 
 Here remembrance was seen in primarily functionalist terms, serving the 
ends of ‘peace and liberty’. In this sense Thierse’s speech merely echoed what 
many others both within the SPD and outside of it were outlining in speeches to 
coincide with similar commemorative anniversaries, even if it was easy enough 
to distinguish in its nuances. When speaking at Auschwitz on Holocaust 
Remembrance Day in 2011, for instance, the ex-CDU politician and then 
President of the Bundestag Christian Wulff also situated Holocaust memory 
firmly at the centre of the Federal Republic’s agenda. In his speech he singled 
out a visit to Yad Vashem in Israel and also pointed to the responsibility of 
Germans towards Polish victims of National Socialist ‘Rassenwahn’, an 
admission that was lent all the more symbolic weight by the fact it was made 
within Poland and at a globally recognised site of National Socialist persecution. 
Thus Wulff situated the Federal Republic within a global topography of memory, 
symbolised here by Auschwitz and Yad Vashem, which metonymically 
referenced National Socialist crimes.688 Restating Germany’s historical 
responsibility for the Holocaust ought to encourage, as Wulff saw it, a 
contemporary ‘Kultur des Hinsehens und Eingreifens, wenn immer es notwendig 
ist’.689  
Even if he spoke in much more generalised terms than Thierse, who 
focused on ‘all jener Menschen, die zwischen 1936 und 1945 im KZ 
                                                
687 Ibid. 
688 ‘Ansprache von Bundespräsident Christian Wulff auf der offiziellen Gedenkveranstaltung 
zum 66. Jahrestag der Befreiung des Konzentrationslagers Auschwitz am 27. Januar 2011 in 
Auschwitz-Birkenau’, BPA-DOK, Doknr.: 13-1, 3. pp. 
689 Ibid., p. 3. 
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Sachsenhausen interniert waren’,690 the parallels between the two speeches were 
hard to overlook. For Thierse too, mirroring Wulff’s enjoinder to ‘pay attention 
and take action’, admonished the audience to be mindful of ‘Gefährdungen der 
Demokratie, die Mechanismen von Stigmatisierung und Ausgrenzung, die 
Ursachen, Erscheinungs-formen und Wirkungen von Intoleranz und 
Rassenwahn’. Only through these lessons from the past was effective 
‘[H]andeln’ in the present possible.691 These virtually identical messages were, it 
should be mentioned, delivered on two somewhat different occasions. Wulff was 
speaking on an international day of Holocaust remembrance, whilst Thierse’s 
speech marked the anniversary of liberation at Sachsenhausen. This was certainly 
no coincidence. The relative consistency with which speakers across the political 
spectrum, speaking at concentration camp memorials both inside and outside of 
Germany, invoked the spectre of the Holocaust in service of a civic code of 
morality simply proved how effectively it could be fused to universal notions of 
democracy and rights.    
 On the other hand, since remembrance was in any case articulated in 
presentist terms, the nature of past crimes in any categorical or descriptive sense 
mattered less than the fact that they stood in direct opposition to contemporary 
liberal democratic values. By extension, the rhetorical impact of commemorating 
both phases of the double past could be seen to outweigh the inherent ethical 
challenges this presented. Arguably this reasoning figured in the address given 
by chancellor Merkel at Buchenwald in 2009, marking US president Barack 
Obama’s tour of the site as part of an official state visit. Accompanying Obama 
to the memorial was indicative, firstly, of its capacity to symbolically evoke a 
universal Holocaust memory, particularly as the president’s visit was intended as 
a restatement of US policy towards Israel.692 Buchenwald once more functioned 
as a stage upon which a politics of gesture could be performed, this time relating 
to US-Israeli bonds, though Merkel herself also spoke of a trans-national 
‘Partnerschaft’ in which remembering the Holocaust constituted the moral 
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bedrock of a common identity.693 Yet for Merkel, the ‘Partnerschaft’ evidently 
amounted not just to a repudiation of National Socialism but also the period of 
German division. As she emphasised: ‘[i]n dieser Partnerschaft lag schließlich 
auch der Schlüssel dafür, 1989 die schmerzliche Teilung unseres Landes und 
unseres Kontinents zu überwinden’. Indeed, it was only then that, in her words, 
the Federal Republic ‘als Mitglied der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft 
wieder Fuß fassen [konnte, RB]’.694 Finally, she made a point of stressing that 
commemoration of Buchenwald’s victims ‘das Gedenken der Opfer des so 
genannten "Speziallagers 2" mit ein[schließt].’695 The effect of this argument was 
to carefully but perceptibly introduce elements of an anti-totalitarian narrative 
into what was otherwise a standard rehearsal of Holocaust-centred 
commemorative rhetoric.   
 Speaking at Buchenwald on the 65th anniversary of the concentration 
camp’s liberation in 2010, the CDU President of the Bundestag, Norbert 
Lammert, utilised the same framing device as Merkel. He too used the occasion 
to also remember the ‘große[…] Revolution in Europa Ende der 80er, Anfang 
der 90er Jahre und der Befreiung der Völker auch in Mittel- und Osteuropa im 
Rahmen dieser großen historischen Veränderung’.696 This reiterated, for one 
thing, the argument that peace did not return to Europe until the collapse of 
Soviet communism, and depicted ‘Befreiung’ as a transition that Central and 
Eastern Europe did not experience until 1989. Likewise, Lammert followed 
Merkel in stressing that the ‘Wiederherstellung der Einheit Deutschlands’ only 
came after a period of National Socialist and communist rule.697 The liberal 
democratic values that Lammert championed therefore stood in opposition to the 
entire 56-year period between 1933-1989, opening up the possibility for 
suffering both sides of 1945 to act as equivalent negative lessons from the past.    
 Together, Merkel’s decision to mention the special camp and Lammert’s 
anti-totalitarian rhetoric could be seen as a corollary of globalised Holocaust 
memory, rather than necessarily a challenge to it. As Bill Niven has suggested, 
the latter trend has seemingly ‘opened up a space in which the rediscovery of 
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German suffering can thrive’ – a space itself ‘opened up further by the general 
trend within many nations and groups towards identification with their specific 
national or group victims.’698 I would venture that this explanation holds for the 
increased attention paid by the federal government to post-1945 injustice at 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen too. However, it is necessary to look behind a 
simplistic explanation of the subtle shift in federal commemorative rhetoric as a 
mere expression of CDU equationism. The shift was only possible in the first 
place through a convergence of political attentiveness to the 20th anniversary of 
1989, globalized Holocaust memory (with all the attendant spaces this opened up 
for commemorating ‘other’ victim groups), and a universalising, rights-based 
commemorative grammar.    
 Equally, the memorials were not simply canvases onto which changing 
commemorative paradigms could be projected. Rather, they played an active role 
in enacting and shaping such changes. Speaking at Buchenwald if anything 
actually facilitated Merkel’s inclusion of German victims in her commemorative 
rhetoric. She could legitimately reference post-war injustice given the site’s 
indexical link to Soviet crimes and ideological instrumentalisation of the past in 
the GDR, whilst her reiteration of Germany’s commitment to remember the 
Holocaust was in turn lent credibility (not to mention symbolic weight) by its 
staging at a site associated primarily with the National Socialist dictatorship. 
Furthermore, the speech was delivered at the central memorial for all victims of 
the concentration camp on the Appellplatz, meaning that the site, as a material 
relic and ‘witness’ of the double past, referenced post-war events only 
secondarily, and through the primary frame of reference victims of the Third 
Reich. It was precisely the site topography and its multiple authenticities that 
underwrote Merkel’s reference to the Speziallager by acting as a guarantee 
against relativization of Germany’s historical responsibility for the Holocaust.   
Of course, not all stakeholders in the memorial draw on human rights 
discourses to support an integrated model of commemoration. For the LAG, for 
instance, Buchenwald remains very much a site of European antifascist memory 
politics. The extent to which the victims’ organisation not only propagates this 
position but feels compelled to resolutely defend it can be read out of its 
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response to narratives of liberation in the media, particularly around the time of 
anniversary ceremonies when interest in the camp peaks.699 In particular the 
round anniversary of 2010 prompted a spirited response to an article in a Hessian 
newspaper that attributed liberation to the US army and not the internal camp 
resistance.700 As it constitutes a programmatic statement of the LAG’s position, it 
is worth looking at in greater detail. 
Implicit in the timing of the LAG’s article and the corrective function it 
serves is, firstly, an assumption that antifascist memory activism has been 
discredited since the fall of the Iron Curtain. What is interesting is that, despite 
the European memory politics being fought out at the same time the article 
appeared, the anti-communism it alludes to is identified with the discussions 
surrounding the place of GDR antifascism in post-unification Germany. In other 
words, the LAG located attempts at an ‘Abwicklung des Anti-faschismus’ in the 
early 1990s and not, as might have been expected, in the late 2000s.701 Given that 
the author, Ulrich Schneider, was named director of the Buchenwald memorial in 
March 1991 and forced out after only a week in the post as a consequence of the 
Thuringian ‘Jagd auf “Rote Socken”’ (see intro and chapter four), this is perhaps 
not surprising. Secondly, one detects a good deal of sympathy for the GDR 
interpretation of the camp’s history in the broadside at attempts made in the past 
two decades to denounce ‘for ideological reasons’ eyewitness accounts published 
prior to 1990.702 Unavoidably, then, the LAG’s antifascist memory discourse is 
intertwined at least in part with the specifically German question of the role this 
tradition plays in the memory landscape of the Berlin Republic.703      
Indeed, the tension between national and international memory 
frameworks runs throughout the entire article. In its explanation of both the roots 
and legacy of the internal camp resistance, it is at pains to stress the international 
cooperation between prisoners of various nationalities. Thus, the Lagerkomitee, 
it is noted, consisted of ten national prisoner groups, and embodied the 
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‘antifaschistischen Internationalismus’ in which the LAG and other organisations 
have their roots.704 But upon closer inspection, it is in fact ‘die deutschen 
politischen Häftlinge, unter ihnen zum überwiegenden Teil Kommunisten’ who 
are identified as the organised and politically active cadre within the camp.705 
The internationalism of the internecine resistance, too, owes to the initiative of 
the German communist prisoners, who sought to convey to their fellow, non-
German prisoners upon arrival at the camp ‘dass es auch ein “anderes 
Deutschland” hinter Stacheldraht gab’.706 Consequently, joining the resistance 
reads as if it were a process of conversion to the (German) antifascist cause for 
prisoners of other nationalities. Ultimately of course, the corollary of this 
exclusive focus on organised, politically motivated resistance is to marginalise 
individual, moral or spiritual (and therefore usually non-communist) acts of 
resistance, which as described above feature prominently in the on-site museum 
(see chapter two). 
The LAG’s interpretation of the Buchenwald Oath has a similar effect. 
As the article explains, the Oath derives its ‘Legitimität als politische 
Orientierung’ from the duality of the camp – it was a site of terrible suffering 
but, in spite of this, a site of remarkable acts of solidarity and resistance too.707 
Drawing together negative and positive historical lessons in this way provides 
the Oath with its political authority in the present. To be sure, the message the 
LAG distils from the Oath resembles the way in which it is interpreted in the 
Buchenwald-Weimar UNESCO application, addressed below; in both discourses 
a positive valuation of human rights is presaged on recognition of man’s inherent 
capacity for inhumanity. That said, the traditions of resistance, solidarity, and 
internationalism are more narrowly conceived of and politically connoted by the 
LAG in the first place, as shown above. In the end, the victims’ organisation 
emphasises the international dimensions of Buchenwald’s history only where 
doing so enables it to claim latter-day memory activism and the promotion of 
human rights as an exclusively antifascist achievement.     
Finally, I address how the memorial professionals have responded to the 
recent human rights conjecture, using as an example the International Memorial 
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Museums Charter, issued in October 2011 by the International Committee of 
Memorial Museums for the Remembrance of Victims of Public Crimes (IC-
MEMO). Conveniently for our purposes, analyzing the Charter draws together 
the various strands of the theoretical approach taken here. Firstly, it justifies the 
application of principles drawn from Luhmann’s theory of social systems to the 
situation at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. IC-MEMO was a multinational 
organisation representing memorial museums dedicated to mass atrocities of 
various kinds, and also a member of the International Council of Museums 
(ICOM), so possessed considerable authority. The Charter, moreover, espoused 
many of the basic principles outlined by the Thuringian and Brandenburgian 
Historians’ Commission, as well as the later Schlußbericht of the second Enquete 
Commission into the East German state. Thus, it could be seen as the 
enshrinement in international institutional practice of the professional ‘code’ 
governing the approach to memorial sites. Secondly, the timing of the Charter – 
it was ratified just a few months after the EU council had invited member states 
to partake in the August 23 day of remembrance – suggested that it was also a 
response to the emerging anti-totalitarian commemorative politics in Europe. 
Thirdly, it possessed normative qualities insofar as it carried forward scientific 
and institutional principles developed in the specific context of Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen’s re-conceptualisation into a universally valid code of practice. 
Similarities between the Charter and the outcome of the Neugestaltungen 
were impossible to overlook. Indeed, the very first point in the Charter stated: 
‘[a] joint culture of remembrance cannot and must not be dictated by decree.’708 
Likewise, along very much the same lines, the Charter later stipulated that: 
 
‘Fundamental decisions in the memorial museums concerning content, 
education and design should be made mostly on the basis of an open, 
non-hierarchical pluralistic discussion with survivors, scholars, educators, 
lobbyists, and committed social groups.’709 
 
The role assigned to states and governments, by contrast, was simply to 
uphold this institutional autonomy and safeguard the memorial museums’ 
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collections. In fact, the Charter if anything presupposed an oppositional 
relationship between political and civic or institutional groups, justifying the 
need for professional standards and a high level of quality work in the museums 
on the basis that they would be required ‘to assert themselves against political 
interests and lobbyists.’710 This was undeniably defensive language, and what it 
aimed at defending – autonomy, anchorage in civil society, and a democratic 
decision-making process – was a model that to a large extent originated in the 
memorial foundations in Thuringia and Brandenburg. 
It was no secret that this form of organisation was favoured by German 
memorial professionals, among them Günter Morsch and Volkhard Knigge. As 
pointed out in earlier chapters, this group consistently praised the 
‘Subsidiaritätsprinzip’ written into the statutes of the Brandenburg and 
Thuringian memorial foundations. There is certainly no doubt that it functioned 
as an effective means of protecting against both external political interference 
and monopolisation by individual stakeholders. Likewise, the participation of 
international prisoners’ councils and a separate academic advisory council were a 
virtual guarantee of ‘non-hierarchical pluralistic discussion with survivors, 
scholars, educators, lobbyists, and committed social groups’ as stipulated by the 
Charter. The latter was in many ways an enshrinement of German ‘best practice’ 
at memorial museums on an international level. As such, it reflected the 
internationalization of a German norm for coming to terms with the past just as 
much as a standardisation of the principles of commemoration in memorial 
museums from above.711   
The experience of confronting the Holocaust and its legacy appeared to 
have been influential in shaping the commemorative and pedagogical principles 
contained in the Charter too. Admittedly, the goal of fostering ‘empathy with the 
victims as individual humans and groups which were specifically targeted for 
persecution’712 was by no means unique to Holocaust memorials. The 
‘individualisation’ of victims of mass atrocities has become a stock exhibition 
motif of geographically and thematically diverse memorial museums, including 
for instance the Occupation Museum in Latvia and the House of Terror in 
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Hungary, where the commemoration of victimisation under communism is given 
priority.713 Memorialization of the Holocaust provided a template for 
remembering other crimes against humanity however, and it functioned as a 
template in the Charter too, which evidently drew its inspiration from the 
presidents of the concentration camp survivors’ associations. Just as the latter 
had, in their Vermächtnis, denounced using history ‘um zwischen Menschen, 
Gruppen, und Voelkern Zwietracht zu saeen’, so too did the Charter recommend 
avoiding ‘commemoration in the form of revenge, hate and resentments between 
different groups of victims.’714 Seemingly the negative lessons learned through 
the conflict-laden process of publicly remembering the Holocaust had found their 
way into the principles outlined by the IC-MEMO. 
German influence manifested itself in the paragraphs of the Charter 
dealing with the pedagogical work of memorial museums too. Indeed, the central 
tenets of the Beutelsbacher Konsens all appeared in unaltered form, beginning 
with Multiperspektivität in the reference to ‘principles of discourse and multiple 
perspectives’.715 Both the Kontroversitätsprinzip and Überwältigungsverbot were 
contained in a subsequent paragraph recommending that ‘visitors are not 
overwhelmed or indoctrinated, that the subjective view of individuals is 
respected, and that controversial subjects are treated as controversial.’716 
Moreover, the pedagogical aims of memorial museums as they were defined in 
the Charter were explicitly orientated around ‘universal principles’717 and 
therefore linked to civic education in the sense conveyed by the German term 
politische Bildung as opposed to playing a more holistic educational role. 
Accordingly, IC-MEMO rejected working towards ‘an agreement about the 
[historical] content’718 in the memorials, in effect marking them out as sites of 
resistance to the consensus-based memory politics being undertaken in 
Strasbourg and Brussels, as well as Potsdam, for that matter (see chapter four).  
By institutionalising the commemorative and pedagogical guidelines that 
historians, educators and memorial specialists had established within Germany, 
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IC-MEMO protected sites such as Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen from 
appropriation by an anti-totalitarian European memory narrative. Not only that, 
but it sought to reclaim them for a de-centralised, plural culture of remembrance. 
That said, its intervention brought with it the risk of supplanting one regime of 
memory with another. After all, the Charter too expressed the need for a ‘shared 
set of positive values’719 as a basis for memory work, which it drew from the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Certainly a focus on rights and 
their abuse provides, on the face of it, an empathetic, egalitarian and subjective 
framework through which to communicate (and commemorate) mass atrocities 
and their victims, entailing as it does an individualised focus on victims and 
allowing for historical differentiation. On the other hand, however, could even 
this professedly differentiated approach risk imposing normative standards on 
memorialisation if elevated to an international standard, particularly when this 
memory work concerns multiple, entangled pasts, as at the sites under discussion 
here?  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has reflected critically on the increasing sway that national and 
trans-national frames would appear to hold over cultural representation of 
difficult pasts. The inauguration of the ‘Holocaust Memorial’ in Berlin and 
attempts in the latter half of the 2000s to establish a unified anti-totalitarian 
memory in Europe demonstrate that this phenomenon belongs at least notionally 
to the post-1998 period. A closer examination of how the memorials to the 
double past have figured in national and trans-national cultural spheres since the 
founding of the Berlin Republic reveals a more complex reality however. 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen are linked to multiple national, European and 
global publics, not to mention the narrower local communities that earlier 
chapters have identified. It is an over-simplification to speak of the ‘nation’ or of 
trans-national space as a single, normative construct shaping patterns of cultural 
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representation.  
 As in previous chapters, the theoretical concept of systemic 
differentiation and evolution has helped to explain the discursive continuities we 
see even as the memorials find themselves at the frontier of European and global 
identity politics. Thinking in terms of ‘codes’, we can begin to map out particular 
discourses on the memorials that are implicitly national, European or even global 
in scope without unduly privileging the mediatory force these spaces have. The 
Federal Memorials Strategy, for instance, established a precedent of linking 
remembrance to forms of governance in the form of the ‘anti-totalitarian 
consensus’. Whilst it is possible to view this, at least in an inner-German context, 
as a normative position on the double past, transposed to the European or global 
stage it does not function as a norm but as a code. Indeed, we have seen that 
German political actors at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen utilize the lens of 
national political culture and identity without exception. Whilst there have been 
differences in inflection of the ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ since 1998, it has 
continued to frame politicians’ narrativisation of the memorials, even though 
they now definitively belong to a global rights regime. Recent commemorative 
speeches held on site by senior politicians have appropriated the language of 
human rights to reinforce this link between remembrance and German civic 
governance. In other words, the context has not altered the discourse – the 
discourse has recoded the context according to its own internal process of 
‘Selektion’.720 
We can further extend the systems-theory approach to capture the 
dynamic of other discourses on the memorials too. Looking at the concentration 
camp survivors’ association (the LAG), it also frames Buchenwald in an 
international discourse, but its internationalist stance is hardly a by-product of an 
emergent discourse on the National Socialist and communist pasts in Europe. 
The LAG has in fact consistently campaigned for a multilateral antifascist 
memory politics since the immediate post-war period – indeed, the origins of this 
can be traced back to the 1945 Buchenwald Oath, as I demonstrate. Likewise, the 
memorials’ staff and advisory councils make recourse to the conventions 
established by the Historians’ Commissions (and reaffirmed by the Enquete 
Commission’s Schlußbericht in 1998) when addressing questions of European 
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historical consciousness. This demarcated their position from the governmental 
‘code’ and illustrated the extent to which the precedents set in the 1990s continue 
to inform and shape their approach to the double past. 
Of course, the notion that such codes govern the contours of cultural 
discourse has several implications for attempts to historicize the decades since 
unification. Primarily, it refutes the argument that the turn of the millennium has 
seen the dissolution of set structures in the handling of the past. Symbols such as 
the Holocaust may well underpin global patterns of remembrance, but these have 
not eclipsed or replaced pre-existing national and sub-national conventions. 
Rather, these conventions, which were discursively established in the course of 
the 1990s, now constitute a resource which structures communication about the 
double past between different groups. To draw once more on systems theory, the 
conventions function as a ‘redundance’ (‘Redundanz’) that facilitates systemic 
communication by filtering out certain modes of processing information from the 
external environment and establishing others as a kind of precedent.721 On this 
reading, the 2000s resemble a continuation of set patterns over and into a new 
global age of memory. 
 A final point to consider is what a model of discursive codes tells us 
about the future of representing the double past at Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen. Are these codes likely to obtain over the next decade, and if not, 
what could trigger such changes? It seems for one thing likely that the ‘anti-
totalitarian’ paradigm will continue to garner support amongst EU member 
states. Moreover, it has already begun to pose challenges for the scientific code 
guiding the work of the Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen memorials. As the 
situational and relational model employed here indicates, the discrete codes that 
shape approaches to the double past exist within specific contexts – in this case 
not just the end of the Cold War, but the post-GDR transition and 
reconceptualisation of the former NMG. Thus, whilst not wishing to relativize 
the search for objective truth that informs the memorials’ approach to their 
multiple histories, it is worth considering the extent to which the principle of 
separate commemoration of the Nazi and GDR pasts can be unproblematically 
exported to the rest of Europe. Some, such as the Regional Commissioner for the 
Records of the former State Security Service of the GDR in Saxony, Michael 
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Beleites, have suggested that the memorials themselves have an obligation to at 
least point to ways of overcoming a ‘zweigleisige’ memory culture.722 It remains 
to be seen how discourses on Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen will negotiate this 
changed political constellation in coming years. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Surveying cultural representations of Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen since 1998 
has shown that there is no single, uniform ‘anti-totalitarian’ master narrative 
shaping the place the recent German past occupies in the Berlin Republic. 
Instead, this thesis has argued for a more differentiated view of the two sites that 
attends to the varying ways in which they are represented across four separate 
cultural spaces. Certainly if one were to focus exclusively on federal rhetoric, 
once could justifiably conclude that a totalitarianist reading of the memorials has 
gained currency after 2005 in particular. This is indeed the conclusion that 
Andrew Beattie comes to in his study of the Bundestag inquiries into East 
Germany.723 Unlike the Enquete Commissions however, which were by their 
very nature representative of ‘state-mandated memory’,724 the memorials to the 
double past serve a wide range of constituencies besides the state and so provide 
a more holistic picture of how Germany’s ‘short twentieth century’ is 
represented. As a result, this thesis has been able to identify different gradations 
of totalitarianist and Holocaust-centred discourse across and even within the 
cultural spaces it has examined. Interpretations of Sachsenhausen in 
Brandenburg, for instance, do seem to have embraced a totalitarianist paradigm, 
whereas in other public spaces such as the memorial museums, Weimar, 
Oranienburg, and Thuringia, trends point towards a continuation of Holocaust-
centred discourse. Moreover, the thesis refutes a normative view of federal 
discourse as interchangeable with ‘national’ discourse by identifying the multiple 
narratives connected to the memorials that coexist and compete at national and 
trans-national level.           
It has proposed a situational and relational approach to the texts and 
discourses under discussion in order to shed light on the dynamic driving them. 
This has entailed looking both synchronically and diachronically across a 
number of ‘discourse strands’ between 1998 and the present day. Before I 
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explain in more detail what the situational and relational model has shown, I 
wish to relate my findings to the comparatively well-researched period between 
1990-1998, suggesting that there is now good cause, 23 years after German 
unification, to differentiate between two discrete periods in the country’s 
handling of its double past. What a detailed examination of Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen has demonstrated is that, firstly, the 1990s saw the discursive 
establishment of a scientific, political and advocative apparatus for the handling 
of the double past. This was a period of consolidation in which the Historians’ 
Commissions developed blueprints for documenting the double past on site at 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, the federal government enshrined the 
memorials at the heart of German political culture with the 
Gedenkstättenkonzeption, and patterns of commemoration and memorialization 
were established. As such, the new millennium has brought with it a host of 
precedents, including but not limited to the Federal Memorials Strategy, for 
stakeholders at the memorials to draw upon. It is for this reason that a ‘systemic’ 
approach to discourse seems apposite; the ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ is, simply 
put, not the only point of reference for processes of working through the double 
past in the Berlin Republic.   
Secondly, the findings presented here show that the memorials continue 
to be embedded in local and regional contexts too, even amidst a proclaimed turn 
to ‘transcultural’ and ‘global’ memory. The result is a comprehensive rejection 
of over-simplistic local-global binaries in understanding how the anti-totalitarian 
consensus is variously reproduced, reinforced, inflected and challenged across 
multiple public spheres.725 In place of these, this thesis has proposed a situational 
and relational approach to cultural discourse on the double past, which I wish to 
briefly sum up. I will first consider the relational model I have applied to the 
memorials and what this has revealed about their implication in the ‘anti-
totalitarian consensus’. Then I return to the situational factors that I have 
identified, namely the role of specific contexts, groups and sites, and ask what 
they have told us about the contours of discourse.  
By treating the normalization discourse and ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ 
as a dispositif that orders discourse, practice and materiality, the thesis has taken 
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seriously the ‘normative force’ they exert over the memorials. Thus even if, in 
the final analysis, the sites serve multiple constituencies and multiple discourses 
on the double past, they remain popular staging posts for federal commemorative 
politics. We need only consider the succession of senior politicians to have 
spoken there on major round anniversaries since 1998 to see that this is 
undeniably true. Gerhard Schröder chose to give an address on the loaded 
anniversary of 1999 from Sachsenhausen, tracing a line not only from the 
outbreak of war 60 years previously but also to the Basic Law, ratified in 1949. 
Later, in 2005 he spoke at Buchenwald on the 60th anniversary of the liberation 
of the concentration camp; in the same year, the then Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fischer spoke at Sachsenhausen on occasion of the 60th anniversary of liberation 
there. Angela Merkel, for her part, accompanied Barack Obama to Buchenwald 
in 2009. Whilst the coordinates of the ‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ shifted 
somewhat within this ten-year period, the fact was that the memorials were (and 
still are) deemed a fitting space at which to symbolically reaffirm Germany’s 
commitment to it.  
Equally, the shifts that the central discourse underwent seemed to in some 
instances presage similar shifts in practice at the memorials. We have seen, for 
instance, that the VOS intensified its anti-totalitarian rhetoric and insisted 
particularly vehemently on analogies between National Socialism and 
communism at around the time the federal CDU faction had proposed revising 
the Gedenkstättenkonzeption. In the same year, Ulrich Schacht used a 
commemorative ceremony for the victims of the Speziallager at Sachsenhausen 
to issue a scathing polemic against the normalization paradigm under the Red-
Green government. Thus, the federal dispositif once again imposed itself on 
developments at the memorials, even if it was in this case a negative frame of 
reference. The fact remained, however, that Schacht’s speech would not have 
been conceivable without the existence of this normative position.    
There are of course limits to the usefulness of the Foucauldian model and 
its insistence on discourse’s imbrication with power and normativity. As the 
chapters looking at local and regional contexts in particular have shown, there is 
not necessarily only one dispositif at work in the structuring of discourse around 
the memorials. In Weimar and Oranienburg, a particularly acute ‘dialectic of 
normality’ must be negotiated on account of the physical presence of the 
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concentration camps in the town; the typically Holocaust-centred discourses in 
these spaces therefore follow from localized reflexes of dealing with the camps 
rather than from cultural policy directives emanating in Berlin. Equally, at 
regional level the challenge posed by unification and post-GDR transition – on 
which more below – has created distinct dispositifs of its own.  
Beyond this, there is evidence that the proliferation of particular 
narratives on the double past may also owe to the work of prominent actors or 
groups in that space. Indeed, a particular advantage of canvassing multiple 
contexts besides the nation state when looking at representations of the double 
past is that it is possible to establish not just who controls forms of representation 
but when and where they do this. Certain groups have had a hand in virtually all 
of the spaces examined here – chiefly the memorial site staff and advisors and 
the victims’ associations. Others, such as the municipalities and the regional 
parliament, unsurprisingly limit their activities to the local and regional spheres 
respectively. In Thuringia, members of the Buchenwald staff assisted in 
producing pedagogical materials that were distributed throughout the state, 
which may go some way to explaining why the approach adopted to the double 
past on site appears to have been taken up in regional curricula too. It is 
necessary to attend to the flow of ideas and knowledge between groups within 
local, regional and national publics as well as the role of dispositifs in explaining 
how discourse on the double past is shaped.  
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen have been implicated in remarkably 
similar debates since 1998, just as they were in the years immediately after 
unification – a fact that can no doubt be attributed to their identical tripartite 
histories and very similar redesigns. This is not to suggest that the matter of 
which of the two sites a particular discourse strand or text deals with is irrelevant 
to the resulting representation of the double past. In fact, we see that the different 
pace of the redesigns most certainly has shaped the outcome of cultural discourse 
in the respective regions. As we have seen, Buchenwald’s redesign was complete 
by 1999, and the issue of personnel at the memorial and their connection with the 
East German state had been broached early on in the 1990s, meaning that it could 
be (and indeed was) seen as a symbol of a successful post-1990 transition in 
Thuringia. Whereas the Initiativgruppe could catalogue the achievements in 
working through Buchenwald’s post-war past at a commemorative ceremony in 
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2010, the ALS in Brandenburg were making no such boasts. Here, by contrast, 
allegations of a ‘Brandenburger Weg’ in handling the East German past (see 
chapter four) went hand in hand with the argument that the Speziallager at 
Sachsenhausen was deserving of greater attention. 
Finally, the thesis draws on Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems, 
and in particular his concept of autopoiesis, in order to de-centre (but not 
dispense with) the notion of ‘collective memory’ from analysis of the memorials 
in post-1998 cultural discourse. Whilst Foucauldian theory allows us to grasp the 
semiotic dimension of networked discourses and non-linguistic practices – that 
is, how they communicate meaning and structure power relations – Luhmann’s 
model can shed light on how discourses operate in ways that resemble self-
referential systems. Combining the two approaches, we can demonstrate how 
both external factors and recursive processes internal to a given discourse 
produce either continuity or change over time. This also nuances the common 
distinction between Holocaust-centred and equationist positions made in the 
literature on representing the double past, thereby permitting a degree of 
differentiation within these two camps.  
In closing, I wish to consider questions related to those addressed here 
that would merit scholarly attention. One fruitful direction that future research 
could take is a reception studies approach exploring how individuals perceive the 
double past in the context of a memorial site visit. This would of course 
complement the current thesis, which has explored the cultural emplotment of 
the double past, and also fill a gap in research looking at responses to memorial 
sites that has existed for quite some time. Very few visitor research studies 
looking specifically at concentration camp memorials have been published, and 
those that have rely on relatively small samplings and in any case do not take 
concentration camp memorials with a double past into consideration.726 In 
addition, honing in on individuated patterns of confronting the double past, if set 
against studies such as this exploring the production of cultural memory, would 
                                                
726 Bert Pampel, “Mit eigenen Augen sehen, wozu der Mensch fähig ist”: Zur Wirkung von 
Gedenkstätten auf ihre Besucher (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2007); Christian Gudehus, Dem 
Gedächtnis zuhören: Erzählungen über NS-Verbrechen und ihre Repräsentation in deutschen 
NS-Gedenkstätten (Essen: Klartext, 2006). 
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considerably deepen our understanding of what Wulf Kansteiner calls the 
hermeneutical triangle of memory’s production, mediation, and reception.727  
A second avenue of enquiry relates to the content and media of 
exhibitions at memorial museums. The permanent exhibition on the 
concentration camp at Buchenwald is in fact currently being redesigned, and is 
due to open in 2015. As the chair of the Buchenwald and Mittelbau-Dora 
Memorials Foundation’s academic advisory council Norbert Frei observes, the 
impending disappearance of the eyewitness generation and increasing temporal 
distance from the Third Reich poses arguably the greatest challenge for new 
permanent exhibitions at the camp memorials.728 Many visitors to Buchenwald 
and Sachsenhausen, particularly school pupils who take a trip to the memorials 
as part of the secondary school curriculum, will have no lived experience of 
German division, let alone National Socialist Germany. As focus inevitably 
shifts towards the sites’ implication in models of humanitarian and civic 
education that cannot rely on the involvement of survivors, the question we will 
need to be attentive to in coming years is how the memorials use new memory 
media and technologies. At sites of a double past, this raises the further question 
of the limits and possibilities such media present for narrating the National 
Socialist and communist pasts in an appropriate relationship to one another. 
Finally, the role of trans-national actors in shaping cultural memory of 
the double past, particularly in Europe, remains to be comprehensively 
researched. Though this thesis has argued that they have not yet supplanted 
national and sub-national protagonists in setting the parameters of remembrance, 
the August 23 initiative (discussed in chapter five) suggests that the role of 
institutions such as the EU is likely to expand in future. In light of the ‘Super-
Gedenkjahr’729 anticipated in 2014, which marks the centenary of the outbreak of 
World War One, the 75-year anniversary of the outbreak of World War Two, and 
the 25-year anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, it would be no surprise if 
attempts to forge a common European memory were given significant impetus. 
As I intimated in chapter five however, there is an implicit politics of memory 
                                                
727 Wulf Kantsteiner, In Pursuit of German Memory: History, Television, and Politics after 
Auschwitz (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2006), pp. 26-27.  
728 Interview with the author, 19 Apr 2012. 
729 K. Wiegrefe, ‘Weltkriege und Mauerfall: Gauck muss das Super-Gedenkjahr retten’, 
SpeigelOnline, 9 Nov 2013 http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/gauck-bundespraesident-
rettet-super-gedenkjahr-a-932405.html. Last accessed 10 Nov 2013. 
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involved in exporting national precedents for commemorating the double past 
onto the European stage, even if – as was the case with the memorial 
professionals at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen – this intervention professed to 
have little to do with moral appeals to memory. The dual role the sites play as 
custodians of an objective historical record and memory activists in national and 
trans-national cultural politics is a complex one, and deserving of further 
exploration too.    
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